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This dissertation studies the professional practices of a college of royal judges in a French sovereign 
court, from the beginning of the Wars of Religion to the end of the seventeenth century. The 
Parlement de Toulouse was a court of final appeal that had jurisdiction over a large swath of Southern 
France, and that the kings used as a bureaucratic outpost to assert their authority over what had 
remained a rather unruly border-region. Through an analysis of the genealogy of ideas regarding 
kingship, justice, and the body social, an account of the material and temporal constraints of judicial 
activity, and a close examination of dozens of lawsuits involving all classes of men and women from 
the Languedoc region, this research transforms the extensive archive produced by this early-modern 
French court into a broad-ranging historical analysis that is at once cultural, intellectual, social, and 
political. The analysis of the court’s records, focused on the magistrates’ professional practices—how 
they investigated, interrogated, tortured, and sentenced litigants while at the same time translating 
social and political conflicts into legal statements of fact, demonstrates that the mutually constitutive 
relationship between ideals of justice and everyday judicial practices, was at the core of a judicial 
epistemology which, situated between facts and faith, calls for a revision of our understanding of the 
political role of those courts, and beyond, of our understanding of early-modern political culture.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a study of the judicial practices of the magistrates of the Parlement de Toulouse between 
1550 and 1700 CE. This concise definition of my research topic immediately raises a few questions that I 
will address shortly—What is a Parlement? Why Toulouse? Why this timeframe? What qualifies as 
“judicial practice?” Before I answer those questions however, I would like to first lay out the larger 
historical questions that frame this research, as they will help understand the more specific choices—
object, time, and place—that frame this research. 
Law, society, and judicial practices: problems and goals 
 
Let us start then with an even more concise and deceptively simple question that underlies this 
research:  What do judges “do”? This question, which is central to a proper understanding of how law and 
society relate to one another, helped to set the main objective of this research: to enhance our 
understanding of the complex relationship between law and society through a case-study of the Parlement 
of Toulouse in the early-modern period. Then as now, law and society constantly reshaped one another 
with significant consequences for the ways in which we, as individuals, relate to one another, and the 
content of the ethical and moral standards which, whether we personally subscribe to them or not, define 
us, both as individuals and members of a larger social group.  
Because there is nothing profoundly groundbreaking about the idea that judges might play a 
crucial role in this important process of interchange, it is quite surprising to see how how little attention, 
scholarly or otherwise, the professional practices of judges have received so far. To be sure, there are 
numerous studies of justice, judicial institutions, criminality, or groups of legal and paralegal 
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practitioners—actually quite a few of them based on studies of early-modern European courts—1 but 
almost none of them have paid substantial attention to the actions and practices of judges. Thus, while 
“law and society” have sparked—and rightly so—significant scholarly interest, and even became the 
eponym of an academic field with learned society in tow, at the confluence of several disciplines, most 
scholars interested in this topic, whether originally trained as historians, sociologists, or legal scholars, 
have mainly focused on judicial sentences.  
This narrow focus on sentences when studying the law court, can be attributed to a widely shared 
assumption that judicial decisions are all we need to focus on in order to understand what goes on at the 
point of contact between law and society. More specifically, the assumption is that we only have to study 
sentences to bridge two main axes of analysis: the critique of the legal theorizing of jurists and 
lawmakers—taken to represent “law”—and the observation of conflicts and disputes—taken to represent 
“society.” Judicial decisions certainly matter as an important locus where law and society do indeed come 
into contact, but judgments constitute only the surface of what could and should be studied at the level of 
the law court in order to form a critical evaluation of the relationship between law and society. In my 
view, the judicial processes and practices that involve both judges and litigants, and by which legal 
decisions are reached—inquiring, interrogating, translating data into legal language, deliberating, 
sentencing—should constitute the primary focus of any study concerned with the relationship between 
law and society.  
 
  
                                                      
1 See for instance Richard Cosgrove, Scholars of the Law: English Jurisprudence from Blackstone to Hart, New 
York: New York University Press, 1996 ; John A. Carey, Judicial Reform in France Before the Revolution of 1789, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981 ; Malcom Gaskill, Crime and Mentalities in Early Modern England, 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000 ; Benoît Garnot, La Justice en France de l'an mil à 
1914, Collection 128. Histoire ; 26, Paris: Nathan, 1993 ; Michèle-Laure Rassat, La justice en France, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1994 ; Les justices de village: administration et justices locales de la fin du Moyen Age à 
la Révolution, ed. Annie Antoine and Michel Brizay, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2003. 
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Approaching judicial practices 
  
My approach to judicial practice can be summed up by a few more specific questions that stem 
from my original question “what do judges do?”  How did judges conceptualize their judicial practices? 
What kind of knowledge did they mobilize and produce in the process of administering the law? How did 
they order social phenomena and transform them into legal statements of facts? To what extent did 
litigants’ own knowledges and practices shape that of their judges? 
In my view, the best way to address these questions is to ground the analysis—thus the answers—
in a study of the concrete, that is, in a case study that seeks to relate a specific group of judges with the 
judicial practices they deploy in the face of actual disputes.  This approach to judicial practices, is 
congenial to—although not originally inspired by—Michel Foucault’s definition of practical systems, an 
idea that he developed in “What is the Enlightenment?”2 In this piece, Foucault advocates the study of 
what he calls “practical systems,” 
(…) [t]hat is, the forms of rationality that organize [men’s] ways of doing things (this might be 
called the technological aspect) and the freedom with which they act within these practical 
systems, reacting to what others do, modifying the rules of the game, unto a certain point (this 
might be called the strategic side of these practices).3 
It seems that justice as a human institution fits perfectly Foucault’s definition of a practical 
systems. Further, and more importantly, Foucault does not just provide a working definition of my object 
of study, he lays out what I think are the pertinent “axes of analysis” for a study of justice as a practical 
system: 
The practical systems stem from three broad areas: relations of control over things, relations of 
actions upon others, relations with oneself. (…) We have three axes whose specificity and whose 
                                                      
2 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," in The Essential Foucault. Selections from the Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984, New York: The New Press, 2003, 43-57. 
3 Ibid., 55 
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interconnections have to be analyzed: the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of 
ethics.4 
This is, in my view, a very fitting description of what judicial practices, in my view, are and are 
about. They are simultaneously “a technological type of rationality” and “strategic games of liberties,”5 
and, what is always at stake in the deployment of this ambivalence is knowledge, power, and ethics. 
Judicial practices are very explicitly connected, from the point of view of both judges and litigants, to 
attempts to clarify one’s relation to things, others, and oneself. Thus, one could say that in the particular 
case of justice as a practical system, knowledge, power, and ethics are twice at stake: first generally, in 
the deployment of practices over a given time and space, and then specifically, in relation to each 
particular case that appears before the judges on a daily basis. My goal then, is to grasp the main features 
of judicial practices thus defined: their technological and strategic dimensions, and the effects of this dual 
nature on the adjudication of knowledge, power and ethics. 
Those are, however, general definitions, situated at a very theoretical level, and I would like to 
spell out more specifically the implications of this theoretical view of judicial practices for the scope and 
methodology of this research. First, this systematic approach entails a rather broad research scope, for a 
wide range of activities and phenomena potentially fall within the purview of judicial practice as I defined 
above. Normative sources, such as codes of laws, manuals of procedure, or official bylaws of the court, 
are absolutely necessary to understand the mechanics of judicial practice, but those sources will not help 
us much to understand the strategic dimension of those practices, that is, how individuals bend those 
rules. Paying attention to the strategic dimension of judicial practice as a critical part of the analysis 
means, for instance, that litigants’ mobilization of their clientele networks outside of the court—thus 
correspondence and exchanges that are not strictly speaking legal or judicial in nature—are very relevant 
to this research. Given the broad chronological scope of this research however, it is simply impossible to 
                                                      
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 56 
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locate, gather, and analyze the extremely vast range of paralegal sources, which, in theory, could shed 
light on the strategic dimension of judicial practice.  
I believe, however, that what French historians call “the documents of practice” (documents de la 
pratique)—by which they mean the documents produced by practitioners as a result of the deployment of 
their professional practices, in this case trial documents—constitute a sound documentary basis for a 
study of judicial practice. As my research will demonstrate, those documents are produced at the 
intersection of the technological and strategic dimensions of judicial practice. On the one hand, the form 
and structure of those documents can be read “backward,” to reconstitute the rules and goals that guided 
their production. An analysis of the ways in which, for instance, a medical report, a record of testimony, 
or the record of a torture session, are organized—what information do they record? How is this 
information organized and presented?—can reveal the technological dimension of judicial practices. At 
the same time, the substance of those documents, their content can also reveal, when read closely and 
“against the grain,” the strategic dimension of those practices. We will see how, for instance, the content 
of both the questions of the torturer and the answers of the tortured, can help show how individuals on 
both sides of this process attempt to bend the rules of the practice to deploy their own strategies.  
The methodology behind this type of reading is ethnographic. My own strategy here is to 
interrogate the documentary traces of judicial practice, to reveal the technological and strategic 
underpinnings of their process of production, that is, something that is mostly transparent to the 
practitioners, users and subjects of those practices. A classic ethnographic approach would entail a direct 
exchange with practitioners, that is, observing them in action and asking them about what they do. This is 
the method employed by Bruno Latour a few years ago in his ethnography of the French Conseil d’État,6 
in some way a distant descendant of the court I will be studying here. While Latour’s study illustrates the 
tremendous potential of this methodology, not everyone enjoys his status of prominent public intellectual 
figure that can open the doors of the deliberation chamber of an institution such as the Conseil d’État. 
                                                      
6 Bruno Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d'Etat. Paris: La Découverte, 2002. 
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More generally, though, there are two main limitations to this ethnographic methodology for a study of 
judicial practices. The first one is a classic ethnographic issue: informants’ actions and testimonials are 
shaped by the anticipation and expectation of the ethnographer’s agenda. It takes the interpretive 
experience and talent of a seasoned ethnographer—which I am not—to work around this difficulty. The 
second difficulty, in my view as constraining as the first one, has to do specifically with judicial 
institutions and the necessarily contentious and often secretive nature of their practices. Even when, 
exceptionally, a court such as the Conseil d’État lets an ethnographer in, important parts of the judicial 
process remain hidden or, at the very least, are affected by the presence of the observer and the 
anticipation of his agenda, no matter how sympathetic to the institution the observer might be.  
Why the early-modern period? 
 
This is one of the ways in which a historical approach can compensate the loss of direct 
observation that an ethnographic study of contemporary justice could allow. The possibility of 
unrestricted access to the documents of judicial practice—which admittedly requires the interpretive 
experience of an historian—constitutes a first reason to turn to the past for a study of this kind. There are 
other reasons, more historiographical than methodological, to turn to the past and more particularly to the 
early-modern period to study judicial practice. 
The choice of the early-modern period is particularly relevant for a research that seeks to 
critically evaluate and extend the conclusions reached by existing studies of modern law and society. 
Conclusions yielded by those studies often tend to be predicated on modern assumptions about the 
relationship between law and generally taken-for-granted phenomena such as the ubiquity of the state, the 
bureaucratic nature of judicial institutions, administrative centralization, the “medicalization” or 
“scientifization” of legal knowledge, and the particular power structure entailed by a capitalistic 
organization of socio-economic structures. Shifting the chronological focus back to the early-modern 
period forces us to consider those features of modernity, not in the illusory state of completion that the 
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present seems to give them, but at a crucial stage of their development. The crimes and offenses that 
emerge from the study of trials in an early-modern royal court—cases of witchcraft and heresy, crimes 
against the king (“lèse-majesté”), theft, sexual crimes and offenses, infanticides, vagrancy, inheritance (to 
name a only a few)—offer invaluable windows on a critical moment in the genesis of important features 
of modernity: transition from “witch-hunts” to the decriminalization of witchcraft, secularization of the 
stigmatization of sexual crimes, hardening of the repression of crimes against property and infanticides, 
increased anxiety towards vagrancy, to name a few. Because those cases crystallized fundamental social 
and symbolic conflicts (over definitions of property, family, community and over the boundaries between 
normalcy and deviancy, elite and popular, orthodoxy and heresy, sacred and secular, and genders), they 
offer an ideal background for a study that seeks to situate judicial practices within much broader socio-
cultural evolutions. 
Considering those elements in the making will allow us to embed the analysis of their relation to 
law and judicial practices within a dynamic perspective, which an exclusive focus on modern law and 
society precludes. My further delimitation of the period studied here to the years 1550 to 1700 has to do 
with the history of France, another choice that befits particularly well, I think, an analysis concerned with 
the broad political and cultural implications of judicial practice. 
Why France? 
 
There are several reasons, both intellectual and historiographical, to choose France for a study of 
early-modern judicial practice. France offers a fascinating and peculiar example of the broad early-
modern transformations I just mentioned. At the beginning of the early-modern period indeed, France 
already offered a relatively advanced example of administrative centralization and bureaucratization. The 
rapid expansion of royal justice and its jurisdiction, the extension of its claims and procedures since at 
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least the thirteenth century had played an important role in those early developments.7 Royal jurists and 
royal judges had been at the forefront of the intellectual transformations that contributed to the relative 
robustness in France of concepts such as royal sovereignty at the turn of the fifteenth century. As Jacques 
Krynen put it,  
the end of the Middle Ages witnessed an astounding reconceptualization of the relationship 
between rulers and ruled. Within three centuries [i.e. from the twelfth to the fifteenth century], the 
fundamental elements of a political consciousness, both monarchical and communal, took shape 
and explained the forming of a consensus that was solid enough to last without any major change 
until the end of the Old Regime.8  
While I do agree with Krynen’s assessment of this important medieval transformation, I find it 
difficult to subscribe to his view that a consensus existed at the end of the Middle Ages and that no major 
change occurred in this area until 1789. There was more early-modern contention over the question of the 
relationship between rulers and ruled than Krynen allows here. In fact, contention turned into full-fledged 
conflagrations at several moments of intense crises that span the entire early-modern period: the religious 
wars of the second half of the sixteenth century, peasant revolts of the 1630s, the Fronde, the crisis of 
Jansenism to name the main ones. Those episodes are the major turning points of an intellectual and 
political transformation that contradicts Krynen’s idea of a relative immobility in this area until the 
Revolution. What was at stake in all of those otherwise diverse crises, was precisely the nature of the 
relationship between ruler and ruled, and more particularly the definition of sovereignty and of the rights 
(or lack thereof) of the king’s subjects.  
A century and half ago already, Alexis de Tocqueville established the chronology of those 
changes and recognized their political and social implications. According to Tocqueville, in the wake of 
the civil peace achieved in France at the beginning of the seventeenth century, urban political life 
                                                      
7 See Chapter 1 for more details on those changes at the end of the medieval period. 
8 “La fin du Moyen Âge est l’époque d’un formidable ajustement intellectuel des relations de gouvernants à 
gouvernés. En l’espace de trois siècles, on voit se dessiner les éléments fondamentaux d’une conscience politique, 
monarchique et communautaire, explicatifs d’un consensus suffisamment solide pour perdurer sans grands 
changements jusqu’à la fin de l’Ancien Régime.” Jacques Krynen, L'empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en 
France, XIIIe-XVe siècle: Gallimard, 1993, 6. 
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witnessed the degeneration of vibrant “small democratic republics,” where city officials “were freely 
elected by all people and were responsible to them, where municipal life was public and active, where the 
city was still proud of its rights and very jealous of its independence,” into “small oligarch[ies]” where “a 
few families ran “everything to their own interest, far from the public eye and without being responsible 
to it.”9  A number of historians adopted and built on Tocqueville’s insight, for instance Roland Mousnier, 
who argued that, as an increasingly assertive monarchy expanded its hold over provincial government 
over the course of the seventeenth century, the nature of political participation changed dramatically and 
the range of those who were entitled to a share of public life declined markedly. To some extent, both 
Tocqueville’s and Mousnier’s views are informed by their longing for a time when “subjects’ rights were 
guaranteed by their participation in legislation, in la police or administration, or, to a lesser extent, in 
government, through orders and corporations of different sorts.”10  While I certainly do not share in this 
lamenting of the loss of a pristine—and in my view, largely romanticized—provincialism, I do agree with 
Tocqueville and Mousnier’s overall assessment of the social and political significance of those 
seventeenth-century transformations. I am especially interested in the question of how those changes 
came about, and in clarifying how exactly the monarchy expanded its hold in practice, that is, not only 
with the support of bolstered political claims that appeared in the works of royal eulogists, but with the 
help and daily work of agents on the ground. The increased assertiveness of the Bourbon kings and their 
supporters in discourses does not suffice to explain monarchical successes in practice. My contention, 
based on my analysis of judicial practice, is that royal courts in the provinces were at the forefront of 
those transformations. While my approach to those political questions via judicial practice is sympathetic 
                                                      
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, ed. François ; Melonion Furet, Françoise, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998, 125-27. “(…) de petites républiques démocratiques, où les magistrats sont 
librement élus par tout le people et responsable envers lui, où la vie municipale est publique et active, où la cité se 
montre encore fière de ses droits et très jalouse de son indépendance. (…) Au XVIIIe siècle le gouvenement 
municipal des villes avait donc dégénéré partout en une petite oligarchie. Quelques familles y conduisaient toutes 
les affaires dans des vues particulières, loin de l’œil du public et sans être responsable envers lui.” L'Ancien Régime 
et la Révolution, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, 136-40. 
10 “Les droits des sujets sont guarantis par leur participation à la legislation, à la “police” ou administration, à un 
degré moindre au gouvernement, par l’intermédiaire d’ordres et de corps de diverses sortes.” Roland Mousnier, La 
plume, la faucille et le marteau. Institutions et société en France du Moyen Age à la Révolution, Paris: P.U.F, 1970, 
321. 
 10 
to the idea that those changes had primarily to do with rights, liberties, and participation in government, it 
does not assume a somewhat Manichean and hard-headed opposition between the monarch and his 
subjects. In other words then, and this would be, I think, another way in which my approach differs 
significantly from Tocqueville’s and Mousnier’s—I am not interested in those developments from the 
perspective of the causes of the French Revolution, but out of a desire to elucidate the ways in which the 
institutions of the monarchy functioned relatively successfully. The study of judicial practices in those 
courts can shed light on this important question of sovereignty and subjects’ rights. The question is 
significant not just for the history of France, but also more generally because it can enrich our 
understanding of sovereignty and its practical workings, by adding an historical perspective to reflections 
and debates on this topic that are often circumscribed to the realm of pure ideas and theories.  
Why a Parlement? 
 
This interest for the history of the contentious expansion of sovereignty in France, both in theory 
and practice, and as seen through the prism of judicial practice, almost dictated the choice of a Parlement 
as a site of observation.  At the top of the hierarchy of “ordinary” royal courts, Parlements were early-
modern supreme courts, so to speak, because they were courts of appeal, for both civil and criminal cases, 
whose own sentences could not be appealed. The Parlements differed from modern supreme courts in 
several respects that make them all the more interesting for a study of judicial practice with an interest in 
sovereignty. First, there were several Parlements in the kingdom (thirteen in 1789), all descended (the 
French contemporary term was “démembré”) from an original Parlement located in Paris. Each one of 
those courts exercised concurrently “sovereign justice” within their own territorial jurisdiction. In that 
sense, and to make an analogy with the organization of the U.S. justice system today, the Parlements 
could be compared to states supreme courts but exerting concurrently the power of the federal supreme 
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court. To further complicate this situation, Parlements were also courts of first instance for those litigants 
who possessed the privilege of committimus.11 
The Parlements were divided into a hierarchy of chambers, each with its own functions. At the 
top of this internal hierarchy, the Grand’ Chambre, treated the cases that were deemed the most 
important, on account of either the matter at stake or the persons involved. The Tournelle was the 
criminal section of the Grand Chambre, and it heard the criminal cases, either in the first instance for 
those who possessed the privilege of committimus, or in appeal for those cases coming from lower courts 
(this was the case for instance for any trial that had resulted in a death sentence). The Chambres des 
Enquêtes (two in Toulouse), treated the lesser civil and criminal cases that had not been “distributed” to 
the Grand Chambre or the Tournelle.  Finally, the Chambre des Requêtes heard civil cases in the first 
instance, that is, the civil cases of those who possessed the privilege of committimus. 
To reflect their role and position in the judicial hierarchy of the kingdom, Parlements were also 
known as “sovereign courts” and their sentences were called arrêts. The term arrêt signified that the 
decisions of the Parlements could not be appealed—for they “stopped” (arrêter) once and for all the 
judicial process—and it was also a reminder that the Parlements found their distant medieval origin in the 
royal council, the only other royal institution that was permitted to call its decisions arrêts.  
This institutional genealogy of the court is well known12 and is significant because it explains that 
the judges of the Parlements—also known as “conseillers”—had an ambivalent and somewhat ambiguous 
relationship with the monarchy.  On the one hand, because the conseillers held directly a share of 
sovereignty that the king had “communicated” rather than “delegated” to them, they “represented” the 
king in the provinces,13 and as such, enjoyed an unparalleled authority, at least in theory.14 On the other 
                                                      
11 High ranking nobles, a number of religious institutions—for instance some abbeys and monasteries—members of 
the Parlement, but also anyone to whom this privilege had been granted for one reason or another. 
12 I retrace this genealogy in Chapters 1 and 2. 
13 I analyze those notions, how they differ, and with what consequences in Chapter 1. 
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hand, the attributions of the court, regarding the exercise of justice but more particularly in relation to the 
courts’ role in the registration of new royal edicts and ordinances, created tensions with the monarchy that 
turned into open conflicts on several occasions throughout the early-modern period—most famously 
during the Fronde and in the second half of the eighteenth century.  
While I will argue below that this particular role of the sovereign courts is best understood as an 
integral part of their judicial attribution, the historiography of the Parlements has traditionally represented 
this role as a legislative function of the court. This is an important point because this view has crystalized 
the dominant historical accounts of the Parlements. 
Political teleology and the historiography of the Parlements 
 
Before I further outline my own research agenda, I would like to address the main main 
characteristics of the historiography of the Parlements, because, while I part ways with all its major 
trends, my focus on judicial practice in a sovereign court, is inspired, at least partly, by a fundamental 
objection to what I think are the misguided assumptions of a number of studies of the sovereign courts.  
First, I would like to address one important trend of the historiography, the largest one in terms of 
volume, but one with which this research is not in dialogue. Those are the monumental institutional 
studies of the Parlements, 15 which, written for the most part during the Third Republic—and to some 
extent under its ideological influence—are now largely outdated in several respects. Though out of date, 
they still function very well for their original purpose, that is, as clearly organized and synthetic 
descriptions of the internal organization and overall functioning of the Parlements.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
14 In practice, other agents of the king in the province could muster significant force and authority. The best example 
is that of the intendants beginning in the 1630s, who, although simple commissaires of the king—that is, having 
received a temporary and limited delegation of authority—could wield much more power than the Parlements, if 
only because the king could entrust them with considerable military backing.  
15 See for instance Félix Aubert, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'origine à François Ier 1250-1515, Paris: A. 
Picard et fils, 1894 ; Edouard Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'avènement des rois Valois à la mort 
d'Henri IV, Paris: A. Picard, 1913 ; Jean Baptiste Dubédat, Histoire du Parlement de Toulouse, Paris: A. Rousseau, 
1885 ; André Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, Albi: Impr. des 
orphelins-apprentis, 1953. 
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Authors in that first historiographical tradition conceived the Parlemement as an institution in a 
traditional sense, that is, primarily as a set of laws, administrative rules, and conventions that regulated a 
specific area of public life. This understanding of the term “institution” has both the merits and 
shortcomings of any systematic approach: while ideally providing an organized and clear account of an 
“institution” such as the Parlement de Toulouse, this type of approach equates the Parlement with a 
synthesis of a massive corpus of normative sources (edicts, ordinances, remonstrations, harangues, 
internal regulations, jurisprudence collections, procedure manuals, etc.). This is precisely the approach of 
Félix Aubert, Edouard Maugis, and, in the case of Toulouse, Florentin Astre, Jean-Baptiste Dubédat, 
Eugène Lapierre, Emile Vaïsse-Cibiel, and, to a lesser extent, André Viala. While one certainly feels 
humbled by—and genuinely thankful for—their titanic research and the mass of information on the 
Parlement they have already organized for us, those studies often ignore deliberately the documents of 
everyday judicial practice. In the process, they dilute an integral dimension of the judges’ activity I want 
to focus on and explore: the messiness of everyday judicial practice, and its embeddedness in the 
constraints of a local historical setting (material, social, political). 
The more recent historiographical trends with which I contend in this research have suffered, in 
my view, from their obsession with the political origins of the French Revolution. This obsession helped 
canonize a triple and almost exclusive focus—on politics, on Paris and on the eighteenth century—that 
has led to a very partial, and I think misguided and misleading account of the sovereign courts. For the 
most part indeed, studies of the Parlements in the second half of the twentieth century have been guided 
by assumptions about the role the sovereign courts supposedly played in what historians generally 
perceived as an eighteenth-century political drama that would ineluctably end with the revolutionary 
outburst. It would be an understatement to say that, within this historical perspective, accounts of the 
sovereign courts have been largely unsympathetic.  
The opening lines of Bailey Stone’s 1981 study of the Parlement of Paris from 1774 to 1789, 
illustrates perfectly an hostility towards the sovereign court grounded in the perception that it was a 
primarily political institution completely out of touch with its enlightened century: 
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In late eighteenth-century France, the Parlement of Paris, while playing a vital role in 
royal justice and administration, helped frustrate critically needed reforms and thereby contributed 
to its own destruction and to that of the monarchy. There was an especially great irony in this 
situation, for, of the myriad institutions obstructing reform during those years, none stood closer to 
the crown or derived a higher prestige from French monarchical traditions than did this high court 
of law in the king’s capital.16 
This passage aptly epitomizes the full range of historians’ scathing critiques vis-à-vis the 
Parlements. Indeed, Stone’s view is situated at the intersection of the two main axes of critique that have 
directed a variety of hostile approaches to the sovereign courts. 
The first axis, adopted by the dominant trend in this historiography, borrows its arguments from 
contemporary enemies of the courts—and thus finds its roots in the eighteenth century itself. The central 
view here is that Parlements embodied the forces of conservatism that barred practical application of the 
“Enlightenment project” in eighteenth-century France.17 Proponents of this approach, widely accepted 
both in France and in the English-speaking world, tend to rely on a set of “pre-postmodern” assumptions 
on the unity of the Lumières and the undisputable validity of their “project.” Further, followers of this 
historical trend understand the project of the Lumières as being in essence unquestionably rational and 
liberal, two characteristics they often consider as almost identical. As seen through this first prism, the 
Parlements seems to be the champions of a reactionary movement, and thus represent the main obstacle to 
the realization of a laudable project, courageously endorsed by an enlightened monarch.18  
                                                      
16 Bailey Stone, The Parlement of Paris, 1774-1789, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981, 3. 
17 Among the most prominent representatives of this approach to the parlements are found Alfred Cobban, Robert 
Palmer, Bailey Stone, and to a certain extent Jules Flammermont and Michel Antoine. 
18 Robert Palmer is one of the best representatives of this view that oriented his treatment of the parlements in the 
Age of Democratic Revolution. Palmer argued that the parlements’ opposition to the “perfectly justifiable” policies 
of the French government had “favor[ed] ideology at the expense of realism in French political consciousness at an 
important stage in its early growth” (R. R. Palmer, The age of the democratic revolution a political history of 
Europe and America, 1760-1800, 2 vols., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959, 87). In his opinion, the 
success of the parlements in their obstructionist maneuvers is best explained by their better command of public 
relations and control over public opinion: “The voice of opposition to government could be heard, but not that of 
government itself. The irresponsible talked, where the responsible kept silent” and “the main victim of the 
withholding of public information was the French monarchy itself, and (…) its failure was a failure of public 
relations.” Ibid. 
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The second axis of criticism has guided the more marginal but also more virulent attacks of those 
who, out of a more or less acknowledged nostalgia for the Ancien Régime, nursed a deep hatred for the 
Parlements.19 These historians held the Parlements responsible for having opened a constitutional debate 
which, in their view, precipitated—in both meanings of the word—the fall of a much regretted French 
monarchy.20 This intellectual tradition too has its roots deep into the eighteenth century itself, as it grew 
out of early counter-revolutionary ideology. This historiographical tradition has stigmatized the 
Parlements for having opened up a constitutional discussion that went out of hand, a debate that was the 
Pandora’s Box of eighteenth-century French politics: to open it was to throw the venerable monarchy to 
the revolutionary wolves. 
Despite their clear ideological opposition, the two brands of critique of the Parlements thus share 
a common eighteenth-century origin and a similar historical focus. Although the two families of 
disparagers of the courts would certainly disagree as to whether or not, as Stone would have it, 
“enlightened reforms” were “critically needed” in eighteenth-century France, both trends castigated the 
Parlements for their assumed political agenda, and for that purpose, focused exclusively on the courts’ 
actions and their attributions in the legislative domain.  
A more recent trend in the historiography of the parlements has sought to account for the 
connection between the political and judicial activities of the sovereign courts, and a few studies even 
                                                      
19 Pierre Gaxotte, Lucien Laugier, and, to a certain extent again, Michel Antoine, Marcel Marion, Roland Mousnier 
and François Bluche are representative of this second trend. 
20 Pierre Gaxotte’s La Révolution française (1928) and Apogée et chute de la royauté (1973) most aptly illustrate 
this marginal but violently hostile view of the Parlements that stems from reactionary sympathies for the 
monarchical regime. For Gaxotte as for others in this ideological tradition, the Parlements are singled out for having 
sped up the fall of the French monarchy because their opposition to royal legislation encouraged others to undermine 
the authority of the kings. 
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aopted an explicit focus on judicial politics,21 thus highlighting how the Parlement wielded its judicial 
action as a political instrument and, on occasion, as a political weapon. While those studies make a much 
more critical use of the same normative sources as the rest of the historiography, their presentation of the 
Parlements and their action is still almost exclusively geared toward an historical analysis of the 
ambivalent relationship (an alternation of cooperation and confrontation) between the sovereign courts 
and the crown. This particular approach is seminal for a reappraisal of the role of the courts in the grand 
scheme of the political history of early-modern France, but its almost exclusive focus on politics forces it 
into a representation of the Parlement, which, in the end, feels very similar to that depicted by the older 
historiography. 
My own focus on the judicial activities of one of those courts is not meant to simply allow me to 
take a different route and eschew the political focus of the existing historiography. On the contrary, my 
focus on judicial practice is very relevant to older historiographical concerns, for I think that my analysis 
calls for a major revision of the way in which we should think of those courts and more generally of Old 
Regime politics. The issue here, is not so much that the teleological obsession with the French Revolution 
has led to an omission of an important aspect of the sovereign courts’ activity, but that it has obfuscated 
the very important point that justice played a central role in early-modern judicial political culture. The 
point of a study of judicial practice in an early-modern French sovereign court is not to rehabilitate those 
                                                      
21 Jean Egret can be said to have been an early precursor of this trend. Constantly elaborating on the basis of his 
meticulous  Jean Egret, Le Parlement de Dauphiné et les affaires publiques dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe 
siècle, Grenoble: B. Arthaud, 1942), Egret ended up producing in his Louis XV et l'opposition parlementaire, Paris: 
A. Colin, 1970), a more sophisticated analysis: while acknowledging the magistrates’ efforts to preserve their 
privileges and interests, it also shed light on their efforts to contain the authoritarian drift that threatened a mass of 
subjects whose political representation was naught. Julian Swann is the historian who, in my view, has most recently 
explored this interesting avenue. In his Julian Swann, Politics and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754-
1774, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, Swann focused his analysis on the interaction between the 
court at Versailles and the palais de justice in Paris and offered an alternative account of parlementaire opposition 
to ministerial policies in the second half of the eighteenth century. According to Swann, parlementaire opposition 
underwent a serious transformation and intensified in the wake of important changes in governmental practices that 
occurred in the 1740s and 50s. In his account, the reappearance of grandees from the sword nobility in royal 
councils of government heralded the collapse of the louis-quatorzien mode of governance. Henceforth, rivalries 
between aristocratic factions and intrigues unseen since the Fronde became once again the structuring principle of 
French politics, and, in this context, the parlements became one of the political instruments court factions utilized to 
undercut one another. Thus, in Swann’s narrative, the conseillers of the sovereign courts are no longer reactionaries 
motivated by their sole interests but rather pawns on the chessboard of courtiers. 
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courts by showing that they were in fact apolitical and thus met our modern—and often disingenuous—
expectations of a clear separation between justice and politics, but that, on the contrary, those were highly 
political institutions, precisely because justice was at the core of early-modern politics.  
Why Toulouse? 
 
Primarily then, the choice of a provincial Parlement can help us keep our distance from an older 
historiographical point of view that has been guided, for the most part, by a teleological focus on 
politics. The focus on the political role of the sovereign court has been so deeply rooted in 
studies of the Parisian court in its relationship—and proximity—to the organs of central, 
monarchical government, that the choice of a provincial court allows a fresh perspective on the 
court.  
There were six provincial sovereign courts in existence in 1550 (Toulouse, Rouen, Grenoble, 
Bordeaux, Dijon, and Aix-en-Provence) and seven more22 by 1700 (Rennes, Pau, Arras, 
Perpignan, Colmar, Besançon, Douai). Why Toulouse then? Toulouse offers a number of 
interesting vantage points for some of the questions I have formulated above. I will get to those 
advantages shortly, but the main reason to choose the Parlement de Toulouse is an unparalleled 
set of archival sources that enables the approach and methodology I have described. While the 
materials preserved in the archives of other French courts is mostly composed of the final 
transcriptions of legal judgments and pleas, in the case of Toulouse, all the documents produced 
in the entire course of hundreds of individual lawsuits—including drafts of interrogations, 
judgments, pleas, litigants’ requests, administrative correspondence—have been preserved. 
These documents are still bundled in their original “bags” (sacs) which occupy the greater part of 
                                                      
22 That is, if we include conseils souverains that were courts created in annexed territories and organized on the 
model of the Parlements. While similar to the Parlements in all other points, those were considered as having a 
somewhat inferior authority and prestige because they were thought of as created ex nihilo rather than descended 
from the original curia regis. Three conseils souverains (Arras, Perpignan, Colmar) were created between 1660 and 
1667 as a result of Louis XIV conquests. 
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an entire floor of stacks in the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne. This archival 
wealth is such that successive generations of archivists have not found the time yet to index them 
all, and, as a consequence, the collection has remained to this day a daunting mass of 80,000 to 
100,000 “bags” mostly avoided by historians.  
The exceptional wealth of sources preserved in the archives of the Parlement de Toulouse can 
help us understand how the judges of the Parlement de Toulouse transformed the mass of social 
relations, feelings, actions, motives, and norms that these cases reflect, into legal statements of 
facts. Properly analyzed, they can help us uncover the various knowledge practices at work in 
this process of “judicialization” of the social. To further an analogy once proposed by Carlo 
Ginzburg, if we are to consider inquisitors, or more generally speaking, judges, as 
anthropologists, one could say that what is to be found in the Archives départementales de la 
Haute-Garonne, is not only the final product of the judges’ professional activity, that is the 
judgments they pronounced, but the entire corpus of documents they drafted in the course of 
their fieldwork. My own methodology, however, significantly differs from that of Ginzburg, for 
my interest is not centered on a few exceptional documents that deviate from the norm—what 
Ginzburg called the “normal exceptional”—but on the contrary, I focus on the mass of 
stereotyped documents that reflect the norms of judicial practice. Thus, by making use of the 
documents judges produce not simply as a result, but in the process of administering justice, I 
intend to expose the mechanics of the “normal normal,” so to speak, of judicial practice and to 
explain the genesis and functions of judicial stereotypes themselves. The documents contained in 
the sacs-à-procès—drafts of interrogations, police reports, secret deliberations, memos, 
instructions, administrative correspondence—constitute testimonies of the particular 
methodologies and epistemologies the magistrates called upon in order to articulate, in a specific 
judicial language, the “truth” of the individual criminal and civil cases they handled. My goal is 
to identify and expose the main characteristics and patterns of these methodologies and 
epistemologies. Because these documents also attest to the knowledges and practices of litigants 
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as refracted by those of their judges, my analysis of judicial practices will not develop in a 
contextual void, but will be anchored in the localized circumstances that the proceedings of 
individual lawsuits record. Thus, those “documents of practice” that the Archives 
départementales de la Haute-Garonne uniquely preserved, constitute the ideal source for my 
analysis because they were produced at the intersection of the technological and strategic 
dimensions of judicial practice. 
There are additional, albeit less momentous reasons to choose Toulouse and its Parlement 
as a site of observation. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, Toulouse was a uniquely 
“legal” provincial city. While conseillers in other provincial courts played an important role in 
local politics and in the local society and economy, judicial and legal professions were nowhere 
else in France as prominent as in Toulouse.23 The Toulousain conseillers not only constituted, as 
in other parlementaire cities, the top tier of the municipal and regional elite—politically and 
economically—, but they also represented the top tier within an unusually large group of legal 
professionals who staffed the many courts of the city.24 This specificity of Toulouse means that 
the conseillers’ judicial practices, and more particularly the technological dimension of those 
practices can be situated within a fairly large epistemic community.  
In addition, the number of the magistrates of the court—varying between 20 and 50 judges 
exercising at the same time for the period 1550-1700—is suitable for a study that seeks to situate 
these men within the networks constituted by the political, social, and intellectual elite of 
Toulouse in this period. In addition, the set of local institutions found in Toulouse is especially 
appropriate for an analysis concerned with situating the magistrates’ practices in their socio-
cultural context: Toulouse’s university—boasting a faculty of arts, a law school and a medical 
school—, its municipal court, the palace of its archbishop, its numerous monasteries, and guilds, 
                                                      
23 See p. 120 below. 
24 See p. 121 below. 
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were populated with the provincial elite of which the judges of the Parlement were an integral 
part.  
Outline 
 
This study is divided into three main parts. The first part, “Ideas and Representations,” comprises 
two chapters in which I present the intellectual framework within which the judicial practices of the 
conseillers took shape and took place. The goal of those two chapters is to assess the normative 
representations of royal justice that underlay the professional practices of the conseillers in the parlement 
de Toulouse. More specifically, this assessment is meant to address a number of questions that foreground 
the ideological underpinnings of the judicial practices at the core of this dissertation: How was the judicial 
power of the king conceived of and justified? What kind of ideal of the king-as-judge matched this 
conception? Did this ideal simply transfer to royal magistrates or did the delegation of justice entail 
distinct features of the ideal royal judge? Did the status of the Parlement as a “sovereign court” further 
transform this ideal of the royal judge into a portrait of the ideal conseiller? 
Chapter 1, gives an overview of the medieval genesis of the concepts, ideas, and theories of 
kingship, justice and sovereignty that framed judicial practices around 1550. This chapter details in 
particular how, starting in the eleventh century, jurists in the king’s entourage began to revamp an older 
association between kingship and justice to back the political claims of the Capetian kings. Building on 
this core, royal jurists from the thirteenth century on developed a specific ideology of royal justice that 
drew from three different traditions: “feudal” (for lack of a better term at this point), Christian, and 
Roman. What emerged at the intersection of these three traditions was an idealized portrait of the king-as-
judge. This portrait informed ideas and expectations about royal justice, which, in turn, grounded 
idealized representations of the royal magistrate. As we will see indeed, at the same time as the king came 
to personify this specific ideal of justice, in practice, the expansion of royal justice on the ground meant 
that the king had to rely increasingly on agents who acted as judges in his stead. The new group that 
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emerged, and that prefigured the corps of the early-modern conseillers, was eager to define its own 
authority and legitimacy to justify its specific role alongside nobility and clergy. One of the most 
important aspects of this effort was the elaboration of the theory of “representation,” which both 
explained and justified the “communication” of sovereign power from king to magistrate.  
Both of those medieval developments—the elaboration of a new ideal of the king-as-judge and 
the construction of theories that allowed royal agents to share into this ideal—constituted the intellectual 
substructure upon which early-modern judges developed a portrait of the perfect magistrate. I investigate 
this portrait in Chapter 2, insisting in particular on how it related to evolving notions of sovereignty and 
the question of the relationship between judicial and legislative power as it was perceived by the 
conseillers. 
The second part of this study is entitled “the Archive and the Clock” after the two main towers of 
the parlementaire “palace” in Toulouse (“Palais de justice”), which I use as representations of judicial 
space and judicial time. In this part, I approach those two dimensions as practical constraints on the ideal 
of judicial practice that emerges in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 deals with the spatial, and more generally 
material constraints, that limited the reach of sovereign justice by circumscribing its capacity to know and 
to act. I use a document drafted by François Garipuy, a local engineer commissioned to assess the repairs 
needed in the Palais, as my main basis to explore sites of tension between judicial theory and practice. 
In this chapter, I observe a number of points of contact between theory and practice. Indeed, my 
analysis of a few sites within the palais begins to address the friction between theories (those presented 
and analyzed in the first two chapters) and practices (those of the magistrates in their everyday 
institutional environment). As my analysis will suggest, place itself is one element of a complex 
relationship in which practice is caught in a productive tension between ideas and materiality. Thus, one 
admittedly simple idea explored in this chapter is that the translation in practice of political theories, 
ideals of justice, and legal norms is not a transparent and neutral top-down process, but a mutually 
constitutive relationship between theory and practice, a relationship that can be affected or at least 
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inflected by space, but also and more generally by the material paraphernalia—papers, robes, furniture, 
etc.—of the exercise of justice. 
In Chapter 4, I turn to the temporal constraints that also affected the practice of justice in the 
Parlement de Toulouse. I assess the impact of the various timescales of royal justice—longue durée of the 
monarchy, lifetime of reigns and careers, judicial year, daily sessions, etc.—to account for the multiple 
ways in which temporal constraints affected the practice of justice. I show that those different timescales 
created practical problems for the conseillers, because they could impose conflicting demands on the 
exercise of justice. I focus in particular on how new socio-economic conditions for the conseillers at the 
turn of the seventeenth century put the time of individual careers at odds with day-to-day practice. Further 
exploring this tension, I show in what particular way judicial time was money and with what 
consequences on judicial practice. 
The third and final part of this study focuses on an analysis of judicial practices based on a close 
reading of the documents produced in the course or as a result of the deployment of those practices. 
Rather than offering a descriptive catalog of each step of the judicial procedure that the conseillers 
supposedly followed, my presentation approaches judicial practices as knowledge practices. In other 
words, I focus on judicial practices not as prescribed in manuals of procedure, but as refracted in the 
documents of practice drafted in the process of producing the judicial truth of specific legal cases. 
Chapter 5 that opens this part focuses on the mundane practices which, guided primarily by the individual 
financial and political concerns of the magistrates, bracketed, at the beginning and the end of each 
lawsuit, the production of judicial truth.  
The last three chapters are organized around three different stages of this production of judicial 
truth in the Parlement de Toulouse. Chapter 6 focuses on the discovery of truth, Chapter 7 investigates 
practices geared toward the articulation of truth, and chapter 8 looks into the problem of the enforcement 
of truth. Those three chapters are not only united by this focus on the production of judicial truth but also 
share a similar approach that seeks to account for both the technological and strategic dimension of the 
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practices that participated in this process of production. Taken together, those three chapters serve as a 
basis for a final discussion of an overall notion of judicial epistemology.
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PART I: IDEAS AND REPRESENTATIONS 
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“…the Court has condemned and condemns [Arnaud du Tilh] 
to make honorable amend in front of the church of Artigat and 
there, on his knees, wearing only a shirt, bare-headed and 
barefoot, the noose around his neck and holding a wax candle, 
he will ask for forgiveness from God, from the king, from 
justice, and from the said Martin Guerre and de Rolz, husband 
and wife… ” 
Arrêt of the Parlement de Toulouse, sentencing Arnaud du 
Tilh to death (September 12, 1560).25 
 
The sentence that condemned Arnaud du Tilh to death in the famous Martin Guerre affair26 fit on 
just one of the more than 300 folios of arrêts recorded by the Chambre Tournelle of the parlement de 
Toulouse for the month of September 1560.27 Two years later however, Jean de Coras —the reporting 
judge28 who had drafted the sentence— published a 178 page-long version of his own arrêt, “enriched 
with one hundred and eleven beautiful annotations.”29  In this widely circulated Arrest memorable,30 
Coras would, on occasion, spend several pages commenting on a single word of the original sentence, but 
he had very little to say about the amende honorable section that opens this chapter. Most likely, this is 
because this particular provision, which seems so peculiar to us, was self-explanatory to both Coras and 
his contemporaries, and the magistrate probably thought that there was, in fact, not much to comment on 
in that particular instance. The apologetic ritual of the amende honorable imposed on Arnaud du Tilh was 
                                                      
25 “lad. court l’a condamné et condamne a faire emande honorable au devant l’esglise du lieu d’Artigat et illec de 
genoulz, en chauses, teste et piedz nudz ayant la hard au col et tenant en ses mains une torche de cire ardant, 
demander pardon a Dieu au Roy a Justice ausd. Martin Guere et de Rolz mariez…” Archives départementales de la 
Haute-Garonne (hereafter ADHG), 2Mi 1607.  
26 Natalie Zemon-Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. The affair 
inspired a play, two novels, and an operetta (Robert Finlay, "The Refashioning of Martin Guerre," American 
Historical Review 93-3 (1988): 553). 
27 The Chambre de la Tournelle –originally a mere criminal section of the Grand Chambre— came to be considered 
as a chamber of its own in the fifteenth century. As a result of this change of perception (and also because the 
increasing number of cases treated by the court made it harder to bound both civil and criminal arrêts in the same 
physical registers) the Tournelle started to keep a separate record of its own arrêts in 1518. About the distribution of 
cases between these two chambers see Chapter 5. 
28 See “Le métier de rapporteur” in Chapter 7 below. 
29 Jean de Coras, Arrest memorable du Parlement de Tholose contenant une histoire d'un supposé mary, advenüe de 
nostre temps: enrichie de cent et onze belles annotations. Par M. Jean de Coras, Conseiller en la Cour, & 
rapporteur du procès. Prononcé ès arrests généraux, le XII septembre 1560, Paris: Gallior du Pré, 1562 
30 See Natalie Zemon-Davis, ""On the Lame"," American Historical Review 93-3 (1988): 572, n. 1.  
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almost exactly identical to the one applied in a few other notorious cases —and in countless forgotten 
ones— spanning across several centuries, most famously that of Robert François Damiens (1757), which 
Michel Foucault described so vividly in the opening pages of Discipline and Punish,31 and those of Giulio 
Cesare Vanini (1617) and Jean Calas (1762), both of whom were, like Arnaud du Tilh, sentenced to death 
by the parlement de Toulouse.32 The invariability of this ritual that linked together God, the king, and a 
quasi-anthropomorphized “justice” through the civico-religious atonement of the condemned, should not 
be interpreted, however, as the formulaic froth of early-modern judicial practice. Quite on the contrary, 
the permanence of the amende honorable33 is in my view better explained by the fact that the words, 
actions, and symbols that it tied together retained throughout the Old Regime their force and their ability 
to encapsulate something fundamental about royal justice. It is not the emptiness of this ritual then, but on 
the contrary its capacity to fully embrace the unique and complex fusion of perceptions of religion, 
kingship, and society that formed the conceptual and moral core of royal justice, thus rendering the ritual 
seemingly transparent to contemporaries and possibly explaining Coras’s ellipsis on this point. 
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I want to unpack the set of ideas and representations 
about kingship, law, justice and magistracy which, unfamiliar to us but made evident to contemporaries 
through acts such as the amende honorable, not only warranted the efficacy of those rituals but served 
more generally as the conceptual bedrock of judicial practice. Indeed, I approach the constellation of 
ideas, norms, and beliefs that I unwind in the following pages as the intellectual framework within which 
                                                      
31 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris: Gallimard, 1975. 
32 This ritual however was not limited to these few famous cases, nor was it used only as a part of a larger ritual of 
capital punishment (the most famous case here is that of Jacques Coeur who submitted to the amende honorable in 
1453 and remained in jail for two years before he escaped), nor was it even limited to criminal cases: it was applied 
in countless other anonymous cases and in many of them the amende honorable was not a preliminary but the main 
sentence itself. 
33 For an illustration of the resilience of this ritual, see the 1788 example of pre-revolutionary appropriation on 
p. 101 below. 
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judicial practices developed in royal courts between 1550 and 1715.34 In other words, the goal of this first 
part is to assess the normative representations of royal justice that underlay the professional practices of 
the conseillers in the parlement de Toulouse. More specifically, this assessment is meant to address a 
number of questions that foreground the ideological underpinnings of the judicial practices at the core of 
this dissertation: How was the judicial power of the king conceived and justified? What kind of ideal of 
the king-as-judge corresponded to this conception? Did this ideal simply transfer to the royal magistrate 
or did the delegation of justice entail distinct features of the ideal royal judge? Did the status of the 
Parlement as a “sovereign court” further transform this ideal of the royal judge into a portrait of the ideal 
conseiller? 
A few caveats are in order before I set out to answer these questions. Because ideals and ideas 
about royal justice and its agents changed over time and, at each point in time, could vary significantly 
from one social group to another, answers to these questions were neither uncontested nor fixed. Because 
those two chapters are driven by a more immediate question however,—how did the conseillers in the 
parlement de Toulouse represent to others and to themselves the judicial power that underlay their 
professional activities?—I will focus here on a specific set of answers at a specific point in time.  I will 
concentrate on self-representations, that is, on representations and ideals of royal justice and magistracy 
that came from the royal milieu itself, broadly understood. In addition, while I will make a few forays into 
the medieval genealogy of these ideals in Chapter 1, I intend to focus on the state of these self-
representations between 1550 and 1620, in the early decades of the period considered in this study. I will 
                                                      
34 This idea of “development” is not meant to imply that this intellectual framework simply “produced” judicial 
practice, for the relationship between the two was more complex, at the same time ambivalent and reciprocal. 
Ambivalent first, because ideas, norms and representations could be a powerful incentive for practical changes but 
also a formidable obstacle to transformations in the practice of justice (and the permanence of the ritual of the 
amende honorable in its form and purpose aptly illustrates the latter possibility). The relationship was also 
reciprocal because the practice of justice was not simply subservient to conceptualizations of justice, for both were 
caught in a mutually constitutive relationship: changes in the practice of justice could affect conceptualizations of 
justice and, conversely, evolving conceptualizations of justice could lead to changes in its practice. I will explore 
this reciprocity between ideas and practices later on, once my detailed study of judicial practices can allow me to 
properly reflect on this question, but for now my focus is on the intellectual assemblage, which, encapsulated in the 
few words of the amende honorable, tied together and at the same time distinguished between God, the king, 
“justice,” and society. 
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come back to conceptualizations of royal justice and their evolution into the early eighteenth century, 
once my intervening study of judicial practices can support my argument that ideals and practices of 
justice were caught in a mutually constitutive relationship.  In contrast, the two chapters that compose this 
first part, although frequently hinting at this dynamic relationship between ideas and practices, mainly 
dwell in the realm of intellectual norms and representations of royal justice and magistracy. 
Whether at the level of the cour ordinaire of the juge royal or in the sovereign court of 
“messieurs du Parlement,” all royal justice came from the king. As obvious as this tautology might seem 
on the surface, it was in fact rooted in a long and rich intellectual tradition that had defined the judicial 
attributions of the king, as part of a more general reflection on the nature of royal power. In order to 
understand in its specificity the judicial power that royal magistrates exercised in the name of the king, it 
is first necessary to go back to what was perceived as its foundation, that is, the judicial power that the 
king himself exercised in person. Thus, in Chapter 1, I go back to the medieval foundations of this power, 
which, evolving into the early-modern period, still accounted for a certain ideal of the king-as-judge 
around the year 1550. I demonstrate how royal eulogists between the eleventh and thirteenth century 
assembled features of Christianity, feudalism and Roman law to shape a model of the ideal king-as-judge 
that Louis IX (1214-1270) ended up embodying from his own time on, until the end of the Old Regime 
and even beyond. 
In Chapter 2, I use this idealized portrait of the king-as-judge to foreground questions about 
another ideal: that of the royal judge. I first problematize the notion of delegation of judicial power and 
highlight the way in which the transfer of judicial power from king to magistrate entailed a different ideal 
of royal justice, with significant political implications in the case of “sovereign courts” such as the 
parlement de Toulouse. Then I show how the particular notions of “representation” and “corps” 
developed in those courts gave way to a reformulation of the ideas and ideals presented in Chapter 1. 
Finally, I rely on the Treze livres des Parlements de France (published in 1617), the normative work of 
Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, a president in the parlement de Toulouse, to show how these parlementaire 
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ideas and ideals informed a portrait of the ideal conseiller, that not only shaped but utilized a normative 
representation of judicial practice as one of the features of the parfait magistrat.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
FONS JUSTITIAE, FONS LEGIS: THE MEDIEVAL GENESIS OF THE KING-AS-
JUDGE 
 
By 1550, the system of ideas that linked together king, justice, and society was hardly 
new. At that time, the configuration of this intellectual framework was already the result of a 
already long intellectual evolution that we must keep in mind to understand how and why it still 
shaped and informed judicial practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The idea that 
“the era of great monarchs … who … following Machiavelli substituted the new notion of 
“reason of state” to the Christian ideal”35 began during that time period is a misleading 
simplification of that intellectual evolution. A number of concepts (sovereignty, crown, majesty), 
legal theories (justice retenue/déléguée, cas royaux, prévention), political theories (absolutism, 
gallicanism, “fundamental laws” of the kingdom), procedures (appeal, évocation, lit de justice, 
enregistrement, remontrances), and legal acts (ordonnances, édits, arrêts, commissions, 
provisions), will remain elusive if we fail to recognize the enduring consequences of the genesis 
of this intellectual framework in the later Middle Ages (from roughly 1000 to 1500). Neither 
sovereign justice nor the concept of “reason of state” were simply and abruptly substituted to a 
former “Christian ideal” of justice at the turn of the sixteenth century. In this chapter, I explore 
how conceptions of French royal justice not only remained religious at the core in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, but had been fueled by politico-religious reflections since at least the 
first Capetians (987-1180).36 
I do not intend, however, to provide here a detailed genealogy of this intellectual 
framework. I am only interested in the features of this medieval genesis that can help us 
                                                      
35 Philippe Wolff, Histoire de Toulouse, Toulouse: Privat, 1958, 181-2. 
36 Hugues Capet (987-996), Robert le Pieux (996-1031), Henry I (1031-1060), Philip I (1060-1108), Louis 
VI (1108-1137), Louis VII (1137-1180). 
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understand the peculiar ways in which French political thinkers, lawmakers, judges, and lawyers 
of the early modern period articulated and weaved together conceptions of kingship, law, justice, 
magistracy, and society. My cursory historical inquiry into the elaboration and transformation of 
these concepts from the eleventh to the sixteenth century, is thus meant to help us understand the 
particular content and potency of older notions which, still vigorous in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, remained critical to contemporary legal and political debates, changes and 
reforms within judicial institutions and procedures, and, most importantly for my purpose, 
conceptions and expectations about the practice of royal justice. 
In order to understand, for instance, how and why at the turn of the seventeenth century 
the question of whether the king of France was “first lord” or “first magistrate” of the kingdom37 
—a question that had significant impact on idealized conceptions of royal justice, its function and 
practice— it is necessary to understand the intellectual transformations of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, when clerics wove together feudal, Christian, and Roman conceptions and 
traditions around the figure of the king of the Franks. Many early modern political thinkers, for 
instance Charles Loyseau, hid the medieval origins—especially the feudal origins—of royal 
power behind the “fictitious clarity” of their intellectual constructions.38 Early modernists have 
often taken this fictitious clarity at face value, thus failing to acknowledge the significant 
conceptual debt sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political thinkers and jurists owed to the 
major intellectual changes effected by their medieval predecessors. Medievalists have told the 
history of these transformations a number of times already39 and I do not intend to repeat it here. I 
want to insist instead on the features of this evolution that had the most enduring effects on the 
                                                      
37 Robert Descimon, "La royauté française entre féodalité et sacerdoce. Roi seigneur ou roi magistrat?," 
Revue de synthèse 112 (1991): 455-73. 
38 Ibid., 461. 
39 Although indulging at times in the contrary excess of exaggerating the modernity of the Middle Ages (for 
instance with the idea that the reign of Philippe Auguste (1180-1223) “ushers in the State and  founds the 
Nation”, two concepts that the best-advised early modernists tend to use very cautiously), Jacques Krynen 
has offered the best summary to date of these intellectual transformations in Krynen, L'empire du roi. Idées 
et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe-XVe siècle, esp. p. 4-61.  
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normative representation of justice and on the idealized relationship between kings and 
magistrates that this relationship entails. 
In order to do so, it is necessary, in my view, to turn to the beginning of the second 
millennium. Although royal justice was, by our modern standard, at its lowest point around the 
Year One Thousand, a major intellectual and material transformation began at that time. This 
transformation would eventually make it possible to think of the judicial power of the king as 
intrinsically different from that of other lords, regardless of their rank and of the power they 
effectively commanded. Clerics of the eleventh and twelfth centuries played a critical role in 
laying down the main conceptual foundations for this transformation. Clerics, to a large extent 
reacting to a dominant mode of conflict resolution that was at the same time vindictive and 
private, clerics initiated a conceptual shift that would redefine notions of kingship, law, justice, 
and society in relation to one another. This shift hinged on a few intellectual achievements that 
preceded the import of notions and concepts drawn from Roman law: the promotion of Christian 
ideals of peace and justice, the preservation and revival of the idea of the sacred nature of 
kingship, and the mobilization of that idea to reshape the existing web of feudo-vassalic 
relationships into a political and social hierarchy dominated by the king. Later on—roughly from 
the thirteenth to the fifteenth century—jurists and political thinkers in the royal entourage would 
superimpose on that “feudo-Christian” intellectual construct concepts and ideas drawn from 
Roman law. In doing so, they introduced in both the realm of justice and that of law-making a 
notion of sovereignty that would prove critical to further reshaping the understandings of how 
kingship, law, justice and society related to one another. 
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Kingship revived: the intellectual origins of the ideal king-as-judge 
 
An important focus of the intellectual transformations of the eleventh to the thirteenth 
century was the figure the king. The principle of kingship had never disappeared, even in the 
wake of the break-up of the Carolingian empire in the ninth century and the atomization and 
privatization of public power in the tenth century. By the time Hugues Capet became king of the 
Franks (987), however, the monarch could hardly be considered a princeps [“the first”], not even 
a primus inter pares [“first among equals”].40 At that time, the king only retained effective 
authority on the rather small domain centered around Paris that he had inherited as a personal 
possession from his Robertiens ancestors. In that respect, the king had become virtually 
indistinguishable from the grandees of the kingdom, some of them (for instance the duke of 
Aquitaine) commanding even more resources and arguably more authority over a larger territory 
than the king did. 
This political situation was at the same time cause and consequence of a particular 
conception and practice of both law and justice. The power of the king as a lawmaker was then 
close to null. To be sure, this was in great part due to the fact that within the paradigm still 
dominant at the time, a prevalent idea was that law, if written at all, was a mere sanction of local 
uses, not the creative prerogative of the political ruler. Thus, we cannot simply attribute the 
absence of legislative activity to the weakness of the king: it resulted, primarily maybe, from the 
fact that the intellectual repertoire of the time did not offer the tools necessary to conceive of 
lawmaking as an active creative process. 
                                                      
40 Richer, a contemporary of Hugues Capet, while favorable to the king famously noted that at the apex of 
his reign, “the king, powerless to reign, live[d] without glory” (“Le roi, incapable de régner, vit sans 
gloire.” Richer, Histoire de France (888-995), trans. Robert Latouche, vol. II, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
1937, 271). 
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The double, interrelated absence of a state and of a legislative power did not mean, 
however, that the kingdom was in a state of anarchy, without law and without justice.41 To begin 
with, the idea of active rule-making through writing was not completely foreign to that world: 
although the Corpus juris civilis still remained, around 1,000 CE, in the intellectual limbo of 
Western Europe, monks and later the papacy resorted to written rules to both govern themselves 
and, in part by doing so, assert their specificity as a dominant social group.42 Clerics however, 
only represented a small minority of litterati and at the turn of the millennium, local oral customs 
were the almost unique expression of the law, the placitum—the seigneurial council held in the 
aula—was the judicial institution that came the closest to what we conceive as a court of justice, 
and revenge was for most the main mode of conflict resolution. It is reductive to characterize this 
primarily vindictive conception of justice that clerics sought to reform as simply “confused.” 43 
Revenge was the dominant mode of conflict resolution, not only because it was “present 
everywhere (…) [and] practiced at all levels of society,”44 but also and primarily because it was 
an integral mode of social regulation, with its own norms and procedures, one that made cultural 
sense to most.45 
                                                      
41 On this point, see the pionneering article of Patrick Geary, "Vivre en conflit dans une France sans Etat 
(1050-1200)," Annales (Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations)  (1986): 1107-33. 
42 This phenomenon concerns Western Europe as a whole and the example of England described by Alain 
Boureau is similar in most respects to the French case. See Alain Boureau, La loi du royaume. Les moines, 
le droit et la construction de la nation anglaise (XIe-XIIIe siècle), Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001. 
43 Georges Duby, "Recherches sur l'évolution des institutions judiciaires pendant le Xe et XIe siècle dans le 
sud de la Bourgogne," Le Moyen Âge 52 (1946): 149-50. 
44 Claude Gauvard, "Introduction," in La Justice en l'an mil, Paris: La documentation française, 2003, 12. 
45 See Dominique Barthélémy, "Introduction : La vengeance, le jugement et le compromis," in Le 
règlement des conflits au Moyen Âge, XXXIe congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de 
l'enseignement supérieur public, Angers, 2000, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2001, 11-20. Legal 
anthropology (see for instance the studies published in La vengeance : études d'ethnologie, d'histoire et de 
philosophie, ed. Raymond Verdier, Paris: Cujas, 1981-1986) contributed significantly to apprehend revenge 
as a formalized practice, regulated by unwritten codes structured around principles such as that of fama in 
the case of societies in medieval Western Europe, still described as “societies of honor” on the eve of the 
early modern period, in the countryside as in cities (see for instance Thierry Dutour, Une société de 
l'honneur : les notables et leur monde à Dijon à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris: H. Champion, 1998). 
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Some, however, began to object to this mode of social regulation, which, based on an 
alternation of armed clashes and settlements, was primarily meant to restore honor. Clerics first 
suggested that this system could be counter-productive, because rather than solve conflict, it 
could foster further disputes, thereby threatening rather than preserving social peace. In the early 
eleventh century, monks and clerics started to argue, self-servingly to be sure, that this system 
was particularly detrimental to those who did not possess the military might required to enforce 
peace settlements to their advantage. Thus, the clerical involvement with the promotion of a 
reformed ideal of justice, kingship and social relations began with an argument that the 
atomization and privatization of political power led to the establishment of local lords’ monopoly 
over military and economic means, thus overturning the vindictive mode of social regulation into 
a violent mode of unilateral appropriation. Clerics were the first to react to this “deregulation,” 
not only because it endangered their material possessions and undercut their spiritual leadership,46 
but also and maybe mainly because they possessed the outillage mental and intellectual repertoire 
necessary to imagine an ambitious overhaul of the dominant mode of conflict resolution. 
The Peace of God movement —the first clerical attempt to limit the excess of private 
wars through excommunication—47 happened well outside of the Capetian domain (Synod of 
Charroux, in the West of France, in 989), and did not call on the king as a guardian or enforcer of 
the peace. Thus, the idea of a pax dei, was developed in the eleventh century independently from 
the idea of a pax regis that would only emerge a century later. The Christian ideal of peace and 
the idea that the royal function entailed a particular right and duty of the king as keeper of the 
peace thus began on two distinct paths in the eleventh century. In the following century, the 
revival of Roman law would operate as a conceptual bridge that allowed clerics in the royal 
                                                      
46 While the phenomenon should not be generalized and one should be careful not to take at face value the 
complaints and grievances of clerics on the matter (our main documentary source in those years), there 
seem to be multiple examples of exactions committed by lords, mainly to the detriment of the humble and 
churches, starting in the years 950. 
47 Dominique Barthélemy, L'an mil et la paix de Dieu : la France chrétienne et féodale, 980-1060, Paris: 
Fayard, 1999. 
 36 
entourage to bring the two ideals together, and transfer concepts and values between clerical and 
royal approaches to law and justice. 
This intellectual bridging had become possible at the end of the twelfth century because a 
renewed Christian ideal of justice and the promotion of a conception of kingship centered on a 
peace-keeping function of the king had converged, in the eleventh century. As a result, the 
concepts, values, tropes, and norms originally attached to either ideal, transferred more easily and 
more frequently over time to the other. Thus, on the one hand, the clerical reflection that provided 
the intellectual basis for the Peace of God movement had revived the concept of the kingship of 
Christ, and, on the other hand, the effective loss of regalian powers and the withdrawal of the 
king onto a confined territorial domain led the embattled intellectual entourage of the Capétiens 
to burnish the main ideological weapon they had left: the sacrality of the royal function. 
 
Vicar of Christ: the king as anointed judge. 
 
Thus, while the king still did not have the material resources (financial, administrative, 
military) to enforce peace outside of his domain at the end of the twelfth century, the idea that 
justice and peace were linked to, and to some extent linked by the royal function, had been 
preserved. The model of the French “king-as-judge” that the early modern period inherited was in 
great part based on the “new” kingship that emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries as a 
result of the mobilization of what Marc Bloch once called the “latent energies” of kingship.48  
Understanding the specificity of royal justice in the later Middle Ages but also in the early 
modern period requires understanding first the specificity of royal power as it was defined—or 
rather redefined—in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The reconceptualization of kingship in 
                                                      
48 Marc Bloch, Les rois thaumaturges. Etude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale, 
particulièrement en France et en Angleterre, Paris: A. Colin, 1961, 258. 
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that time period was the result of the cross-fertilization of intense reflections on two, increasingly 
interrelated topics: the Christian foundations of royal power and the place of the king in an 
evolving feudo-vassalic hierarchy. 
Although the clerics who sought to promote the Peace and Truce of God at the turn of the 
millennium did not seem to think that the Capétien king had the political and military clout 
necessary to be a relevant actor in this movement, the idea of a particular relation between 
kingship and peacekeeping was not unfamiliar nor even new.49 This idea had been preserved and 
had been expressed repeatedly by an oath50 the king swore during the coronation ceremony. This 
oath indeed, clearly associated peace, justice and Christianity in a definition of the royal function: 
“To this Christian populace subject to me, I promise in the name of Christ: First, that by our 
authority the whole Christian populace will preserve at all times true peace for the Church of 
God.”51 This oath, and the coronation ceremony as a whole, presented the king as the Vicar of 
Christ on earth (“I promise in the name of Christ”) and thus participated in the medieval revival 
of the idea of the kingship of Christ.52 The comparison certainly functioned as a reminder—in 
particular from the point of view of the clergy that orchestrated the ritual—that the sacred nature 
of kingship extolled but also limited the power of the French kings. 
Within this perspective, the idea that justice was as much a prerogative as it was a duty 
for the Christian prince (hence the form of the oath), underlay the figure of the king-as-judge 
represented during the coronation ceremony. This ambivalence of royal justice, both prerogative 
                                                      
49 One should note first that while the principle of the pax regis had disappeared in France, it remained one 
of the main foundations of royal authority in England at the time (Krynen, L'empire du roi. Idées et 
croyances politiques en France, XIIIe-XVe siècle, 37). 
50 By using the term “oath” I simply follow here the dominant trend in the historiography, but it should be 
noted that the question of whether the king swore an oath or pronounced a somewhat less binding promise 
can be and has been debated (see in particular Marcel David, Le serment du sacre du IXe au XVe siècle. 
Contribution à l'étude des limites juridiques de la souveraineté, Strasbourg: Palais de l'Université, 1951). 
51 Richard A. Jackson, Vive le roi! : a history of the French coronation from Charles V to Charles X, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984, 58-59 This oath was “sworn by the king with his 
hands placed upon the Gospels, and afterward he kissed the Gospels” (Ibid.).  
52 See Jean Leclercq, L'idée de la royauté du Christ au Moyen Âge, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1959. 
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and duty, explains that while the association between kingship and justice had been repeated for a 
long time (this promise first appeared in 869),53 it had not become simply formulaic in the first 
half of the eleventh century. When Eudes de Blois, a turbulent vassal of Robert le Pieux (996-
1031), told the king in 1023, “justice and peace are the root of your office,”54 his remark was 
certainly intended to work both as a recognition of a particular royal prerogative in judicial 
matters, and a mildly threatening reminder that this recognition by the barons was justified by the 
fact that the royal “office” entailed both judicial rights judicial duties. 
Beyond the promise made by the king, the coronation ceremony further specified the 
nature of that “office” in ways that indirectly shaped conceptions of royal justice. Indeed, the 
coronation ceremony put forth a specifically religious conception of the nature of royal power, 
which, in turn, had significant implications for the conception of royal justice. More precisely, the 
anointing ritual was the key moment of the coronation, for it manifested the recognition of the 
king as chosen by God and this recognition effectively transformed the very person of the king. 
No longer a pure lay because he had shared in the priests’ privilege of the huile sainte [holy oil], 
the king became a sacred figure. This transformation not only entailed the sacerdotal character of 
kingship—as a direct consequence of this ritual the king was reputed “bishop of the outside” [i.e. 
outside of the Church]—but soon helped to justify the preeminent position of the king at the top 
of the political and social hierarchy. This link was made explicit in the twelfth century, not only 
in political theory but also in the acts of practice such as this 1143 diploma delivered by Louis 
VII and which stated in its preamble: 
We know that, in accordance with the prescriptions of the Old Testament and 
the laws of the Church in our own times, kings and priests alone are consecrated 
                                                      
53 Krynen, L'empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe-XVe siècle, 36. 
54 Ibid. 
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by unction of the holy chrism. It is thus fitting that only the ones who are united 
by the sacrosanct chrism are placed at the head of the people of God…55 
The reference to the Scriptures did more than just attempt to situate the French kings 
within the long line of Old Testament kings, for it referred back to a period when not only kings, 
high priests and prophets were anointed,56 but also when there was no clear-cut distinction 
between those different functions.57 Thus, the reference was meant to suggest that the anointment 
not only indicated that the French king was chosen by God in the same way as the kings of the 
Old Testament, but was also the sign that his power was religious, almost magical in nature.58 
This power, manifested rather than created by the anointment,59 justified the preeminent position 
of the king “at the head of the people of God,” a position in which God himself had put him. It is 
                                                      
55 “Scimus qui ex auctoritate Veteris Testamenti, etiam nostris temporibus, ex ecclesiastica institutione soli 
reges et sacerdotes sacri crismatis unctione consecrantur. Decet autem ut qui, soli pre ceteris omnibus, 
sacrosacancta crismatis linitione consociati, ad regendum Dei populum preficiuntur, sibi ipsis et subditis 
suis tam temporalia quam spiritualia subministrando provideant, et providendo invicem subministrent.” 
Charter by which Louis VII renounce the right of his predecessors to appropriate the furniture of the 
bishops of Paris upon their death (1143). Monuments Historiques. Carton des rois. Jules Tardif ed., Paris: 
J. Claye, 1866, 253.  
56 While most of the examples are of anointment of kings—for instance Solomon (1 Chronicles 29.22b), 
David (1 Samuel 16.1-13), or Saul (1 Samuel 9.25-10.1)—there are also a few examples of anointment of a 
high priest (e.g. in Exodus 29.4-8). 
57 David, who among Old Testament kings held an iconic status with medieval authors, can be seen acting 
as a priest (e.g. in 2 Samuel 6.12-19), or even as a prophet (e.g. in 2 Samuel 23.1-7). 
58 See Bloch, Les rois thaumaturges. Etude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale, 
particulièrement en France et en Angleterre, . 
59 Since at least the end of the fourteenth century, political thinkers and theologians generally agreed that 
the coronation ceremony was not “constitutive” of kingship, that, in other words, the ritual performed in the 
cathedral at Reims did not create but simply confirmed the legitimacy of the prince who had already 
become king on the very moment his predecessor had died. (Jean Barbey, Être roi. Le roi et son 
gouvernement en France de Clovis à Louis XVI, Paris: Fayard, 1992, 64. See also Jackson, Vive le roi! : a 
history of the French coronation from Charles V to Charles X,  The medieval origins and political 
implications of that theory were most famously analyzed by Ernst Kantorowicz (Ernst Kantorowicz, The 
king’s two bodies; a study in mediaeval political theology, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). In 
the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin, formulated that older theory in terms that befitted his reflection on 
sovereignty: “The king never ceases to be king, even without coronation or consecration, neither of which 
partake in the essence of sovereignty” (“Le roy ne laisse pas d’être roy sans le couronnement ni 
consécration qui ne sont point de l’essence de la souveraineté” (La République, Lyon, 1593, liv. VI, chap. 
9, p. 203)). Although a mere confirmation of the authenticity of royal power from a legal standpoint, the 
ceremony remained however a significant constitutive element of the royal dignity, for it manifested most 
aptly the divine essence of the monarchy, the majesty of its kings, and the sovereignty of their power. Thus, 
the coronation was an important moment of representation of kingship and the emphasis on the king’s role 
as a judge or more generally as a guarantor of justice played a critical role in this representation. 
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in that particular position that the king acted not only as a ruler (“head”) but also, as the oath of 
the coronation made clear, as a keeper of the peace among the “Christian populace subject to 
[him].” The model of the king-as-judge was based on this ideal of peace-keeping, the position of 
preeminence of the king that made it a particular royal prerogative, and the justification of this 
position by the idea of the sacred nature of kingship. 
 
A lord without superior: the judge-king as supreme suzerain. 
 
Both this claimed position of preeminence and its justification were certainly appealing to 
those clerics who, in the royal entourage, sought to take advantage of the contemporary 
reorganization of feudo-vassalic relationships to build a new political hierarchy dominated by the 
king. While the reflections of royal eulogists on the matter were not primarily concerned with the 
judicial power of the king, they eventually had consequences for both the conceptualization and 
the practical organization of royal justice. To understand those developments, it is necessary to 
explain first how justice related to the feudo-vassalic system and how the dominant position that 
the king claimed for himself in that system had lasting consequences for royal justice. 
At the risk of overlooking the complexity and diversity of “feudalism” as a particular 
historical phenomenon in that time and place, one could describe these relationships as stemming 
from a contractual bond between lords and their vassals. This bond was of a dual nature: it was 
both a personal bond between two men that created vassalage and a “real” bond that resulted from 
the concession of a fief, most often in the form of land.60 Within the particular social and political 
organization entailed by that system of interpersonal relations, adjudication and arbitration were, 
as in any society, necessary processes and their conception was shaped by both dimensions—
                                                      
60 I do not mean to imply that “real” and “personal” are somehow mutually exclusive categories. I simply 
use those terms here with the technical meaning that the canonical historiography of feudalism gave them  
(see Jean-François Lemarignier, La France médiévale: institutions et société, Paris: A. Colin, 1970, 126). 
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personal and real—of the feudo-vassalic relationship. The two-part ritual—homage and oath of 
fidelity—that created the personal bond between lord and vassal, carried mutual obligations, 
which, although not primarily directed at maintaining peace and justice, provided the basis to 
conceive of the role of the lord as an arbiter. Indeed, the obligation to protect one’s vassal 
entailed that the lord found himself in a position to arbitrate conflicts between his vassals. Thus, 
the lord’s judicial power, his personal jurisdiction, was rooted in the sum of contractual 
relationships established with those who had accepted to become his men. As for the territorial 
jurisdiction of the lord, it was founded in the “real” bonds that resulted from the concession of 
landed fiefs to his vassals. 
At the turn of the millennium the king of the Franks took part in this system of 
relationships. Thus, his judicial court was a seigneurial court that treated mostly cases relating to 
the exercise of his seigneurial rights, and its jurisdiction was limited territorially to his personal 
possessions and the fiefs of those vassals who still felt compelled to pay homage to him.61 In 
practice, the king-as-judge was virtually indistinguishable from any lord-as-judge, who exercised 
the judicial power that came to him as one of the rights attached to the lordship he owned. This 
was due in part to the situation of relative weakness of the first Capetians, but it also stemmed 
from the fact that the feudal system of relationships, because it was primarily based on one-on-
one relationships negotiated on an individual basis, could do without a hierarchy of ranks. One 
could even say that in practice, this system undermined such a hierarchy: a lord could be, for 
some his lands, the vassal of another lord of a much inferior rank, and he could even be, the case 
is not so rare, the vassal of one of his vassals.62 
                                                      
61 Le gouvernement royal aux premiers temps Capétiens, 987-1108: A. et J. Picard, 1965, 163-6 
Lemarignier describes royal justice in the eleventh century as a “justice of the first feudal age” (ibid., 163). 
62 Louis Halphen, "La place de la royauté dans le système féodal," Revue Historique 172 (1933): 249-50 
Halphen gives the example of the count of Champagne who, “at the end of the thirteenth century held fiefs 
not only from the king of France and the Emperor, but also from the duke of Burgundy and the archbishops 
or bishops of Reims, Sens, Autun, Châlons-sur-Marne, Langres, and from the abbot of Saint-Denis, and all 
of them happen to be his vassals as well.” (ibid., 250). 
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The great intellectual achievement of political thinkers in the royal entourage in the 
twelfth century (and most notably of Suger, abbot of Saint-Denis), has been to successfully utilize 
to the advantage of the king (and to their own) a situation of political weakness that was both a 
cause and a consequence of the demise of the power formerly concentrated in the hands of the 
Carolingian emperors and kings. The insight of Suger was that the web of discrete personal links 
between lords and vassals could be reordered into a pyramidal political structure that would best 
serve the interest of the French king (and of the Abbey of Saint-Denis, to which the Capétiens 
were closely associated).63   Of course, Suger did not singlehandedly create that structure, but he 
did play a major role in a significant reinterpretation of feudo-vassalic relationships that had 
already started around 1100, evolving in a direction that benefited the French kings. This earlier 
reinterpretation was not itself a purely intellectual construction, it reflected the growing 
importance, in practice, of the “real” element (land) over the personal element (fidelity) as the 
basis for the link between lords and their vassals.64 At a time when the Capetians had started to 
extend their territorial domain and increase their military might (both extensions feeding into 
each other), this emphasis on land favored the position of the king within the web of feudo-
vassalic relationships. This material evolution was required to give to Suger’s reflection a 
semblance of credibility, and his reflection, in turn, would not only support the position of the 
king, but, more significantly, effect a radical break by placing the king outside, or rather above 
this system of feudo-vassalic relationships. 
Suger’s account of a 1124 episode, when Louis VI took the oriflamme65 at the Abbey of 
Saint-Denis to lead a royal army to defend the Champagne region, then threatened by Emperor 
Henry V, is the best-known illustration of Suger’s theory and of the mobilization of the sacrality 
                                                      
63 Françoise Autrand, Claude Gauvard, and Jean-Marie Moeglin, Saint-Denis et la royauté : études offertes 
à Bernard Guenée, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999. 
64 Lemarignier, La France médiévale: institutions et société, 126. 
65 The oriflamme is the military banner of the Saint-Denis abbey. Philippe Contamine, "L'oriflamme de 
Saint Denis aux XIVe et XVe siècles. Etude de symbolique religieuse et royale," Annales de l'Est 3 (1973). 
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of kingship as its justification.  Suger’s observation that Louis “acknowledged that he held [the 
Vexin français] from the abbey and that, in his quality of standard-bearer, he should pay homage 
for it [i.e. the Vexin] if he were not king [my emphasis]”66 was the starting point of the theory that 
the king of France had no earthly superior, except for the Pope in spiritual matters. Suger 
expressed this idea more strongly and connected it more clearly to the particular nature of royal 
power in his less famous account of the same episode in his Life of Louis VI where he wrote that 
the king “because of this county [of Vexin], was obligated to pay homage [to the abbey], if royal 
authority had not opposed it [my emphasis].”67 In this particular passage, Suger does not connect 
this auctoritas that justified overriding the elementary rules of the feudo-vassalic system to the 
coronation ceremony. He does so in other places, however, for instance when, in order to 
establish the particular prominent position of the Abbey of Saint-Denis in the kingdom,68 he notes 
that “[Louis VI], with much devotion, gave back to the Martyrs [i.e. to the abbey] his father’s 
crown that he had unjustly kept, for, by right, all the crowns of the deceased kings belong to them 
[i.e. the Martyrs].”69 Regardless of the role of the coronation in this justification, a comparison of 
Suger’s two accounts suggests that what he calls auctoritas regia, must be understood not as 
royal “authority” but rather as the quality of being king (cf. “si rex non esset”), or what other 
                                                      
66 “(…) in pleno capitulo beati Dionysii professus est se ab eo habere, et jure signiferi, si rex non esset, 
hominium ei debere. ” Suger, "Liber de rebus in Administratione sua Gestis," in Œuvres Complètes, ed. A. 
Lecoy de la Marche, Paris: vve de J. Renouard, 1867, 162.  
67 “(…) quod de eodem comitatu, nisi auctoritas regia obsisteret, ecclesie homagium facere tenebatur.” Vie 
de Louis le Gros, Paris: A. Picard, 1887, 142. 
68 Suger’s association of Saint-Denis with the royal authority of the French kings was meant in part to 
support rather bold claims for the abbey. Based on a forged diploma in which Charlemagne was supposed 
to have given some outrageous privileges to Saint-Denis (among which the primacy of the abbot over all 
the bishops and archbishops of the kingdom), Suger pushes forward the idea that the entire kingdom was a 
fief held from the abbey. Not surprisingly however, the French kings dismissed the idea that the recognition 
they had made for the Vexin could be extended to the kingdom as a whole (Robert Barroux, "L'Abbé Suger 
et la vassalité du Vexin en 1124," Le Moyen Age 64 (1958): 15-16). 
69 “coronam patris sui, quam injuste retinuerat – jure enim ad eos omnes pertinent –, devotissime 
restituerit.” Suger, Vie de Louis VI le Gros, ed. Henri Waquet, Paris: H. Champion, 1929, 229. 
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authors called the royal “dignity” (dignitas regia).70 What matters to us here is that this dignitas 
regia troubled the rules of feudo-vassalic relationships with important consequences for the 
conception and actual administration of royal justice.  
As for the theory of royal justice, the idea that the king “was not a lord like any other,”71   
entailed that he was not either a seigneurial judge like any other. Kingship was exclusive of 
vassality—in the sense that the king paid homage to no lord—and the consequences of this idea 
that had quickly become fact were multiple. Indeed, the dignitas regia allowed for exceptions to 
the feudal rules that affected the nature of both the personal and the real element of the feudal 
bonds contracted with the king. In judicial terms, this change is best understood as a shift in the 
nature of the king’s jurisdiction, both personal and territorial. For the king’s vassals, it meant that 
there was no suzerain to appeal to to overturn the rulings of the king, thus transforming the royal 
court into a de facto supreme court. In territorial terms, because the king could not be a vassal, his 
lands and the rights attached to them could not be, properly speaking, a fief, with the consequence 
that the king could never lose (nor even transfer willingly, as would be soon argued)72 the 
propriété éminente,73 hence the jurisdiction, attached to the lands he had either inherited or 
acquired. Applied retroactively, this theory led to the idea that all fiefs in the kingdom proceeded 
from the crown, and thus that the territorial jurisdiction of the king coincided with the territory of 
the kingdom. 
                                                      
70 The phrase was first used in England, and started to appear in the twelfth century, especially in writs that 
linked corona (crown) and dignitas regia. See Albert Rigaudière, "Pratique politique et droit public dans la 
France des XIVe et XVe siècles," Archives de la philosophie du droit 41 (1997): 92-93.  
71 Halphen, "La place de la royauté dans le système féodal," 250. 
72 This is indeed the origin of the theory of the “inalienability of the royal domain,” that would develop in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth century. See Jacques Krynen, Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la 
fin du Moyen Age (1380-1440) : étude de la littérature politique du temps, Paris: A. et J. Picard, 1981, 303-
12. 
73 A person or institution that had the propriété éminente [“eminent” ownership] of a land owned it by title 
and had rights over that land but did not exploit it themselves. Those who exploited that land were said to 
hold propriété utile [“useful,” or rather “use-related” ownership] over it. 
 45 
In other words, the peculiar position of the king in the web of feudo-vassalic relationships 
created de facto a royal jurisdiction that had some of the essential features of sovereignty even 
before jurists trained in Roman law started to employ this word to bolster royal prerogatives. De 
facto, because justice seems to have been, very early on, a privileged site of implementation for 
new ideas about kingship and its relation to the increasingly hierarchical feudo-vassalic political 
structure of the kingdom. Indeed, core elements of the political reflection of Suger and others 
were reflected in ideas and procedures that were fundamental for the later development of royal 
justice as a sovereign justice. For instance, the appeal and the évocation74 procedures that could 
move cases upward along the pyramidal hierarchy of royal courts of justice were predicated on 
the same dignitas regia that justified Suger’s likewise pyramid-shaped political structure. Suger 
offers a clear illustration of the feudal basis of ideas about royal justice, its rationale and its 
organization when he recounts how the duke of Aquitaine allegedly declared to king Louis VI in 
1126 “[a]s for the count of Auvergne, since he holds Auvergne from me and that I hold it from 
you, if he has committed some fault it is my duty to make him appear before your court on your 
command.”75 What is important in this remark is not so much that a vassal could appeal to a 
suzerain—this was a common occurrence—but that the duke of Aquitaine, a vassal of the king 
who was then arguably more powerful than the king, already recognized that it was his “duty” to 
forward cases involving his own vassals to the king. At this early date (the episode takes place 
only two years after the oriflamme story), the logic behind this recognition is still primarily 
feudal, for the judicial case of the count of Auvergne goes to the court of the king, moving “from 
the bottom up,” following a line that had been created in the contrary “top down” direction by the 
concession of a fief. Because fiefs had been granted according to local, most often military, 
                                                      
74 Evocation was the practice of taking a case away from one court to transfer it to another one. Most often, 
cases were “évoqués” from a lower court to a higher one (for instance, from a bailliage to a Parlement). In 
other instances, a case could be transferred between two courts of a same level, for instance from one 
Parlement to another one.  
75 Suger, Vie de Louis VI le Gros, 241. 
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considerations and regardless of any sort of theoretical hierarchy, there was at the time a 
profusion, one is tempted to say a confusion, of such lines of vassality that crisscrossed each other 
in a myriad of directions. Soon, however, the idea that all fiefs—hence all judicial rights—
proceeded from the crown would prompt a reordering of those lines into a pyramid that led to the 
king’s judicial court and ended there for he held the kingdom from God. 
Because this elementary structure of judicial appeal predated and survived the import of 
Roman conceptions of sovereignty, royal justice was and would remain at its core of a double 
nature, both religious and feudal. The eleventh and twelfth centuries thus constituted a period of 
solidification of a long-lasting ideal of royal justice, that saw the revival of the idea of a sacred 
nature of kingship that led to conceive of the king as supreme judge in his kingdom. With the 
backing of the material and military successes of the first Capetian kings, this conception led to a 
critical reorganization of feudo-vassalic relationships that both shaped indirectly the elementary 
structure of royal justice and extended the personal and territorial jurisdiction of the king.  
 
Kingship and Roman law: juristic reformulations of the king-as-judge  
 
While Roman conceptions of sovereignty could be—and indeed would be, as we will see 
shortly—superimposed on this core, these Christian and feudal origins were never erased from 
the understanding of the nature of kingship and of royal justice. Arguably, it could even be said 
that eleventh- and twelfth-century reflections on kingship in its relation to religion and feudalism 
explain in part the success of the revival of Roman law outside of the academic circle. Indeed, the 
figure of the king-as-judge at the end of the twelfth century—that of an arbiter in charge of peace-
keeping by virtue of both his anointment and his newly-found position in an evolving feudal 
hierarchy, and that of a judge who was at the same time a semi-cleric acting as the vicar of Christ 
and a warrior in his quality of supreme suzerain—eased the import of a number of Roman 
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concepts into medieval statecraft, in particular in its judicial area. Justinian’s Institutes opened 
with a famous formula, “The imperial majesty must be not only decorated with arms, but also 
armed with laws that it be able to govern rightly in either time, in war and in peace,” and it is easy 
to see how this introduction might have resonated at the end of the twelfth century with 
contemporary representations of the king-as-judge. This king-as-judge as a cleric-warrior figure 
was identifiable for instance in the iconography by the essential regalia he received at the 
coronation ceremony: the crown, the sword in one hand, the “hand of justice” in the other.76 
While it is necessary to uncover, as I have tried to do this far, the religious and feudal 
origins of royal power that early modern authors have tended to mask, it would certainly be an 
exaggeration to try and downplay Roman law as just some lexical coating applied to a more 
authentic core. As Kantorowicz put it, “scientific jurisprudence gradually began to change the 
vocabulary of statecraft, and the new vocabulary began to influence statecraft itself.”77 Justice, a 
fundamental area of statecraft in the later Middle Ages, was certainly influenced in both its 
representation and its workings by the reflections of the jurists trained in Roman law who started 
to surround and advise the French king in the thirteenth century. Those jurists made three major 
contributions to the renewal of conceptions of royal justice from the thirteenth century on: they 
reformulated the position and role of the king-as-judge within an anthropomorphized conception 
of the body social, they revived the legislative power of the kings, and they inaugurated the 
professionalization of the study of law and of the administration of justice. 
The jurists’ reformulation of conceptions of the body social as a human body with the 
king as its head, reshaped the understanding of the purpose of royal justice as consisting in 
                                                      
76 When recounting the coronation ceremony of Louis VI Suger noted that these insignia symbolized the 
king’s role as a peace-keeper. He wrote that the archbishop “gave him the sword of the Church for the 
punishment of criminals, crowned him and congratulated him for the royal crown, and with the greatest 
devotion, gave him the scepter and the hand of justice, and by this gesture entrusted him with the defense of 
the churches and of the poor.” (ibid., 87).  
77 Ernst Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the impact of jurisprudence," in Selected Studies, Locust Valley, 
N.Y.: J. J. Augustin, 1965, 161. 
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“giving each one his due” (“rendre à chacun son droit”), an understanding still prevalent in the 
early modern period. This particular conception of justice itself was far from new, for this 
ubiquitous medieval formula was in fact a translation of Augustine’s definition of justice as a 
virtue.78 The reconception of society as a human body from the twelfth century on,79 gave a new, 
particular content to what “one’s due” meant, a meaning that was dependent on what one’s 
position and role as a member—literally—of the body social was thought to be. More importantly 
for our purpose, the conception of both the body social and the body politic as a human body 
adopted by many theorists in the thirteenth century,80 led to a reformulation of the role of the king 
in this corps, and more particularly of the purpose of royal justice. This analogy that represented 
the king as the head of this body, its soul and intelligence, nobles and knights as its arms or 
hands, the subjects as its feet, was fraught with political implications—for instance about 
authority and its origin, its delegation, tyrannicide—that were central to the thought of many 
theorists, especially in the fifteenth century.81 But the analogy, by binding individuals into a 
living whole whose survival was dependent on the maintaining of a symbiosis between the 
different members, also provided a new way of understanding the purpose of royal justice. The 
role of the king as the head of that body, was precisely to safeguard this symbiosis, to prevent 
dysfunctions of the whole by keeping all members within the bounds of their proper bodily 
function. Justice, already defined as consisting in “giving each one his due,” fit this particular 
view of an essential role of preserving the whole. Far from egalitarian, the purpose of justice thus 
conceived was on the contrary to maintain a hierarchy of rights (tellingly, the French formula is 
                                                      
78 “justitia porro ea virtus est, quae sua cuique distribuit.” De Civitate Dei, XIX, 21. 
79 John of Salisbury (c. 1120-1180) was the first one to formulate this analogy in his Policraticus (c. 1159, 
Book V). His claim that he drew this concept from Plutarch has been seriously contested (see Hans 
Liebeschütz, "John of Salisbury and Pseudo-Plutarch," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 6 
(1943).). 
80 Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1900, 140-50. 
81 For instance, Jean Juvénal des Ursins, Philippe de Mézières, Jean de Terrevermeille. See Krynen, Idéal 
du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du Moyen Age (1380-1440) : étude de la littérature politique 
du temps, 73, 107, 15, 319, 35. 
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“rendre à chacun son droit”), in order to maintain the harmony within the body, peace between 
its members. As Guillaume de Saint-Pathus put it at the end of the thirteenth century in his Life of 
saint Louis, the “virtue of justice” had two purposes: to “give each one his due [“son droit”]” and 
to “guard the common good.”82 The organicist analogy provided a particularly apt way of 
thinking of these two purposes as intimately connected. This analogy both reframed and 
reinforced the older idea that the king was “princeps” or “at the head of the people of God” and 
that justice was both the essence and the main instrument of the particular role entailed by that 
position. 
This conception of the king as the head of the body social also underlay jurists’ efforts to 
develop ideas in support of a revival of royal legislative power. While the organicist analogy was 
certainly in the back of the mind of the royal jurists who contributed to this revival, they drew 
more directly and explicitly on Roman law, and more particularly on the already well-known lex 
regia,83 in order to ascertain the legislative power of the French king. This particular law served 
as a basis for the famous sentence “Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem” [What has 
pleased the Prince, has the force of the law], a maxim that was not simply meant to justify that the 
king could make the law but intimated that the king was himself the law, or living law [lex 
animata].84 This was a major shift, in fact a shift of paradigm, for it led to a transition from the 
conception that law was a collective and largely unattended—if not unintended— creation, the 
                                                      
82 “La vertu de justice, qui a chacun donne son droit et garde le commun profit” (Guillaume de Saint-
Pathus, Vie de Saint Louis, par Guillaume de Saint-Pathus, confesseur de la reine Marguerite. Publiée 
d’après les manuscrits par H.-François Delaborde, Paris: A. Picard, 1899, 121). 
83 This law was discussed as early as the late eleventh century, in the context of the struggle between Pope 
Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV, when jurists in the papal and imperial entourage resorted to Roman 
law to debate the question of whether or not the pope could depose the emperor. The debate had focused on 
the question of the origin of imperial sovereignty and jurists in both camps had dedicated a lot of attention 
to the lex regia, a law which, quoted in the Digest, the Code and Justinian’s Institutes, intimated that the 
Roman people had bestowed the imperium on the Emperor. (Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the impact of 
jurisprudence," 157). 
84 Walter Ullman, Law and politics in the Middle Ages : an introduction to the sources of medieval political 
ideas, London: Sources of History Limited, 1975, 60-1. 
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manifestation of pre-existing rules sanctioned through use, to the idea that law was the concrete 
expression of an individual will, fully aware of its own creative intent.85 
However, while these principles at the origin of the renaissance of a royal legislative 
activity certainly helped to further the king’s claim to exclusive sovereignty86 (and the famous 
royal jurists’ maxim is here that “the king is emperor in his kingdom”), including judicial 
sovereignty, they did not necessarily reinforce the king in his role as a judge. Indeed, together 
with this idea that the king was fons legis [“the source of law”], jurists sought to give authority to 
this other idea that the king should not pass judgment himself.87  
Jurists were unconcerned with what would have been anachronistic qualms about the 
separation between legislative and judicial powers.88 This idea, while expressed once again 
through Latin maxims that seemed to give it an ancient cachet,89 had in fact very little basis in 
Roman law, but was rather a reflection of a recent change in practice that saw the king sit less and 
less often as a judge in his council. Tellingly, in what can be interpreted as a sign of persistence 
of the feudal origins of royal justice, the French kings only tended to sit as judge in their court for 
                                                      
85 This latter paradigm would of course undergo multiple adjustments between the thirteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, some of them very significant, but by and large, the paradigm itself would remain unquestioned 
until the religious conflicts of the second half of the sixteenth century when clashing theological 
conceptions of community led to call the sovereignty of the king into question, and I would even argue 
until the transfer of sovereignty from king to nation first imagined and then enshrined—if not realized–
during the French Revolution. 
86 Renaissance Du Pouvoir Législatif Et Genèse De L'Etat, ed. André Gouron, Montpellier: Société 
d'histoire du droit et des institutions des anciens pays de droit écrit, 1988. 
87 Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the impact of jurisprudence," 155-6. 
88 Most, if not all of them, argued on the contrary that the judicial and legislative activities were tightly 
linked, indeed inseparable from one another. For a specifically parlementaire view on this point, see below 
p. 83. 
89 Andreas of Isernia wrote for instance “Rex aut Imperator non cognoscunt in causis eorum” [king and 
emperor do not pronounce judicially in their causes]. Quoted in Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the impact 
of jurisprudence," 155-6. 
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cases of high treason.90 For the most part, however, royal justice was increasingly, and soon in 
practice almost exclusively, administered by judges who received a “delegation”91 from the king. 
This change was due in part to the practical consequences of the extension of the royal 
jurisdiction, which, as I have argued before, had started in the twelfth century as a result of a 
territorial expansion of the royal domain, concomitant with the reordering of feudo-vassalic 
relationships. As the royal jurisdiction reached new lands, either directly owned by the king or 
considered as fiefs proceeding from the crown as the new theory had it, it became simply 
impossible for the king to adjudicate the increasing number of cases that naturally followed from 
that extension. The change, however, is not solely explained by the advance of royal power in 
practice, it also reflects on the ground, so to speak, the progress royal power had made on a 
theoretical level as a result of the reflection of jurists. Roman law indeed, was not merely a new 
source of law—as matter of fact, the French kings decided early on that Roman law could not be 
invoked in their courts—, or even just a stock of ideas and concepts jurists could readily draw on 
to bolster a range of royal claims, it also entailed a new approach to law. The nature of Roman 
law, its organization, its written form and its antiquity, entailed an approach, scientific and 
systematic, that was necessarily different from the former approach to customs and the still very 
thin corpus of royal legislation. While in the former context of a “conception of the judicial 
function [that] was predicated on interpersonal relations and domestic considerations,”92 the king 
could lay claims to interpreting, under divine inspiration, the customs of the land and older royal 
laws, no one expected him to have the ability to administer in person the new, increasingly 
                                                      
90 As Kantorowicz pointed out, this seems to have been the case in the Empire and in England as well. 
(ibid., 155 n. 19). 
91 As we will see below (p.62-66), the contemporary notion of “communication” is more appropriate than 
that of “delegation.” 
92 Duby, "Recherches sur l'évolution des institutions judiciaires pendant le Xe et XIe siècle dans le sud de la 
Bourgogne," 149-50. 
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technical, body of royal legislation that resulted from the influence of Roman law on his 
legislative activity.93 
While this decisive shift found its origin in practice, it was theorized by jurists who drew 
a parallel between the relation of the prince to law and his relation to justice. In the same way the 
king, lex animata, was the “source of law” [fons legis, that is literally, “fountain of law”], he 
became by analogy “source of justice” [fons justitiae]. This emphasis on the person of the king as 
a source of power, both legislative and judicial, was to a certain extent self-serving, for it allowed 
jurists to justify of delegation of power that they themselves received as advisers in the king’s 
council or as judges in his courts.94 The concomitance of this delegation of judicial power to 
professional judges with the progress of the judicial sovereignty of the king is best illustrated by 
the appearance of the first Parlement of the kingdom in the 1250s.95 The creation of this court 
formalized indeed some of the most significant trends I have discussed above: as a supreme court 
it institutionalized both the appeal procedure and royal claims to judicial sovereignty, but as a 
court manned with professional judges its creation was also indicative of the depersonalization of 
sovereign justice, or rather of the delegation of judicial power from king to magistrate that the 
increasing technicality of law entailed. 
 
                                                      
93 Again, Kantorowicz report that this was the case in the Empire and in England as well. In the early 
fourteenth century, Andreas of Isernia expressed the general opinion that “rarely will a prince be found who 
is a jurist.” In England, Sir John Fortescue was even more specific, writing to the king that he should not 
“investigate precise points of the law … but these should be left to [his] judges and advocates … and others 
skilled in the law.” Quoted in Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the impact of jurisprudence," 156. 
94 Further, one should note that this delegation had become necessary in great part because of the 
technicalities that those same jurists had introduced in the law. In other words, by helping advance the 
cause of the king, jurists had made themselves indispensable to the monarchy. 
95 See p. 106 below on how this Parlement was progressively detached from the royal council and has no 
foundation act or date. 
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Medieval legacy: Louis IX as embodiment of the ideal of the king-as-judge. 
 
“Depersonalization” is in fact probably not the right word, for the Parlement detached 
itself from the royal council during the reign of Louis IX,96 the king who, more than any other 
French monarch, would personify the model of the king-as-judge until the end of the Old Regime 
and even beyond.97 Before we turn to the figure of the professional judge who increasingly 
became the central figure of royal justice, it is worth pausing on the figure of Louis IX and on the 
long-lasting example of the king-as-judge that his reign set. This model informed indeed the ideal 
of the perfect magistrate I analyze in more detail in Chapter 2. Joinville’s original account of 
Louis IX distributing justice under an oak tree at Vincennes, despite all the later distortions that 
transformed this episode into a myth still present in the French national memory today, gives us a 
model of the king-as-judge that was congruent with both persistent features and drecent changes 
in the conception of royal justice I have just described: 
Often in the summer he went after Mass to the wood of Vincennes and sat 
down with his back against an oak tree, and made us all sit around him. Everyone 
who had an affair to settle could come and speak to him without the interference 
of any usher [“huissier”] or other official. The king would speak himself and ask, 
“Is there any one here who has a case to settle?” All those who did would then 
stand up and he would say, “Quiet, all of you, and your cases shall be dealt with 
                                                      
96 Aubert, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'origine à François Ier 1250-1515, II, 5. 
97The figure of saint Louis is already very prominent in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the miroirs 
du prince, a literary genre intended for the education of future kings (see Krynen, Idéal du prince et 
pouvoir royal en France à la fin du Moyen Age (1380-1440) : étude de la littérature politique du temps, 91-
2). The figure of Saint Louis as the embodiment of the ideal judge went beyond the monarchy, as it was 
extolled by the Third Republic—and to some extent, still is today—and beyond France (Saint Louis is 
represented, for instance, on a frieze in the courtroom at the Supreme Court of the United States).  
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in turn. Then he would call my Lord Pierre de Fontaines and my Lord Geoffroy 
de Villette and say to one of them, « Now give me your judgment in this case ».98  
 The excerpt reminds the reader of the Christian foundations of the judicial function of 
the king. First in a obvious manner, by noting that Louis IX acted as a judge after mass, that is, 
immediately after having received the body of Christ in Communion. The inscription within the 
Old Testament tradition is performed through the symbol of the oak tree, reminiscent of a passage 
in the Book of Judges where justice was distributed under a palm tree,99 and even more 
compellingly of another passage (Isaiah 61.1-3) that associates anointment, crown and the “oaks 
of justice.”100 As for the persistence of feudal traits, it can be inferred from Joinville’s use of “us”: 
the group that surrounds Louis IX and to which the king distributed justice was made of close 
companions, mainly knights like Joinville himself, who were at the same time advisers and 
litigants, attached to the king by personal bonds of fidelity.101 In addition, as the expression 
“without the interference of any usher” highlighted, this idealized justice was still a “man to man” 
justice so to speak, between lord and vassal, not yet spoiled—from the aristocratic perspective of 
the author—by the ignoble clerks of a growing judicial bureaucracy. While the king, anointed 
                                                      
98 "Il arriva bien des fois qu'en été il allait s'asseoir au bois de Vincennes, après sa messe, et s'adossait à 
un chêne et nous faisait asseoir autour de lui. Et tous ceux qui avaient une affaire venaient lui parler, sans 
être gênés par des huissiers ou par d'autres gens. Et alors il leur demandait de sa propre bouche : "Y a-t-il 
ici quelqu'un qui ait une affaire ?" Et ceux qui avaient une affaire se levaient, et il leur disait : "Taisez-vous 
tous, et l'on règlera vos affaires l'une après l'autre." Et alors il appelait messire Pierre de Fontaine et 
messire Geoffroi de Villette et il disait à l'un d'eux : "Réglez-moi cette affaire."" Jean de Joinville, Vie de 
Saint Louis, Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1998, 59.  
99 “4. Now Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lappidoth, was judging Israel at that time. / 5. She used to sit 
under the palm tree of Deborah between Ramah and Bethel in the hill country of Ephraim ; and the sons of 
Israel came up to her for judgment.” (Judges, 4.4-5). 
100 “1. The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me / Because the Lord has anointed me / To bring good news, to 
the afflicted / He has sent me to bind up the brokenhearted, / To proclaim liberty to captives / And freedom 
to prisoners. / 2. To proclaim the favorable year of the Lord / And the day of vengeance of our God ; / To 
comfort all who mourn, / 3. To grant those who mourn in Zion, giving them a garland [coronam in the 
Vulgate] instead of ashes, / The oil of gladness instead of mourning, / The mantle of praise instead of a 
spirit of fainting / So they will be called oaks of righteousness [ea fortes justitiae], / The planting of the 
Lord, that He may be glorified.”  
101 In the early fifteenth century, this small group of noble companions had already become a crowd 
including the weak and the destitute. Christine de Pisan wrote for instance in her Livre de la Paix (1412-
1413), “O ! What a pleasant thing it was to see him regularly give a hearing after mass to all kinds of poor 
and others. There could be seen nobles, women and people from all estates, high, medium and small.” 
(Christine de Pisan, Livre de la Paix, ed. Charity C. Willard, S'Gravenhage: Mouton, 1958, III, 26, fol. 84). 
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suzerain, remains source of justice in this passage, this justice is also clearly delegated to 
professional judges: Geoffroy de Villette had been bailli [royal judge] in Tours and Pierre de 
Fontaines had not only been bailli as well (in Vermandois) but was also a famed jurist who had 
incorporated elements of Roman law in the customs of Vermandois in his Conseil à un ami.102 
Thus, Joinville’s account aptly sums up the major evolutions of royal justice in the two to three 
preceding centuries, and in this respect it is already an end point rather than the mandatory 
starting point of any history of French justice.103 
While Joinville’s account of Louis IX under the oak had not yet been turned into the 
myth it would become, it already idealized in its own time a symbiosis of sorts between religion, 
feudalism, and the Romanization of justice, smoothly coming together in the peaceful and bucolic 
setting of the woods of Vincennes. Another episode of Louis IX’s reign, one that created a much 
greater sensation among contemporaries, reveals that those three elements did not come together 
so naturally to support this model of the ideal king-as-judge. The trial of Enguerran de Couci 
(1259)104 suggests indeed that, on the contrary, the background for the portrait of Louis IX as the 
ideal judge-king was a state of great tension between the religious, feudal and Roman dimensions 
of royal justice. The trial reveals that, at this particular juncture, conflicting views on the kind of 
social order royal justice was supposed to maintain led some to question the relationship and 
hierarchy between these three elements. 
                                                      
102 Arlette Lebigre, La justice du roi. La vie judiciaire dans l'ancienne France, Paris: Albin Michel, 1988, 
245, n. 1. 
103 I would thus take issue with Jean-Pierre Royer’s intimation that “any history of French justice 
necessarily begins under the oak at Vincennes” [Royer’s emphasis]. On a side note, when one considers the 
numerous distortions that transformed Joinville’s account into the Third Republic image d’Epinal of this 
national myth on which we still live today, there is also reason to doubt that “the image that Joinville gave 
us in his Histoire de Saint Louis remained intact through the centuries.”  (Jean-Pierre Royer, Histoire de la 
justice en France : de la monarchie absolue à la République, Droit fondamental. Droit politique et 
théorique, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1995, 23). 
104 See Edmond Faral, "Le procès d'Enguerran IV de Couci," Revue historique de droit français et étranger 
26 (1948): 213-58. 
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Since these conflicting views also entailed conflicting models of the king-as-judge, it is 
worth analyzing this trial in some detail. Enguerran de Couci had been summoned to the king’s 
court for having hung three children caught hunting on his land. In front of Louis IX, Enguerran 
and his imposing group of relatives and friends argued, on a number of feudal grounds, that he 
should escape judgment by the king’s judicial court. Enguerran first argued that the quality of his 
fief gave him a privilege of barony that should entitle him to be judged by his peers (that is, the 
barons of the kingdom). In that first instance, Louis IX retorted that Enguerran’s fief did not carry 
this privilege, for the barony had fallen to one of his brothers’ share after the division of the 
paternal inheritance, but the king did not question the feudal logic and the principle that the 
privilege of barony entitled to a judgment by one’s peers. In fact, it is very likely that Louis IX 
granted the request nonetheless, since, one of the sources tells us, the king “established a day for 
all the barons of the kingdom to come [to the trial].”105 It is at this point that, as Edmond Faral 
noted, “the affair took a worrying turn” for the king, for all the lords present were related to 
Enguerran in one way or another and sided with him.106 Thus, “the judges became advisers to the 
accused,” and the king was left “all alone except for his council.”107 The barons exited the king’s 
court to go advise Enguerran, leaving the king alone in the throne room with the councilors of his 
own household108—and one can assume that some of them at least were jurists of the kind of 
Pierre de Fontaines or Geoffroy de Villette—, and this movement of people translated clearly the 
opposition of two groups, two conceptions of royal justice. 
Enguerran’s next request translated this clash in legal terms, for it clearly pitched feudal 
custom against new royal procedures inspired from Roman law. Enguerran argued indeed that he 
should not be submitted to the inquest procedure—a procedure inspired from Roman law that had 
                                                      
105 Ibid., 224. 
106 Ibid., 226. 
107 Chronique of Primat (ibid., 219).  
108 In his Vie de saint Louis, Guillaume de Saint-Pathus says that Louis IX was then left alone “except for 
his household [fors que sa mesniée]” (ibid., 220). 
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already been in use in the Church for more than two centuries—109, because this inquest would 
infringe on “his person, his honor, and his possessions” and that in such case he should have the 
right to defend himself by judicial duel.110 Louis IX first sought to deny the request on moral 
grounds, arguing that the judicial duel should not apply when the weak were involved, for “no 
one would be foolish enough to fight for this kind of people against the barons of the 
kingdom.”111 The king also invoked a precedent during the reign of Philip Augustus (1180-1223), 
but neither this point nor the moral argument destroyed the principle of the legal argument put 
forward by Enguerran.112 In the end, Louis IX had to admit that the inquest procedure could not 
be applied in this instance, because the custom of the kingdom was indeed that, if the accused had 
refused to submit to the inquest, the judge could not pronounce a sentence against him.113 
A final move on the king’s part however, revealed another tension, this time between 
feudal law and religion. Despite his admission that the inquest procedure could not be applied, 
Louis IX did not agree to the judicial duel. Instead, he invoked his privileged relation to God to 
still judge the case himself, stating that “for he knew well God’s will in this case, he would not let 
                                                      
109 See Paul Fournier, Les officialités au moyen âge. Etude sur l’organisation, la compétence et la 
procédure des tribunaux ecclésiastiques ordinaires en France, de 1180 à 1328, Paris: E. Plon et cie, 1880 ; 
Paul Guilhiermoz, Enquêtes et procès : étude sur la procédure et le fonctionnement du Parlement au XIVe 
siècle ; suivie du Style de la chambre des enquétes ; du Style des commissaires du Parlement et de 
plusieurs autres textes et documents, Paris: A. Picard, 1892. 
110 Faral, "Le procès d'Enguerran IV de Couci," 220. 
111 “es fez des povres, des eglises ne des persones [dont en doit avoir pitié], l'en ne devoit pas einsi aler 
avant par loy de bataille; car l'en ne troveroit pas de legier aucuns qui ne voulsissent combatre pour tele 
manieres de persones contre les barons du roiaume.” (ibid.).  
112 Ibid., 228-9 Thus, when the count of Britanny later spoke for him he just articulated with the same 
phrasing the previous opposition: the count told the king “he should not maintain that inquests should be 
conducted against the barons of the kingdom in matters concerning their person, their possessions and their 
honor.” (ibid., 229). 
113 Guillaume de Saint-Pathus tells us that the king acknowledged that “according to the customs of the 
kingdom he could not judge by an inquest held against him since this punished him in his person, given that 
my lord Enguerran had not submitted himself to the said inquest ” (transl. Paul Hyams, Medieval Source 
Book, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1259coucy.html). Adolphe Tardif had noted this rule in the 
customary law of the time: “it was a principle, in all of northern France, that [the inquiry procedure] could 
only produce effects against the accused if he had willingly submitted to it.” (Adolphe Tardif, "La date et le 
caractère de l'ordonnance de saint Louis sur les duels," Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et 
étranger 11 (1887): 168). 
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the nobility of [Enguerran’s] lineage or the power of some of his friends prevent him [i.e. the 
king] from doing full justice of him [i.e. Enguerran].”114 It seems that in this final instance Louis 
IX had his way, for if the inquest did not take place, neither did the duel Enguerran and the 
barons had been asking for: Louis IX stripped the count of his right of high justice, confiscated 
the wood where the youth had been caught and imposed a fine of 12.000 l. As if to confirm the 
religious inspiration of his “royal coup” and of his judgment, Louis IX gave the wood to the 
neighboring abbey of Saint Nicolas, sent the money from the fine to Acre to help with the 
ongoing crusade, and had Enguerran “make and endow three perpetual charities for the souls of 
those hanged.”115 
A popular song composed in the aftermath of the trial aptly represented what could have 
been the barons’ opinion on the matter. While Edmond Faral has entitled this anonymous piece 
“Song against the inquiry procedure,”116  and while it is true that the song indeed conveyed 
resentment on the part of the French “born of the fiefs” stripped of their privileges [franchise] and 
“cruelly duped” by this procedure, it also explains this violation of their rights by the influence of 
the clergy on the king.117 The song echoes and questions Louis IX’s assertion that he was doing 
the will of God by denying the duel and passing judgment himself, opposing that “such a 
servitude does not come from God.”118 The song however, did not question the king’s “loyalty”— 
that is literally, his fidelity to the law—but blamed instead “the clergy” whom the author indicts 
                                                      
114 “se il seust bien la volenté de Dieu en tel cas, il ne lessast ne pour noblece de son lignage ne pour la 
puissance d'aucuns de ses amis que il ne feist de lui pleine justice.” 
115 Hyams, ibid. 
116 Faral, "Le procès d'Enguerran IV de Couci," 252. Leroux de Lincy, who first published this song in 
1840, had given it a less specific title, “Chanson sur les Etablissements du roi saint Louis” (Le Roux de 
Lincy, "Chansons historiques des XIIIe, XIVe et XVe siècles," Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes 1 
(1840): 370-4). 
117 “Mult vous a l’en de franchise esloigniez, / Car vous estes par enqueste jugiez. / Quant deffense ne vos 
puet faire aïe / Trop iestes cruelment engingiez / A touz pri.” "Chansons historiques des XIIIe, XIVe et XVe 
siècles," 372. 
118 “Je sai de voir, que de Dieu ne vient mie / Tel servage, tant soit il esploitié.”  Ibid., 373. 
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as responsible for a move that had “blended together charity and sin.”119 It is worth noting that the 
song also told that an adviser of Louis IX, “loyal” as well, was also “prisoner” of the Church and 
its harmful influence.120 Edmond Faral failed to identify this man close to the king, “apparently 
both noble and lay,”121 and I would propose that Faral’s failed attempt to put a name on this 
character is not all that surprising if we consider that it might not have represented any particular 
individual but the archetypical figure of the ideal conseiller, friend of the law but victim of the 
Church. In any case, the song did not question the authority of the king, nor the Christian 
foundation of that authority, nor even Roman law per se, it lamented the passing of a former ideal 
of the king-as-judge, now a primus inter pares, whose main duty should have been to maintain a 
pristine social order that preserved the barons’ privileges, their “franchise,” that is, their rights as 
free men.122 The new ideal enacted by Louis IX on the contrary, was that of a supreme judge who 
was also a lawmaker, one who, in the name of a divinely inspired sense of equity—we are not 
quite yet at this point where the king could do without this explicit religious justification and 
simply argue that “what has pleased the king has the force of the law”—, could limit the “law of 
the sword” that the barons longed for. 
The trial of Enguerran de Couci reveals that, to a certain extent, the role of the king-as-
judge had become subservient to his role as lawgiver. As Edmond Faral pointed out, the trial was 
not a simple application of the recent law on the judicial duel. The trial had farther-reaching 
consequences for it revealed that royal justice could extend royal jurisdiction “in ways no one had 
thought of at first [when the law on duels was promulgated].”123 The two royal activities, 
                                                      
119  “Tout ont ensemble broié / L’aumosne et le péchié.” Ibid. 
120 “Et icelui est si pris du clergie / Q’il ne vous puet fere aïe.” Ibid. 
121 Faral, "Le procès d'Enguerran IV de Couci," 253. Leroux de Lincy “believe[d] he had recognized Robert 
de Sorbon” in this figure, but did not provide any evidence for this identification besides his intuition. 
(Lincy, "Chansons historiques des XIIIe, XIVe et XVe siècles," 372). 
122 The language of the song (“franchise,” “servitude,” “land of subjects”) reveals that the crux of the 
matter had to do with clashing conceptions of the social order. I will go back to this important point at the 
end of next chapter. 
123 Faral, "Le procès d'Enguerran IV de Couci," 246-7. 
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legislative and judicial, now clearly worked in a tandem that reflected the double meaning of 
auctoritas in relation to law, that is, on the one hand and in the etymological sense of the term, 
the power to create law, to “author” it, and on the other hand and in the modern sense of the term, 
the power to enforce it.
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CHAPTER 2: 
PARLEMENTAIRE REPRESENTATIONS: SOVEREIGN JUSTICE, 
PARLEMENTAIRE ETHOS, AND THE PARFAIT CONSEILLER 
 
As the trial of Enguerran de Couci illustrates, in the middle of the thirteenth century the 
king could still judge in person in matters relating directly to this auctoritas. At that point in time, 
however, professional royal judges already handled the great majority of the ever-growing 
number of cases that ended in front of a royal court. Thus, the remapping of law through judicial 
practice was increasingly carried out by professional magistrates who had received a delegation 
of royal judicial power. As we shift the focus from king to royal magistrates in this chapter, 
however, both the notion of “delegation” and that of “professional group” appear to be 
anachronistic and misleading shortcuts. Both terms distort the contemporary understandings of 
the ideal conseiller that I wish to depict in this second chapter. The clarification of these two 
notions—which I propose to replace with those of “representation” and “corps”—serves as my 
basis to reconstitute the portrait of the ideal conseiller that underlay standards and expectations of 
the practice of justice in the Parlement de Toulouse in the second half of the sixteenth century. 
I begin by reflecting on the notion of “delegation” of judicial power from king to 
magistrate that our perception of modern administrative practice and a misguided but entrenched 
historiographical distinction between justice the king “reserved” for himself (justice retenue) and 
justice he “delegated” to royal officials (justice déléguée), would have us use. Indeed, this 
clarification is first in order, for the principles and workings of the transmission of the king’s 
judicial power had a formative impact on ideas about the origins, nature, function and extent of 
the judicial power held by royal magistrates. As we will see, because royal judicial power was at 
the same time transmitted and transformed in this process, these ideas accounted for the 
specificity of a portrait of the ideal royal judge that both resembled and differed from that of the 
ideal king-as-judge described in Chapter 1. As we will see moreover, this process was further 
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complicated in the case of conseillers in a sovereign court such as the Parlement de Toulouse, 
where the magistrates as a “corps,” that is collegially, claimed to “represent” majesty and the 
very person of the king. 
My explication of these interrelated notions of corps and representation points to the 
existence of a particular parlementaire ethos. In this chapter I focus on how this ethos, as it was 
envisioned and represented by the conseillers themselves, bespoke a specific conception of 
sovereign justice, of its political and social function, and consequently, of the magistrates’ self-
understanding of their position in the body politic and the body social.  Because of its diverse and 
far-reaching roots (political, social, religious), this idealized parlementaire ethos resists modern 
analytical categories such as that of professional ethos. In order to work around this elusiveness, I 
use the repertoire of parlementaire imagery the magistrates mobilized to represent themselves 
(“knights” of a “legal militia”, “priests of justice”, “senators”) to extract from it a self-portrait of 
the ideal conseiller, highlighting both its similarities and differences with the portrait of the ideal 
king-as-judge. Finally, I suggest how this self-portrait, congruent with the parlementaire 
conception of sovereign justice, shaped the practice of sovereign justice.  
 
“Communication”: theorizing the flow of judicial power. 
 
The reflections of jurists on the nature and origin of royal judicial power presented in the 
first chapter, raised a number of theoretical difficulty regarding the transmission of this power to 
others—to non-kings, so to speak. How could the king “delegate” judicial power and still retain, 
contained in his sole person, the majesty, the dignitas regia, that founded this power? Indeed, 
royal jurists had bound judicial power so tightly to the very person of the king, to unique features 
of kingship—most notably the exclusive quality of the king as a sacred figure and supreme 
suzerain—, that they had created a paradox of sorts: the theories they had elaborated to support 
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the idea that the king was the “fountain of justice” seemed to preclude the possibility that judicial 
power could plainly “flow,” unchanged, from king to others. Thus, the “delegation” of royal 
judicial power was a transmission that necessarily required a transformation of this power, a 
transformation that preserved its essence while changing its substance. The central question for 
our purpose is the following: did this “delegation” result in a simple transfer of the ideal of the 
king-as-judge onto the magistrate or did it imply a different kind of ideal, specific to the royal 
judge? To assess the specificity of the judicial power bestowed on the magistrate and the model 
of the ideal royal judge it entailed, we need first to look further into this process by which, in 
practice, royal power was both transmitted and transformed. With those general principles of the 
“delegation” of royal power in mind, I explore the specific case of the magistrates of the 
Parlement and focus on how the sovereign status of this court further complicated the question of 
delegation and explained that particular variations on the theme of the king-as-judge were 
available to the conseillers to shape their own ideal self-portrait. 
As Jacques Krynen noted, the concept of “delegated justice” (justice déléguée) was 
created by legal historians of Old Regime France as a counterpart to the concept of “reserved 
justice” (justice retenue)—that is, justice exercised by the king in person or through his council—
that they had invented as well.124 In fact, neither the concept nor the word “delegation” was part 
of the intellectual apparatus of the time. Instead, contemporaries thought of and formulated the 
transmission of royal power in terms of “communication.” Jean Bodin for instance, wrote in his 
République that the magistrate is the person to whom the sovereign “communicated the force, the 
authority and the power to command.”125 This “communication” entailed limitations, for the 
                                                      
124 Jacques Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la 
justice»," Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome.Moyen Âge 114-1 (2002): 100. 
125 "(...) le magistrat après le souverain, est la personne principale de la république, et sur lequel se 
déchargent ceux qui ont la souveraineté, luy communiquant l’autorité, la force, et la puissance de 
commander (…)"Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République, de J. Bodin, Angevin, Lyon: à l'imprimerie 
de Jean de Tournes, 1579, III, ch. 4, 284. 
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magistrate was an “officer” whose power to command was “limited by edict.”126 This limitation 
inscribed in the letters that communicated royal power to the officer was first and foremost a 
temporal one, for, Bodin explains, “kings and princes, who are (…) protective of their own 
power, are in the habit of including in any letter of office an ancient clause, which bears the mark 
of seigneurial monarchy, stipulating that the officer will enjoy the office “as long as we 
please.””127 Historical research confirms Bodin’s explanation that this limitation found its origin 
in the administrative practices of medieval kings. Roland Mousnier for instance, attempting to 
retrace the deep historical roots of the early-modern venality of royal offices, pointed to a form a 
proto-venality which, inaugurated by the first Capetian kings, was meant to put an end to a 
practice of infeudation of “public” functions that had undercut the authority of their 
predecessors.128 To counter this practice that had led, over the course of the ninth and tenth 
centuries, to the fragmentation and privatization of royal power into the hands of the vassals of 
the Carolingian kings, the Capetians began to lease out the many powers—including judicial 
power—they delegated to their prévôts.129 One administrative rank higher, the judicial power 
given to the baillis was similarly limited in time, not in the form of a lease but in that of a 
commission. Thus, the communication of royal judicial power began, for the period that interests 
                                                      
126 Ibid., III, ch. 2, 259. 
127 “(…) les rois et princes qui sont plus jaloux de leur grandeur, ont accoutumé de mettre en toutes lettres 
d’office une clause ancienne, qui retient la marque de la monarchie seigneurial, c’est à sçavoir que 
l’officier jouïra de l’office « tant qu’il nous plaira » (…)” ibid., III, ch. 3, 273. 
128 Roland Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, Paris: PUF, 1971, 14. 
129 According to Mousnier, this new practice began as early as the reign of Robert Le Pieux (996-1031) 
(ibid.). 
 65 
us here, as a royal reaction against a feudal mode of transmission of power,130 and this reaction 
was congruent with the views of prominent jurists of the time such as Baldus, who was of the 
opinion that “ordinary judges are not lords but mere administrators of their jurisdiction.”131 
In addition to the temporal limitation inscribed in the official act that communicated royal 
power to the king’s agent, a jurisdictional limitation was implied as well by the possibility to 
appeal against the decisions of royal judges.132 We have already seen how the trial of Enguerran 
de Couci suggested that, by the end of the thirteenth century, this procedure was already in place 
within the hierarchy of royal jurisdictions. The trial also showed how new royal legislation—in 
that particular instance, a provision of Louis IX’s ordonnance on judicial duels—, had allowed 
the appeal procedure to infiltrate the seigneurial jurisdictions of the barons as well. Contrary to 
the temporal limitation, this jurisdictional limitation of the power of the royal judge was not 
thought of as a reaction against the feudal system, but to a certain extent partook of this system in 
                                                      
130 This reaction however hardly entailed the end of the privatization and patrimonialization of royal power. 
It was due in part to the fact that, in practice, the Capetians lacked the authority and the material means 
necessary to effectively control and restrain how royal agents exercised their power. As Mousnier noted 
indeed (ibid., 15, ibid.), in practice the prévôts had full control over their judicial court, their military force, 
their archives and their finances; in the eleventh and twelfth centuries they sometimes simply ignored the 
orders of the king; still in the fourteenth century they stayed in office as if their lease was automatically 
renewed; and from the start the king had even authorized some of them to bequeath their office to their 
heirs (ibid., 15). As late as the end of the fourteenth century, even some baillis whose power was define by 
a revocable commission, leased their office. The Songe du vergier (1378) for instance castigated those 
baillis who had taken after “the pastors in the churches and especially in Paris and in other places where the 
cure of souls are auctioned to those who will pay the most. For each cure has a leaseholder [fermier] as if it 
was the leaseholder of a barn.” (Le songe du vergier, ed. F. Chatillon, vol. 13-14, Revue du Moyen Age 
Latin, 1957-8, II, 92, fol. 134). But I would argue that, maybe more importantly, what we might simply 
perceive as a sign of Capetian failure to reform the practice of the infeudation of royal offices was above all 
indicative of the persistence and pervasiveness of a deep-seated patrimonial conception of power, including 
judicial power. Despite the reflections of contemporary jurists on the link between the particular nature of 
royal power and Roman notions of common good and interest, seigneurial as well as royal administrative 
practices were still ingrained in a domestic conception of government. Indeed, this form of delegation that 
still entailed a significant degree of privatization and patrimonialization of royal power certainly seemed 
like normal practice for the king and his agents in a time when “there was no real distinction between 
private property and public office, between general and particular interest, and it seemed natural to draw a 
profit (…) from the possession of public power.” (La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 16). 
131 "les juges ordinaires ne sont pas seigneurs de leur juridiction, mais simples administrateurs." Cited in 
Descimon, "La royauté française entre féodalité et sacerdoce. Roi seigneur ou roi magistrat?," 457. 
132 See Serge Dauchy, Les voies de recours extraordinaires : proposition d'erreur et requête civile (de 
l’ordonnance de Saint Louis jusqu’à l’ordonnance de 1667), Paris: PUF, 1988 and "Aux origines des voies 
de recours extraordinaires: la proposition d'erreur," Cahiers du CRHIDI 1 (1993). 
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which one could appeal against one’s lord to his suzerain. In the royal judicial system as in the 
feudal political system, the appeal followed backward, from the bottom up, the path of the 
transmission of power, from the top down. 
Within the royal judicial administration, the prévôts were also called “inferior judges,” 
not to denigrate these judges who, at the lowest rank of the judicial hierarchy, were the face of 
royal justice for most French men and women at the time, but to indicate that their decisions 
could be appealed against, to a superior judge.133 For practical reasons, this superior judge was 
most often the bailli, situated immediately above the prévôt in the hierarchy, but it could as well 
be the king himself. Although appealing directly to the king was a rare occurrence, it was more 
than a vague possibility: even at a much later time, Louis XIV still collected himself, every 
morning after mass (note in passing the enduring legacy of the episode of Louis IX under his oak 
tree), the placets—a written request, meaning literally “may it please”—which those subjects who 
managed to get close enough could hand to him in person, to appeal against the decision of one of 
his judges.134  Louis XIV, as Louis IX five centuries before him, did not judge the appeal himself: 
the former gave the placet to one of his maîtres des requêtes to examine, the latter, as Joinville 
told us, to one of the jurists of his entourage. That is, in both cases, the “appeal” was presented to 
the king but the judgment was left to his council, whether in its early modern or its medieval 
form. 
 
The sovereign twist: the theory of representation. 
 
It is precisely because the Parlement had been progressively “detached” from this royal 
council that the general principles of the “communication” of judicial power I have just described 
                                                      
133 Lebigre, La justice du roi. La vie judiciaire dans l'ancienne France, 38. 
134 These placets could be used more generally to ask any personal favor from the king. Ibid., 49.  
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could not apply to that court. Indeed, both the temporal and jurisdictional limitations implied in 
the communication of judicial power contradicted the particular status of the Parlement. In 1489, 
the Parlement de Paris presented remonstrations (remontrances) to king Charles VIII that aptly 
summarize the parlementaire view on this point, highlighting the key differences between the 
Parlement and other royal courts: 
(…) while the king has in his whole kingdom a variety of ordinary judges 
whose jurisdictions, by way of the appeal, fall within one another, all of them 
ministers and distributors of justice, past kings however, have instituted and 
always maintained a Parlement made up of one hundred men—of which the king 
in his person is the head and the first—, XII peers of France, both clerics and lay, 
his chancellor, IV presidents, VIII maîtres des requêtes, and the remainder made 
up of conseillers, all of them together, mixed clerics and lay, forming a mystical 
corps, holding the authority of Senators representing the person of the king, for it 
is the last jurisdiction and the sovereign justice of the kingdom of France, the true 
seat, authority, grandeur [magnificence] and majesty of the king.135 
This is an extremely rich passage that links together a number of fundamental ideas and 
politically-loaded concepts and metaphors in order to support a rather bold self-representation of 
the Parlement. I will come back later to the critical analogy with the Roman senate and the related 
arguments about the nature of the court as a “mystical corps” and its authority.  
Before that, we should further explore those differences between the parlementaires and 
the “ordinary judges” that this passage spelled out, for they served as the basis for a different 
theory of transmission of judicial power, summarized here in the expression “representing the 
person of the king.” As opposed to “ordinary judges” who are “ministers” of justice (temporal 
limitation) and who can be appealed against (jurisdictional limitation), the Parlement is first a 
perpetual court (it has “always been maintained”), and second a sovereign court, that is, a court 
                                                      
135 " (…) combien que le roy ait par tout son royaume plusieurs juges ordinaires ressortissans par appel 
les ungs aux autres, tous ministres et distributeurs de justice, néantmoins les prédécesseurs roys ont 
institué et tousjours entretenu ung Parlement composé de cent hommes, dont le roy en sa personne est chef 
et le premier, XII Pers de France clercs et lays, son chancelier, IV presidens, VIII maîtres des requêtes et le 
surplus de conseillers faisans ung corps mistique meslé de gens ecclésiastiques et lais, tous en auctorité de 
Sénateurs, représentans la personne du roy, car c’est le dernier ressort et la souveraine justice du royaume 
de France, le vray siège, auctorité, maginificence et majesté du roy." Cited in Maugis, Histoire du 
Parlement de Paris de l'avènement des rois Valois à la mort d'Henri IV, I, 374-5. 
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against which one cannot appeal, that has no judicial superior, for the king is one of its members. 
Both notions of perpetuity and sovereignty are key to understand the nature of the judicial power 
that the conseillers held, or at least argued they held. 
The notion of perpetuity is supported by the mention of the Peers of France, a reminder 
that the Parlement was cour des Pairs, that is, a section of the royal council from which it had 
been progressively detached. The gradual character of this “detachment” was also critical to 
support the notion of perpetuity: the Parlement had no birth act, no dateable document had 
created it, in fact, the idea advocated by the conseillers was that it had not been created at all and 
had existed, as the expression went, “from time immemorial.”136 In his opuscule on the Parlement 
de Toulouse (1515), Nicolas Bertrand, a lawyer in the court, thus considered that it had never 
been “properly and explicitly” founded.137 The perpetuity of the court reflected by extension the 
perpetuity of the judicial power it held, thus invalidating the idea that this power could have been 
delegated in any way. This point was also made clear through symbolic manifestations such as 
the wearing of red robes—a reference to the Roman purple that was meant to manifest the 
authority of the court—at the funeral of the king:138 by not wearing mourning clothes in this 
occasion but the formal attire that bespoke their authority in the most solemn circumstances, the 
conseillers of the Parlement asserted that like justice itself, the authority of the court did not die 
with the king.139 This notion of perpetuity of both the court and its judicial power was the first 
                                                      
136 Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 101 
In the eighteenth century this argument would be pushed even further, the parlements arguing that the court 
predated the advent of kings. 
137 “Cum enim nullum in Francia proprie ac expressim fundatum fuisset parlamentum.” Nicolas Bertrand, 
"Opusculum de magnifica parlamenti tholosani institutione atque noveissima illius roboratione sive 
confirmatione," in Opus de tholosonarum gestis, Toulouse: Jean Grandjean, 1515. 
138 On the wearing of the red robes, see p. 93 below.  
139 Ralph E. Giesey, The royal funeral ceremony in Renaissance France, Genève: E. Droz, 1960, 92-102. 
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pillar of the notion of representation, a connection made explicit in a number of contemporary 
sources, parlementaire but not only.140 
The second pillar of the theory of parlementaire representation was the notion of 
sovereignty of the Parlement, manifested and justified in the fact that one could not appeal against 
the decisions of the court. The 1489 remontrances still took the trouble to mention that it was so 
because the king himself was a member of the court, its head (litteraly, its chef, I will come back 
shortly to the implications of this organicist metaphor), thus playing on the implicit idea that it 
would be counter-intuitive, indeed illogical, to appeal to him against a sentence he had himself 
pronounced. A little more than a century later, Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, would formulate the 
same idea more peremptorily, linking it explicitly and directly to the notion of representation: 
“(…) as one does not appeal against the king, one does not appeal either against his parlements, 
who represent him immediately [that is, with no intermediary] in the distribution of justice.”141 La 
Roche-Flavin’s conclusion as well was sans appel: the judicial power held by the Parlement was 
not a share of the judicial power of the king, it was the judicial power of the king in its entirety 
and integrity, for the court and the sovereign were “together as one” (“tout un”).142 A century 
earlier already, during a royal session in the Parlement de Paris, president Guillart had formulated 
the same idea, using a metaphor that anticipated Louis-quatorzian expressions of sovereignty, 
when he declared to Francis I: “As there is one sun in the universe and there is one king in 
France, so there should be a single sovereign justice, which should (…) be permitted to remain, as 
it was, in the Parlement of Paris.”143  
                                                      
140 Chroniclers of royal funerals in the fourteenth and fifteenth century as well as political theorists such as 
Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century also made this connection explicit. See Krynen, "De la représentation à 
la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 103. 
141 "Or comme on n’appelle point du Roy, on n’appelle point aussi de ses Parlemens, qui le representent 
immediatement en la distribution de la justice (…)." Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, Bordeaux: S. Millanges, 1617, XIII, ch. 59, 811. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Quoted in Elizabeth A. R. Brown, The Lit de justice : semantics, ceremonial, and the Parlement of 
Paris, 1300-1600, Sigmaringen: J. Thorbecke, 1994, 66. 
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The success of this notion of “representation” with the conseillers should be explained in 
part by the legal dimension of this concept that made it amenable to political uses. As Jacques 
Krynen noted, “at the end of the medieval period, jurists never shied away from thinking the 
political realities and necessities of their times with the categories of private law,”144 the notion of 
representation was indeed such a concept which, drawn from private law, allowed the conseillers 
to think the political reality of their relationship to the king in terms that befitted their legal 
intellectual repertoire.145 More precisely, the concept of representation was drawn from the law of 
succession and had been imagined in the thirteenth century by the jurists of the Orléans school as 
a mechanism to fully substitute, in cases of intestate successions, a third person (generally a son 
or a nephew) to the predeceased beneficiary of the inheritance (father or uncle).146 This concept 
that rapidly became a full-blown “law of representation” (jus repraesentionis),147 thus substituted 
fully (that is—as opposed to the procuratio—with no limitation of time nor right)148 one person to 
another, absent one. In the thirteenth century, a time when the king physically withdrew from his 
own judicial court, this legal concept must have seemed, to the mind of royal jurists who were 
familiar with it, like a particularly apt way of theorizing and justifying the substitution of this 
court (the council, curia regis, that was then becoming in its judicial capacity “cour de 
Parlement”) to the person of the absent prince. The king himself, by way of these same jurists 
who drafted his laws, was the first one to introduce this concept of representation into the 
                                                      
144 Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 102 
See also L'empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe-XVe siècle, 135 ff. 
145 The “communication” of royal judicial power to ordinary judges was also understood and formulated 
after the legal model of the Romano-canonical procuratio. The lettres d’offices received by ordinary judges 
followed indeed the model of the instrumentum of a procuration in which the procurator is designated by 
name and the object and duration of his mandate are defined ("De la représentation à la dépossession du 
roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 100). 
146 Robert Besnier, La représentation successorale en droit normand, Paris: Libr. du 'Recueil Sirey', 1929. 
147 Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 101. 
148 See note 130 above. 
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political realm, precisely to found the judicial authority of the Parlement.149 The Parlement was 
indeed explicitly said to “represent” the king in the earliest legislative texts regulating its 
organization.150  
 
The Parlement as corps: the organicist theory of representation. 
 
From the very beginning of the existence of the court as an institution distinct from the 
council, the use of this concept to formulate the particular relation between the king and his 
Parlement drew not only on the legal mechanism of the jus repraesentationis, as it had been 
defined in private law, but on the much older etymological and literal meaning of repraesentare, 
“to make present,” “to be the living image of.” This literal understanding of the concept of 
representation of the king was critical for it founded the parlementaire self-understanding of their 
relation to the prince, of their existence as a corps, and of the significance of their exercise of 
sovereign justice. In other words, the idea that the conseillers formed a corps and that this corps 
represented the mystical body of the king151 was at the core of a parlementaire ethos. 
In order to get at this ethos and at the portrait of the ideal conseiller it entailed, it is 
necessary first to explain this idea in some detail, for it is key to understanding how and why the 
parlementaires appropriated some of the features of the ideal of the king-as-judge but also 
departed from that model in significant ways. What I would call the organicist theory of 
                                                      
149 This was retrospectively an ironical move, for if it was originally meant to assert the authority of a court 
which, at the time—late thirteenth- early fourteenth-century—was one of the king’s main instruments to 
effectively extend his own authority in practice (for instance, by systematizing the appeal procedure), the 
theory of representation would eventually be used as we will see to resist the king and even, in the 
eighteenth century to undermine his authority. 
150 Ordonnances of November 17, 1318 (Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 
jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, ed. François-André Isambert, Decrusy, and Alphonse-Honoré Taillandier, 29 
vols., Paris: Belin-Leprieur, 1821-33, III, 195), December 1344 (ibid., IV, 495), March 11, 1345 (ibid., IV, 
513). 
151 Kantorowicz, The king’s two bodies; a study in mediaeval political theology, 193-272. 
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representation of the king is ubiquitous in parlementaire discourse—in remontrances, in the 
published works of the conseillers, in lawyers’ speeches pronounced in the court—from the 
thirteenth to the eighteenth century. This organicist theory certainly underlay the 1489 
remontrances quoted above which made clear that the king was the “head” of the Parlement, not 
simply as its leader, but also, as the idea was to be understood literally within the context of a 
corporal metaphor, as the head of the “mystical body” of the Parlement, the corps that the 
conseillers formed as its members. Thus, the court was a corps, its judges were its “members” in 
a quasi-literal sense, and in this quality were part of the body of king. 
This last point is illustrated most clearly in practice by the fact that physical attacks 
against members of this corps were legally treated as cases of lèse-majesté, for they were 
considered as attacks against the body of the king. Jean Le Coq, a renowned fourteenth-century 
lawyer put it most clearly in a passage of his Quaestiones. Commenting on the stabbing of a 
conseiller by a litigant in 1393, he approved of the treatment of the crime as a case of lèse-
majesté “because the lords of the Parlement, especially in the exercise of their office, are part of 
the body of the king (…), and consequently, it was as if the king himself had been killed.”152 
Beyond exceptional occurrences such as the stabbing of a conseiller, the organicist theory 
operated in fact on a day-to-day basis, for each one of the arrêts of the court was “supposed to be 
pronounced,” as Bernard de La Roche-Flavin put it in the early seventeenth century, “by the 
mouth of the king.”153 La Roche-Flavin elaborated: “in fact, the formal arrêts [arrêts en forme] 
always begin with the person and quality of the king and thus the sovereign courts make the king 
speaks in their arrêts.”154 This idea was not new, for it went back to the first years of existence of 
the Parlement as a judicial court distinct from the royal council and actually preceded the explicit 
                                                      
152 Quoted in Françoise Autrand, "Offices et officiers royaux en France sous Charles VI," Revue Historique 
242 (1969).). 
153 "Les Arrests sont censez comme prononcez de la bouche du Roy." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, XIII, ch. 61, 824. 
154 "De faict les Arrests en forme commencent tousjours par la personne, et qualité du Roy, si que les Cours 
Souveraines font parler les Roys en leurs Arrests." ibid. 
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use of the legal notion of representation in royal legislation. Indeed, when royal laws started using 
explicitly the notion of representation in the early fourteenth century, they merely reformulated in 
legal terms the parlementaire ventriloquism that had already started to take place in practice to 
overcome a problem inherent to the very existence of this court. Jacques Krynen aptly 
summarized this problem: “when under the reign of saint Louis the curia parlamento began to 
regularly hold sessions in the absence of the king, the distance from the person of the king raised 
a juridical issue (…): how does one turn a judgment decided without the king into a sovereign 
sentence?”155 The problem was quickly solved by the use of the royal voice in the text of the 
arrêts (“It has been judged by our court…”)156 and this practical solution prefigured the legal 
fiction of representation that would retroactively justify this parlementaire ventriloquism.157 
This organicist understanding that anticipated and to some extent founded the notion of 
representation, had a profound impact on the ways in which the conseiller understood the origin, 
nature, and purpose of their judicial power. As for the origins of this power, the organicist theory 
of representation allowed the Parlement to claim that, like the king, it found its authority and 
power in its own corps. Because the conseillers were part of the mystical body of the king, 
because, as the king himself put it in the fourteenth century, “they properly represent[ed] in the 
eyes of the people the highness of [his] majesty,”158 they felt entitled to appropriate royal theories 
to justify their own judicial power. And indeed, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the idea 
that the Parlement itself was “origin”159 of “fountain of justice”160 appeared increasingly in royal 
ordonnances. 
                                                      
155 Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 97. 
156 The formula “Judicatum fuit per nostra curia” first appeared in 1276 (ibid.). 
157 I will come back later to this “ventroliquism,” when I reflect on the practice of arrêter and on the idea 
that the Parlement “made the king speaks in its arrêt.” See p. 363 below. 
158 Françoise Autrand, Naissance d'un grand corps de l'Etat. Les gens du Parlement de Paris, 1345-1454, 
Paris: Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, 1981, 136. 
159 “the Court is the mirror and origin of the entire justice of our kingdom” (August 15, 1389. Recueil 
général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, VI, 681). 
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Priests, Knights, Senators: metaphors of parlementaire self-representations. 
 
 The organicist underpinnings of the representation theory also introduced, however, a 
significant difference in nature between the judicial power of the king and that of the Parlement. 
Indeed, while the king found his judicial power in himself, as an individual, the court only found 
its own power in itself as a corps, that is collectively, as the sum of members without which this 
corps did not exist. Thus, while the court could claim to represent the king, it was much more 
difficult to claim that the Parlement, as a collection of individual conseillers, was the anointed 
vicar of God on earth or the supreme suzerain of a feudal hierarchy that antedated it. Yet, as the 
1489 remontrances made clear, the “mystical corps” of the Parlement was in the image of the 
sacred supreme suzerain it represented, formed of members who were “mixed clerics and lays.” 
In order to appropriate the two essential features of kingship that founded sovereign justice—the 
sacred nature of kingship and the king’s preeminent position in the political hierarchy of the 
kingdom—, the conseillers developed their own repertoire of political images. These images, 
those of the conseillers as “priests of justice,” as “knights of a legal militia,” and above all as 
“senators,” were the intellectual contraptions that allowed the magistrates to translate the notion 
of representation at their own individual level. These images are of particular interest to us here 
for they were the normative metaphors that shaped the portrait of the ideal conseiller. 
The image of the “judge as priest” and that of the “judge as knight” were neither 
parlementaire inventions nor exclusively applied to the conseillers in the Parlement. Both images 
were products of the reasoning jurists had developed in the twelfth and thirteenth century in order 
to carve for themselves a new political, social and cultural position, beside the two existing elites, 
clerical and aristocratic. The conseillers in the Parlement quickly appropriated the two sets of 
images and theories precisely because they helped them cast themselves as both priests and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
160 “our supreme and capital court is the fountain and origin of justice in our entire kingdom” (November 
13, 1403. Ibid., VII, 71). 
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knights, thus mirroring a duality which, as we have seen, was inherent to the figure of the king-
as-judge they claimed to represent. Both faces of this medieval juristic self-portrait—priest and 
knight—were developed independently from one another, on the basis of distinct elements found 
in Roman law and history. The conseillers picked on those two images, precisely because they 
appealed to a different intellectual and cultural tradition, sufficiently distinct from contemporary 
theories of kingship to allow them to develop analogies between themselves as individuals and 
the king-as-judge, and yet, compatible enough with current theories of royal power to preserve 
the principle of the collective representation of the king that the organicist theory entailed. 
Despite Baldus’s intimation that judges ought to be considered—and consider 
themselves—not as “lords” but as simple “administrators,” professional judges who held a degree 
in law demanded to be called “lords” [domini]. They did so not because of the jurisdiction they 
held, but on account of a self-representation of their social position, which they considered to be 
on par with that of the existing elites, both secular and religious.161 This claim happened to fit 
neatly with contemporary royal claims to a legislative power that was presented, as we have 
already seen, as the counterpart of the king’s military might. Indeed, it seemed natural enough to 
argue that the Roman idea that majesty “must needs be not only decorated with arms, but also 
armed with laws,” not only justified the legislative power of the warrior-king but also supported 
the claim that, as there was a militia armata [militia in arms] of chivalry, there was a militia 
legum [militia of laws] and that jurists were its knights. While this claim to a legal knighthood 
was based on a rather loose interpretation of passages of Roman law,162 it was put forward and 
repeated by some of the most famous jurists of the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, 
Placentinus, Azo, Accursius, among others.163 
                                                      
161 Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the impact of jurisprudence," 153. 
162 The claim was indeed supported on the one hand by a reading of the Roman miles (soldier) as equivalent 
to the medieval miles (knight) and on the other hand by a rather generous expansion of references to the 
Roman advocatus (lawyer) as encompassing all medieval jurisperiti (legal experts). See ibid., 154. 
163 Ibid. 
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The jurists’ claim to being “priests of justice” was based on different ideas and passages 
found in Roman law, but the method they employed to justify this claim—combining loose 
analogies and lexical interpretations—was very similar to the one used to support the idea of a 
legal knighthood. In the same way jurists were knights because laws were swords, they were also 
priests because laws were “things holy.” Both this expression and the analogy to priesthood were 
used for instance by Accursius in his Glossa ordinaria : 
Just as the priests minister and confection things holy, so do we, since the 
laws are most sacred … And just as the priest, when imposing penitence, renders 
to each one what is his right, so do we when we judge.164 
Thus, in order to cast themselves as “priests,” jurists did not attempt to Christianize 
Roman justice and law. Indeed, they presented Christianity not as a source from which the 
sacredness of laws was derived, but rather as one of the two terms of an analogy between two 
kinds of sacredness, one religious and the other secular. This analogy was not the prerogative of 
renowned jurists such as Accursius, for it pervaded the entire field of legal studies. The 
anonymous author of the rubric “De sacris et sacratis” in a late twelfth-century legal dictionary 
for instance, articulated it even more clearly and drew more explicit conclusions for the existence 
of two types of sacredness: 
There is one thing holy which is human, such as the laws; and there is 
another thing holy which is divine, such as things pertaining to the Church. And 
among the priests, some are divine priests, such as presbyters; others are human 
priests, such as magistrates, who are called priests because they dispense things 
holy, that is, laws.165 
Clearly then, instead of drawing the sacredness of their function directly from the 
spiritual realm, province of the theologians, twelfth-century jurists behaved as quasi-
                                                      
164 Glos.ordin. on D.1,1,1, v. Sacerdotes, cited in The king’s two bodies; a study in mediaeval political 
theology, 121. 
165 Petri Exceptionum appendices, l. 95. Ed. Fitting, Jurist Schriften, 164. 
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anthropologists, uncovering the sacredness of the temporal realm and casting themselves in the 
process as its priests. 
For all their reasoning on the distinct sacredness of their field however, jurists did not try 
and most likely did not even intend to place human laws and justice outside of the realm of 
Christian faith. Quite on the contrary, the contemporary portrait of the ideal magistrate is that of a 
judge who, in his sacred role of guardian of secular laws, was to be guided by his Christian faith, 
the two elements were perfectly compatible. This interplay between Christian faith and the 
“secular sacredness” of royal justice is still clearly seen in the early modern period in the oath that 
the judges in the Parlement took at the beginning of each judicial year. In the early seventeenth 
century, Bernard de La Roche-Flavin tells us, reporting the words of Président de Pibrac 
addressing his colleagues in a plenary opening session of the parlement de Toulouse, “the 
formula we use in our oath is abbreviated [compendieuse] : in a few words it obliges us to much, 
for we swear to guard the royal laws [Ordonnances].”166 By “much” [beaucoup], Pibrac pointed 
to the same sacredness of human laws that twelfth-century jurists had emphasized, for this duty of 
guarding the laws was, in his words, a “good and sacred thing” (“chose bonne et sainte”). God 
was called as a witness to the judges’ oath, not because of the sacredness of their mission—for 
that sacredness was founded in “human things” as twelfth-century jurists had put it—, but 
because as “in any instance we [i.e. “we judges”, for Pibrac was addressing the court] ask for his 
favor and his assistance without which we cannot do anything.”167 
Thus, the judge who failed to keep this oath would not only incur the divine punishment 
for perjury, but this punishment “would be doubled because this profane mockery [i.e. mockery 
of the duty to guard the laws] is full of impiety.”168 The idea that a mockery of something profane 
could be full of impiety referred to this now older idea of the sacredness of human justice. Yet, 
                                                      
166 "La formule (…) dont nous usons en nostre serment est compendieuse : en peu de parolles elle nous 
oblige à beaucoup." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 327. 
167 "nous invoquons sa faveur et son ayde, sans laquelle nous ne pouvons rien" ibid. 
168 "laquelle [peine] redoubleroit par ceste moquerie proffane pleine d’impieté." ibid. 
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the idea that God would punish this mockery twice as harshly, intimated that this “secular 
sacredness” was not disconnected from but encompassed by Christian faith and religion, if only 
indirectly because the conseillers represented a king who was source of law and justice as well as 
a sacred Christian figure. 
Thus, as they had done to prove their nobility, jurists used a strategy that consisted in 
trying to not simply incorporate themselves into an existing ruling group, nobility or clergy, but 
rather to claim an affiliation with both of them while carving a new social and political space for 
a group of their own. The two images were especially appealing to the conseillers in the 
Parlement who were supposed to “represent” the person of the king, for they provided the basis to 
draw a dual self-portrait—half warrior, half cleric—that was reminiscent of, not identical to that 
of the king.169 
The parlementaires however, did not simply draw on these medieval metaphors that 
could apply to royal judges in general, they resorted to a metaphor of their own, that of the 
conseiller as senator, that aptly fused together priesthood and knighthood into a model that was 
considered proper and exclusive to the magistrates of the sovereign courts, especially in the South 
of France.170 Drawing parallels between contemporary royal institutions and the institutions of 
                                                      
169 One could even say that, on the contrary, it is the position of preeminence of the king which, to a certain 
extent, was redefined as a consequence of the jurists’ self-serving remapping of the social, political and 
cultural landscape. We have seen how the idea that laws were weapons to restore peace supported the idea 
that the king’s role as a lawmaker was a counterpart to his role as a warrior. It is easy to see how the 
existence of the legal militia that the jurists claimed to form further supported this argument. Similarly, the 
idea of a sacredness that was not derived directly from God, but was present in “things human,” and 
primarily in human laws, meant that the king, both as supreme judge and law-maker, could claim a 
sacredness that did not require the anointment nor, more generally, the involvement of the Church. This is, 
in fact, what happened later, for the reasoning first developed by twelfth- and thirteenth-century jurists in 
support of their self-identification as lords and priests would feed the reflection of late-medieval and early-
modern jurists on royal sovereignty (for example Jean Bodin or Guillaume Budé). 
170 A few southern jurists were cautious toward the analogy (Jean Coras, a conseiller of the court even 
rejecting it). In the north, some jurists refused the political analogy (for instance Guy Coquille), others (for 
instance Jean Bodin) limited its use to the royal council. (see Jacques Krynen, ""Senatores Tolosani." La 
signification d'une métaphore," in Actes du colloque international de Toulouse, mai 2004, réunis par 
Nathalie Dauvois, Paris: Honoré Champion, 2006, 53). 
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ancient Rome was nothing original,171 but the use of the senatorial metaphor in the case of the 
Parlement was more than a simple comparison. It was a “fundamental assimilation,”172 for it 
incorporated both the religious and aristocratic analogies into the figure of the Roman senator, 
that is, a figure who was both a member of an aristocracy, and a member of a corps, the Senate, 
that had, in its own time and place, claims to the exercise of sovereign power. Although the 
senatorial reference resonated clearly and specifically with the conseillers’ self-understanding, 
they did not create it ex nihilo, for they were not the first ones to make use of it.173 Late medieval 
authors indeed recommended that the king’s adviser imitate the qualities of the Roman people: 
“the love of virtue, the passion of honor, the cult of common good that had underlain the solidity 
of the [Roman] state.”174 The model offered to the royal conseiller in general was that of the 
Roman official, especially that of the senator who divested himself from “[his] personal 
affections and desires to put on the common ones, that is, for the common good, without bias.”175 
In their own quality of “conseillers”176 the magistrates in the Parlement certainly did not shy 
away from picking on this senatorial model. The conseillers in the parlement de Toulouse were 
                                                      
171 City magistrates, baillis, royal treasurers were respectively compared to municipal decurions, governors 
and quaestors. See Katia Weidenfeld, "Le modèle romain dans la construction d'un droit public médiéval. 
Assimilations et distinctions fondamentales devant la justice aux XIVe et XVe siècles," Revue historique 
de droit français et étranger 81-4 (2003): 479-502. 
172 Jacques Krynen, "Une assimilation fondamentale. Le Parlement "Sénat de France"," in A Ennio Cortese, 
Roma: Il cigno Galileo Galilei, 2001. 
173 The equation between the Roman Senate and the Sacred College of cardinals was already commonplace 
among thirteenth-century canonists (cf. Ugo Petronio, "I senati giudiziari," in Il Senato nella storia, Roma: 
Istituto poligrafico e zecca dello Stato, 1997, 376-7). 
174 Krynen, Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du Moyen Age (1380-1440) : étude de la 
littérature politique du temps, 96. 
175 "Ils laissoient leurs propres affections et voulentés et prenoient les communes, c'est-à-dire pour le bien 
commun, sans partialité." Jean Gerson, "Rex in sempiternum vive, discours au roi contre Jean Petit, 4 
septembre 1413," in Oeuvres complètes, ed. Mgr. Glorieux, 1018. 
176 While the use of the title of conseiller was certainly not the exclusive prerogative of the magistrates in 
the Parlements—judges in lower courts as well as agents in other royal administrations used this title as 
well—judges in the sovereign courts had a unique claim to belonging to an institution that was organically 
born out of the conseil du roi. 
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particularly keen on their self-representation as “senators,”177 not solely on account of the appeal 
of the model of Roman virtue it carried,178 but also and more importantly because the Roman 
senate as an institution seemed to offer striking parallels with the self-understanding the 
parlementaires had of their own corps. 
As early as the twelfth century, jurists had developed an organicist interpretation of the 
administrative structure of the Roman Empire, considered as a body of which the Prince was the 
head and the senators formed the magna pars, the main member.179 Early modern jurists, for 
instance Charles de Grassaille, did not fail to pick on this interpretation to draw a parallel 
between the Parlement and the Roman Senate, both part of the body of the prince (“pars corporis 
principis”).180 Combined with the idea that the Roman senators worked for the salvation of the 
respublica—an idea explicitly developed, for instance, by Nicolas Bertrand—the senatorial 
metaphor helped to further specify how the Parlement participated of the mystical body of the 
king and to what effect: the conseillers, like the Roman senators, were “the soul of the Prince” as 
Charles de Grassaille put it, or as La Roche-Flavin later intimated, “the soul, reason, and 
intelligence of a republic.”181 This analogy did more than help identify more precisely the 
location of the Parlement within the mystical body of the king, for the soul was, not any part of 
the body, but its magna pars, the main part which, attached to the physical body, transcended it. 
As the soul was both instrument and object of salvation, the analogy was meant to stake out the 
                                                      
177 Senatus tholosanus or Senatus Tolosae are standard latin expressions used to designate the court. The 
parlementaires themselves commonly went by the titles consiliarius in curia Senatus Tholosae, senator in 
tolosatum curia, or, more simply, senator tolosanus. The senatorial metaphor applied to the parlement de 
Toulouse was introduced in the Repetitio (published 1523) of Guillaume Benoît, conseiller in Toulouse in 
the fifteenth century (see Patrick Arabeyre, Les idées politiques à Toulouse à la veille de la Réforme. 
Recherches autour de l'oeuvre de Guillaume Benoît (1455-1516), Toulouse: Presses de l'Université des 
sciences sociales de Toulouse, 2003, 437-45), and later relayed and expanded in the Regalium Franciae 
libri duo (1539) of Charles de Grassailles, a graduate from the Toulouse law school. See Krynen, "Une 
assimilation fondamentale. Le Parlement "Sénat de France","  and ""Senatores Tolosani." La signification 
d'une métaphore," .  
178 See below p. 79.  
179 Krynen, ""Senatores Tolosani." La signification d'une métaphore," 44-5. 
180 Ibid., 50-1. 
181 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 1-2. 
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Parlement’s claims to an essential and central function within the mystical body of the king, 
hence the body politic at large. 
Indeed, if we follow further the logic implied in this image of the Parlement as soul of the 
king, the senatorial metaphor did more than just give ancient authority to a familiar organicist 
theory: it provided an intellectual tradition and a new repertoire of tropes and images that could 
be used to formulate new theories on the function of the court. Nicolas Bertrand clearly laid out 
the audacious claim that his observation that the Roman senate worked for the salvation of the 
respublica was meant to support: similarly, the “senators” in the parlement de Toulouse had the 
authority and an “evident duty” to “rule the world.”182 This combination of rights and duties that 
stemmed from the exercise of sovereign justice was certainly reminiscent of the figure of the 
king-as-judge as it appeared in the oath of the coronation.183 The conseillers, however, instead of 
referring to the sacrality of kingship, turned again to the senatorial exemple to formulate this 
point. In this case, the image that was mobilized was that of the senators as “fathers” of the 
Roman people, an analogy founded on the idea that the Senate was entrusted with the legal 
guardianship of the respublica.184 As in the case of the notion of “representation,” a legal 
concept—guardianship—and the senatorial metaphor were the instruments of a process of both 
identification with and distancing from the king. Identification, for Louis XII—a king whose 
reign (1498-1515) was still idealized as a golden age at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century—had been nicknamed “père du peuple” on account of the supposedly moderate character 
of his government.185 This moderation suited the ideal of a royal power exercised collegially and 
constrained at the top, in gestation at the time, for instance in the thought of Charles de Grassaille 
                                                      
182 “Verum (…) in tholosano parlamento tanti sunt senators (…) ad universum regendi orbem apertissimi.” 
(Bertrand, "Opusculum de magnifica parlamenti tholosani institutione atque noveissima illius roboratione 
sive confirmatione," fol. 62, col. 2). 
183 See p. 37 above. 
184 Petronio, "I senati giudiziari," 370-85, ibid. 
185 See Laurent Avezou, "Louis XII, père du peuple : grandeur et décadence d'un mythe politique, du XVIe 
au XIXe siècle," Revue Historique 625 (2003): 95-125. 
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who entrusted this role of control to the conseillers of the Parlement, “senators” and “soul of the 
prince.”186  
While the conseillers too called themselves “fathers of the people,” they did so not in 
reference to an ideal of moderation but drawing again on the senatorial tradition, this time to 
convey the idea of fatherly authority and duties implied by what the parlementaires conceived as 
their role and position within the body politic. Indeed, this mix of fatherly authority and duties 
reminiscent of the “patres conscripti,” bespoke the blend of severity and love that befit the 
salvation-driven role implied by the identification of the Parlement as the “soul” of the republic. 
As it was not lost on the conseillers that the Roman senate was not a judicial but a 
legislative body, the magistrates began, in the first half of the sixteenth century to see that this 
role of regulation of the body politic involved not only the exercise of sovereign justice but also a 
control of the legislative activity of the king through the practice of remonstration. Debates 
among jurists over the nature and extent of the parlementaire power entailed by the senatorial 
analogy187 reveal that, in the first half of the sixteenth century, the conseillers had started to take 
the senatorial metaphor in directions that could pit them against the king. The “stormy royal 
sessions”188 of the early 1520s in which Francis I explicitly rejected, in front of the court, the 
senatorial analogy189 that his predecessors, most notably Louis XII, had tolerated or even 
encouraged,190 heralded indeed the beginning of a protracted conflict between the king and the 
                                                      
186 Krynen, ""Senatores Tolosani." La signification d'une métaphore," 50-1. 
187 For Nicolas Bertrand, the auctoritas of the Parlement is “of a high and senatorial eminence,” Guillaume 
Budé validated the comparison from an institutional point of view, Robert Gaguin made its political 
implications clear, noting that “the authority of the Parlement (…) has always been so revered by the 
French that the decisions of the king himself in matters of public affairs, law and finances cannot be 
implemented without a decree of this Senate.” Pierre Rebuffe pushed the claim the farthest, drawing up a 
list of thirty-four privileges of the parlements that began: “Here are the privileges of the supreme courts. 
(…) First, that it is certain they can make laws.” 
188 Brown, The Lit de justice : semantics, ceremonial, and the Parlement of Paris, 1300-1600, 65. 
189 Arguing that the court’s remontrances had delayed a levee of taxes that had cost him the duchy of 
Milan, Francis told the court that it was “not a senate of Rome” and that its authority came from him and 
from him alone. (ibid., 59). 
190 Ibid., 50. 
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sovereign courts that would reach two peaks, in the middle of the seventeenth century during the 
Fronde and in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Although this early stage of what was not yet, in the sixteenth century, a full-fledged 
confrontation between the king and his sovereign courts is of great significance for the political 
history of early modern France in the long run,191 what interests us here more particularly is what 
these new developments reveal of the parlementaire conception of the exercise of justice at the 
end of the Middle Ages. Indeed, the parlementaire sense of entitlement to control the production 
of law did not simply “grow out” of an organicist parallel with the Roman senate but stemmed 
from a particular understanding of the preeminence of justice over law. If the Parlements had 
been established not only “for the judgment of affairs and trials between private parties,” but also 
“for public affairs and de verification of edicts,”192 these two functions were intimately linked, an 
idea which eighteenth-century parlementaires would resume and reinvigorate with great force.193 
The two functions, judicial and legislative, were not only connected but organized into a 
hierarchy in which justice had the primacy. As La Roche-Flavin put it, “laws must be interpreted 
[“entendues”] and observed as far as justice permits it,”194 and even more clearly, “justice is the 
                                                      
191 Ironically from this longue durée perspective on Old Regime politics, parlementaire claims to 
legislative control were often formulated in the sixteenth century in support of royal power. Pierre 
Rebuffe’s catalog of parlementaire privileges was part of a commentary on the Concordat of Bologne that 
asserted the rights of the king over the pope to nominate bishops in the kingdom. Similarly, when Charles 
de Grassaille noted in his Regalium Franciae libri duo that these “senators,” “who sit side by side with the 
Prince, not at his feet” (Charles de Grassaille, Regalium Franciae libri duo, jura omnia et dignitates 
Christianiss. Galliae regum continentes, Carolo Degrassalio, Carcassonensii, authore, Lugduni: Prostant 
apud heredes Simonis Vincentii, 1538, 166) “make the kings reign” [reges faciunt regnare], it is not 
because the conseillers in the Parlement were independent from, and even less superior to the king, but on 
the contrary because, like the Roman senators, they were “part of the prince’s body” [pars corporis 
principi], the king’s “soul.” 
192 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, XIII, 17, 701. 
193 See for instance the remontrances of the parlement de Paris, presented to Louis XV on November 27, 
1755: “…this legislative power, inseparable from justice, or rather, which is, within our kings, nothing 
more than justice itself.” (“cette puissance législative, inséparable de la justice, ou plutôt qui n’est dans nos 
rois que la justice même” Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Jules Flammermont, 3 
vols., Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1888, II, 87). 
194 Treze livres des Parlemens de France, XIII, 17, 703 
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end of law.”195 La Roche-Flavin was neither the only parlementaire nor the first one to hold this 
opinion,196 and members of the parlements were not the only ones to assert this idea: Bodin, 
Charondas le Caron had already developed it as part of what can be called a “constitutional 
thought” of the sixteenth century,197 itself indebted to the idea, formulated by medieval jurists, 
that justice was the end and raison d’être of political power.198 
But parlementaire legislative claims were not only based on theories and ideas about the 
preeminence of justice, they were also corroborated by an argument about the magistrates’ 
experience of judicial practice. Because of their daily exercise of justice, because they were in 
charge of the practical handling of law—what remontrances in the eighteenth century would call, 
reviving this theory, the “manutention of public order”—199, because through justice they 
accomplished, as Etienne Pasquier put it, the mission of “mediating between the king and the 
people,”200 the conseillers argued that they could foresee better than anyone whether the 
interpretation and observation of new laws would bring about justice. The daily exercise of 
sovereign justice was thus the basis of a practical and technical knowledge, which, besides in-
house theories of sovereignty, justified parlementaire control over the registration of new laws.  
                                                      
195 Ibid., XIII, 49, 785. 
196 Etienne Pasquier had already formulated this idea before him (William Farr Church, Constitutional 
Thought in Sixteenth-century France; a Study in the Evolution of Ideas: Harvard University Press, 1941, 
155), president Guillart had made the point in front of Francis I (P. S. Lewis, La France à la fin du Moyen 
Age : la société politique, [Paris]: Hachette, 1977, 141), president de Harlay in front of Henri III (Sarah 
Hanley, Le lit de justice des rois de France. L'idéologie constitutionnelle dans la légende, le rituel et le 
discours, Paris: Aubier, 1991, 207-8). 
197 Church, Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-century France; a Study in the Evolution of Ideas, 140-3, 
47. 
198 Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 117. 
199 The "représentation" the premier président of the Parlement de Paris made to the king on November 27, 
1755, read: "Ce tribunal, Sire, à qui, par les lois et ordonnances du royaume appartient la manutention de 
l’ordre public (…)" Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, II, 20.  
200 Pasquier wrote that the Parlement had a "mission metoyenne entre le roy et le peuple." Quoted in Elie 
Barnavi and Robert Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 
novembre 1591), Paris: Hachette, 1985, 129. 
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Parlementaire ethos and the portrait of the ideal conseiller. 
 
We have seen thus far how the metaphors of the judge-as-priest, of the judge-as-lord, and 
above all, that of the conseiller-as-senator —a synthesis of the first two that suited particularly 
well the parlementaire self-understanding of their corps—served as anchoring points for the 
magistrates’ formulation of their conception of the sovereign justice they exercised as both 
related to and distinct from that of the king. Those metaphors however, were not simply 
constitutive elements of a self-reflexive parlementaire discourse on the nature of sovereign 
justice, for they were located at the articulation between this particular conception of sovereign 
justice and the model of the ideal conseiller this conception entailed. Those metaphors indeed, 
because they invoked archetypal figures—the priest, the lord-knight, the senator—vested with 
specific moral traits and values, were also the constitutive elements of a parlementaire ethos. This 
ethos is an elusive object of analysis, but it is accessible through its reflection into the normative 
portrait of the ideal conseiller. This portrait was shaped and informed, like the more abstract 
ethos it reflected, by the wide range of moral features attached to the three archetypical figures of 
the priest, the lord, and the senator. 
We are fortunate enough that a contemporary work, produced by an insider of the 
parlement de Toulouse, has already organized these features into a self-portrait of sorts of the 
ideal conseiller. Bernard de La Roche-Flavin’s Treze livres des Parlemens de France (1617) is of 
great interest and of great help to untangle the richness and variety of features which, borrowed 
from these three archetypes, were arranged into a new one, specific to members of the corps of 
the Parlement. “Conceived for the moral and professional edification of royal magistrates, and 
mainly the “young” members of the Parlement,”201 La Roche-Flavin’s massive book—928 pages 
                                                      
201 Krynen, "De la représentation à la dépossession du roi : Les parlementaires «prêtres de la justice»," 109. 
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in its first, 1617, edition—is a normative work,202 fraught with comparisons and parallels between 
those three archetypes, from which an early seventeenth century portrait of the ideal conseiller 
can be extracted.  
Especially striking is the way in which La Roche-Flavin draw on these models to reframe 
the ideal magistrate as it was defined, very succinctly, in royal ordonnances. The formula, 
ubiquitous in royal legislation touching the matter, was that the men chosen to become “officers 
and ministers of justice” should be the “best-read, most experienced and of the best reputation we 
can find in our kingdom.”203 Under La Roche-Flavin’s pen, those elementary requirements are 
reframed and expanded in terms drawn from the political metaphors we are now familiar with, 
especially that of the conseiller-as-senator.  The end result of his elaboration is a portrait of an 
ideal conseiller who possesses the essential Roman virtues: pietas, gravitas, dignitas. 
La Roche-Flavin’s reframing of the requirements of royal law is best illustrated in his 
presentation of the requirements for the “reception” of new conseillers—their acceptance as new 
members of the corps. This particular topic is for us a first fruitful site of investigation in La 
Roche-Flavin’s book, for it not only gives us access to what a toulousain président thought the 
essential qualities of the ideal conseiller should be but it also illustrates how the moral character 
demanded of the magistrate was framed, sometimes forcibly, to fit a senatorial model. 
By the time La Roche-Flavin wrote the Treze livres, a would-be conseiller had first to 
pay to obtain a royal “letter of provision” attesting that the king had “provided” him with the 
office. The “pourvu”—literally, “one who had been provided”—, however, still had to go 
through, a specific procedure before he could be accepted as a member of the corps. The two 
stages of this procedure, the “inquiry” (“enquête”) and the “exam” (“examen”), sought to 
establish whether the applicant had the qualities that the ordonnances prescribed. The “inquiry of 
                                                      
202 "A propos des "Treze Livres des Parlemens de France"," in Les Parlements de province, ed. Jacques 
Poumarède and Jack Thomas, Toulouse: FRAMESPA, 1996. 
203 For an exemple, see the ordonnance of June 1510 in Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, 
depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, XI, 580. 
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life, mores, and religion” was meant to ascertain the reputation of the would-be conseiller while 
the two-part exam was meant to test his legal knowledge (the kind of knowledge implied by the 
phrase “well-read”—“lettrez”—in the ordonnances) and his experience of judicial practice 
(“experimented” in the ordonnances).  This procedure was of recent origins and had been devised 
to address two specific sixteenth-century developments: the Reformation and the open practice of 
the sale of royal offices. 
La Roche-Flavin acknowledged his preference for the former, medieval mode of 
recruitment through parlementaire cooptation and he recognized explicitly that the inquiry was 
intended to ascertain the catholicity of the applicant. He also acknowledged that the examination 
was meant to prevent the “ignorant” who had bought his office to become conseiller. All those 
acknowledgments are contained in a single paragraph,204 much shorter than his extensive catalog 
of ancient parallels to the practice of the inquiry205 and his attempt to describe this procedure as 
an appropriate way of making sure that the applicant to the office of conseiller possessed the 
moral qualities necessary for the exercise of his office. Specifically, the moral qualities that the 
“inquiry” sought to indentify fall under the rubric of the Roman virtue of pietas, a concept best 
translated by the idea of devotion or duty to both one’s god(s) and one’s familias (another 
idiosyncratic Roman concept that finds a close early modern equivalent in the wide group 
designated by the contemporary expression “parents, friends and affins”206). 
Although La Roche-Flavin described Calvinism as a “damnable” “contagion,” he never 
pointed out specifically any fundamental incompatibility between the reformed faith and the 
                                                      
204 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 340. 
205 .  In doing so, La Roche-Flavin did not really innovate, for others had long before him put forward the 
Roman method of recruitment of public officials as a model to be followed in their own time. Christine de 
Pisan, for instance, already noted two centuries earlier that the Romans, in order to select “the worthiest 
and wisest” to be their public officials and make sure they were not corrupted by “vices and bad morals,” 
(Pisan, Livre de la Paix, II, 1, fol. 40) proceeded by “good inquiry” [bonne enqueste] (ibid., I, 13, fol. 23). 
206 See Françoise Autrand, "'Tous parens, amis et affins': le groupe familial dans le milieu de robe parisien 
au XVe siècle," ed. Philippe Contamine, Thierry Dutour, and Bernard Schnerb, Paris: Presses de 
l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 1993. 
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exercise of the office of conseiller. Under his pen, the purpose of the inquiry into the applicant’s 
faith becomes a way of ascertaining less his religious orthodoxy than his religious devotion. This 
particular reframing of the purpose of the inquiry is corroborated throughout La Roche-Flavin’s 
work by the idea that, after the model of the Roman public official, the conseiller’s religiosity 
plays a functional role in the exercise of his judicial office. I have already mentioned above how 
the oath the conseillers took at the beginning of each yearly session of the court pointed to the 
interplay between the secular sacredness of the conseiller’s duty to guard royal laws (“things 
holy”) and a religious faith without which none of the duties of the conseiller could be properly 
carried out. This faith was specifically Christian but for La Roche-Flavin, religion in a more 
general sense was meant to inspire the ideal judge in the day-to-day exercise of his office. He 
noted that each daily session began with a mass in the chapel of the court, “after the example of 
the Romans, (…) who were so religious that their Senate could not convene nor decide on 
anything anywhere else than in a place consecrated and dedicated by their augurs (…) and 
without first praying and sacrificing to their gods.”207 Likewise, La Roche-Flavin saw Mass as a 
“very holy and precious sacrifice,” a purifying ritual, a “marvelous antidote” that “prepares [the 
conseiller’s] conscience.”208 What prepared the judge’s conscience was not, in La Roche-Flavin’s 
mind, the commemoration of the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, but “the sacrifice of Mass”  209 
itself, intended to obtain inspiration from the Holy Spirit whose name “must be invoked, 
                                                      
207 "Pour la celebration desquelles Messes, il y a en tous les Palais et Parlements de France des chapelles 
consacrées, à l’exemple des Romains : lesquels estoient si religieux, que leur Senat ne se pouvoit assembler 
ny rien resouldre, sinon en un lieu consacré et dedié par leurs Augures (…) les Grecs et Romains ont eu 
ceste bonne et loüable coustume de ne rien faire sans prealables prieres et sacrifices à leurs Dieux (…)." 
La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 422-3. 
208 “(…) la cour assiste à la celebration du tres-sainct et precieux sacrifice (…). Quoy faict, et apres avoir 
prepare nos consciences par cest antidote merveilleux (…)” ibid., V, 3, 321. 
209 Ibid., VIII, 4, 423. 
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especially in matters of justice,” for it “purifies the air” and “his wings (…) always feather [the] 
actions [of the just man].”210  
Thus, this particular relation of the conseiller to God in which the Holy Spirit is called 
upon to inspire the magistrate in his actions as a judge, closely resembles the relation between 
God and the model of the king-as-judge embodied by Louis IX, who heard cases after mass or 
declared in the trial of Enguerran de Couci, to “know well what God’s will was in this case.” In 
fact, La Roche-Flavin, refers explicitly to Louis IX on this point, noting that “Saint Louis had the 
Sainte Chapelle built at the entrance of the Palais in Paris so that (…) those whom he had 
commissioned to distribute justice, and himself first, could go there to invoke the Holy Spirit.”211 
In another passage, it is clearly the exercise of sovereign justice, and explicitly the notion that the 
Parlement “represents” the king, that grounds the parallel between the king and the acting 
conseiller, for both possessed a status of exception in religious matters. Noting that “the kings of 
France have obtained from the Popes this privilege that they cannot excommunicate them (…) 
this privilege has been extended to their Parlements who represent the king in the exercise of 
sovereign justice.”212 This point not only highlights a practical application of the notion of 
representation, it also suggests that, while the Holy Spirit was to inspire the conseiller in the 
exercise of his “sacred” duty, the secular sacredness of sovereign justice seems to take 
precedence over the religious sacredness of Christianity when the two comes into tension. Even 
the conseiller-bishop was expected to abide by this hierarchy on the very moment of his reception 
in the corps of the Parlement, taking the oath “to keep the ordonnances of the king, the arrêts and 
                                                      
210“Le soleil levé ne purge l’air si sommairement et ne l’esclaircit si vivement, comme le fait l’esprit de 
Dieu, qui est invoqué. L’homme juste, qui a les ailses du S. Esprit, tousjours elles l’accompagnent, et 
tousjours le portent, et tousjours emplument ses actions. Nous ne devons jamais faillir de l’invoquer, 
principalement es functions de la justice.” Ibid., V, 9, 325. 
211 "Sainct Louis fit edifier la Saincte Chappelle à l’entrée du Palais à Paris, pour (…) ceux qu’il 
commettoit pour la rendre [i.e. justice], et luy mesme le premier, alloient invoquer le S. Esprit." ibid. 
212 “Comme les Roys de France ont obtenu ce Privilege des Paptes de ne pouvoir estre par eux 
excommuniés (…) ce privilege a esté estendu à leurs Parlemens qui representent le Roy en la justice 
souveraine (…).” Ibid., X, 4, 590. 
 90 
rulings [“règlements”] of the court” on his knees, a kneeling otherwise strictly reserved for 
God.213  
Thus, the quality that the “inquiry of religion” attempted to ascertain, according to La 
Roche-Flavin, was not only the candidate’s catholicity—that is, what the royal ordonnances had 
originally meant the inquiry to establish— but more importantly his devotion, his aptitude to 
properly discharge his religious duties, that is, his religious pietas. This virtue was the basic 
requirement which, on the model of the Roman senator, reflected the ability to duly practice the 
sacrifice through which the judge could obtain “a clear mind and the conscience necessary to 
discriminate between false and true, between uprightness and injustice.”214 
Similarly, La Roche-Flavin does not present the inquiry into the applicant’s “life, mores, 
and conversation” as a means to uncover signs and manifestations of religious heterodoxy, but 
rather as a search for signs, in the domestic sphere, of the moral aptitude and rectitude required to 
exercise a public office, that is, signs of the applicant’s “familial” pietas. Indeed, La Roche-
Flavin’s view is that “economic science, that is the art of ruling one’s household, is one of the 
main parts of political science (…) also consists in applying oneself to one’s domestic and private 
affairs.”215 As was his habit, La Roche-Flavin immediately backed this idea of a link between 
civic and domestic virtues with the authority of a Roman example, in this instance that of Cato 
                                                      
213 This formula is taken here from the reception of the bishop of Nîmes  in December 1644 (Etienne de 
Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, ADHG MS 147, vol. III, fol. 75) “(…) et après s’alla 
mettre à genoux devant M. le premier president qui lui fit jurer sur le tableau de la passion figurée de notre 
seigneur qu’il tenoit en ses mains de garder les ordonnances du roi, arrêts et reglemens de la cour (…).” 
For another illustration of this hierarchy, see p. 144 below for how the bishop-conseiller had to have his 
cross lowered and put behind him once he entered the salle d’audience of the Parlement. 
214 "(…) afin d’obtenir le Sainct Esprit et avoir l’esprit net, et la conscience pour discerne le faux d’avec le 
vray et la droicture d’avec l’injustice, jus ab injuria, aequuum ab iniquo, verum a falso, purum ab impuro, 
rectum ab obliquo." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, VIII, 4, 423. 
215 “Bien que la science oeconomique, c'est-à-dire l’art de bien regir un mesnage soit l’une des principales 
parties de la science politique (…) toutesfois elle consiste aussi, et se doibt estendre à un honneste soing de 
pouvoir à ses affaires domestiques et privées.” Ibid., VIII, 10, 436. See also VI, 28, 356: “they should not 
be promoted to the office of magistrates, those who don’t know how to govern their families and their 
servants, and who do not manage well their private property, and neglect their own affairs, for they are not 
capable of handling the public ones” (“on ne doit promouvoir aux Offices et Magistratures ceux qui ne 
sçavent gouverner leur familles et leur domestiques et qui ne conduisent pas bien leur fortune privée, et 
font fort negligemment leurs affaires, pour n’estre capable de manier les publiques.”). 
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“the Censor” who was known to be “as a good and wise governor of public affairs, as well as a 
good father.”216 
This probity at home, however, and the ability to conduct one’s domestic affairs were not 
just signs of the integrity and capacity necessary to properly act as a public official. Indeed, the 
requirement of domestic virtue had a twofold justification in La Roche-Flavin’s mind, for it was 
also the moral requirement that founded, in the eyes of the public, the authority of the judge and 
of his sentences. “Having to judge of the possessions, properties, and honor of others, [the 
magistrates] must be free of criticism,”217 for “if the subjects have a bad opinion of those who 
command, how will they obey? And if they don’t obey, what kind of outcome should we 
expect?”218 In other words, the inquiry is meant to establish a set of qualities, “good judgment 
[“prud’hommie”], probity, integrity of conscience, purity of hands,”219 that fall under the category 
of the Roman pietas, all required because the magistrate “must be irreprehensible” in order to 
judge others.  
This idea that this ancient model of moral perfection of the judge is the foundation of the 
authority of his sentences and, to a lesser extent, a requirement to exercise his judgment in 
judicial affairs to reach these sentences, drives much of the rest of La Roche-Flavin’s work. 
Turning to the acting conseiller indeed, La Roche-Flavin dedicates much time and attention to 
those exterior signs—attitudes, ways of behaving, speaking, holding one’s body, dressing—
which, taken together, bespoke the virtues—Roman again—of gravitas and dignitas of the 
                                                      
216 “Cato dict le Censeur, lequel avec ce qu’il fut bon et sage gouverneur de la chose publique, il fut aussi 
bon père de famille.” Ibid., VIII, 10, 437. 
217 “ayant à juger des biens, des fortunes, de la vie, et honneur d’autruy, ils doivent estre exempts de 
blasme.” Ibid., VI, 2, 340. 
218 “Et si les subjets ont mauvaise opinion de ceux qui commandent, comment obeiront ils? Et s’ils 
n’obeissent quelle yssue en peut on esperer?” Ibid., VI, 1, 339 Following another formulation: “the people 
and subjects of the king, having to give to the [magistrate] respect and obedience, they must be disposed to 
do so by his good life and reputation. Which would be a difficult thing if the magistrate bore a stain or 
imperfection.” (“le people et subjets du Roy, estans obligez de luy rendre tout respect et obeissance, il faut 
que la bonne vie et reputation les y dispose. Ce qui seroit mal-aisé si le Magistrat estoit noté de quelque 
tasche ou imperfection.” Ibid., 340). 
219 Ibid., VI, 3, 341. 
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individual conseiller, virtues that were supposed to both manifest and reinforce the authority of 
the court.   
The gravitas sought from the conseiller was achieved through a self-discipline that mixed 
repeated calls to moderation and strict prohibitions on a range of topics. Moderation and sobriety, 
a quality “commendable to all, but even more to the magistrates, who must be the mirrors and 
examples of virtue to others,”220 must be applied to drinking,221 eating,222 dressing,223 speaking,224 
laughing,225 to postures, gestures, and composure.226 These recommendations, down to 
considerations on how to hold one’s hands, whether sighing is acceptable, frowning tolerable, are 
laced with the usual amount of ancient, preferably Roman, examples. La Roche-Flavin is more 
ambivalent on the question of moderation in one’s possession, for if ostentatious luxury is to be 
avoided—for instance with furniture, horses, coaches, jewelry—227 the wealth of the magistrate is 
both a sign of a social standing that carries a form of personal authority, and a safeguard against 
the temptations of corruption. The gravitas thus manifested by this moderation was to be 
maintained through prohibitions against a number of practices and activities deemed frivolous or 
immoral: hunting,228  gambling, attending public dances229 and the “farces of comedians,” 230 
wearing perfume, and wigs, dying one’s hair.231  
                                                      
220 Ibid., VIII, 9, 432. 
221 Ibid., VIII, 9, 432-3. 
222 Ibid., VIII, 9, 433-6. 
223 Ibid., VIII, 13, 449-59. 
224 Ibid., VIII, 15, 460-2. 
225 Ibid., VIII, 47, 517. 
226 Ibid., VIII, 32, 495-8. 
227 Ibid., VIII, 33, 498-502. 
228 Ibid., VIII, 43, 511-3. 
229 Ibid., VIII, 44, 513-4. 
230 Ibid., VIII, 74, 541. 
231 Ibid., VIII, 46, 515-7. 
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The gravitas and dignitas of the conseiller were to a certain extent related, in that both 
virtues were meant to function as manifestations of the majesty attached to the office of sovereign 
judge. Where gravitas can be seen as a passive reflection of this majesty (mainly achieved 
through restraint), dignitas appears to be an active assertion of this majesty (achieved through a 
certain lavishness of gestures and symbols). The elementary requirement for the dignitas of the 
conseiller, has to do with his quality of office-holder and sends us back to the virtue of pietas, 
which, as we have seen, is the basis of the reputation of the magistrate. As La Roche-Flavin put it 
quoting Loyseau,232 “the office being defined as a dignité, this honorary title cannot be granted to 
those who have lost their honor,” that is “good fame, good opinion and reputation.”233 Thus, the 
basic idea is that the dignitas of the conseiller should match the dignité of his office. Drawing on 
the theory of representation, royal majesty was attached to the “dignity” of the office of 
conseiller, and reframed through the senatorial metaphor, this majesty became imperial. The idea, 
formulated for instance by Nicolas Bertrand at the beginning of the sixteenth century, that the 
Parlement was of “great and senatorial eminentia,”234 translated in very practical terms at the 
level of the individual conseiller.  
The wearing of the parlementaire red robes (the prescriptive counterpart to the 
prohibition against wearing indecent clothes), best exemplifies how the idealized conseiller was 
expected to wear his dignitas on his sleeve, so to speak. Those judicial robes were reminiscent of 
the senatorial toga and the color red was understood to manifest both imperial majesty and the 
sacred dimension of justice. As La Roche-Flavin put it, “scarlet, was the color that Ezekiel 
                                                      
232 Charles Loyseau, Cinq livres du droit des offices, Paris: Veuve Abel L'Angelier, 1613, I, 13, 38. 
233 "l’office estant defini dignité, ce titre d’honneur ne peut demeurer à ceux qui n’ont plus d’honneur (…) 
c'est-à-dire bonne renommée et la bonne opinion et reputation de tous." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, VI, 19, 352. 
234 Bertrand, "Opusculum de magnifica parlamenti tholosani institutione atque noveissima illius 
roboratione sive confirmatione," fol. 62v. 
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attributed to justice and divine severity”235 The function of this display was no less clear: the goal 
of “this majesty and gravity is to impress in the people’s minds, respect and veneration of 
justice.”236 Thus, the virtue of dignitas consisted in the proper representation to others—and this 
word of representation can be taken in its theatrical meaning—of the majesty of the office of 
conseiller. While the wearing of the red robes was reserved for solemn occasions such as the 
entrance ceremony of the opening session of the Parlement, processions and lit de justice, the 
black robe, less solemn but which still clearly bespoke the rank, dignité and authority of those 
who wore it, was to be worn at all times, on the model of both the priest and the senator.237 
The resulting normative portrait of the ideal conseiller, combining the virtues of pietas, 
gravitas, and dignitas, was congruent with in-house theories of parlementaire power. This ideal 
conseiller who demonstrated, through those virtues, that he carried his office at all times, in 
himself and on himself, was the individualized translation of the idea that the perpetual and 
sovereign corps he was a member of found the origin of its power in itself. Thus, what La Roche-
Flavin spelled out through hundreds of pages packed with hundreds of Roman exampla, are the 
elements of a discipline that was meant to regulate the attitude, demeanor, appearance of the 
individual conseiller, thought of as exterior manifestations of the authority the royal magistrate 
carried within himself. In other words, the ideal conseiller whom this individual discipline 
intended to produce was conceived as a reflection of the majesty of the whole corps. While 
calling on ancient virtues associated with the Roman senator, the application of this self-
discipline, the sense of the higher purpose that motivated it—to “work for the salvation of the 
respublica”—also points to both the noble and ecclesiastical dimensions of this normative 
portrait.   
                                                      
235 "escarlate, de telle couleur qui est attribué par Ezechiel à la justice et severité divine." La Roche-Flavin, 
Treze livres des Parlemens de France, V, 3, 321. 
236 "Et ce affin que par ceste majesté et gravité nous imprimions en l’esprit des personnes, le respect et la 
veneration de la justice." ibid. 
237 Ibid., VIII, 11, 451. 
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As for the nobility of the conseiller, it appears in discussions of the title of messire or 
chevalier attributed to members of the court238 which send us back to medieval jurists’ self-
fashioning as “knights” of a “legal militia.” Arguing that the conseillers had, throughout history, 
saved the kingdom, La Roche-Flavin puts them on par with the sword nobility, and called on the 
now traditional arms-laws binary to draw a parallel, set in a specific historical context: 
(…) we can say that our monarchy has been preserved, particularly during 
the disorders and civil wars that have begun in this kingdom in the year 1562, 
and several times before during the long wars against the English and other 
foreigners, and during interregna or the absence of kings, not only by the 
victorious arms of our brave and valorous nobility, but also by the authority, 
judgment and foresight of our Parlements, solid columns and flying buttresses 
[arcs-boutans] of this State [Estat].239 
The argument, however, functioned as a historical illustration of a nobility of the 
conseiller that La Roche-Flavin more often derived from his favored parallel with the Roman 
senator and the higher purpose of the duties of sovereign judge. 
Because La Roche-Flavin insisted on the sacred nature of this duty—thus following in 
the now long tradition of the jurists’ self-fashioning as priest—, the parallels between the judicial 
function of the conseiller and that of the cleric, are more frequent under his pen. I have just 
mentioned above how La Roche-Flavin prescribed that conseillers should wear their robes, “the 
mark of their magistracy”, not just in the Palais, but “through the entire city,” on the model of the 
priests, who were not allowed to appear in public without their “sacerdotal cloth.”240 The analogy 
is present throughout the book on a much more general level, stemming from a view of the 
                                                      
238 Ibid., II, 6-9, 46-8. 
239 “mesme nostre Monarchie peut dire avoir esté conservée singulièrement pendant les troubles et guerres 
civiles esmeues en ce Royaume puis l’année mil cinq cens soixante deux, et plusieurs fois auparavant 
durant les guerres longues des Anglois et autres estrangeres, et pendant les interregnes, ou absence des 
Rois, non seulement par les armes victorieuses de nostre brave et valeureuse noblesse, mais aussi par 
l’authorité, prudence, et prevoyance des Parlements, fermes colomnes et arcs-boutans de cest Estat.” Ibid., 
I, 2, 2. 
240 "les Presidens et Conseillers doivent porter la robe longue à la grand et large manche, amis aussi par 
toute la ville et ès faux-bourgs, pour la marque de leur Magistrature, ayant le Pape Leon IV faict pareil 
commandement aux Prestres, de ne paroistre en public et hors leurs maisons sans leurs habits sacerdotaux, 
de peur que les seculiers n’en recoivent du scandale et eux, peut estre, de l’injure. " ibid., VIII, 11, 451. 
 96 
exercise of justice as a sacred activity that underlay La Roche-Flavin’s contention that the 
parlementaire dignity is a sacerdotal dignity.241  
A striking passage of La Roche-Flavin’s book demonstrates how the sacredness of 
justice, the representation of parlementaire dignity as a sacerdotal dignity, and the normative 
representation of the conseiller as priest they entailed, underlay a particular normative 
representation of judicial practice as well. Elaborating on the view that “the chambers of the 
Parlement are altars that have been erected in the temple of Justice,” La Roche-Flavin wrote,  
Nothing can be more pleasant to God than a trial whose throat has been 
properly slit on these altars. One wishes that every hour, minute after minute we 
performed a massacre of trials and that we found ourselves with the blood of 
trials up to our knees. Judges, if they do so, should not fear to be called cruel, for 
in those matters, piety is cruel [“in hac re, pietas esse crudelem”]. We wish 
indeed that trials only had one head and that we could severe it in one clean 
gesture of our knife, so that its root would be killed forever.242  
As this passage suggests, judicial practice was not simply an object that was framed by 
representations of the ideal conseiller, it was also, in and of itself, an element of the normative 
portrait of the magistrate. As I have mentioned earlier in this section, experience in judicial 
practice was a requirement vaguely defined in the ordonnances and scrutinized more specifically 
by way of an examination that preceded and conditioned the reception of the conseiller. La 
Roche-Flavin’s observations on this two-part examination—the court tested first the legal 
knowledge and then the practical experience of the applicant—was a translation, at the level of 
the individual conseiller, of the ideal of a preeminence of justice over law that I have mentioned 
                                                      
241 Ibid., VIII, 16, 463-4. On this point, also see the analysis of Colin Kaiser, "Les cours souveraines au 
XVIe siècle: morale et Contre-Réforme," Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations. 37 (1982). 
242 "[les chambres du Parlement de Paris] sont autant d’autels qu’on a dressés au temple de la Justice, sur 
lesquels autels on dresse ordinairement les sacrifices, on presente les holocaustes, non pas seulement au 
matin, mais aussi les apresdinées (…) dieu ne pouvant avoir une victime plus agreable que d’un procès 
bien esgorgé sur ces autels, estant à desirer qu’à chascune heure, voir de moment en moment on fit des 
heccatumbes de procès, et que nous fussions jusques au genoüil dans le sang des procès esgorgés. Auquel 
cas il ne faut que les juges craignent qu’on les appelle cruels, car in hac re, pietas este crudelem. (…) Car 
nous voudrions que tous les procès n’eussent qu’une teste et que d’un seul coup on la peut si bien trancher 
que la racine à jamais en fust esteinte et périe." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, I, 
22, 40. 
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before.243 His assessment of the examination of the théorique (as opposed to pratique),244 is rather 
critical, for, while the examination was meant to prevent the “ignorant” to become conseiller, La 
Roche-Flavin expresses serious doubts on the usefulness of the knowledge tested in this first part 
of the exam. In most cases indeed, candidates who were able to “cackle like magpies”245 on the 
passages of the law-books randomly opened in front of them, once appointed conseiller became 
silent during the deliberation on trials. La Roche-Flavin blamed this outcome on the law schools 
where the educational focus was on the humanities and elements of Roman law that were 
completely irrelevant to the practice of justice in the Parlement, disconnected as they were from 
the laws and legal matters actually in use in the kingdom.246 
More fundamentally, La Roche-Flavin’s doubts about the usefulness of doctrine came 
from his view that “the true science of law is learned in the Palais, and more particularly at the 
hearings [“ès audiences”].”247 This view is in keeping with the idea that “justice is the end of 
law,” a view which La Roche-Flavin reformulates in terms of day-to-day judicial practice, 
explaining that, because laws have a rigidity that does not suit the diversity of circumstances and 
situations which trials bring about, the “office” of the judge consists in “accommodating the laws 
to serve current affairs, rather than accommodating affairs to suit the laws.”248  In fact, 
immediately following this observation, knowledge of the laws per se has altogether disappeared 
                                                      
243 See p. 83 above.  
244 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, VI, 28, 361-3. 
245 “Mais le malheur est que ces respondans, ou la plus part apres avoir longuement discouru et caquetté 
comme des pies, des le leandemain de leur reception estans distribué et installés en leur Chambre et veans 
aux prises et à opiner sur le jugement des procez qui se presentent, ils demeurent muets comme de 
poissons, sans sçavoir presque la moindre decision ou resolution du droict practiqué et observé en 
France.” Ibid., VI, 28, 361. 
246 Ibid., VI, 28, 361-2. Most of these relevant legal matters are related to private law. Among them, La 
Roche-Flavin quotes “contracts, pacts, transactions, stipulations, wills, legacies, substitutions, intestate 
successions.” 
247 Ibid., IV, 38, 307. 
248 “Il ne suffit pas, pour estre bon juge et magistrat, d’avoir beaucoup estudié et estre bien versé es loix, 
mais il faut sçavoir les bien accommoder et faire servir aux affaires occurans, et non accommoder les 
affaires à icelles.” Ibid., VIII, 56, 527-8. 
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from the list of qualities required of the ideal judge. The judge must be “first, gifted with a good 
and sound natural judgment, secondly he must be prudent, mature and without passion or any 
affection except for the common good and salvation, and thirdly, he must be well-versed and 
experimented in various types of trials.”249 
Thus, experience in judicial practice is for La Roche-Flavin an essential feature of the 
ideal conseiller. In order to be a good judge, one has to study the arrêts of the court rather than 
the laws,250 to have been not only a practicing lawyer but one who has “haunted the bar” (“hanter 
le barreau”),251 and “attended hearings assiduously.”252  As a result, La Roche-Flavin is much 
more favorable in his observations on the exam on practice, for which he drops his criticism of 
contemporary universities and jurists to go back to his usual stock of ancient models, putting 
forward the example of Cato of Utica, who would not assume the office of quaestor because he 
had not familiarized yet with all the practical aspects of the charge.253 
Ultimately, when thinking of the qualities required of the ideal conseiller, La Roche-
Flavin places the experience of the practice of justice and the possession of Roman virtues on the 
same level. He noted indeed, that practical experience, like the honor without which one cannot 
hold the office,254 is a requirement of the parlementaire dignity. Without it, magistrates “cannot 
exercise their charge with dignity.”255  
On the surface, it might seem that a detour via the Old Testament, ancient Rome, Saint-
Denis, or the coronation of Hugues Capet, has taken us very far, in time and space, from Arnaud 
                                                      
249 "il faut que le juge et magistrat soit doüé en premier lieu d’un bon et sain jugement naturel, et qu’il soit 
en second lieu sage, meur et sans passion, ny affection aucune, fors qu’au salut et bien public ; et 
tiercement qu’il soit versé et experimenté en plusieurs sortes d’affaires." ibid., VIII, 56, 528. 
250 Ibid., VIII, 77, 542. 
251 Ibid., IV, 39, 307-8. This was not only the opinion of La Roche-Flavin but a legal requirement: one had 
to have been a registered lawyer for four years before he could be received conseiller. 
252 Ibid., IV, 39, 306. 
253 Ibid., VI, 36, 372-3. 
254 See p. 93. 
255 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, VIII, 6, 426. 
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du Tilh and his amende honorable. The theories of power, legal concepts, and political imagery 
that underlay, as we have seen, a specific, self-reflexive parlementaire discourse, also shed light 
however, on the meaning of this ritual and on a shared conception of the ideal of royal justice it 
entailed. What we have learned thus far, tracing the roots of the ideal of the king-as-judge and of 
parlementaire conceptions of their own judicial power, certainly helps elucidate why and how 
God, the king, “justice,” and the victims— Bertrande and Martin Guerre —were perceived to be 
bound together in a way that justified Arnaud’s request for forgiveness to each one of them 
separately and to all of them together. 
God had been offended not only because, in that particular instance, Arnaud had defiled 
specifically the sacred institution of marriage, but because his “despicable crime” was an offense 
to and an attack on a divinely ordered organization of the body social, a body which, 
anthropomorphized not just by jurists and political theorists but in the minds of all, was in the 
image of God, that is, sacred and perfect. Thus, Arnaud had also committed an offense to the 
king, to a certain extent to “his” king Charles IX, but much more generally to the king as an 
abstraction, that is, to the mystical body of the king, the dignitas regia, in a word to a French 
kingship, which, God had recognized, represented him on earth, as the coronation ceremony 
sought to make clear. This offense to the king was in fact a betrayal, for this unique position in 
which God had put the king, sacred figure “at the head of the Christian people,” entailed a 
contract between the monarch, whose duty it was to maintain peace among the French men and 
women who, in exchange, owed him fidelity and thus became his subjects. Justice was both the 
instrument and the object of this contract, and as such was both the central duty and the main 
source of power attached to the royal office. Justice was an eternal principle, one of the cardinal 
virtues of Christianity, but also a feature of the dignitas regia, which, like the mystical body of 
the king, never died—justice never moves (“jamais justice ne bouge”). 
Although justice thus came from the prince, the condemned, after he had already asked 
for forgiveness to the king, turned to his immediate judges when he next asked for forgiveness 
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from justice. This was more than just a logical next step in the apologetic sequence that gave its 
rhythm to the amende honorable, for a process of assimilation between the intangible, eternal 
principle of justice and the judges who “distributed” it was already well under way in the middle 
of the sixteenth century, especially in the case of conseillers such as Jean de Coras—Arnaud’s 
judge—, who had claimed with some success, that they were members of a corps whose 
perpetuity and sovereignty were in the image of justice itself. This corps—the Parlement, but also 
more generally the judicial corps that royal magistrates arguably formed together—was part of 
the corps of the king, and as such, occupied a particular location and function in a larger corps, 
that of the anthropomorphized body politic and social, to which all involved in the amende 
honorable were related: God as its creator, the king as its head, justice as the life principle that 
regulated its proper functioning, Arnaud, Bertrande, and Martin, like millions of subjects the king 
of France, as the hardworking members that fed and carried this corps. Arnaud had betrayed this 
corps he belonged to: he had scorned not only justice but some of the elementary institutions—
marriage, familial piety, trust—which maintained, on a day-to-day basis, the harmony and health 
of peripheral regions of this body, of remote village-communities such as Artigat, whose life, far 
away from the head, was regulated on a daily basis without intervention from the king or the 
judges who “represented” him. Because he had violated some of the basic principles of this 
regulation, Arnaud had become a gangrenous member, a malignant element that threatened the 
health of the whole body. 
Arnaud had to ask for forgiveness from God, the king, justice, and the members— 
Bertrande and Martin— that stood for the whole of this body he had endangered, because he had 
committed not just “a prodigious crime,” but a multi-layered parricide against all of them: against 
his divine author, against his earthly protector, against those who, through justice, “worked for 
the salvation” of the body he belonged to, and finally against this very body social of which he 
was both a member and the progeny. The amende honorable translated a conception of justice 
which was so entrenched in the collective imaginary of early modern France that the ritual 
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seemed to have that ability to transcend major shifts in the political culture of the country at the 
end of the Old Regime. In 1788, at a time when the desacralization of the monarchy was well 
under way, when a transfer of sovereignty from king to nation had already become imaginable,256 
when the notion of representation was undergoing a major transformation, when conceptions of 
the body social had started to change in radical ways, a Parisian crowd apparently still thought 
that the ritual of the amende honorable was a potent form to express their conception of justice. 
Having hung a sign that read “traitor to the king and the patrie, disturber of public peace” around 
the neck of a mannequin of minister Lamoignon, the crowd carried it in cart around Paris and 
stopped in several different places to take it down, force it on its knees, and demand that he asks 
for forgiveness “to God, to the king, to justice and to the Nation for the offense he had done to 
them.”257 
 
Sixteenth-century parlementaire self-representation, was a particular, politically-loaded, 
reformulation of this shared and deep-seated conception of justice. Through the self-serving 
promotion of the idea of a distinctive secular sacredness of justice, it contributed from afar to 
make possible this later transformation of the conception of justice into an ideal that ended up 
transcending its own monarchical origins. We have seen how a number of ideas originally 
developed by medieval jurists—conceptions of sovereignty, the notion of representation, the 
metaphors of the jurist as priest and knight—have been appropriated by parlementaires, and how 
these ideas underlay a self-reflexive political discourse on the nature of the power, both judicial 
                                                      
256 See Chap. 5 of Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat? (1789) : “The nation exists prior to everything; it is the 
origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself. Prior to the nation and above the nation 
there is only natural law. … In each of its parts a constitution is not the work of a constituted power but a 
constituent power. … The national will … simply needs the reality of its existence to be legal. It is the 
origin of all legality. … However a nation may will, it is enough for it to will. Every form is good, and its 
will is always the supreme law.”(Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès, "What is the Third Estate," in Political 
Writings: Including the Debate between Siéyès and Tom Paine in 1791, ed. M. Sonenscher, Indianapolis 
and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003, 136-8). 
257 Clarisse Coulomb, ""L'Heureux retour". Fêtes parlementaires dans la France du XVIIIe siècle," Histoire, 
Economie, et Société 19-2 (2000): 210. 
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and legislative, of the Parlements. As La Roche-Flavin’s Treze livres des Parlements de France 
illustrates, these ideas and the particular discourse they supported, also shaped a specific 
normative portrait of the ideal conseiller. Judicial practice in the sovereign courts, was not simply 
shaped by this portrait, for, as we have discovered as well, a normative representation of judicial 
practice was also an integral part of this portrait of the parfait magistrat.  
La Roche-Flavin’s use of a conditional mode of expression in the striking passage where 
he describes judicial practice as a religious sacrifice of trials performed by a conseiller-priest, 
(“one wishes,” “we would,” “if”), reminds us of the gap between these representations and the 
practical realities they intended to reform rather than reflect accurately. Concluding Book 8 of the 
Treze livres, La Roche-Flavin himself notes that the parfait magistrat does not exist, that he is an 
imaginary figure, an assemblage of ideal features which can be found separately in the collection 
of individual magistrates, but not together in any single one of them.258
                                                      
258 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, VIII, 82, 549. 
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PART II:  
THE ARCHIVE AND THE CLOCK: JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN 
ITS SPACE AND TIME 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE SPACES OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE. 
 
Kingdom, ressort, city: the imagined spaces of sovereign justice. 
 
I approach the French kingdom, the ressort (the territorial jurisdiction of the Parlement), and the 
city of Toulouse as “imagined spaces” because they shaped the conseillers’ judicial practices mostly on a 
conceptual level. To be sure, the material reality of those different spaces also affected the judges’ 
activities in practical ways. At a time when it took more than two weeks to travel from Toulouse to Paris 
and several days to reach the most remote parts of the resort, distance affected concretely the circulation 
of news, information, orders, men, with direct and obvious consequences on the practice of justice. In this 
chapter however, I argue that those spaces—kingdom, ressort, city—had as much, if not a greater 
influence on judicial practices as imagined spaces as they had as physical spaces. Even at the local level 
of Toulouse, a physical space that the conseillers mastered more effectively than the ressort or the 
kingdom, sovereign justice was thought of as integral to the imagined city of Toulouse—that is, its 
imagined urban space and its imagined local community.  
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Kindgom 
 
As the king’s procurator (procureur général du roi) reminded the court in 1512,259 “the kingdom 
of France contains the whole of Gaul,” an ancient territory that the magistrate then proceeded to 
identify—using Caesar’s old definition—as a space found between “natural” frontiers: the Rhine river, 
the Alps, the Pyrenees.260 Because the king “[was] emperor in his kingdom,” the procurator continued, all 
the seigneuries of Gaul fell within the royal jurisdiction. In accordance with the contemporary 
understandings of sovereignty presented in the first two chapters and illustrated here by the procureur 
général in Toulouse, the primary imagined space of sovereign justice was the kingdom, the territory over 
which the French kings claimed sovereignty. This basic, quasi-tautological point raises a number of 
difficulties, for if sovereign justice was in theory indivisible, it was shared between, or properly speaking, 
exerted concurrently by several sovereign courts. In the first and second chapters, I have shown how the 
theory of representation helped explain that sovereign justice always remained in the hands of the king 
and at the same time exercised by his sovereign courts. From a territorial perspective, the difficulty seems 
to be further complicated by the existence of several parlements that exercised sovereign justice 
concurrently with the king but also with one another.261 The seemingly counterintuitive idea that 
sovereign justice could be divided territorially between the jurisdictions of several courts of final appeal 
was justified by the theory that all the parlements were part of a larger entity, a “super-parlement,” as 
Robert Palmer once called it to explain the parlementaire theory that came to be known as “union des 
                                                      
259 Quoted in Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 2, 221. 
260 This is a practical illustration, in the law court, of the famous theory of “natural frontiers,” developed by late-
medieval and early-modern French jurists and political thinkers and later championed (militarily) by the French 
kings, most notably Louis XIV at the end of the seventeenth century with his aggressive policy of the “pré carré.” 
261 In 1550, there were seven parlements, in chronological order of their date of creation: Paris (1250s), Toulouse 
(1444), Grenoble (1453), Bordeaux (1462), Dijon (1477), Rouen (1499), Aix (1501). Six more were created between 
1550 and 1715: Rennes (1553), Pau (1620), Dombes (1623), Metz (1633), Tournai (1668), Besançon (1676). 
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classes” in the eighteenth century.262 While the “union” component of the theory served an ideology of 
parlementaire solidarity that emerged in the specific political context of the courts’ opposition to a 
number of monarchical reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century, the concept of “classes” was 
much older and arguably already in use—albeit under a different guise—at the end of the Middle Ages. 
This idea that each parlement was a subdivision of a larger sovereign court whose territorial jurisdiction 
corresponded to the kingdom as a whole, is attested in parlementaire theory as early as the first half of the 
seventeenth century.263 This idea can even be traced back to a much older theory, which the kings 
themselves had put forward to justify the institution of new parlements, presenting them not as creations 
ex nihilo but as divisions of pre-existing sovereign courts. This was precisely the rationale that underlay 
the establishment of the parlement de Toulouse in 1444, presented by the king as a “dismemberment” 
(démembrement) of both the territorial jurisdiction and the corps of the parlement de Paris.264 Thus, the 
imagined space of sovereign justice was always, at least in theory, not simply the territorial jurisdiction of 
a particular parlement but the kingdom of France as a whole. And in theory at least, the arrêts of each 
                                                      
262 “[The parlements] now claimed that they were parts of a general or super-parlement, a parlement of all France, of 
which the several actual parlements were simply subdivisions, or what they called “classes” in the older Latin sense 
of the word.” Palmer, The age of the democratic revolution a political history of Europe and America, 1760-1800, 
94. 
263 A conseiller argued in an assemblée générale des chambres in 1615 that “[The Messieurs of Bordeaux] are 
treated as confrères and as part of the corps, and it is also true that all the courts of Parlement of France are deemed 
to be one Parlement, equal in power and jurisdiction.” 263“On traitoit [Messieurs de Bordeaux] comme confrères et 
comme tenans du corps, aussi est-il vrai que toutes les (…) cours de Parlement de France ne sont estimées qu’un 
Parlement, égales en leur pouvoir et leur ressort.” Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 149.  Thirty 
years later, in the course of a deliberation on the letters endowing François Fouquet, bishop of Agde and formerly 
conseiller in the parlement de Paris, with an office of conseiller in the parlement de Toulouse, a toulousain 
conseiller offered a more elaborate formulation, placed within a historical perspective : “the parlement de Paris is 
the first parlement of France, and that of Toulouse was erected by Philip the Fair at the same time as that of Paris, 
thus one could say that these two parlements fraternizing with each other are reputed to be one same parlement.” 
(“le parlement de Paris est le premier parlement de France, et celui de Toulouse a été erigé par Philippe le Bel a 
même temps que celui de Paris, et par ainsi il se peut dire que ces deux parlemens fraternisans ensemble ne doivent 
être censés qu’un même parlement.”) Ibid., III, 90 (1er avril 1645). 
264 In his letters that founded the parlement de Toulouse, the king (Charles VII) first acknowledged the 
inconvenience and difficulty for his Southern subjects to plead their cases in “our city of Paris, where our supreme 
court of Parlement is established,” and then proceeded to establish that same court in “our city of Toulouse.” The act 
never distinguished the two courts because, according to the royal logic, they were in fact the same court “sitting” in 
two different cities. (Lettres portant institution du Parlement de Toulouse, ADHG, 1B 1899, October 11, 1443, read 
and published in Toulouse on June 4, 1444). From the perspective of the Parisian parlementaires this 
“dismemberment” was experienced as a “mutilation” and an humiliation (see Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et 
l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 2, 281). 
 107 
parlement —the sovereign act par excellence for only the conseil du roi and the parlements could call 
their decisions “arrêts”—took effect in the kingdom as a whole and their authority was mutually 
recognized and enforced by all sovereign courts. 
The kingdom as space was imagined not just as a somewhat abstract geographical area but also as 
a collection of sites which, situated outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the parlement de Toulouse, 
occupied a special place in the mental landscape of the conseillers. The residence of the kings, still partly 
nomadic in the first half of the sixteenth century but increasingly fixed in Paris and then Versailles 
(1682), was an anchoring point of the parlementaire spatial imaginary. The toulousain conseillers—like 
their counterparts in the other provincial parlements—had an ambivalent relationship to the distant seat of 
the central government, for it was the location whence both their power and its limits came from. This 
seat was not only the throne—the literal royal seat—it was also the location of a number of organs of 
central government related to the exercise of sovereign justice. Bureau des parties casuelles, chancellerie, 
conseil du roi, for instance, were the locations through which the sale of the conseillers’ office—the core 
of their sovereign judicial power—was negotiated.265 The magistrates could thus perceive Paris and 
Versailles as the source of their power, but they were also places from which conflict, threats, 
deprivations, and punishments came to the toulousain conseillers. The conseil privé was the place where 
the cases that were removed from their purview were judged,266 where their arrêts could be quashed,267 
where the letters of the premier président reporting their resistance to the king or their breaches of 
discipline were sent, read, debated and sometimes led to reprimand, punishment, or disgrace. Finally, and 
in a similarly ambivalent way, Versailles and Paris were also central to the conseillers’ imaginary, for 
                                                      
265 See Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, , esp. 150-83. 
266 David Parker, "Sovereignty, Absolutism and the Function of the Law in Seventeenth-Century France," Past and 
Present 122 (1989): 56. 
267 Albert N. Hamscher, The Conseil Privé and the Parlements in the Age of Louis XIV: A Study in French 
Absolutism, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987, 85. 
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there gravitated around the king the grandees whose patronage was critical to parlementaire careers.268 In 
the parlement de Toulouse, as in that of Rouen studied by Jonathan Dewald, “what was critical to most 
robe careers (…) was not loyalty to the crown but patronage from members of the great aristocracy.”269 
Of course, in all those cases, it was the men who resided and acted in those places who could 
empower or disempower the toulousain conseillers, not the places themselves, be they the room where the 
conseil privé convened in the chateau de Versailles, the bureau of the Chancellerie where the conseillers’ 
letters of provision were sealed, or the Parisian hôtel particulier of an influential grandee. But what 
matters here from a spatial perspective is not so much the locations themselves but the distance, or rather 
the sense of distance that shaped the magistrates’ perception of these ambivalent influences on their 
political, judicial and social power. Because of this ambivalence, this distance was both a blessing and a 
curse on the magistrates. 
This ambivalence of geographical distance appears most clearly in the way in which the rules of 
political interaction between a sovereign court and the king changed depending on how far a parlement 
was from the physical person of the king. For instance, when the Parlement de Paris refused to register an 
edict, the text of the law could be back on their desk the following day, while it would take about a month 
in the case of Toulouse—about two weeks for the lettres de remontrances to reach Paris and two 
additional weeks for the king’s lettres de jussion to come back. This precious time, a luxury that the 
parlement de Paris could never afford, could be used to prepare and deploy pre-emptive strategies of 
defense against the central government. On the other hand, when the court was in conflict with local 
forces—be they other judicial institutions, royal or not, or popular movements against monarchical 
                                                      
268 See Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986 ; Judicial Politics and Urban Revolt in Seventeenth-Century France. The Parlement 
of Aix, 1639-1659, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. See also the role of the Prince de Condé in the 
career of Philippe Giroux, président in the parlement de Dijon, James Richard Farr, A tale of two murders : passion 
and power in seventeenth-century France, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005. See Chapter 3: 
“Manutentionnaires de la loi: the men behind the practices.” 
269 Jonathan Dewald, The formation of a Provincial Nobility. The Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen, 1499-
1610, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, 86. 
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policies, especially tax policies—the conseillers found themselves cut off from the backing—most 
critically the police and military backing—of the power they represented. 
Similarly, the ways in which both conseillers and litigants perceived the distance that separated 
them from the king affected their respective perception of the nature and extent of the judicial power of 
the magistrates. In the situation of relative spatial isolation of the court from the material and military 
support from the king, this perception of the power of the Toulousain conseillers was at the core of the 
court’s actual authority (or lack thereof), and thus shaped the magistrates’ ability to deploy their judicial 
practices. For most of those who lived within the territorial jurisdiction of the Parlement de Toulouse —
that is, a 90 to 95% rural population who would never embark on a two-week journey to Paris—the 
distance from the king was immense. To them, the physical person of the king was not just symbolically 
but literally a distant figure, Paris and Versailles were other worlds which they knew they would never 
see. This perception was also a double-edged sword for the judicial authority of the magistrates. On the 
one hand, distance from the king could paradoxically enhance the royal pedigree of the conseillers in the 
eyes of the provincial litigants, for the magistrates probably were the closest to an incarnation of royal 
majesty most of them would ever get close to. On the other hand, because of this distance, those 
displeased with the conseillers’ judgments could be tempted to test the court’s capacity to enforce its 
decisions, as was the case in the context of local political struggles involving the sovereign court.270 
 Thus, whether we consider the kingdom as a whole or as a nexus of islands of power outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Parlement de Toulouse, the influence of this distant space on the practice of 
sovereign justice had two main characteristics: it was ambivalent and it was indirect. Indeed, the 
ambivalent influence of distance and isolation from the king rarely affected judicial practice in a direct 
                                                      
270 “Judicial commotions” were, however, extremely rare. Contrary to what Arlette Farge suggested in her study of 
public opinion in Paris in the eighteenth century (Arlette Farge, Dire et mal dire. L'opinion publique au XVIIIe 
siècle, Paris: Seuil, 1992), rebellions against sentences perceived as unjust were not frequent at all. Pascal Bastien 
noted for instance only five rebellions against capital executions in Paris for the whole eighteenth century (Pascal 
Bastien, L'exécution publique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle, Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2006, 128). This phenomenon was 
restricted neither to Paris or to the eighteenth century. In his study of “scaffold rebellions,” Jean Nicolas counted 
only 32 judicial commotions for the whole kingdom over 125 years (1661-1789) (Jean Nicolas, La Rébellion 
française. Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale, 1661-1789, Paris: Seuil, 2002, 379-86). 
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way—it was the case, for instance, when a trial was removed from the purview of the court to be 
transferred to Paris, a rare occurrence in the history of the parlement de Toulouse. Rather, this imagined 
distance was a remote but permanent backdrop to the conseillers’ conception of their practices and to the 
litigants’ appreciation of the actual authority and power vested in those practices. To put it simply, the 
judges of the parlement de Toulouse appeared as both the biggest and the most isolated local players on 
the mental political map of early-modern Languedociens. 
 In this particular provincial situation, the interdependency between the practices of the 
conseillers and representations of the sovereign nature of their power was even more critical than in the 
Parlement de Paris. In Toulouse as in Paris, judicial practices were both an end and a means of 
representation of parlementaire power. An end, for these repeated and often ritualized representations 
participated in the production of the judicial and largely symbolic authority that founded the conseillers’ 
practices. An instrument as well, for practicing sovereign justice meant being seen acting as sovereign 
judge and thus was in itself a representation and assertion of sovereign power. In the parlement de Paris 
too, judicial practice was both a significant goal and instrument of representations, but in the case of 
Toulouse, the distant and provincial situation of the court turned self-representations of sovereign power 
into a truly vital foundation of judicial authority. 
Ressort 
 
Although the kingdom as a whole and a few sites of central government constituted important 
sections of the conceptual backdrop that shaped, obliquely, the practice of sovereign justice, the ressort—
that is, the territory over which each parlement had jurisdiction—271 was a more prominent spatial 
reference that framed the conseillers’s judicial practices more directly.  The ressort, however, also 
remained for the most part an imagined space. While the shape of the ressort of the parlement de 
                                                      
271 One could say that, as each parlement was a classe of an imagined “super-parlement,” each ressort was a 
territorial subdivision of the kingdom over which each court exerted full sovereign justice. 
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Toulouse was delimited with great precision and was thus known to the conseillers, most of the space 
contained within its borders had to be imagined. The ressort of the parlement de Toulouse covered a vast 
stretch of Southern France, roughly equivalent to fourteen of today’s departments.272 In a time when 
traveling was much slower and much less frequent than today, even the most mobile of contemporaries—
merchants, peddlers, itinerant preachers, journeymen—could only know partially or at least very 
indirectly this area of more than 45,000 square miles. A fortiori, the most assiduous conseillers—that is, 
those who were present almost every day in the Palais in Toulouse (as the attendance records of their 
chambers attest)—273were even less likely to have direct knowledge of most of the places from which a 
significant number of their cases came. 
Although each conseiller could certainly write down the list of the twenty-five sénéchaussées and 
maybe even a list of most of the one-hundred-and-ninety-two sièges royaux that fell under their 
jurisdiction,274 most of the ressort remained to them an unseen space. Arguably, this nomenclature of 
royal jurisdictions that took the form of a list of cities where the lower royal courts resided rather than that 
of map of the ressort divided into smaller territorial jurisdictions, operated as an elementary and 
reassuring administrative tool, devised precisely to overcome a lack of direct knowledge of the space over 
which the court had judicial authority. 
While some of the magistrates of the parlement de Toulouse might had visited those imagined 
places, to Paris, to Versailles, and while many of them came from remote corners of the ressort, they 
remained largely ignorant of the spaces and places that fell under their jurisdiction. The great majority of 
their judicial practices and more generally most of their actions as conseillers, took place within the 
                                                      
272 In 1462, the sénéchaussées of Landes, Agenais, Bazas, Périgord, Saintonge and Guyenne were taken away from 
the ressort of the parlement de Toulouse to form the ressort of the newly created parlement de Bordeaux, but in 
1788 the ressort of the parlement de Toulouse was still the second in size after that of Paris and included the quasi-
totality of today’s départements of Haute-Garonne, Aude, Hérault, Tarn, Gard, Lozère, Ardèche, Haute-Loire, Tarn-
et-Garonne, Lot, Aveyron, Gers, Hautes-Pyrénées, and Ariège. The creation of the parlement de Pau in 1620 and of 
the conseil souverain de Roussillon in 1660 only led to minor territorial subtractions from the ressort of the 
parlement de Toulouse. 
273 On the question of parlementaire attendance, see p. 184 below. 
274 See Appendix 1. 
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circumscribed space of the Palais. Only under a limited number of specific circumstances did the 
conseillers officiate outside of the Palais: deputations (to the king, to a grandee, to a royal official such as 
the governor of the province or a freshly appointed premier président), processions, visitations of the 
prisons of Toulouse three times a year (“reddes”), an occasional one year assignment to serve in the 
Chambre de l’Edit in Castres,275 and the rather rare commissions to carry out an investigation on locations 
outside of Toulouse. The work that the conseillers did at home, in their private study, was the judicial 
activity that the magistrates conducted most regularly outside of the Palais, that is not very far from the 
Palais, for, as we will see shortly, they lived in the neighborhood and some of the conseillers could see 
the Palais from their window. 
The conseillers’ “spatial ignorance” of most locations that fell under their territorial jurisdiction, 
was not a new phenomenon in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. A number of early-modern 
transformations contributed to accentuate this ignorance: the geographical widening of the magistrates’ 
recruitment pool meant that an increasing number of “foreigners” were brought in to administer regions 
unknown to them, the expansion of territorial jurisdictions (as a result of the territorial expansion of the 
French kingdom) meant that “foreign” regions were brought under the authority of local administrators, 
and the tightening and extension of the administrative network of the monarchy within pre-existing 
jurisdictions meant that royal agents started reaching places which, in practice, had remained blank zones 
on the royal jurisdictional map. The spatial ignorance of the magistrates however, predated these 
transformations, for, even when the royal domain was confined to the Paris region in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, it had been an administrative requirement that local royal agents—the prévôts—came 
from outside the circonscription they were sent to administer and that they be transferred to a new district 
                                                      
275 This Chambre de l’Edit, also known as Chambre mi-partie, was instituted by the Edict of Nantes (1598) to judge 
the trials of Protestants with equity. Manned equally by protestant and catholic magistrates, the court was installed in 
Castres (about fifty miles East of Toulouse) and was abolished by Louis XIV in 1670, just a few years ahead of the 
abolition of the Edict of Nantes (1685). See Stéphane Capot, Justice et religion en Languedoc au temps de l'édit de 
Nantes. La chambre de l'édit de Castres (1579-1679), Paris: Ecole des chartes, 1998. 
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after a few years on the job.276 Thus, the sixteenth-century conseiller in the parlement de Toulouse was in 
a similar judicial situation as that of the twelfth-century prévôt in that they both received a great majority 
of cases from places—that is, from communities with their own local privileges, customs, balance of 
power—they did not know. 
Although this state of spatial ignorance persisted into the early-modern period, it was 
apprehended very differently by the sixteenth-century conseiller, with significant consequences on 
judicial practices. The change in the perception and attitude vis-à-vis this ignorance must be linked to the 
slow transformation of the nature of judicial truth which took place between these two time periods.277 
Within the context of this general transformation, the “spatial ignorance” that had been largely irrelevant 
to the medieval judge who operated in a primarily ethical system of truth that gave precedence to the 
testimony of worthy members of the local communities, became a constraint for the early-modern judge 
increasingly concerned with a need to establish the factual circumstances of legal cases. 
Trying to understand the way in which space was imagined, and more particularly the way in 
which the space that remained unknown to the parlementaires within and outside their territorial 
jurisdiction was perceived, can help us understand larger trends in the transformation of judicial practice 
in the early-modern period. A number of judicial practices—for example inquiring, interrogating—
underwent transformations that were guided by a new need to overcome ignorance—as we will see not 
just ignorance of space. This judicial need to overcome ignorance was itself not new. After all, it could be 
said that all judicial systems share as their most basic purpose the uncovering of some form of truth—but 
it was felt in new ways in the early-modern period as a change in the nature of judicial truth drove 
parlementaire practice away from judicial ethics and toward judicial epistemology. 
                                                      
276 March 23, 1302. Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, II, 
773. 
277 To put it in general terms for now, judicial truth—that is, the truth established by judicial processes and 
procedures—underwent a shift in standards and in focus, transforming from an ethical system concerned with 
establishing the social and moral worthiness of the litigants through the testimony of co-jurors, into a system 
increasingly geared towards reaching the “objective” truth of a crime through knowledge practices aimed to 
establish “facts.” 
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Toulouse, judicial city 
 
Although the city of Toulouse was, in contrast, a fairly well-known space, I would like to 
approach it as an imagined space as well, for it is as such that the city’s local space primarily shaped 
judicial practice in the Parlement. Toulouse can be called a judicial city: justice was one of the main local 
activities, it involved a large segment of the population and constituted the basis of the social standing, 
financial clout and political power of the top tier of the Toulousain elite. This particular situation of 
justice in the local space—a situation that was not confined to an imaginary level for it manifested itself 
physically in the stone of parlementaire hôtels particuliers, suburban mansions, castles, and close-by 
landed property—had a significant formative influence on the conseillers’ judicial practices. 
A contemporary traveler approaching Toulouse could get a sense of the local prominence of the 
conseillers well before the city walls had appeared in sight. Somewhere along one the main roads that led 
to Toulouse, in that suburban area—in fact completely rural—called the gardiage,278 the Parlement 
started to manifest itself physically. A little less than ten miles or so away from the city, especially in the 
northern and eastern part of the gardiage,279 large parlementaire mansions, some of them genuine castles, 
began to appear on both sides of the road (Illustration 1).  
 
                                                      
278 In 1195, Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, had given a charter that placed a territory (extending about 15km north 
and south of Toulouse) under the guard (hence “gardiage”) of the capitouls—the municipal magistrates of the city. 
This rather large territory (30,000 acres), almost entirely deforested, was heavily exploited and populated and, 
although situated out of the walls, constituted an integral part of the city and thus directly fell under the jurisdiction 
of the capitouls. This is the reason why the commune of Toulouse today is larger than that of Paris. (Michel 
Taillefer, Vivre à Toulouse sous l’Ancien Régime, 35-36). 
279 See Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 1, 268. 
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Most of the surrounding fields, vineyards, orchards, woods belonged as well—directly or 
indirectly—to a few messieurs of the Parlement. If that traveler could have mentally translated the 
surrounding landscape into a land register bearing the names and titles of the owners, he would have 
certainly realized that in the immediate vicinity of the capital city of Languedoc, an office of conseiller 
or—better—président in the Parlement de Toulouse, put much more than a share of royal authority in the 
hands of the magistrates. With that virtual land register in mind, our traveler would have discovered that 
in every direction he turned his gaze most of the trees, stones, fences, fields and cattle he saw belonged to 
members of the Parlement. The local inhabitants of Toulouse and its immediate vicinity—that is, a good 
number of the litigants in the parlement de Toulouse—did not need a land register: they knew all too well, 
and without the help of any archives, to whom the bulk of their landscape belonged. 
Resuming his journey to Toulouse, our traveler would have started to make out the profile of the 
city. At first, he would have seen a profile that resembled that of any major French city of the size of 
Illustration 1: Château de Merville, property of the de 
Chalvet family. 
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Toulouse at the end of the sixteenth century (about 35,000 inhabitants in 1600, 64,000 in 1789): thick and 
high walls enclosing a mass of buildings spiked with a number of towers.280  
 
 
As he got closer however, the traveller would have started to distinguish some peculiar features. 
First of all, he would have noticed an unusual profusion of these spikes, many of them, including the 
tallest ones, topped with crosses.281 Many of those spikes, however, did not bear a cross and concentrated 
in the southern part of city (Illustration 2). Those were the hôtels particuliers of the most prominent 
citizens of Toulouse and the purpose of the towers raising from their hôtel was precisely to manifest the 
local importance of their owner, their varying height reflecting the supposed degree of prominence of 
these men. The oldest of these towers—often the tallest ones as well (Illustration 3)—had sprouted in the 
first half of the sixteenth century atop the hôtels particuliers of a few merchants who invested the profits 
                                                      
280 My imaginary voyager traveled in the 1590s. Toulouse underwent some major changes between that time and 
1778—when Garipuy wrote his rapport that will serve as a basis for our exploration of the Palais. While a late 
eighteenth century traveler would have certainly noticed important transformations (especially on the periphery of 
the city), he would have easily recognized the main features of the urban landscape. Contrary to most French cities 
for instance, Toulouse still had its walls in 1789. The inhabitants had been obliged to destroy the walls after the 
capture of the city that marked the end of the croisade des Albigeois in 1215. In 1346 however, they had been 
authorized to rebuild to defend themselves against the English who occupied the close-by province of Guyenne. 
These walls were only destroyed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
281 Despite being only the seventh or eighth largest city in the kingdom, Toulouse was probably only second to Paris 
for the number of its churches. The tallest spikes would have been the clochers of Notre-Dame de la Dalbade (81m) 
and Saint-Sernin (65m). 
Illustration 2: View of Toulouse in 1775 
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they had made in the pastel business282 to buy offices of conseillers in the Parlement de Toulouse.283 Thus 
by the beginning of the seventeenth century, most of these towers belonged to members of the Parlement, 
whether these men had inherited, bought or built them. The social, economic and political dominance of 
the parlementaires toulousains literally towered over the vast majority of smaller toulousains who 
swarmed in their long shadows.  
 
 
Coming from the north our traveler would have seen these towers in the background, that is, in 
the southern part of the city. One could almost say in another city. Indeed, although the old interior wall 
that used to separate the northern bourg from the southern cité had long been destroyed,284 the contrast 
between the two parts could not go unnoticed and, as matter of fact, is still visible in the toulousain urban 
landscape today. In 1544, Guillaume de La Perrière, then historiographer of the city, noted: 
 
                                                      
282 The pastel is a blue dyeing plant cultivated in the region. The trade of pastel in these years allowed powerful 
businessmen, experts in international trade, to constitute huge fortunes, while employing numerous workers, some 
of them, such as essayeurs, peseurs, or emballeurs, practiced entirely new professions. The trade started to stall in 
the 1560s because of rash speculation, overproduction of a lower quality, difficulties on the market of Anvers—its 
main outlet—and, most importantly, the discovery of the indigo, a better and cheaper dye coming from “the Indies.” 
283 I will look at those merchant ascensions to the Parlement in more detail in Chapter 5. 
284 Michel Taillefer, Vivre à Toulouse sous l'Ancien Régime: Perrin, 2000, 16. 
Illustration 3: Hôtel de Mansencal 
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As much as the city is full of houses and inhabitants around the Château narbonnais 
[as we will later see, this is the location of the Palais], Saint Etienne, la Pierre, les 
Changes, la Daurade, it is empty and deserted around the Bourg of Saint-Sernin, Saint-
Pierre des Cuisines, Lascrosses and their surroundings.  
 
Thus, having passed the porte Arnaud Bernard at the north of the enclosed city, the traveler 
would have entered the bourg and, whatever street he chose to continue his journey to the Palais, he 
would have walked between the large and almost cross-ruled plots of this northern part of Toulouse. The 
religious communities of that area had constituted the largest moulons—the local, contemporary term for 
city blocks—in the city: the Chartreux for instance, had progressively constituted, between 1571 and 
1617, the largest plot of the city (about 25 acres) east of the porte du Bazacle.285 This tendency will be 
even more pronounced in the seventeenth-century with the installation of numerous new religious 
communities in that area of Toulouse.286 Thus, still walking south in the direction of the Palais, our 
traveler would have first passed by the blank walls of these enclosures and of the churches and collèges 
that mainly constituted this northern part of the city.287 
 
Arriving where the place du Capitole would later stretch,288 the surroundings began to change: 
continuing his journey he would have left the blank walls of the bourg for the profusion of shops and 
smaller houses of the rue Saint-Rome, rue des Changes, rue des Filatiers. Not only the smaller moulons 
and higher density of buildings but also the multitude of the crowd and the effervescence in these streets 
contrasted with the relative calm of the bourg. Here started indeed the cité, this part which, as noted 
                                                      
285 Ibid., 26. 
286 Dames noires (1603), Capucins (1615), Carmelites (1617), Tiercerettes (1625), Visitandines (1649), Pénitents 
gris (1609), Filles de l’Enfance (1662). 
287 More than 50% of the Bourg was ecclesiastical property. The cadastre of 1680 thus indicates that in the 
capitoulat of Saint-Sernin, the 25 moulons included a major abbey (Saint-Sernin), a parochial church (Notre-Dame 
du Taur), eight convents, three colleges each of them with its church or chapel, an hospital and a cemetery. 
(Taillefer, Vivre à Toulouse sous l'Ancien Régime, 56-57). 
288 Today’s square and building (« le Capitole ») were cleared and built in the 1750s. Symbolically, the maison 
commune (later hôtel de ville) was built at the end of the twelfth century at the junction between the two parts of the 
old city, where the porterie, a gate of the roman wall that enclosed the cité, had been standing. 
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above in the words of Guillaume de La Perrière, was “full of houses and inhabitants.” The architectural 
density and human activity kept increasing until that point where the rue des Changes crossed the rue 
Saint Géraud, at the Halle de la Pierre, where the old Roman forum once stood. The Halle, Toulouse’s 
central market and commercial key point, was certainly the most active spot in the city. As the traveler 
resumed his journey south toward the Parlement the activity decreased: entering the neighborhood where 
the hôtels he had seen from afar were located, the streets became smaller, tortuous, less populated, and 
less busy (Illustration 4). He would have discovered that these hôtels with their high towers were 
surrounded by a number of smaller hôtels. 
 
 
Taking for instance the rue Tolosane in the direction of the Palais, he would have walked a street 
made up almost exclusively of hôtels particuliers, most of them belonging to officiers de justice, but none 
of them surmounted with one of these high towers. Here on his left the hôtel of Pierre Roguier, conseiller 
in the Parlement (1568-1578), that of François de Gargas, conseiller (1553-1602), Arnaud de Campistron, 
docteur et avocat and capitoul in 1589-1590, Mathieu de Chalvet, président of the seconde chambre des 
Illustration 4: Rue Vélane, in the 
Parlement neighborhood. 
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Enquêtes (1573-1604) and his son François, conseiller (1583-1605) (see Illustration 5), there on his right 
that of Jean de Melet, conseiller, Simond de Garaud, capitoul in 1585-1586, conseiller (1587-1605), son-
in-law of the premier président Duranti, Guillaume d’Ambes, conseiller (1554-1585), Jean Vigoros, 
procurator in the Parlement, Jean de Bonnefoy, secrétaire du roi, Antoine Alart, conseiller in the 
présidial. Thus, except for an apothecary shop and a salle de jeu de paume, this street—typical of this 
neighborhood situated between the Halle and the Palais—was almost entirely made up of hôtels that 
belonged to Toulouse’s gens de justice.  
 
Thus, the owners were not solely members of the Parlement, for many of them practiced in one of 
the numerous judicial institutions of the city. At the end of the sixteenth century indeed, Toulouse boasted 
the seats of three ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the Officialité métropolitaine, the Officialité diocésaine, the 
Chambre souveraine du clergé ; a seigneurial jurisdiction, the Temporalité of the archbishop ; a 
municipal jurisdiction, the tribunal of the Capitouls ;  the commercial jurisdiction of the bourse des 
marchands ; special royal jurisdictions: the tribunal of the maréchaux de France, the Bureau des finances, 
the Cour des monnaies, the Bureau des gabelles, the Maîtrise des ports, the Grande maîtrise des eaux et 
Illustration 5: Hôtel of Mathieu de 
Chalvet, rue Tolosane. 
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forêts ; finally two royal jurisdictions de droit commun, the tribunal of the senéchal, and the Parlement. 
Thus, not surprisingly, judicial professions represented an important part of toulousain society. As matter 
of fact, justice constituted the most important sector of activity in the city, even ahead of the textile 
industry that represented 15.1% of the inhabitants.289 According to the records of the capitation in 1695 
Toulouse counted 202 magistrates, 142 lawyers, 168 procurators, 37 notaries, 57 huissiers, 118 
praticiens, 71 “employés subalternes” in the various courts. These 795 people represented 2.7% of the 
population of the city at that time, 18.6% if one includes their dependents, family and domestics. 
 
Thus, still several hundred meters away from the Palais our traveler could have seen magistrates 
in their coach, huissiers and sergents carrying orders and summons to litigants, secrétaires dragging sacs 
of procedure from a praticien’s office to a magistrate’s house, litigants and lawyers converging to the 
Palais, litigants again, lining up at the door of their judge, like in Racine’s Plaideurs, and the crowd that 
Toulouse’s intense judicial activity set in motion. From this point of view, the judicial neighborhood 
around the Palais resembled the commercial neighborhood around the Halle.  
Thus, the judicial practices of the conseillers were visible and inscribed in indirect but multiple 
ways in the local urban and suburban space. The mansions and landed properties in the gardiage, the 
hôtels particuliers in the cité and, as we will see below, the iconographic use of the Palais as the symbol 
of the highest secular power in the city, were all unmistakable reminders of the social, economic, political 
and cultural capital that grew out of the practice of sovereign justice. Conversely, the judicial practices of 
the magistrates were shaped in part by local political concerns: the practice of sovereign justice, 
especially in the case of those judicial practices performed publicly, was an instrument of assertion of 
local power, for to be seen doing justice was not only, as the adage has it, a crucial legitimizing part of the 
                                                      
289 Taillefer, Vivre à Toulouse sous l'Ancien Régime, 223. 
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judicial process,290 it was also for the judges a critical part of a process of assertion of their judicial 
authority through repeated representations of that authority in action. 
 
The Palais as judicial maze 
 
Thus, while a number of parlementaire judicial practices were deployed against the backdrop of 
distant and imagined places, and while on occasions judicial procedure required that the conseillers 
actually transport themselves physically to places distant from Toulouse to perform some of those 
practices, most judicial practices were enacted in the circumscribed space of the Palais. 
Situating these judicial practices within the Palais offers an opportunity not just to look at yet 
another important way in which space shaped some of the conseillers’ professional activities, but to test a 
novel approach to the sovereign court, at a distance from the two main trends in the historiography of 
Parlements.291 Despite their ideological antagonism,292 these two historiographical trends share a number 
of methodological similarities that are reflected in the way in which they circumscribe parlementaire 
history within very few locations within the Palais. Indeed, both trends dwell almost exclusively in the 
salle d’audience de la Grand Chambre, that is, in only one of many locations in the Palais, in the one 
room which members of the Parlement themselves sought to frame as the unique stage of their self-
                                                      
290 Some French legal historians are keen on characterizing the saying “Justice must not only be done, but also be 
seen to be done” as an “anglo-saxon” adage (quoted by Antoine Garapon, "L'archéologie du jugement moderne," in 
Les rites de la justice : gestes et rituels judiciaires au Moyen Age, ed. Claude Gauvard and Robert Jacob, Paris: 
Léopard d'or, 2000, 222 and Robert Jacob, Images de la justice: essai sur l'iconographie judiciaire du Moyen Âge à 
l'âge classique, Paris: Léopard d'Or, 1994, 6), maybe because of its reformulation by a British judge, Lord Hewart, 
in the twentieth-century ("it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly 
and undoubtedly be seen to be done,” Lord Chief Justice Hewart in R v. Sussex, ex parte McCarthy). The maxim 
has been repeated quite often in recent decades in the context of the development of humanitarian law (e.g., the 
Antonio Cassese, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, quoted in Rachel 
Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia : an exercise in law, politics, and diplomacy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 92. 
291 On those two trends, their differences and similarities, see p. 12-15. 
292 This antagonism, as I noted in my introductory chapter, perpetuates the rift that the Enlightenment opened in 
eighteenth-century French politics (see Introduction, p. 15).  
 123 
serving representations. Staged in that particular room, this representation of a united corps sitting in 
general assemblies for a variety of aggrandizing purposes (to validate or reject royal laws, conduct the 
trials of grandees, publicize the highly ritualized rentrées parlementaires, pronounce arrêts généraux in 
solemn red robes, etc.), obfuscates a far less magnificent but sprawling “backstage,” a labyrinthic 
architectural complex in which judges, but also litigants, lawyers, procurators and judicial auxiliaries of 
all kinds, enacted with words, papers and objects the everyday judicial practices that occupied most of 
parlementaire time and space. 
The judicial maze 
 
As a starting point, I would like to develop the analogy I have just hinted at: the Parlement is a 
labyrinth. This is what the court looks like to the neophyte historian, this is what it still feels like after 
months of research and despite a decent degree of familiarity and understanding, this might be as well the 
impression it left on the unknowing litigant who entered the Palais for the first time. The Parlement is a 
jumble of parchment, papers, sacs, walls, stairs, corridors, studies, halls, archives, shelves, desks, 
benches, prisons, etc., which constructed and housed a variety of entangled jurisdictions, attributions, 
offices, social relations, political fictions, legal theories, rules, procedures, emotional and symbolic 
investments and expectations, and, of course, practices.  
The image of the Parlement as a labyrinth seems to hold true on a number of levels. Materially 
first, since, as we will see shortly, the Palais was quite literally a labyrinth. On a less literal level as well, 
for in the Parlement’s records, dichotomies such as those between civil and criminal, ordinary and 
extraordinary, public and private, secular and religious, blur into an unfamiliar haziness that makes the 
Parlement look like an elusive “judicial maze” to our modern eyes. Finally, on a human level too, for the 
idea of labyrinth befits the sophisticated tangle of the many interpersonal relationships that were regulated 
by a variety of taxonomies: professional hierarchy, the division of labor dictated by judicial procedure, 
patron-client networks within and outside the corps, dynastic positions and linkages. 
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Maybe most interestingly for my purpose, the labyrinth analogy can also help us approach the 
judicial process without falling prey to what I call the “rhetoric of linearity” of judicial procedure.  
Reading dozens of lawsuits helps realize that judicial procedure, as the historian can reconstitute it, is no 
less a normative framework than law itself293 and produces the illusion of a rather smooth and linear path 
which, starting with the filing of a case in the greffe and ending with the pronunciation of an arrêt in the 
Grand Chambre, is nothing but a fictional judicial itinerary. This archetypal journey is almost never 
realized in practice and overlooks the multiplicity of paths litigants treaded in the judicial maze, the legal 
loops in which they often got caught, the obstacles (legal or otherwise) that brought their lawsuits to a 
halt, the dead ends in which they could get lost or sidetracked. Their judicial journey could last from a 
few minutes—if the case was dismissed at the greffe—to several decades and in many cases, possibly 
most cases, did not even end with a sentence.294 Thus, the labyrinth analogy can function as a safeguard 
against an uncritical acceptance of the rationalization of the judicial process that judicial procedure itself 
seeks to erect as a façade, precisely in order to mask the messiness of its actual practices. 
This analogy leads to a methodological difficulty however, for the labyrinthic representation 
evidently threatens to complicate rather than ease the task of presenting the Parlement de Toulouse: how 
can one go about unfolding with some sort of order this intricate assemblage of elements of such diverse 
nature? How can we render this whole intelligible without simplifying its complexities, flattening its 
irregularity or solving its inconsistencies? However heterogeneous the “jumble” of the Parlement, it was 
not a shapeless mass, an aggregate without order and I chose to call it a labyrinth rather than chaos or 
confusion, precisely because its many elements are connected to one another following pathways that 
might seem extremely intricate—if not plainly random—when seen from afar, but which in practice were 
trodden daily by insiders familiar with at least parts of the construction.295 None of these insiders might 
                                                      
293 In that respect, it comes as no surprise that the first legal codes drafted by the royal legislator pertained to 
procedure, first civil (1667) and later criminal (1670). 
294 This could and did happen for a variety of reasons: an amicable agreement could be reached within the Parlement 
(accord) or outside the court, the lawsuit could “die” because neither party pushed it further. 
295 At times, the engineer Garipuy expresses this idea very explicitly, see p.158 below. 
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have had a clear and complete understanding of the overall architecture of this eclectic complex, but most, 
if not all of them, seem to have had an intimate knowledge of the corners, bends and junctions of the 
particular areas they dwelled in and needed to navigate for the purpose of doing their job, advancing their 
careers, and even more frequently, their cause. 
In order to sort through the parlementaire tangle and also to meet my goal of conveying how the 
Parlement was enacted through practices by its insiders—a group in which I include magistrates, litigants 
and judicial auxiliaries—, I propose to forget temporarily about the construction as a whole, to focus 
instead on these “corners,” “bends,” “junctions,” and “areas” and approach them very literally, that is, as 
physical locations. In other words, I intend to explore these locations as sites of judicial practices based 
on a spatial representation of the Parlement de Toulouse, starting from the very literal labyrinth that was 
the Palais, a building which the contemporaries sometimes called le Parlement, precisely because it could 
be perceived as a metonymical representation of both the institution and the corps. Thus, my 
characterization of the Parlement de Toulouse as a labyrinth only holds as an overall, preliminary and 
admittedly vague assessment of the whole. It does not function as a concluding or conclusive definition 
but as a mere starting point for a more detailed representation through architecture. This representation 
will serve as a heuristic tool to assess the relationship between space, practice and the legal and political 
theories analyzed in the first chapter, the organization of judicial practices within that space, and the 
movement of people, papers and lawsuits through that space. 
An engineer in the judicial maze: François Garipuy and his rapport. 
  
The first methodological problem when one tries to infuse a representation of this architectural 
complex with an insider’s perspective stems from the almost complete lack of internal accounts of the 
Palais—an understandable absence since insiders were primarily users of a space which they had no 
particular reason to represent. To work around this issue, I will cross-read different sources in order to 
superimpose users’ practical uses of the judicial space onto an outsider’s account of that space. 
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Fortunately, this outsider visitor is not some hypothetical individual that I would need to create ex 
nihilo in order to hold up an account of a fictional journey into the Palais. In 1778, the engineer François 
Garipuy, “directeur des travaux publics de la sénéchaussée,” had been commissioned by the Etats de 
Languedoc to establish an estimate of the repairs needed in the Palais, and, as a result, left us an 
extremely valuable Vérification et raport de l’état actuel du Palais où siège le Parlement de Toulouse, 
ainsi que des divers battiments qui en dépendent, tels que les greffes, les prisons, les bureaux de la 
chancellerie.296 I use this very detailed, late eighteenth-century description of the Palais as my Ariadne’s 
web in and out the Parlement. I follow in the footsteps of this outsider who, not unlike us, had to find his 
way in the Palais, circumnavigate the buildings, assess their arrangement, and eventually find his way 
out. 
Before we let Garipuy be our guide, it is necessary to acknowledge that his rapport is, after all, 
yet another subjective representation of the Parlement de Toulouse, concerned with goals significantly 
different from ours. It is useful then to reflect first, if only briefly, on Garipuy’s status as an “outsider” to 
the Parlement and on the context of his commission in order to address the blanks and distortions of his 
account. 
First, it is important to note that Garipuy was not, of course, as much of a complete outsider or 
genuine foreigner to the Parlement de Toulouse as we are today, more than two centuries after the court 
was dissolved and the corps disbanded. Although not necessarily familiar with the internal arrangement 
of the Palais or with the functioning of the court on the eve of his commission, we can rest assured that, 
on the day Garipuy passed through one of the gates of the Palais to begin his report, the Parlement de 
Toulouse was not a completely unknown object on his mental map. First, and simply because Garipuy 
was a contemporary of the court and furthermore an educated citizen of Toulouse, we can assume that he 
presented himself at the gate of the Palais with some knowledge, at least a more extensive knowledge 
than ours, of what he was about to discover within the walls of the Parlement. As a Toulousain, he must 
                                                      
296 Rapport: ADHG, C 2254 ; Plans: ADHG, PA 263. 
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have passed by—if not crossed—these gates many times, and, the Palais, at least as seen from the 
outside, was already a familiar landmark in Garipuy’s literal and imagined landscape.297  
A second caveat concerns the limited scope of the commission Garipuy had received from the 
Etats de Languedoc and the kind of partial perspective it entailed in practice. However detailed Garipuy’s 
description of the Palais, it always remains circumscribed within the bounds of his specific assignment: 
Garipuy’s assessment of the building is unsurprisingly terse, as the engineer set aside any consideration 
irrelevant to the practical goal of his mission. This is precisely what makes Garipuy an outsider, since his 
perspective on the Palais is that of an expert but not an expert of law or justice, or even royal 
administration.298 This particular outsider position, the specific representation of the Palais it entails, and 
the constraints of the commission certainly explain why throughout his exploration of the Palais, Garipuy 
ignored (or maybe just did not see) two interrelated dimensions that are crucial for my own account: the 
symbolic and human dimension of the palais. 
First, while giving a very detailed description of the architectural elements he saw, Garipuy 
constantly ignored their symbolic dimension and function. I believe this ignorance to be intentional and it 
can be partly explained by the rather modest goal of Garipuy’s commission: his rapport was meant to 
establish an estimate of the repairs needed to ensure the solidity of the Palais. While Garipuy duly stuck 
to a plain assessment of these repairs, the somewhat disillusioned conclusion to his rapport indicates that 
he was well aware of the insufficiency—if not outright inadequacy—of the Etats’ project: 
Despite the details I delved into in order not to forget anything that is necessary to 
ensure the solidity of the buildings of the Parlement de Toulouse, I cannot promise I have 
included in this estimate all the repairs indispensable to achieve that goal. When one 
works on repairing constructions that are this old and dilapidated, it almost always 
happens that when one demolishes the parts that are visibly defective he discovers others 
that are in a comparably bad state and need as well to be built anew, although these 
additional repairs could not be foreseen at first. 
                                                      
297 If only because Garipuy’s father had an astronomical observatory built at 16 rue des Fleurs, just across the street 
from the Palais (Maurice Prin and Jean Rocacher, Le château Narbonnais : le Parlement et le Palais de Justice de 
Toulouse, Toulouse: Privat, 1991, 90). 
298 Although his first-hand experience as a royal engineer might have informed his report, especially when adopting 
a realistic approach to the bureaucratic and financial obstacles to the realization of the Etats’ project. 
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I have already said that, in order to diminish the expenses, the works we propose here 
are only repairs relative to solidity only and will not change anything to the organization 
of this palace, a building as much unpractical as it is irregular.299 
Thus, Garipuy certainly realized that the Palais was in need for much more than the haphazard 
papering over cracks that had been the rule in the course of the previous two centuries, but because the 
project of the Etats de Languedoc was rather limited in its scope, Garipuy rarely commented explicitly on 
the matter. Scattered throughout the rapport however, one finds hints—such as the conclusion above—
that Garipuy considered that the Palais was in need of a complete structural overhaul in order to do away 
with a tortuous spatial structure that congested papers, records, litigants, prisoners, lawyers, procurators, 
and magistrates within a faw narrow spaces. While I argue below that this congestion had become a 
constitutive part of judicial practice—and for that reason was maybe not perceived by inside users as an 
impracticality of the Palais—, the engineer did not fail to notice what appeared as a considerable 
architectural hindrance in his idealized and rationalized outsider’s conception of the practice of justice —
a conception that might have been closer to ours than to that of contemporary practitioners of justice. 
However, probably because his rapport was not meant to document plans for the construction of an ideal 
palais de justice, but more modestly to layout the most urgent repairs needed, the building that emerges 
from Garipuy’s description is significantly different from the one he had visited. The edifice of his 
rapport seems like a huge, empty, and wormy ghost vessel, very different from the Palais, to be sure 
dilapidated, but filled up with a constant flow of men and paper, resounding with the speeches of lawyers, 
pronunciations of arrêts, chanting of the daily mass in the chapel, and the hubbub of the crowd. Because 
his commission did not require him or give him the means to address this perceived impracticality, 
Garipuy cleared all this life away from his rapport. 
                                                      
299 "Malgré les details ou nous sommes entrés pour tacher de ne rien omettre de ce qui est necessaire affin d’assurer 
la solidité des battiments qui dependent du parlement de Toulouse, nous ne sçaurions nous promettre d’avoir 
compris dans ce devis toutes les reparations indispensables pour remplir cest objet. Lorsqu’on travaille a reparer 
des ediffices aussi anciens et aussi vetustes il arrive presque toujours qu’en demolissant les parties dont les vices 
etoient aparents on en decouvre d’autres qui sont en aussi mauvais etat et dont la reconstruction est egalement 
necessaire quoy qu’il ne fut pas possible de la prevoir. 
Nous avons deja dit que pour diminuer la depense les ouvrages que nous vous proposons ne sont que des 
reparations relatives a la solidité seulement et ne changent rien a la distribution aussi incommode qu’irreguliere de 
ce palais." ADHG, C 2254, fol. 112. 
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As the brief conclusion to the rapport quoted above indicates, Garipuy understood that the project 
of the Etats was quite insufficient. Not surprisingly then, the patching of the Palais, inadequate yet very 
expensive,300 never followed through and Garipuy’s report went unheeded. Thus the Palais remained in 
the same state for a few more decades because of a fundamental impossibility to reform and build anew 
that had lasted for over two centuries. There is an obvious parallel to be drawn here, as if the old fissured 
stones Garipuy described a mere decade before the Revolution materialized the cracking monarchical 
edifice as it still stood then: a massive but dilapidated construction that had started to groan under its own 
weight, that no one seemed able—by lack of means and/or will—to consolidate, but that had been 
standing for so long that no one seemed able either to realize that it could be on the verge of collapsing. 
The analogy interests me here not so much as an hermeneutical device to read the political history 
of the couple decades that lie ahead of Garipuy’s rapport, but rather as an invitation to read the 1778 
Palais back as a text, or rather, given its multilayered structure, as a palimpsest of its own human history. 
As we now proceed to follow Garipuy and observe this palimpsest-palace from both the outside and the 
inside, the multilayered structure the engineer mentioned in his conclusion and observed throughout his 
rapport, will serve as the basis for a particular kind of archaeology, one that cuts through these successive 
layers that looked “defective” to Garipuy, not to build anew in our case but to read the men and the 
activities that accommodated this material setting into a practical judicial space. 
 
But where and how to follow this guide? What itinerary should we take to circumnavigate the 
Palais? Garipuy followed a path that was determined by both the goals and constraints of his particular 
mission.301 With my own goal in mind I will dismantle and rearrange the engineer’s report in order to 
bring out the mutually constitutive relationship between the materiality of the Palais, the judicial 
practices and the theories (political and judicial) that did more than simply “take place” in it. 
                                                      
300 Garipuy’s final estimate amounted to 161,984 l. 4 s. Garipuy, Vérification et rapport, ibid. 
301 Clearly, not all repairs were dimmed equally urgent or necessary. The priority given to certain locations over 
others certainly explains why Garipuy started with the Salle d’audience de la Grand Chambre and ended with the 
prisons, however appalling their state. 
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Instead of replacing Garipuy’s itinerary by my own however,302 I propose to sort out and interpret 
the dozens of individual physical locations Garipuy described by identifying and analyzing a limited 
number of sites in the Palais that can fall under three main spatial rubrics: “outside views,” “stages,” and 
“behind the scenes.” 
As I have just suggested above with my two caveats, while Garipuy can guide us from site to site, 
his description will need to be completed. Fortunately, Garipuy’s rapport can be used in combination 
with other primary sources which, as an almost perfect complement to his report, let us know about the 
life of the court but are not the least concerned with situating these episodes within a systematic 
description of the Palais. 
 
Outside views. Asymmetry, irregularity, heterogeneity: history inscribed on the 
surface. 
(Place de la monnoye, Château Narbonnais, private houses, Porte de l’Inquisition, 
courtyard) 
 
 
The importance of the two caveats mentioned above appears immediately when reading the first 
notes Garipuy scribbled as he was standing at the foot of the Palais on the place de la monnoye (today 
place du salin), one morning of August 1778. Garipuy was only interested in assessing the nature and 
state of the buildings that housed the court and thus, his description of the outside of the Palais is rather 
succinct and only mildly concerned with architecture and, to a lesser degree, what we would call “urban 
planning”: 
                                                      
302 This refusal his motivated in part by the prevention against the rhetoric of linearity mentioned above, in part by 
the fact that I want to avoid privileging only one of a multiplicity of itineraries that all together make up the 
organization of judicial practice within the space of the Palais : that of the magistrates, in itself not one but different 
itineraries depending on the chamber in which they served, that of the litigants, determined by the type of lawsuit, 
their status as either plaintiff or defendant, as either men or women if prisoners, that of the auxiliaries, dictated by 
their particular functions in the judicial process. 
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The Palais where the Parlement holds its sessions is part of the former residence of 
the counts of Toulouse. It is situated on the edge of the city, near the gate called of the 
château Narbonnois. 
All the depending buildings are enclosed within a sort of compound [une espèce 
d’enceinte], closed at the south by the walls of the city, at the west and most of the 
northern part by their own walls bordering the surrounding streets and square, and for the 
remainder by the party walls of the adjoining houses that belong to private individuals 
and depend from the [royal] domaine.303 
Garipuy omitted here a number of details of interest to us. First, the place de la monnoye on 
which Garipuy was standing: to say the least, the engineer did not do justice to the exuberant activity, the 
swarming crowd, the noises, and cries which, most of the time, filled this space. Standing there, Garipuy 
certainly could see—but did not see fit to report—the intense activity of the Palais’ neighborhood I 
described above.304  
Similarly, Garipuy’s simple mention of the “château Narbonnais” and more generally his 
succinct description of the outside of the buildings must be completed because it fails to render the part of 
Toulousain history that was inscribed on the surface of the Palais. Had the project of the Etats been more 
ambitious and aimed at a major reconstruction of the Palais, Garipuy would have probably expressed a 
severe judgment on the lack of exterior visibility and solemnity of the judicial compound. He could have 
then pointed to the lack of luster of the architectural patchwork that had been pieced together on the ruins 
of the medieval castle of the counts of Toulouse, in order to insist on the necessity of a tabula rasa 
project. The contrast between architectural projects dans l’air du temps, for instance that of Claude 
Nicolas Ledoux for the Palais de justice in Aix-en-Provence (also the seat of a provincial parlement, see 
Illustration 6 below), and the façade presented by the Palais in Toulouse was stark indeed.  A simple look 
at one of the entrances of the Palais (Illustration 7) gives a clear measure of the discrepancy between the 
                                                      
303 "Le Palais ou siege le parlement fait partie de l’ancienne demeure des comtes de Toulouse. Il est placé sur le 
bord de la ville près de la porte apellée du château Narbonnois. 
Touts les battiments qui en dependent sont renfermés par une espece d’enceinte fermée au midy par les murs de 
ville, au couchant et sur la plus grande partie du nord par les murs qui les terminent vers les rues et la place 
voisine, et le reste par les murs mittoyens avec les maisons contigues qui apartiennent a des particuliers et qui 
relevent du domaine." ADHG, C 2254, fol. 1. 
304 See p.121. The litigants I described above lining up at a conseiller’s door could have been standing here at 
number 12 place de la monnaie, the hôtel of the de Chalvet family, which, without interruption throughout the 
seventeenth century, counted at least one of its members on the bench of the nearby Parlement. 
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actual building and an idealized vision of justice imbued with the Roman gravitas that transpired in 
projects such as Ledoux’s but also in the “senatorial” self-representation of the conseillers in the 
Parlement.305  
 
 
A nineteenth-century engraving representing one of the gates of the Palais (la porte de 
l’Inquisition,306 see Illustration 7 below) that was still standing before the ensemble was demolished in the 
course of the nineteenth century307 gives us a better sense than Garipuy’s rapport of the exterior aspect of 
the complex. On this engraving one can get a sense of the aggregate of public and private, of the 
asymmetry of the ensemble, of the successive layers which, adding on top of one another, had ended up 
constituting a highly heterogeneous architectural ensemble. As one can see on this engraving, the ogival 
                                                      
305 The Parlement de Toulouse as a corps often represented itself as the “senate of Toulouse” and the conseillers 
commonly self-titled “Senator Tolosae.” See Chapter 1, part 2: “Le parfait magistrat: early modern portrait of the 
ideal judge.” 
306 This “Inquisition” does not have anything to do with the Parlement. The gate was given this name because it 
faced another building across the street that had been the seat of the Holy Inquisition. 
307 The old Palais was demolished in stages, starting in 1825, to be replace by a new palais de justice, to a large 
extent the one that still stands today (Prin and Rocacher, Le château Narbonnais : le Parlement et le Palais de 
Justice de Toulouse, 135-56). 
Illustration 6. Claude Nicolas Ledoux, Project for a Palais de Justice in Aix-en-
Provence, 1786. 
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arch and the small bricks that made up the gate itself reveal the medieval origin of the gate. The corbelled 
construction hanging above the gate displays architectural features of a later time—probably the sixteenth 
century—and was a former guardroom from which a sliding iron gate could be operated. A quick look at 
this construction reveals that it was modified on several occasions over time. First, the modillions (the 
small projecting brackets placed in a series under the crown moulding of the cornice) between the two 
parts suggest that the upper half of this construction was not originally planned and was added later. The 
two bricked-up windows of the lower—and older—half of this upper part are symptomatic of the 
makeshift architectural solutions that were most often adopted when modifications and repairs were 
needed anywhere in the Palais.308 From this point of view then, after the tabula rasa decision of 1549 the 
Palais was very much in the image of the corpus of royal legislation: parts were never destroyed to be 
built anew, and except for a few ambitious but rare renewals, the edifice was patched willy-nilly, always 
in the hope that these temporary solutions would hold until the major reconstruction that was always 
called for but never came. 
The general asymmetry of the Palais is summarized here on both sides of the gate where the 
“private houses” rose to unequal heights. One can see in the architecture of these constructions too that 
floors were added at different points in time, with no apparent planning. Finally, the heterogeneity 
appears in the juxtaposition of various elements: a niche was carved in the old gate of the royal Palais to 
host a religious statue, on the left side of the gate a shop was set up, on the right side the former chambre 
du concierge du Palais seems to have been converted into a shop as well by the time the engraving was 
drawn in the early nineteenth century. 
 
                                                      
308 Maybe the nineteenth-century owner bricked up these windows to avoid paying the tax on doors and windows 
(instituted in 1798). 
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Illustration 7. Porte de l'Inquisition at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
(Musée Paul Dupuy). 
 
Looking through this gate one can make out on the other side what just looks like yet another 
street, bordered by unaligned buildings of varying heights. This “street” was in fact the largest courtyard 
of the Palais. Thus, a foreign traveler, unaware that this was the location of the former Château 
Narbonnais, now of the Parlement, could have unknowingly passed through this gate and entered the 
Palais. This almost seamless integration in the urban landscape is manifest on the contemporary maps of 
the city. On all of them, it is in fact very difficult to distinguish the courtyards of the Palais from the 
surrounding streets (see Illustration 8 and Illustration 9). 
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Illustration 8. The neighborhood of the Palais on a seventeenth-century map. 
(Plan Tavernier, 1631, AMT ii 671). The highlighted section marks the Palais (1). On both 
this illustration and the following one, compare the Palais to the architectural unity of 
other “institutions,” for instance the complex of the Dalbade church (2) and of the 
Augustins cloister (3). 
 
 
Illustration 9. Neighborhood of the Palais on another seventeenth-century map 
(Plan Boisseau, 1645, AMT ii 674). 
 
Thus, the physical presence of the former castle was only attested by a few scattered architectural 
elements such as the ogival arch of the porte de l’Inquisition that had survived in the early modern palais, 
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and one can understand that in the perspective of his rapport Garipuy did not spend more than a couple 
lines on the matter of the Château Narbonnais. The symbolic significance of the appropriation of the site 
of the château however, the former center of local power turned into a seat for the highest royal 
jurisdiction in the province, could not be lost on either Garipuy or any Toulousain. The unification of 
Languedoc with the royal domain in the thirteenth century was still, in the eighteenth century, a well 
known history309 and the Château Narbonnais was one of the main sites of that history: it had been the 
scene of a major battle when Simon de Montfort, leading the army of the French king, attacked Raymond 
VI, count of Toulouse, and besieged the city (1215).310 Immediately after the defeat of count Raymond 
VI, Simon de Montfort had settled in the château Narbonnais, as later did the representative of Alphonse 
de Poitiers,311 and later again the sénéchal the king of France sent to Toulouse to oversee the newly 
incorporated province. Thus, the occupation of the former residence of the counts of Toulouse had 
become synonymous with the possession of the highest secular authority in the city and the province. It is 
certainly worth noting that the magistrates of the court in the early modern period were not only keenly 
aware of this history but that some of them apparently took a particular interest in these episodes. 
François de Chalvet for instance, conseiller (1583-1605) and later président (1605-1622) in the 
Parlement, owned in his personal library a fifteenth-century manuscript of the Histoire de la guerre de 
Simon de Montfort contre le comte de Toulouse et les albigeois, an account of the events rather favorable 
                                                      
309 It resulted from a major armed conflict which, in the context of the croisade des Albigeois (1208-1215), had 
opposed the king of France to the counts of Toulouse. After Raymond VI was defeated at the siege of Toulouse 
(1215), and the immense territory that had been under his almost autonomous and exclusive authority later became 
an apanage entrusted to Alphonse de Poitiers. When the latter died without a male heir (1270), all his possessions, 
including the province of Languedoc, were incorporated into the royal domain. At that point, the king of France had 
direct authority over Toulouse and Languedoc.  
310 This episode has been told and retold many times, for instance in the Chanson de la croisade and by the 
chroniclers Pierre des Vaux de Cernay and Guillaume de Puylaurens. 
311 The treaty of Meaux (1229), included a clause by which the count of Toulouse Raymond VII gave his lands as a 
dowry for his daughter Jeanne who was to marry Alphonse de Poitiers, brother of Louis IX then king of France. The 
Château Narbonnais was one of nine “fortresses” to be given immediately to the king. (Prin and Rocacher, Le 
château Narbonnais : le Parlement et le Palais de Justice de Toulouse, 13). 
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to the count of Toulouse, and a contemporary edition of a slightly more neutral Histoire des albigeois et 
gestes de Simon de Montfort.312   
Not surprisingly, when in 1444 the second Parlement of the kingdom was created in Toulouse, its 
Palais was installed in the château where the sénéchal and viguier had had their seat since the late 
thirteenth century.313 While the choice of the château as a seat for the Parlement must have been partly 
guided by practical considerations,314 there can be no doubt that this decision was also, and probably 
mainly, motivated by the political statement that this occupation of the former château entailed. The 
importance of this occupation is underlined by its duration: over three centuries, from 1444 until the end 
of the Old Regime, despite the fact that the building offered less than ideal conditions. The unpractical 
and unsuitable character of the château for the activity of the Parlement resulted in its partial destruction 
between 1550 and 1555, but complaints about the new Palais were voiced as early as the late sixteenth 
century and would be repeated until the end of the period. Significantly, when the decision to give the 
court new premises was taken in 1549, no one suggested that the court be moved somewhere else and it 
was decided that the old castle would be demolished but that a new Palais would be built on the exact 
same spot where the counts of Toulouse had held their own court. In this case again, while many practical 
factors were certainly taken into account when making this choice,315 symbolic motivations should not be 
underestimated: as we will see repeatedly and in more details in subsequent chapters, the authority of the 
Parlement—a fundamental element for the functioning of the court—depended to an important extent on 
symbolic manifestations and representations of this kind. The physical location of the palais indeed 
manifested the appropriation and occupation of the traditional seat of the highest authority in the 
                                                      
312 Célestin Douais, "Les manuscrits du château de Merville," Annales du Midi 2 (1890): 36-64, 170-208, 305-64. 
313 When the château was partly demolished in the sixteenth century (1550-1555), the court of the sénéchal was 
relocated in the bourg, rue Mirabel (today rue Rémusat) where it remained until the end of the Old Régime. 
314 It was the only building in fifteenth-century Toulouse that was large enough to host the court (Prin and Rocacher, 
Le château Narbonnais : le Parlement et le Palais de Justice de Toulouse, 32). 
315 Among other reasons, the demolition of the château would at the same time clear a space that was large enough 
and provide a mass of stones that would be necessary for the construction of the new Palais. 
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province, and thus functioned as a literal reification of the Parlement’s claim to being the natural and 
exclusive successor to a long line of justice holders in the province.316 
Thus, this space not only served as a ground for the Palais but also bore a topographical and 
historical testimony to the idea that the authority of the court, and thus the basis and means of the exercise 
of parlementaire justice, were derived from two different and at times competing sources of power. The 
local source, that is, the lost power of the seigneur (dominium) which, although it had passed from the 
counts of Toulouse to the king of France—one could say the roi seigneur—, had always remained 
attached to a local space now occupied by the court, and the source of sovereign power, that is the 
allegedly superior power of the roi magistrat (imperium) which was passed on to the conseillers in the 
form of lettres de provision.317 I thus argue that the very location of the Palais, can be interpreted as a 
comprehensive account of the nature of royal power, here in its judicial manifestation. To my mind, this 
account is less partial than that of most of the contemporary political literature that put a particular and 
arguably exaggerated emphasis on the “fiscal king” over the “feudal king” (Kantorowicz).318 In other 
words, the Palais, while absorbed in theory in the royal “seigneurie in abstracto,” remained a physical 
object, an element of a “seigneurie in concreto” that had formerly belonged to the counts of Toulouse and 
retained a certain confusion of power that the lessons of political thinkers such as Loyseau tended to erase 
beneath the “fictitious clarity” of their intellectual and theoretical reasoning.319 
The power of the king of France as direct lord, was also tied to the space of the Palais by a 
peculiar jurisdiction that delimited the enclosure of the Palais much more clearly than seventeenth-
century maps. As Garipuy noted, this enclosed space was part of the domaine. In other words, this plot 
was, within the walls of a city that had long had its own libertés et privilèges, a direct and personal 
possession of the king of France. Thus, despite the fact that, as Garipuy duly noted, the compound 
                                                      
316 As we have already seen in chapter one, parlementaire claims to constituting the “senate” of Toulouse actually 
attempted to place the origin of the court’s authority within a much older historical tradition. 
317 Descimon, "La royauté française entre féodalité et sacerdoce. Roi seigneur ou roi magistrat?," 471. 
318 Cited in ibid. 
319 Ibid., 461-2. 
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comprised and was partly made of houses owned by private individuals (“des particuliers”) the location 
kept a theoretical unity by virtue of the king’s propriété éminente and the jurisdictional affiliation it 
entailed.320 
This interlocking of public and private buildings constitutes a first illustration of the peculiar 
labyrinthine nature of the Palais. While Garipuy was apparently not surprised by this tangle, he could not 
fail to take note, even before entering the Palais, of the architectural irregularity we have already noted on 
the porte de l’Inquistion and on the maps: 
The irregularity of this palace, the numerous rooms it contains, the unequal height of 
the floors where they are located, the twists and turns of the passages that lead to them, 
made it necessary that, in order to give an exact idea, I joined to this verification a plan of 
each floor and give each room a number corresponding to the one used in this report.321 
 
                                                      
320 The Parlement had direct jurisidiction over this space: all crimes and offenses committed within the enclosure of 
the Palais, whether in Palais proper or in these “private” houses were to be handled in first instance by the Chambre 
des requêtes, that is, literally on the spot. 
321 "L’irregularité de ce palais, le nombre des pieces qu’il renferme, l’inégale hauteur des etages ou elles sont 
placées, et les detours des avenues qui y conduisent ont exigé pour en donner une idée exacte qu’on joignit à cette 
verification le plan de chacun des etages, et qu’on y cottat chaque piece du meme numero par lequel elle est 
designée dans ce raport. Ces plans sont divisés en deux feuilles sur lesquelles sont colés des papiers de retombe 
pour indiquer certaines pieces de distribution qui sont placées les unes sur les autres."ADHG, C2254, fol. 1v. 
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Illustration 10. Garipuy's map of the first floor of the Palais. 
What Garipuy describes as “private houses” appear in light grey, the “shops” appear in black 
(ADHG 2 Mi 615). 
 
Garipuy’s two-dimensional plan sought to present a rationalized view of the Palais. Thus, despite 
the number of rooms and the asymmetrical structure that can still be seen on his plan, much of the tangle 
of the Palais is lost in this representation. In order to try and restitute it I have marked on Garipuy’s plan 
above (Illustration 10) the “private houses” and shops that interlocked with the premises of the court. 
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Illustration 11. Attempt of a reconstitution of the Palais at the end of the eighteenth century. 
(Prin and Rocacher, Château Narbonnais, Figure 16) 
 
The reconstituted elevation of the Palais at the end of the eighteenth century above gives a better 
idea of the overall irregularity of the architectural complex. Still, it displays an artificial uniformity and 
smoothness that these buildings did not have—as the engraving of the porte de l’Inquisition attests— at 
the time Garipuy visited them.  
Entering this long and irregular courtyard (56 feet wide and 394 feet long, see Illustration 10, 
location 3 above)322 one could believe he had actually just arrived on a market place, strangely located in 
a dead end. Garipuy’s plan clearly reflects that this courtyard was surrounded with shops on all sides. 
These shops not only generated an intense commercial activity that could have misled one into believing 
he had reached some trading center rather than the siege of sovereign justice in the province, they actually 
masked the buildings where justice was dispensed. A litigant looking for the Chambre de la Tournelle, 
could have explored the courtyard in vain in search for a sign or an imposing and solemn entrance to the 
                                                      
322 Garipuy: “This street is connected to the extremity of an irregular courtyard numbered 3, the average width of 
which, following on the orientation of the street, is 56 feet [9 toises 2 pieds], and the length of which, split in two 
halves by the pillars that support the bureau de la grand chambre [Fig. 9, location 3’], is 394 feet [65 toises]”. 
(Garipuy, Vérification et raport…, 2). 
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hall where criminal justice was dispensed at the highest level in Languedoc. The two narrow passages 
leading to the salle d’audience de Tournelle (Illustration 12, location 72), were hidden between the 
protruding stalls of the shops that crammed into the very bottom of the courtyard: 
 
 
 
Illustration 12. The eastern courtyard surrounded by shops 
(all shops appear in dark grey). 
 
Not only the plan, but Garipuy’s description indicates that these shops had grown in such a way 
that they “completely masked the entrances”323 to the buildings of the Palais. As can be seen on 
Garipuy’s plan, the double flight of steps (Illustration 10 and Illustration 13, location 4) that led to the 
Salle d’audience de la Grand chambre (Illustration 10 and Illustration 13, location 6) was no exception. 
 
                                                      
323 ADHG, C2254, fol. 28. 
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Illustration 13. Around the western courtyard.  
The western courtyard (3), the perron (4) and the Salle d’audience de la Grand Chambre (6), the chapel (7). 
 
A shop grew along the entire length of this perron on the side of the courtyard and thus both 
flights of steps were stuck between this shop and private houses on the west, between this same shop and 
another one on the east. The only element that could have indicated the presence of these stairs from the 
courtyard was the slate roofing that rose behind the shop and covered the common landing were the two 
flights ended: 
When one turns to his left in this courtyard he can find a double flight of stairs 
numbered 4, one oriented toward the east, the other towards the west, both made of 
dressed stone. On the landing, four little columns support a slate roofing above, the steps 
are worn and the whole is in a bad state.324 
 
Stages: magistracy and justice in representation. 
(Perron, Costumes, Salle d’audience). 
 
 
                                                      
324 "On trouve en se tournant sur la gauche dans cette cour un perron a double rampe cotté n° 4 qui est a l’aspect 
du midy de deux rampes de ce perron tournées l’une au levant l’autre au couchant sont en pierre de taille ainsi que 
quatre petites colonnes qui portent au dessus une forme de pavillon couvert d’ardoise, les marches sont usées et le 
tout est en mauvais état." ADHG, C2254, fol. 2. 
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However dilapidated and masked this perron, there was the genuine location of the passage from 
the outside world into the Palais. While Garipuy’s description and plan suggest that this perron, because 
of its bad state and the adjoining shop that partly masked it, barely stood out in the architectural landscape 
of the courtyard, its symbolic function would still have been visible to the onlooker standing in the 
courtyard thanks to the rituals that took place on the landing above. The most significant of these rituals 
would have been that of the entrance of a bishop-counselor in the Palais:  
(…) when [the archbishop of Toulouse] enters on the perron du Palais, his cross, 
which is carried before him when he gets about the city, is lowered and carried behind 
him. And when he enters the grande salle du plaidoyé [Illustration 13, location 6] his 
cross-bearer carries it to the chapel [Illustration 13, location 7], from where he takes it 
back when the said archbishop leaves. Then, the said archbishop walks before his cross 
until he is on the landing of the perron du Palais.325 
The arrival of the “episcopal troop” in the courtyard could not possibly go unnoticed: the 
bishop—or archbishop—wearing his luxurious episcopal chasuble, preceded by his cross-bearer holding 
the six feet tall cross up high and surrounded by a small group of canons and secretaries, could be seen 
from afar pushing his way through the crowd to the perron. Once there, in a clear sign of submission to 
the majesty of royal justice, the cross that manifested up high the majesty of episcopal power until that 
point was lowered and moved behind the bishop who then became, for all to see, conseiller du roi. 
Properly speaking, the bishops who were also members of the Parlement were like their lay 
counterparts conseillers at all times, but like all others magistrates, their entrance on the perron du Palais 
marked a visible transformation. It was only passed this point that the conseillers, whether lay or cleric, 
could and had to wear the attributes of their specific position in the court. The space where and moments 
when parlementaire robes could be worn was clearly demarcated by a set of strict rules and traditions that 
point to the importance attached to the display of insignia. The uncompromising character of these rules 
suggests that the wearing of parlementaire paraphernalia was not limited to the function of displaying 
                                                      
325 "et que quand [l’évêque] entrera au perron du palais, sa croix laquelle il fait porter devant lui quand il va par la 
ville sera portée après lui et baissée, et lorsqu’il sera entré dans la grande salle du plaidoyé son porte croix l’ira 
porter à la chappelle d’où à la sortie dud. Sr. archevêque il l’ira prendre, le susd. archevêque marchant devant elle 
jusques à ce qu’il soit sur le perron du palais." Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 319v.-20 [May 19, 
1628]. 
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social and professional status: it genuinely conveyed the authority attached to the exercise of the functions 
of the judicial office. 
This latter function of both the sartorial and spatial regulations was clearly illustrated on the 
occasion of the visit of the Prince de Condé to the Parlement de Toulouse in September 1611. This visit 
raised questions that occupied the court for two entire mornings of debates in general assemblies. These 
debates and their outcome illustrate how the parlementaires managed to use a lackluster and impractical 
space such as the one offered by the perron to stage improvised but significant political rituals. More than 
a month in advance, the Parlement had received the news of the upcoming arrival of the Prince and the 
13th of August 1611 the premier président de Clari told the court that 
M. le prince de Condé was expected to arrive in Toulouse in a few days and that, as 
premier prince du sang, he deserved to be received with honor ; and in order to give this 
reception proper dignity it was decided by the chambres assemblées that M. de Lestang, 
third president, together with three conseillers of the court would go greet him in 
Montauban.326 
 More than a month later however, when Condé was finally about to arrive to Toulouse, he sent a 
maître des requêtes to let the court know that he had heard of its August 13 deliberation and 
was not pleased with it. He wanted to be received as he had been in Bordeaux where 
the first and second presidents went to greet him together with twelve conseillers, the 
presidents wearing their red robes. He said as well that when he came back from Flandres 
he received the same honor in the parlement de Paris. The court, deliberating on this 
matter, decided that he would receive no other honor than the one that had been 
previously deliberated [on August 13], and that the president [de Lestang] would only 
wear the black robe, and in addition it was decided that those who would accompany him 
would not wear the hoods [chaperons] but the cornet and the wool robe.327  
                                                      
326 "M. le prince de Condé devoit arriver dans quelques jours à Toulouse et que comme premier prince du sang il 
meritoit d’être honorablement reçu ; pour laquelle reception faire plus dignement fut arrêté aux chambres 
assemblées que M. de Lestang tiers president avec trois conseillers de la Cour l’iroient saluer à Montauban." ibid., 
I, 58v.-59. 
327 “qu’il n’en étoit pas content et qu’il desiroit qu’on le reçut comme il avoit été reçu à Bordeaux où les premier et 
second president l’étoient allés saluer avec douze conseillers, portant les présidens la robe rouge ; disoit aussi qu’à 
son retour de Flandres il avoit reçu meme honneur à la cour de parlement de Paris. Sur quoi deliberant la cour, elle 
arrêta qu’il ne lui seroit fait autre honneur que celui qui avoit été deliberé, et que le president ne prendroit que la 
robe noire, et encore fut il arrêté que ceux qui iroient avec lui ne porteroient point les chaperons ains les cornettes 
et robes de laine.” Ibid., I, 60. 
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But the Parlement could not oppose a blunt refusal to the man who was arguably the most 
powerful individual in the kingdom at the time,328 and the court delved into a detailed justification of its 
decision. The fundamental reason for rejecting the prince’s request was that  
it is a custom of the Court to only allow M. le premier président to leave to go meet 
the king and that the presidents never leave the Palais with their red robes, and M. les 
conseillers wearing the black robed, all of them [i.e. the presidents and the conseillers] 
had to wear the red or the black one. Red was impossible because this honor was only 
granted to the king, thus all of them had to wear the black one.329 
In retaliation against the court’s obstinacy, the prince decided to precipitate his arrival in 
Toulouse in order to force the Parlement into an improvised and unexpectedly restaged greeting: 
On the said 17th of September the said prince entered and precipitated his entrance so 
much that he arrived earlier than expected to the convent of the pères Récollets, in the 
cloister of which he was supposed to be greeted by the court. However, because he had 
already gone up on to the gallery, the president de Paulo, together with twenty three 
others—either presidents in the Enquêtes or conseillers in the court, greeted him from 
down below. The said prince received the court rather coolly, and manifested by his 
composure that he was not pleased …330 
Having failed to obtain the mark of honor he desired through the symbolic of clothing, he 
attempted to use the space of the Palais to manifest the deference he wanted the court to display towards 
him. Back to the perron, the prince “requested that a president be sent to meet him on the perron, that a 
chair be prepared for him, covered with a cloth with one cushion for the feet and one on the seat …”331 
                                                      
328 Henri IV had been assassinated on the previous year and Henri, prince de Condé, was at the time the putative heir 
to the throne after the underage Louis XIII and his young brother Gaston. This dynastic position combined with the 
minority of the child king put Condé in a very influential political position. 
329 “la Cour n’a pas accoutumé de permettre que M. le premier president sorte que pour aller au devant du roi et 
que les presidens de la Cour n’ont point accoutumé d’aller hors le Palais avec les robes rouges, M. les conseillers 
la portant noire, qu’il falloit qu’ils la portassent tous en rouge ou noire, rouge cela ne se pouvoit n’étant dû qu’au 
roi seul, il falloit donc que tous la portassent noire.” Ibid., 61. 
330 “Led. jour 17e septembre led. Sr. prince entra et précipita si fort son entrée qu’il fut plûtôt que la cour au couvent 
des peres Recollets au cloître desquels il devoit être salué par la cour, neanmoins parce qu’il étoit deja monté à la 
galerie, le Sr. president de Paulo avec les vingt trois ou presidens des enquêtes ou conseillers de la cour le salua en 
bas la galerie. L’accueil que led. Sr. prince fit à la Cour fut assés froid, et leur temoigna par sa contenance qu’il 
n’étoit pas content.” Ibid., 62v. 
331 “il demandoit qu’on lui envoyat un president sur le perron, qu’on lui preparat une chaire, et qu’on lui mit un 
tapis sur lequel fussent les carreaux du siege et des pieds.” Ibid., 63. 
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The court deliberated on this request and agreed to it, adding however that the president and 
conseillers who would go greet him on the perron would remain on the landing and were not to go down 
the stairs.332 Thus, however minuscule the space occupied by the perron it was re-demarcated so as to 
devise a unique ritual adapted to the visit of this prince who, in the specific political context of the time, 
was in a position of power that allowed him to expect a special deferential treatment. This particular 
treatment was marked by the unusual exit out of the buildings of one president and four of the oldest 
conseillers to come and greet the prince at his arrival in the courtyard. Still, the Parlement used the spatial 
configuration of the Palais to constrain the staging of this ceremony within precise limits that would 
manifest clearly that, however powerful and close to royal majesty by virtue of his blood, the prince could 
not be granted marks of honors reserved to the king only. Several measures were taken to make this fact 
very clear: the premier président would not be part of the delegation, the small deputation would exit the 
premises but would stop at the perron, which, as noted earlier, was covered by a slate roofing that could 
operate symbolically as a canopy over the parlementaire delegation so as to mark the side on which royal 
majesty resided in this unusual summit meeting. For this was the point at stake in this occurrence: 
however vain this kind of bickering over a point d’honneur might seem to us at first, the dispute over the 
few meters the deputation of the Parlement would or would not walk outside the building, was in fact a 
debate over the spatial representation of the relative share of royal majesty to which both the Parlement, 
by virtue of the exercise of sovereign justice, and the prince, by virtue of his blood and of his prominent 
political position at the time, were entitled. To a certain extent, the drama that was to be enacted on this 
improvised stage and at that particular time was that of the rivalry between two kinds of nobility, two 
conflicting (although not incompatible) conceptions of sovereignty.  
In the end, the solution adopted was a compromise that could satisfy both parties: Condé on the 
one hand, forced the Parlement out of its customs and traditions into giving him a public reception that no 
other prince du sang had ever received, the court on the other hand, by a shrewd use of symbols was able 
                                                      
332 Ibid. 
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to maintain the superiority of its claim to a share of royal majesty and sovereignty. This superiority was 
made visible by the remaining of the deputation on the landing of the perron. To begin with, this 
configuration evened out the greeting the court had previously given from down below in the convent of 
the pères Récollets. More importantly, it forced the prince to climb up the stairs, for all to see in the 
courtyard, to meet the delegation.  
In order to make the hierarchy that this ceremony was supposed to manifest even clearer, the 
premier président further commented the original question about the wearing of the red robe in his 
solemn harangue to the prince in the Grand’chambre: 
M. le prince manifested, in the harangue he addressed to the court, some small 
resentment he had about the honor he believed was due but not given to him. However, 
M. le premier président answered that the court had given him everything they thought 
belonged to him, but that, as for the purple [i.e. the red robes] he had desired, the court of 
Parlement wore it in display and parade only for the service of God and for the person of 
the king himself.333 
This observation, made solemnly in the presence of the prince in a public plenary session in the 
Grande Salle, was not innocent: it laid out the court’s vision of its own position in the hierarchy of power 
and of the related honor and dignity attached to that position. Not surprisingly, God and the king are at the 
top of this hierarchy. This view is in keeping with a long tradition of political thought that considered the 
king as the vicar of God and viewed royal majesty as derived from divine majesty.334 More unusual here 
is the view, manifested through the regulated wearing of red robes, that sovereign courts, as a corps 
invested with the solemn exercise of the highest form of royal authority, occupied the second position in 
the hierarchy, even before a premier prince du sang such as Condé. Of course, the view was self-serving 
coming from a premier président in the Parlement, but, as Condé’s acceptance of the compromise 
suggests, was more than wishful thinking at this point in time. A few decades later and in a different 
                                                      
333 “M. le prince témoigna en la harangue qu’il fit à la Cour quelque petit ressentiment de ce que l’honneur qu’il 
croyoit lui être dû ne lui avoit pas été rendu, toutefois il lui fut reparti par M. le premier president que la cour 
s’étoit disposée de lui rendre tout ce qu’elle avoit cru lui appartenir, mais que pour la pourpre qu’il avoit desirée, la 
Cour de Parlement ne la mettoit en montre et en parade que pour le service de Dieu et pour la propre personne du 
Roi.” Ibid. 
334 See Chapter 1. 
 149 
political setting that further underline the contingency of this kind of enacted debates, the balance of 
power would clearly tilt in favor of the prince: having become governor of Burgundy and a major 
political ally of the cardinal-minister Richelieu, Condé could muster enough authority in 1636 to come 
unannounced to the Parlement de Dijon and step right into the Grand Chambre to force the reception of 
one of his creature, Philippe Giroux, as a president of the court.335 
 
In any case, the use of space, and in particular of the perron du Palais in this instance, thus 
functioned as a materialized representation of the political hierarchy that the magistrates envisioned as a 
consequence of their command over sovereign justice. When the court decided that its delegation would 
remain on the landing “sans descendre les degrés,”336 this detail should be understood literally—degré is 
the old french word designating the step of a stair—and figuratively, that is, without going down the 
degrees of a new hierarchy of power and honor that superimposed over the old degrés de noblesse. 
This was a pragmatic and especially ingenious use of space, for the Palais, because of its lack of 
luster and dilapidated state, did not speak by itself the haughty political and social claims of the 
parlementaires. Garipuy’s description of the grande salle d’audience, arguably the location for the most 
solemn and important rituals of the court, reveals a far less brilliant reality than that the Parlement 
managed to stage for the reception of Condé. It is worth reading the details of Garipuy’s account here: 
This chamber … is lit on the south by five windows with oak casements and large 
panes. It is tiled with dressed stones on a floor supported by stone and wood pillars. The 
floor of the square of the siege, also called barreau, is made in very old and partly 
defective planks. In the two angles of the barreau are located two lanterns en jalousie 
made of sculpted wood. The facing of the walls are decorated with plaster. These walls 
are defective, cracked in several parts, especially the northern wall, which is eaten so 
badly by saltpeter and humidity that the surface—in plaster on the side of the chamber 
and in mortar on the side of the courtyard of the Tournelle—cannot hold anymore, and 
that the wood of the paneling of the backs and chairs of the said chamber as well as the 
tapestries are completely rotten. There is a very important crack in this part that runs 
through the thickness of the wall up to the top and can only result from a construction 
fault. There are two other, but less serious cracks: the first one on the same wall above 
                                                      
335 Farr, A tale of two murders : passion and power in seventeenth-century France, 118. 
336 Malenfant, I, 63. 
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the little door to the chambre des manteaux, the second one above the main door of the 
chamber, both of them resulting from the building of the said doors that occurred after the 
walls were built. 
The base of the walls of this room is lined with wood on the entire perimeter, below 
the plaster pilasters that decorate the said walls. In the part of the siege of the tribunal that 
occupies one of the angles, there is a higher wood panel that serves as the back of a chair 
cover with a tapestry decorated with fleurs-de-lis. The benches and chairs on both sides 
of this tribunal are padded and those that make up the enclosure of the barreau are just 
made of plain wood. The floor of the inside of this barreau—also called parquet—is 
made of large planks. … The ceiling of this room is made of mosaic. Several of the 
pieces of wood that compose it are defective, the framework of the roof space à la 
française above this ceiling is equally defective in certain parts.337 
As in the case of the perron however, one should not be misled by Garipuy’s grim description of 
a genuinely dilapidated but artificially empty chamber. Once again, we must try and fill up this room 
mentally with the men and activities that surely did not mask the cracks and saltpeter, but at least diverted 
the eye of the onlooker. Other types of representations, not motivated by Garipuy’s concern for a precise 
and exact description of the architecture, provide us with a very different image of the Salle d’audience de 
la Grand’ chambre (see Illustration 14 below). 
 
 
                                                      
337 “Cette chambre (...) est eclairée par cinq ouvertures de fenetre au midy, assorties de croisées bois de chene a 
grands carreaux. Elle est carrelée en pierre de taille sur un plancher porté sur des pilliers de maçonnerie et de bois, 
le quarré du siege ou barreau est planchayé en planches fort vielles et partie deffectueuses. Dans les deux angles du 
barreau sont placées deux lanternes en jalousie de bois sculpté. Les parements des murs sont decorés en platre. Ces 
murs sont deffectueux et lezardés en plusieurs parties, principalement dans celle du cotté du nord qui est attaquée 
par le selpetre et l’humidité au point que les enduits en platre du cotté de la chambre et en mortier du cotté de la 
cour de tournelle ne peuvent plus y tenir, et que les bois des lambris des dossiers et sieges de laditte chambre ainsi 
que les tapisseries sont touts pourris. Il y a une lezarde très considerabe en cette partie qui traverse l’epaisseur du 
mur et se continue dans toute l’elevation, on ne peut en attribuer la cause qu’au vice dudit mur. On en voit encore 
deux autres, mais de moindre consequence. L’une au meme mur au dessus de l’ouverture d’une petite porte qui 
comunique au pasage de degagement de la salle des manteaux et l’autre au dessus de la principale porte d’entrée 
de la grand chambre, l’une et l’autre on eté occasionées par les ouvertures desdites portes qui ont été faites après 
coup. 
Le soubassement des murs de cette salle sont lambrissés en bois dans tout le pourtour jusques au dessous des bazes 
des pilastres en platre qui decorent les susdits murs. Il y a dans la partie du siege du tribunal qui occupe un des 
angles un lambris plus elevé servant de dossier couvert d’une tapisserie fleur delisée. Les bancs et sièges de deux 
cottés de ce tribunal sont rembourés et ceux qui forment l’enceinte du barreau sont seulement en bois. L’intérieur de 
ce barreau ou parquet est planchayé en grosses planches : dans l’angle opposé au siège ou tribunal est placée la 
chapelle cottée n° 7 ornée d’un tombeau d’autel et d’un tableau derrière, fermée d’une balustrade en fer d’hauteur 
d’apuy, le plancher superieur de cette chambre est en mosaique. Plusieurs des pieces de bois qui la composent sont 
deffectueuse, la charpente du grand comble a la françoise au dessus dudit plancher, est pareillement deffectueux en 
certaines parties au fonds de laditte grand chambre.” ADHG, C2254, fol. 3-6. 
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Illustration 14. A sixteenth-century representation of the Salle d'audience de la Grand' Chambre of the 
Parlement de Toulouse. 
(Title page of Nicolas Bertrand’s Opus de Tholosanorum gestis ab urbe condita (1515). 
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In the sixteenth-century representation above (Illustration 14), it seems that the artist took some 
liberty with the architectural set up of the Grand Chambre described by Garipuy.338 Conversely however, 
because the artist had goals and concerns different from those of Garipuy, his representation of the Grand 
Chambre includes important elements that the engineer overlooked deliberately. First and foremost, the 
crowd, dense and numerous, is as prominent in this image as it is conspicuously absent from Garipuy’s 
report. The artist correctly placed this crowd behind the barreau which, symmetrically facing the benches 
of the judges, delimited the square of the parquet. The artist also duly included the desk of the greffier—
the scribe of the court—, as we will see shortly, a crucial element of the judicial practices that took place 
in all chambers of the Parlement. This desk is not any desk, it is “le bureau” as the professionals of the 
court called it, in expressions such as “mettre sur le bureau,” meaning literally to put the documents of a 
lawsuit on the desk and by extension to open the deliberation on a case. This desk was the workbench of 
the judicial workshop, it is the central site on which the stuff of justice is exposed, scrutinized, worked 
upon, and transformed. The artist did not forget either to include the greffier himself, an essential actor in 
all these operations because of his permanent control over both the space of this desk and the objects that 
lay on it. The representation however, is a bit misleading, for the scene it pictures was very unusual in the 
Parlement de Toulouse. Indeed, the presence of the king sitting in the corner, in the chair of the premier 
président indicates that the scene represents here a lit de justice, which had never happened in Toulouse at 
that point in time.339 The premier président is sitting at the right hand of the king, and the second 
character sitting at the desk of the greffier is the chancellor, probably watching over the registration of an 
ordonnance the greffier is copying in the Parlement’s register. 
                                                      
338 Admittedly, more than 250 years separate the two renditions, but as Garipuy’s report indicates, the overall 
structure of the room was quite old and we know for facts that most of the elements he described (for instance the 
number and style of the windows, the location and arrangement of the benches) had been left unchanged since the 
late fifteenth-century. 
339 The first lit de justice in the parlement de Toulouse occurred on August 4, 1533, when Francis I visited the court. 
A second (and last) one occurred in 1563, when Charles IX and Queen Mother Catherine de Medici stopped in 
Toulouse on a tour of provincial parlements to force the registration of the Edict of Amboise (see Mack P. Holt, 
"The King in Parlement: The Problem of the Lit de Justice in Sixteenth-Century France," The Historical Journal 31-
3 (1988): 519). The drawing was published as the title page of Nicolas Bertrand’s Opus de Tholosanorum gestis ab 
urbe condita in 1515. 
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Regardless of the scene represented, what matters here is the presence of this desk, covered with 
parchments, papers, registers, sacs. Its location, in the enclosed space of the parquet is especially 
noteworthy. This empty diamond shaped space that functioned as a buffer between the judges and the 
densely crowded room, was the location where complaints, requests, accusations, defenses, rapports, 
were articulated. It constituted a clearly delimited and peculiar stage. No backstage here, no behind the 
scenes—at least that was what the spatial organization of the chamber attempted to display—but 
spectators on all sides, clearly divided between judges on the one hand and the crowd on the other. The 
isolation of the character at the center of this stage—materialized by the empty space created by the 
enclosure around him—both indicated clearly what was to be the center of attention and attempted to 
literally create objectivity by making the central object stand out, seemingly isolated from all present 
around. The same applied to the bureau du greffier: the documents supporting the case at stake as well as 
the act of writing that gave legal authority to documents—that made them authentiques in the vocabulary 
of the time—were put on display, for all to see. This staging did not simply seek to give something of a 
dramatic solemnity to the procedures of the Parlement, it was, in and of itself, a customary procedure of 
validation. While the signatures of the greffier, président, and rapporteur alone, affixed in the secret of a 
conseil session at the bottom of an arrêt sufficed to give an entire procedure legal validity, one should not 
underestimate the importance of the presence of the crowd during the audience sessions. Actually, while 
the control of the public eye was unnecessary to validate a procedure, it was indispensable to give the 
court’s final decision legal authority. Although the drafting of arrêts was a complex process, taking place 
mostly in the secret of the rapporteur’s private study340 and of conseil sessions,341 the final document—
the arrêt grossoyé, duly signed and sealed, only assumed its legal authority when it was pronounced—
that is read—publicly in this same room.  
Another important feature of this drawing is its very choice of the Salle d’audience de la 
Grand’chambre to represent the Parlement as a whole. To a certain extent, Garipuy endorsed this choice 
                                                      
340 See below Chapter 7. 
341 See below Chapter 8. 
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as well by going straight to this room from the gate of the Palais. This choice was neither random nor 
innocent. It resulted from and contributed to reinforce a specific representation of the court that identified 
the Parlement with only some of its functions and practices. This image, that of the entire corps, gathered 
in full dress to perform solemnly the tasks that manifested most clearly the sovereign attributions of the 
court, was the representation that the parlementaires sought to give of themselves and that the artists and 
the engineer two centuries later seemed to have readily accepted and at the same time contributed to 
reinforce (tellingly, this representation of the Salle d’audience is entitled “the magnificent Parlement of 
the kings in Toulouse”). It seems that the parlementaires have been especially successful in promoting 
this image, for the identification of the court with these particular functions survived the Parlement itself: 
modern historians as well endorsed and reproduced this representation by laying particular—and in some 
cases exclusive—emphasis on the activities that took place in the Grande Salle d’Audience.342 Thus, as a 
result of this self-representation reified by the primary sources modern historians tend to favor, unity of 
place, circumscribed to that unique location, has become a tacit canon of historical narratives focusing on 
the court. This unity of place that constrains most historical accounts within the walls of the Grande Salle 
d’Audience, also led to the adoption—implicit as well—of a unity of action that tied historical narratives 
to the sovereign attributions that were manifested in that single location. The resulting storyline most 
often consists in pulling threads between the rare lits de justice, occasional remontrances, plenary 
sessions, solemn pronunciations of arrêts that punctuate the three centuries and half long life of the 
Parlement de Toulouse. 
While these events should certainly constitute an integral part of any historical account of the 
parlements—including one focusing on judicial practices—it must be emphasized that only a small 
fragment of the court’s judicial history was written—literally and figuratively—in the Grande Salle. The 
bulk of the documents that attest to the activities of the court were written in other places, behind the 
                                                      
342 This idealized representation also guided the architect who renovated the Grande Salle in the twentieth-century. 
The current aspect of this room that houses today’s first chamber of the Cour d’appel mirrors this idealized 
representation much more than any appearance the Grande Salle might have had at any point in time during the Old 
Régime.  
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scenes where the bulk of these activities themselves took place. Most of the practices that took place in 
the Grande Salle d’Audience were peripheral to these activities or only intervened at the very end of a few 
procedures and processes thanks to which cases matured in other places. 
I should make it clear that I am not trying to make here an argument purely based on quantity and 
frequency. The fact that the judicial practices that took place in the Grande Salle d’Audience were less 
frequent and only generated a small part of the archive of the court certainly does not mean that these 
practices should receive less attention. The issue here is one of itinerary in the circumnavigation of the 
Palais and of representation of the experience of judicial practices—from the point of view of all actors 
involved: magistrates, praticiens, litigants. Indeed, the journey of the litigants into the Palais began very 
differently from that of Garipuy: only a fraction of those who came to the Parlement walked straight to 
the Grande Salle, if they were to set foot in it at all (see Illustration 15 below). In other words, one should 
be careful not to let the Grande Salle and its activities be the majestic and carefully trimmed tree that hide 
the sprawling and luxuriant parlementaire forest. 
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Illustration 15. “Where does the journey begin?” 
(1) In the Salle d’audience de la Grand Chambre for a visitor or spectator. 
(2) In the Greffe des présentations for a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit. 
(3) In the Greffe de la Tournelle for a plaintif in a criminal lawsuit. 
(4) In the Salle de la miséricorde for a male prisoner. 
(5) In the Prisons des femmes (upstairs) for a female prisoner. 
(6) In the Chambre des manteaux for a magistrate. 
(7) In the chapel for a bishop-magistrate. 
(8) In the Greffe des requêtes (upstairs) for a plaintiff with a committimus privilege. 
(9) In the Salle des procureurs for a procurator. 
(10) In the Salle d’audience des Requêtes for someone who committed a crime in the Palais. 
(11) In the Vestibule de la Grand Salle for a counsel. 
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Behind the scenes: the tortuous maturation of lawsuits.  
(Hallways, stairs, greffes, shelves, racks, studies, papers, sacs, interrogation rooms, jails, 
conseils) 
 
In order to break away from both the representation focusing on the Grande Salle and the 
resulting plot which, passing quickly on the daily judicial activities of the court, depicts the Parlement as 
a mainly political and legislative body, it is necessary to look behind the scenes. It is at this point that the 
labyrinth analogy should be resumed, for what one discovers behind the salles d’audience conforms to the 
definition of a labyrinth, “a structure consisting of a number of intercommunicating passages arranged in 
bewildering complexity, through which it is difficult or impossible to find one’s way without 
guidance.”343 Garipuy expresses this sense of bewilderment at several points in his rapport, when he 
reflects for instance on the impracticality of the salle d’audience de la Tournelle (the room for the 
hearings of the criminal chamber) because of the distance and intricate path that separates it from the 
chambre ordinaire de la Tournelle (the room for the deliberation of the same criminal chamber): 
The entrances of [the salle d’audience de la Tournelle] are completely masked by 
shops, and it is very impractical for the service and exposes the judges to get sick because 
of the distance that separates it from the chambre ordinaire or bureau de la Tournelle, 
following a rather long path out in the open, climbing or going down bad stairs 
interconnected by corridors [dégagements] at times on the first floor, at times of the 
second one.344 
 Even worse than the circulation of judges was that of papers. In this instance, Garipuy was again 
amazed at the length and complexity of the path (see Illustration 16), but also pointed out that the 
“guidance” without which it was “impossible to find one’s way” according to the definition above, was 
precisely practice: 
                                                      
343 Oxford English Dictionary, Second edition. 
344 “L’eloignement de cette salle d’audiance dont les entrées sont totalement masquées par des boutiques et ou l’on 
ne peut parvenir de la chambre ordinaire ou bureau de la Tournelle qu’en parcourant un assés long espace a 
decouvert, ou en montant et descendant plusieurs mauvais escaliers qui se comuniquent par des degagements tantot 
au rez de chaussée tantot au premier etage, la rend très incommode pour le service, et expose les juges a prendre 
mal dans le passage et communication de l’un a l’autre.” ADHG, C2254, fol. 28-9. 
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The greffe345 of [the Tournelle] … is too far away and out of reach for the service [of 
this chamber], as can be seen on the plan. The length of the space that one has to walk 
between them is so considerable that it would be impossible to figure out this path if it 
was not known by usage and practice.346 
 
 
Illustration 16. The tortuous pathway of papers. 
From the greffe de la Tournelle (49) to the salle d’audience de la 
Tournelle (72), the greffier or the reporting judge, most likely 
overburdened with sacs, papers and registers, had to cross no less than 
four courtyards in the open (39, 35, 76, 3). 
 
Before I look in more detail at these three types of interconnected spaces (greffes, salles 
d’audience, bureaux) I would like to suggest that these tortuous pathways which can only be revealed 
through practice as Garipuy noted, had functions overlooked by the engineer’s assessment of their 
“impracticality.” First, it should be noted that because their intricacies could only be memorized through 
daily practice, these pathways gave to men of justice a monopoly over the knowledge of practical judicial 
processes. The intimate knowledge of the judicial space acquired through daily practice functioned as a 
                                                      
345 This is the room where the documents of the current lawsuits were temporarily stored. 
346 "Le greffe de cette chambre (…) est trop eloigné et hors de portée de son service, ainsi qu’on peut le voir sur le 
plan. Il y a un espace de terrein si considerable a parcourir qu’il est difficile de le decouvrir si on ne le connoit par 
usage et pratique." ADHG, C2254, fol. 29. 
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dividing line between the experts (judges, greffiers, but also huissiers, secrétaires, procurators) and the 
laymen (litigants, spectators, the reporting engineer). Because of his particular commission and his 
knowledge of the overall arrangement of the building, Garipuy saw only “impracticality.” Other laymen, 
in particular litigants whose knowledge of the complex was much more partial, only saw experts who 
could be identified not only by their robes and the papers they carried but also by the fact that they might 
have seemed like the only ones who knew where they were headed in this labyrinth. As opposed to the 
bookish knowledge of the law and of legal doctrine accessible to the wealthy and cultivated laymen, this 
practical knowledge of the judicial space could only remain a monopoly of the practicing expert. 
I would also like to suggest, taking cues from Bruno Latour’s study of the Conseil d’Etat (to a 
certain extant a distant descendant of the Parlement),347 that these tortuous pathways were an integral part 
of a process of maturation of the lawsuit as a material object (the dossiers of the Conseil d’Etat and the 
sacs of the Parlement). The parchments, papers, sacs, and registers on which judicial practice fed had to 
go through the long and tortuous guts of the Palais before they could be processed on a bureau. But this 
process of maturation, the fattening of the sac that manifested physically a transformation by which a 
lawsuit gradually became amenable to the judicial practices of the magistrates in the bureau, happened 
primarily in the greffes. 
The modern definition of greffe, an office where the minutes of a trial are kept, has only retained 
the archival function of the place. The early modern greffes of the parlements already had that function, to 
which I will come back to conclude the first part of this chapter. But for now, I would like to consider the 
original function that had given its name to a place where the trials were written. The etymology of the 
word greffe, from the Latin graphium (the pen) manifests the fact that the place was originally conceived 
around the the act of writing in its materiality. The function of the greffe, the place where one writes, 
became secundary at the end of the seventeenth century, as a result of two converging evolutions: one 
                                                      
347 Bruno Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d'Etat, Paris: La Découverte, 2002. Latour 
retraces how the dossiers move in the court, observes how they are “meticulously fattened” along the way (80) and 
notes “Following relentlessly our hardback folders, noting how they gain weight, crease, and feed, noting the 
closets, offices, hallways, basements, chairs or seats where they are made to mature, we can identify the various 
métiers of the Conseil” (ibid., 96-7). 
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within the judicial world where the constant increase in the number of lawsuits, and in particular of civil 
lawsuits, exacerbated the formulaic nature of judicial documents, and one outside the courts, with the 
progress of the printing press, which made it easier than ever to compose and mass reproduce single-sheet 
forms. The legal printed forms that start appearing in the sacs in the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century only left a few blanks on the page, which the greffier or the procurators would complete by filling 
them in with the relevant text. The information written by hand in those blanks became de facto the sole 
particulars of a case (dates, names, birth dates, professions, places, types of crimes and offenses). This 
change was not a sudden break, for the decision to use printed forms resulted from but also accentuated a 
shift in the way judges conceptualized conflicts, crimes and litigants. I anthropomorphize here justice to 
be brief, but behind this shift in judicial epistemology are of course men and their practices that I will 
analyze in greater detail in later chapters. 
For now, I want to focus on how, even after that conceptual shift reflected in the changing layout 
on the material of the paper, writing practices in the greffes constituted an integral part of the judicial 
process and how the greffe as place played a role in that relationship. It should be noted first that while 
the early modern greffe had retained their original function as “writing places,” by the beginning of the 
sixteenth century most of the writing of the actual documents that composed the lawsuit was already 
decentralized and done in other places: in the study of lawyers, procurators, notaries, and various other 
experts (for instance, the surgeons and doctors who could be called upon to write autopsies and exams in 
criminal trials). While the greffiers and secrétaires participated directly in the production of some of the 
documents of the lawsuit (aptly called productions)—for instance the records of interrogations or the 
speeches of lawyers during hearing sessions—their more critical role from the point of view of the overall 
judicial process consisted in penning and manipulating the paratext (written words, cloth, string, and 
paper) that manifested physically the maturation of a lawsuit. In this role, they not only wrote but bundled 
the productions into the fundamental judicial unit that was the sac (see Illustration 17). Thus the clerks of 
the court, under the supervision of the greffiers, presided over the putting together of the material which 
all subsequent judicial practices processed and acted upon. Indeed, the judicial procedure required first 
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and foremost the metamorphosis of a set of subjects and objects—litigants, the crimes and offenses they 
had committed or had been victims of, the circumstances of these crimes, the emotions and expectations 
they involved—into judicial objects, that is into objects that the judicial gaze could identify, order and 
evaluate from within the language and practice of the law. This initial process of refinement of a raw, 
non-judicial material into a processed material amenable to further judicial manipulation—in the literal 
sense of the term—happened in the greffes where documents were reviewed, cataloged, and put in a sac. 
 
 
Illustration 17. The two sacs of a trial with their productions. 
(ADHG 2B 44 & 44bis, 1608). 
 
This sac transformed conflicts into manageable material units amenable to further judicial 
treatment in other places of the palais (the salles d’audience, bureaux, chancellerie). This physical 
containment of the lawsuit turned paper, was the first necessary step toward a legal comprehension of the 
case and it functioned as an elementary material articulation of the judicial will to establish command 
over the matter at stake at the very beginning of the trial. This intent to assert an initial mastery over the 
case was further expressed physically on the évangile, a piece of parchment stitched on the sac and on 
which the basic data of the case were recorded (see Illustration 18). 
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Illustration 18. The évangile, map of the trial. 
The standardized layout of the évangile allows one to identify quickly the basic data of 
the trial: the chamber where the case was to be judged (1, here “in arrestis,” meaning 
the Grand chambre), the name of the litigant(s) whose productions are contained in the 
sac (2, here Catherine Garrigues, François, Charles, Nicollas and Margueritte 
Campaigne, “mother and sons [sic.]”), the name of the opposing party (3, here Jeanne 
Tissette widow of Pierre Campaigne), the date of the report to the court (4, here March 
4, 1684), the date of the sentence (5, same date here), the name of the reporting judge(s) 
(6, here M. de Caulet and M. de Vedelli), the name of the litigant’s procurator (7, here 
Fajou) and of the opponent’s procurator (8, here Bossat). (ADHG 2B 2583) 
 
The évangile also had a more practical function, for it was an indispensable visual aid that helped 
the greffiers, garde-sacs, and secrétaires manage the impressive mass of sacs in the tight space of the 
greffes.348 But the writing practices of the greffes did not solely relate to space through the classifying 
function of the évangile. The inventaire written by the litigant’s procurator, was another crucial element 
in the paratext surrounding the productions of the lawsuits, for it played an essential role in asserting the 
control of the greffiers over the circulation of the sac and its documents within and outside the palais. 
                                                      
348 Although many of these sacs have been lost or destroyed, more than 80,000 of them are still kept today for the 
Parlement de Toulouse (the sole parlement for which these documents have been preserved), occupying an entire 
floor of the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne.  
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This circulation was essential to the judicial process since the contradictoire was the fundamental 
principle of the procedure followed in the Parlement. This principle, still upheld today in the Conseil 
d’Etat,349 required that the procurators for each party exchanged (the term still in use today is 
“communicated”) their productions so that each party could reply (“répliquer”)—with additional 
productions—to its opponent. The inventaire played a crucial role to control the fairness of this “ping-
pong game”350 as it recorded the list and short description of all the documents contained in the sacs 
(Illustration 19). 
 
Illustration 19. The inventaire, map of the productions. 
On the left an inventaire of the documents contained in the sac of a 1666 trial. Each document is 
briefly described and given a letter (A, B, C, D, etc. highlighted here). On the right, the back of the 
testimony of Jeannette Roussignolle in this trial, cataloged as document B (ADHG 2B 787). 
 
With the inventaire in hand, the greffiers could keep on the side a record of the movement of the 
documents that were constantly extracted and reinserted in the sac. When the exchange and production of 
new documents finally ceased, the maturation of the sac had reached its term, but the movement did not 
                                                      
349Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d'Etat, 92. 
350 Ibid. 
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end for then started the circulation of the sac itself, a circulation that the greffier and his clerks recorded 
as well. A reporting judge now came to the greffe, handed the record of his assignment to the case (the 
distribution signed by the president of his chamber) and obtained in exchange the sacs that he now took 
home to dissect and scrutinize them in the secret of his private study.351 Because there was the hub 
through which productions and sacs passed incessantly, the greffes rather than the salle d’audience de la 
Grand Chambre was the center around which the activity of the Parlement revolved. As Garipuy 
observed, “the grand greffe civil garde sac is without a doubt the most used [le plus pratiqué] in the 
entire Palais, because it is where the documents and procedures of the current and past lawsuits are 
kept.”352 
The greffes were also the place in the Palais where the engineer’s bewilderment reached its peak. 
The greffes were indeed labyrinths of their own, even more tortuous and dilapidated than the Palais as a 
whole. Again, it is worth reading Garipuy’s report at some length here. Describing the “haut greffe” he 
noted the ruinous state of the place: 
 [this room] … is a large repository for the papers of the said greffes. These papers 
hang from wooden racks lining the walls and on other racks arranged in lines in the 
middle of the room from floor to ceiling. These racks have been so overloaded with paper 
that part of their wooden structure, old, worm-eaten and unable to sustain the weight of 
the bundles, have turn to dust and the papers have fallen on the floor. The rats have 
devoured the cloth and strings of the sacs, and what’s left of them is scattered over the 
floor so that one cannot walk there without stepping on them. The room is lighted by 
three windows on the northern wall through which winds, rain and all sorts of bad 
weather have passed in the absence of window panes, thus rotting a great part of the 
papers.353 
                                                      
351 See Chapter 7. 
352 "Le grand greffe civil garde sac qui est sans contredit le plus pratiqué de tout le palais , parce que c’est la ou 
sont touts les depots des pieces et procedures tant des affaires courantes que de celles qui sont terminées (…)" 
ADHG, C2254, fol. 56. 
353 "[cette pièce] (…) est un grand depot des papiers dudit greffe suspendus et accorchés a des rateliers en bois le 
long des murs, et a d’autres rateliers diposés par files paralleles dans l’interieur de laditte piece depuis le 
carrelement jusques au plancher. Ces rateliers ont été si chargés de papiers que partie des bois vieux et vermouleux 
n’ayant peu soutenir le poids des liasses ont rompu ou se sont reduits en poudre, et les papiers sont tombés à terre. 
D’un autre cotté les rats on devoré les sacs de toile ou leurs attaches de fissele, en sorte que le carrelement en est 
tout couvert, et qu’on ne peut y marcher sans les fouler aux pieds. Cette piece est  eclairée par trois ouvertures de 
fenetres du cotté nord, par ou passent les vents la pluye et toute sorte de mauvais temps a deffaut des croisées ce qui 
a pourri et perdu une grand partie de papiers." Ibid., fol. 50-1. 
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This run-down state of the greffes did not simply generate an apparent chaos of papers that added 
to the intricacy of a tortuous and narrow architecture, it exposed the place and the documents it harbored 
to practical dangers. Describing the greffe civil that housed the oldest registers of the Parlement de 
Toulouse, Garipuy noted that “the vaulted ceiling that covers this room, because of either a faulty 
construction or the insufficiency of the walls that sustain it, threatens to collapse.”354 In the greffe de la 
peau (so called because it was the place where the arrêts grossoyés were written, originally on 
parchment), a room also filled with papers and parchment, with wooden floors and ceiling, “the fireplace 
… does not have a chimney that communicates with the second floor, so that in order to warm up the said 
greffe they burn coal in terrines made of clay or copper, which creates a great danger of fire.”355 
 Despite the hazards, the chaos of papers, registers, racks, shelves, desks, the distance from the 
salles d’audience and bureau, the tortuous paths one had to follow to reach these other places, the greffes 
functioned. When a few sacs disappeared in 1555, the chief greffier Jean Burnet was in trouble but no one 
even considered that the sacs might be lost under some other papers or a collapsed rack. Confident in the 
effective recording of the circulation of the sacs, the court suspected instead (and the greffier argued 
himself) that some unreliable clerks in the greffes had “sold” the sacs to someone interested in their 
disappearance.356 This confidence was probably based on the fact that practice served as a guide in the 
labyrinth of the greffes, a fact that Garipuy noted himself again: 
The greffe and the adjoining rooms are so impractical and insufficient that all the 
papers, procedures, incriminating documents [pièces de conviction] against criminals are 
piled one onto the other, on stacks and shelves along the walls, on the floor so that it is 
impossible to walk there, and all the practice and experience of the greffiers is needed to 
                                                      
354 "La chutte prochaine dont menaçoit la voute qui couvre cette piece soit par le vice de construction soit par la 
deffectuosité et insuffisance des murs (…)" Ibid., fol. 13. 
355 "Le fonds de cette piece est occupé par des gros pilliers de plante, d’une grande cheminée en massonerie au 
premier etage, mais il n’y a pas de canon percé pour le rez de chaussée, en sorte qu’on est obligé de se chauffer 
dans ledit greffe avec du charbon dans des terrines de terre ou de cuivre, ce qui est très dangereux pour le feu." 
Ibid., fol. 23. 
356 “Arrêt du Parlement de Toulouse sur la requête de Jean Burnet, greffier civil de la Cour, au sujet de la perte de 
plusieurs sacs, procès et pièces déposés audit greffe,” March 13, 1555 (ADHG, 1B 1905, 143). 
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find the items they need for their current work. For the older lawsuits, it is almost 
impossible to find one’s way back to them.357    
In fact, the greffiers were quite successful in practice at recovering older sacs, documents and 
registers and Garipuy’s amazement at the apparent chaos of the greffes resulted in part from his 
unfamiliarity with a daily practice that rendered this place if not completely functional at least 
manageable. But I would argue that maybe more interestingly, this amazement of the engineer also 
resulted from a preconceived ideal of the greffes which, before his plunge in the labyrinth, he might have 
imagined as a highly rationalized space where the documents of the court—its “monuments” in the 
language of the time—would be not just preserved, but enshrined. This idealization of the greffes resulted 
from a particular conception of the nature of the documents they harbored, a conception that Garipuy 
expressed explicitly when voicing his concerns about the solidity of the actual greffes he visited: 
The roof space as well serves as a repository and because its floor and ceiling are in 
the oldest and most ruinous state one can imagine, there is a just reason to be alarmed and 
worried that this part of the building that should be the most solid collapse some day and 
see these documents that are of such a great importance to so many citizens completely 
lost, without any hope of putting them back in good order.358    
This “roof space” and that “part of the building” was the tour de l’aigle also known as the tour 
des archives, because it harbored the great majority of the documents of the Parlement de Toulouse. It is 
unclear to what extent the “citizens,” laymen like the engineer, shared Garipuy’s conception of the 
Parlement’s archives and of the documents, but I would suggest that this tour des archives, the most 
visible part of the Palais, did symbolize the Parlement de Toulouse much better than the salle d’audience 
de la Grand Chambre. 
                                                      
357 "Le greffe et les pieces qui lui sont jointes sont si incommodes et si peu suffisantes que touts les papiers, 
procedures, et pieces de conviction des criminels sont entassées les unes sur les autres, sur des rayons et tablettes le 
long des murs, et a terre sur le carrelement, de maniere qu’on peut a peine y marcher, et il faut toute la pratique et 
l’experience des greffiers pour pouvoir retrouver les pieces." ADHG, C2254, fol. 49-50. 
358 "Ce comble qui sert pareillement de depot et qui presente ainsi que les planchers inferieurs l’etat le plus vieux et 
le plus ruineux, fait qu’il y a de quoy etre justement alarmé et inquiet d’une part par la crainte de voir crouler 
quelque jour cette partie du battiment qui devroit etre la plus solide et qui l’est si peu, de l’autre de voir des pieces 
d’une si grande importance pour tant des citoyens totalement perdues et sans espoir de pouvoir les remettre dans un 
bon ordre." Ibid., 63. 
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Rather than the Grande Salle, the tour de l’aigle was at the center of the Parlement’s judicial 
activities. While litigants never entered it, this construction literally towered over the Palais, like a visible 
axis around which most itineraries revolved. This tower constituted the central archive of the court: no 
magistrate in red robe, no fleur-de-lys patterned tapestries, no staged rituals in there, just sacs, papers and 
parchments. Thus, the tallest building of the Palais, the one which seen from afar could symbolize the 
authority of the court, did not harbor a courtroom or a prison: it was filled from the bottom to the top with 
the documents that resulted from decades, centuries, of judicial practices.  
The two towers, the tour de l’aigle (or tour des archives) and the tour de l’horloge (see 
Illustration 22)—which I construe in this chapter and the next one as representations of, respectively, the 
material (the archive) and immaterial (time) aspects of judicial practice— could be seen from afar from 
both the inside and the outside of the city of Toulouse, since the Palais, built on the location of an ancient 
roman city-gate (porte narbonnaise), backed onto that symbolic and physical border that was the city 
wall. This metonymic representation of the Parlement by the towers of its palais, was not only visible in 
the urban landscape: it had been used over time as part of an official self-representation of the city of 
Toulouse that had insisted, since at least the twelfth century, on the physical duality of the toulousain 
urban space. This duality itself reflected the duality of local power: the palais stood for both the cité and 
secular power, while the Saint-Sernin basilica stood for the bourg and religious power (see Illustration 
20), the two areas and powers being mediated by Christ, represented by the cross and the lamb (see 
Illustration 21). 
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Illustration 20. Seal of the consuls of Toulouse. 
 (1211, Histoire graphique de l’ancienne province de 
Languedoc, Ernest Roschach ed., Toulouse: Privat, 
1905). On the left the Château Narbonnais, on the right 
the Saint-Sernin basilica. 
 
 
Illustration 21. Weight of the city of Toulouse. 
 (1506, Histoire graphique de l’ancienne province de 
Languedoc, Ernest Roschach ed., Toulouse: Privat, 1905). 
Here the Château Narbonnais appears on the right. 
 
 Thus, at the ending point of a century-old symbolic tradition359 that pervaded the iconography 
and materialized in the frontier area of the urban space, the tour des archives and tour de l’horloge ended 
                                                      
359 This tradition preceded the existence of the parlement de Toulouse, since the palais was set up in the old château 
narbonnais, the seat of the counts of Toulouse, already present on the seals of both the counts and the city. 
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up representing not only the palais, but indirectly secular power in the city, that is in the early-modern 
period, the Parlement, sovereignty, the king. 
 
 
Illustration 22. Detail of the Entrée des Carmes à Toulouse. 
(anonymous, Eglise de Seysses). The clock-tower of the Palais appears 
on the right on this eighteenth-century painting representing a 
procession of Carmes passing through the porte du château. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
BETWEEN WORKDAY AND LONGUE DURÉE: THE RHYTHMS OF SOVEREIGN 
JUSTICE 
 
The tour de l’horloge can be read as a symbol of the two opposite ends of the parlementaire 
temporal scales: on the smaller scale of the workday, the clock chimed out the hours that punctuated the 
daily sessions of the court, and on the larger scale of longue durée, the tower itself, a construction 
inscribed in a long tradition of local self-representation,360 symbolized the century-old, indeed pre-royal 
presence of secular power in Toulouse.361 Like the tour de l’horloge, the phrase “judicial practice” 
encapsulates these two temporal dimensions of sovereign justice. As we will see shortly, “practice” in the 
parlement was often synonymous to mundane, discrete activities that were thought of as, and regulated by 
brief periods such as the workday, the session, and even shorter time units proper to specific practices (for 
instance the “turn” of deliberation or the “button” of torture). “Judicial” on the other hand, relates to a 
notion of royal justice, which on an abstract level could be thought of as permanent, an almost timeless 
concept that possibly transcended the history of the monarchy itself. Thus from a temporal point of view, 
“judicial practice” in the parlement de Toulouse was situated between workday and longue durée. 
Between the two ends of this temporal spectrum, a number of other judicial times and 
timescales—for instance, the judicial year or the time of one’s judicial career—informed judicial practice 
in varying and at times contradictory ways. This gradation of judicial timescales suggests that, instead of 
a uniform parlementaire time, we must consider a diversity of parlementaire times that I highlight in the 
first section of this chapter. I do so in two ways, first by shedding light on a temporal tension inherent in 
contemporary ideals of justice, and then by giving an overview of the various judicial timescales which, 
from the imagined longue durée history of the French monarchy down to the minutes timed by clocks and 
hourglasses, framed the whole range of parlementaire practices. In the second section of the chapter, I 
                                                      
360 See above p. 167-168. 
361 See above p. 136. 
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show how some of these various times were put to strategic uses in the Parlement. I suggest that time, in 
great part because it was integral to judicial procedure—sometimes as a mere parameter, sometimes as an 
instrument to achieve judicial effects, sometimes as the very object on which the procedure sought to 
act—, was both a constraint and a resource for the judicial practices of the magistrates. In a third and final 
section, I show how time was not only a procedural resource but also a literal resource, that is, a source of 
income for the magistrates. More specifically, I explore how the ambivalent position of the conseillers as 
both officers (officiers) and commissioners (commissaires) entailed two ways in which, from their point 
of view, judicial time was money.  
The multiplicity of parlementaire times 
Temporal ambivalence of the ideal of justice 
 
I have mentioned above that judicial practice was “situated” between workday and longue durée. 
To be more accurate, one should say that judicial practice was “caught” between these two timescales. 
Indeed, judicial practice was not simply framed by these two opposite temporal scales, it was shaped by a 
tension between them. The general concept of judicial practice itself—not just the early-modern notion of 
judicial practice—entails a basic temporal tension between the contradictory requirements of swift justice 
and patient deliberation. In the specific case of early-modern royal justice, this basic tension was 
accentuated by a temporal contradiction inherent in contemporary ideals of royal justice. As we will see 
throughout this chapter, judicial practices were often thought of and deployed as means to resolve, or at 
least alleviate, the contradiction between the demands of everyday judicial life on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the ideal of an everlasting royal justice that built its legitimacy, at least in part, by placing 
itself above the contingencies of daily life. Royal justice was stretched between these contrary 
expectations not just as a result of a problematic discrepancy between an idealized justice and its practical 
demands, but more fundamentally because, independently from the contingencies of daily practice, a 
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temporal contradiction was already contained in the idealization of royal justice as an instrument of 
stability.362  
The goal of royal justice—whether defined as a peace-keeping mission as it was in the later 
Middle Ages or understood as the “maintaining [manutention] of public order”363 in the lexicon of 
eighteenth-century parlementaire ideology—remained tied to a “conservative” ideal that placed these 
contradictory temporal demands on justice and its agents. Preserving order—whether social, political, or 
more vaguely “public”—was indeed a twofold and seemingly paradoxical task from the point of view of 
time management: it required swiftness, to cut short any disruption of order, but also patience, for taking 
one’s time to reach a judicial decision was a way of demonstrating to the disrupted community that the 
sentence had been carefully thought through—yet another reason for justice having “to be seen to be 
done.” Taking one’s time was a way of publicizing the maturation of the sentence in order to enhance its 
authority. Judicial patience, judicial slowness as it was more often perceived, could help create a 
consensual recognition of its authority which, ideally, would prevent further disruptions. This apparent 
paradox is reflected in the existence of two competing ideals: that of a prompt justice (the “brieve et 
prompte justice”of royal ordinances) and that of the carefully thought through sentence (the proverbial 
“jugement mûrement délibéré”364). The tension between these two ideals constitutes the overarching 
temporal framework within which judicial practices were thought of and deployed. 
Given this framing tension, festina lente [“make haste slowly”] could have been the motto of 
royal magistrates in early-modern France. This adage aptly encapsulates the ambivalent attitude of royal 
judges vis-à-vis time, an ambivalence that reflected in part the magistrates’ conflicting obligations to the 
                                                      
362 See Chapter 1. 
363 This expression is found for instance in remontrances to the king (e.g. remontrance of November 17, 1755 on the 
undertakings of the Grand Conseil ; Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, vol. 2, p. 20 Chancellor 
Daguesseau also uses this same expression in his “Fragments sur l’origine et l’usage des remontrances” (Henri-
François d' Aguesseau, "Fragments sur l'origine et l'usage des remontrances," in Oeuvres, Paris: Libraires Associés, 
1789, 536). 
364 As a king’s counsel (avocat général) in the parlement de Toulouse put it in the fifteenth century, the magistrates 
had to “proceed levelheaded, with temperance, and carefully” (“ung juge doit (…) ponderate et cum temperamento 
et maturitate procedere” ; quoted in Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 
environ, vol. 1, 413).  
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dual ideal of a swift/patient justice. To be sure, the magistrates did not always have this ideal in mind, and 
other considerations, often more mundane, also explain the judges’ ambivalence toward the temporal 
dimension of their professional activities. The magistrates’ conceptions and expectations of judicial 
practice were informed by perceptions of time that varied considerably depending on the task at hand. A 
conseiller did not experience and value the temporal dimension of judicial practice in the same way when 
he was being paid hourly fees to churn out sentences on minor cases in a bureau on a Saturday afternoon 
and when he contemplated sovereign justice in the longue durée, beyond his career and lifetime, beyond 
the reigns of kings. 
The nested timescales of judicial practice 
 
These varying judicial perceptions of time sometimes matched and sometimes differed from a 
number of actual, institutionalized judicial times that were often specifically designed to govern judicial 
practices. Indeed, “imagined” judicial times superimposed over layers of “real” judicial times that 
spanned the whole range of timescales, from the short-term—e.g. the regulated paid hour of deliberation 
known as “tour” I mentioned above—to the long-term—e.g. the personal, sometimes decade-long,365 
reigns of kings that delimited in time the legal validity of judicial offices.366 Some of those official 
judicial times, for instance again the “tour” of deliberation, or the regulated time of application of torture 
known as “bouton,” shaped very directly, in fact organized, judicial practices. Other, more flexible, 
official judicial times, for instance the varying time of maturation necessary before a trial was deemed 
                                                      
365 For instance, the famously long reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715), the longest in French history, that falls within 
the scope of this study. 
366 One of the first official acts of a new king was to confirm all royal officers in their offices. While this act had 
become a formality from a bureaucratic point of view, it remained an important political statement, for this 
confirmation amounted to a re-assertion that authority and power lie in the hands of the king and that the sharing of 
that authority through the granting of offices was always in theory provisional, based on a personal delegation from 
one mortal king to one mortal officer. Like the mystical person of the king, royal justice never died, but offices, 
hence royal officers in their official capacity, did die with the physical person of the king that had given or 
confirmed their offices. 
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ready to be judged [a point reached when the trial was declared “en l’état”], also influenced strongly, 
albeit more indirectly, judicial practices. 
Between these two extremes, sovereign justice was regulated, practiced and thought of through a 
series of nested temporal scales: “tour,” session, workday, “tour de role,” judicial year, the time of kings’ 
reigns and magistrates’ careers, the longue durée of the history of the French monarchy. In this section, I 
shed light on how these various temporal scales shaped judicial practice and how, conversely, the practice 
of justice in sovereign courts contributed to shape the conception of these different timescales. 
 
The longue durée perspective. 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I explored the ways in which jurists and political thinkers from the Middle 
Ages on linked sovereign justice to the monarchy. One implication of that linkage was that sovereign 
justice, like the monarchy itself, was eternal. As I also pointed out, however, when early-modern thinkers 
looked back to a distant historical past, they found that other political systems had preceded the French 
monarchy and that these different regimes, pagan or Christian, monarchical or otherwise, had nonetheless 
some form of sovereign justice.367 I have stressed in particular how an ancient, indeed pre-monarchical 
institution, the Roman senate, even served as a much revered ideological model and reference in 
parlementaire reflections on sovereignty. Thus, despite the many and tight links between the French 
monarchy and sovereign justice as it was exercised and thought of in the parlements, there existed a sense 
that from a historical point of view, sovereign justice possibly transcended the monarchy, or that 
sovereign justice—and sovereignty more generally—was “more eternal,” so to speak, than the monarchy.  
This is not to suggest that conseillers, even at the apex of their conflict with the king during the 
Fronde or in the eighteenth century, ever thought that they could exercise sovereign justice outside of a 
monarchical political framework—one would be hard pressed to find even a remote hint of such an idea 
                                                      
367 See p. 79 above. 
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in contemporary sources—but that a number of them, quite possibly most of them, believed that 
sovereignty could transcend the monarchy. This belief was not revolutionary in the sense that even the 
most radical forms of parlementaire ideology remained rooted in a monarchical political framework and 
never posited that the monarchy itself could be an obstacle to the exercise of sovereign justice, but it was 
a radical belief in the sense that the primacy that it gave to justice over lawmaking could put the 
parlements in sharp disagreement with the king.  
The idea that sovereignty transcended the monarchy not only had a temporal basis—that is, a 
historical justification found in pre-monarchical, in particular Roman history—it also had temporal 
implications, for it imbued sovereign justice and its exercise with a sense of eternity.  This sense of 
eternity informed some of the ideas I have reviewed in Chapter 2, for instance the idea that the divine 
inspiration that the magistrates were supposed to call on was not mediated by the French king—the “vicar 
of Christ on earth”—but came directly from God himself.368 Thus in this case, the idea of an eternal 
sovereign justice reinforced (and was reinforced by) this other notion that sovereign judges were 
accountable to God in a more fundamental way than they were accountable to the king. This is not to say 
that this imagined timelessness of justice directly shaped all judicial practices, but that it certainly 
informed, at least in oblique ways, those practices that seemed to cross a threshold between human and 
divine—for instance practices, such as judicial torture and sentencing to death or corporal punishment, 
that damaged the integrity of a human body, that is, of God’s creation. 
 
Reigns and careers: the lifetime scale. 
 
Despite this sense that an eternal sovereign justice could transcend a transient monarchy, no one 
would have questioned the fact that the judicial capacity of royal magistrates depended very strictly on the 
person of the reigning king. The fact that the conseillers exerted sovereign justice as a representation of 
                                                      
368 See p. 89 above. 
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the king rather than by delegation of the king369 did not change anything from that point of view: as 
individuals, the conseillers had no judicial power or authority outside of the office that they held from the 
individual king and that office died together with that physical king. Thus, the lifetime of individual 
kings, an unpredictable temporal variable that could range from a few days370 to several decades, set the 
chronological bounds of the magistrates’ judicial power. 
This idea was not confined to the theoretical reflections of jurists and political thinkers, for it 
manifested itself in practice at the beginning of each new reign through the official confirmation of all 
royal officers, a foundational administrative and political act. While this act had become a formality from 
a bureaucratic point of view, it remained an important political statement for both the king and his agents 
because this confirmation amounted to a re-assertion that authority and power lie in the hands of the king 
and that the sharing of that authority through the granting of offices to individuals was always in theory 
provisional, based on a personal delegation from one mortal king to one mortal officer. 
Mortal as the king, the magistrates also considered the finitude of their own lives in ways that 
informed their perception of how time related to judicial practice. From this perspective too, the office 
remained an object of central importance, for the office was not only the exclusive source of judicial 
authority framed by the king’s lifetime, but it was also a patrimony at the heart of interconnected 
parlementaire strategies: career strategies, matrimonial strategies, and more generally dynastic strategies. 
I will come back later and in more detail to some of the strictly financial implications of the “venality” of 
offices371—the fact that most official positions in the royal administration could be bought, sold, 
exchanged, bequeathed, and treated almost exactly like any other form of immovable property. In 1550, 
the venality of offices had been officially recognized by the king for a mere three decades (1522) but it 
                                                      
369 See p. 66-71. 
370 For example Jean I, who only reigned for the five days he lived (November 15 to 20, 1316). The shortest reign 
for the period studied here was that of François II, king for a little more than a year (July 10, 1559 to December 5, 
1560). 
371 See p. 221-236 below. 
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had been practiced for at least a couple centuries.372 The process of commodification of royal offices was 
not completed until 1604 however, when they officially became hereditary. This last transformation had 
very significant political, social, economic and ideological consequences: it changed the dynamics of the 
relationship between the king and his officers, provoked an explosion of the price of offices, and 
contributed to reinforce the dynastic character of the robe nobility that had started to self-identify around 
that same time.373 For all these reasons, royal offices became an object of desire for those who could 
afford them and were connected well enough to secure them, and an object of detestation for almost all 
others. These contrary feelings were particularly exacerbated in the case of higher royal offices and 
especially offices of conseillers in the parlements. On the one hand, because of the ideal of rectitude 
expected of those in charge of maintaining justice—a mission that remained at the core of the royal 
function as it was still idealized in the early-modern period—374 the commodification of the highest 
judicial offices and the abuses and corruption it could (and did) lead to, was perceived with a particular 
acuteness.375 On the other hand, the high financial value of an office of conseiller, the social capital it 
bestowed on its owner, the symbolic capital associated with the judicial functions attached to it—as 
opposed for instance to offices in the tax administration— made them all the more attractive as a 
patrimonial core from which to build not just a fortune, but a prominent dynasty.  The testament of 
François de Chalvet, conseiller (1583-1605) and later président aux Enquêtes (1605-1625) in Toulouse, 
aptly reflects the parlementaire awareness of the multifaceted nature of the judicial office as capital 
(financial, social and cultural): 
I […] pray my said only son Jacques de Chalvet et de Rainier, as well as all my said 
nephews, to always love virtue, lettres, and especially jurisprudence [i.e. legal studies] 
and to follow in the footsteps of the wisest of their predecessors [i.e. ancestors], to join, if 
                                                      
372 On this “proto-venality” (my phrase, not Mousnier’s) see Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et 
Louis XIII, 15-7. On the officialization of venality and its integration in royal revenues in 1522, ibid., 37. 
373 See Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 
novembre 1591), 172-73 ; Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 529-78.  
374 See Chapter 2. 
375 See Chapter 5. 
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they can, the robe longue because, although one can live honorably, as some in our 
family have done, in the military and other professions, I consider that there is more 
comfort, crédit [i.e. social capital], security [assurance] and commodity found in the 
position [tear in the document] and that families [tear in the document] maintain 
themselves, without [tear in the document] much more fortunate and longer than in any 
other condition. Because of this, they will do wisely if they hear the sound advice I give 
them and will never regret to have followed it.376 
François de Chalvet’s example and that of his son Jacques are particularly revealing of the 
interplay between genealogical contingencies and the transmission and/or acquisition of offices. In 1617, 
the fifty-eight year-old François de Chalvet, “seeing that [he] was of a weak and sickly constitution and 
that [he began] to near [his] end” provided this advice to his son, but Jacques was then a child and could 
not be received to his father’s office of conseiller. François did not die in 1617, but when he did so in 
May 1622, Jacques was still too young for the office (the 1622 codicils to François’s testament suggest 
that he was not yet fourteen year-old). The best François could do to ensure that Jacques would get an 
office of conseiller in due time was to “resign” (that is, sell) his own office and entrust the money from 
the sale to two guardians chosen among his colleagues in the Parlement (the conseillers Claret de Lafont 
and d’Ouvrier) with the recommendation that they “advise [his son] to be a man of letters and take some 
office de robe longue.”377 Despite François’s efforts, Jacques never became conseiller: being an only son, 
it seems that he was quite content to buy himself a sinecure office of gentilhomme de la chambre du roi 
(1644) and live from the extensive landed property he inherited from his parents. Interestingly and 
ironically, however, because he himself had twelve surviving children, it appeared that a significant 
division of this landed patrimony was unavoidable, and Jacques turned back to the Parlement to maintain 
                                                      
376 “J’exhorte et conjure, tant mon dit fils unique Jaques de Chalvet et de Rainier, que toutz mes susd. nepveus, 
d’aimer tousjours la vertu, les letres, et singulierement la jurisprudence et suivant les vestiges des plus sages de 
leurs predecesseurs, se metre s’il leur est possible à la robe longue car bien qu’on puisse vivre honorablement 
comme ont fait plusieurs des nostres en la profession des armes et aultres j’estime neantmoins qu’il y ha plus de 
soulagement, de credit, d’asseurance et de commodités aus estats [tear] et que les fami[tear] s’y conservent, sans 
di[tear] de biens plus heureusement et longuement qu’en toutes aultres conditions. A cause de quoi, ils feront fort 
sagement de croire le bon conseil que je leur en donne et ne se repentiront jamais de l’avoir suivi.” ADHG, 3E 
11821 (June 16, 1617). 
377 Ibid. (codicil, May 11, 1622). 
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the status of the dynasty. He wedded his eldest daughter Diane-Marie to the conseiller Pierre-Antoine de 
Valette, and bought an office of conseiller for his eldest son Jacques-François.378 
Thus, the connection between the contrary genealogical “accidents” of these two generations and 
the movement out of and back to the Parlement, François de Chalvet’s praise of the judicial career in his 
testament, illustrate the interplay between conceptions of the office of conseiller on the one hand and 
perceptions of the finitude of one’s own lifetime, ideas about one’s career, and hopes for one’s 
posthumous dynasty on the other. Conceptions of the office of conseiller (a multifaceted object with 
financial, social, cultural and symbolic dimensions), hence the judicial activity and practices it entailed, 
were certainly shaped by concerns proper to the subjective timescales that framed these perceptions, ideas 
and hopes.  
  
Parlement as judicial year. 
 
We have already seen that the word “Parlement” could refer to different objects: the judicial 
institution, the corps formed by the conseillers, the building where the court resided.379 This polysemy 
also extended to encompass a temporal meaning in which “Parlement” designated an extended judicial 
session, or we could say a judicial season. Indeed, in expressions such as “le Parlement encommençant” 
or “le prochain Parlement,” the word referred to the judicial year. In fact, there was a polysemy within 
this temporal meaning, for Parlement could mean the judicial year or one of the two shorter sessions—
winter Parlement and spring Parlement—into which the judicial year was broken down. 
The judicial year began with the winter Parlement that started on the day after the “Saint-Martin 
d’hiver” (November 11). This day (November 12) was the “opening” (ouverture) of the Parlement as 
judicial year, and for that reason involved a series of solemn rituals (mass, oath, harangue). The spring 
                                                      
378 Despite putting his four younger daughters into religious orders, Jacques still had to set aside some money for the 
dowry of one older daughter and divide the patrimony between six surviving sons (including Jacques-François). 
379 See Chapter 2. 
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Parlement began on the day after Easter (movable feast) and lasted until an unfixed date, somewhere 
between mid-August and early September.380 After that date and until the next Parlement took place the 
vacations (“vacations” in French) during which the activity of the court slowed down significantly. A 
smaller number of conseillers (in theory eight)381 drawn from each chamber seated a few days a week to 
expedite the current  and smaller affairs that might happen until the opening of the next judicial year 
(cases involving large amounts of money were delayed until then). 
This division into three different sessions reveals that, overall, the parlementaire judicial year fit 
into a traditional conception of the year framed by the succession of natural seasons. The parlementaire 
yearly calendar indeed is an apt illustration of the way in which all professional activities followed the 
agricultural cycles. Mapped onto a calendar, the intensity of the activity of the magistrates—and for that 
matter of the whole judicial world—appears as an exact negative of agricultural activity.382 The periods of 
intense judicial activity (winter and spring parlements) corresponded to the lowest points of agricultural 
labor and conversely, the “vacations” (roughly from mid-August to late October) corresponded to the 
period of intense agricultural activity (harvesting, threshing, pressing, storing, etc.).383 
This correspondence can be explained in part by the fact that, for practical reasons, judicial 
activity was conditioned by the litigants’ availability to pursue lawsuits. In a world in which 90 to 95% of 
the population lived directly from agricultural production, the seasons of highest activity in the fields 
severely diminished the opportunities and desire of most to plead their cases in court, especially when that 
court was situated several days (sometimes weeks) away from the locations that required uninterrupted 
daily labor. Thus, most would-be litigants saved their lawsuits for the winter, that is, for a low season that 
was mainly occupied by indoor activities that could be interrupted with less dramatic consequences. 
                                                      
380 Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 1, 396. 
381 Ordonnance of July 1519, quoted in Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'avènement des rois Valois à la 
mort d'Henri IV, vol. 1, 317. 
382 As Fernand Braudel noted “the succession of seasons was not simply synonymous to changes of temperature, it 
regulated the alternation of period of activities and of slack periods of peasant life” (Fernand Braudel, L'identité de 
la France, Paris: Arthaud-Flammarion, 1986, vol. 3, 26). 
383 Ibid., 27. 
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Judges however, were not simply “following” the agricultural seasons that framed the calendar 
used by the population at large. The inverted correspondence between the judicial and agricultural 
seasons must also be explained by the fact that the magistrates, like the rest of the urban population,384 
were fully integrated into the agricultural economy. The “vacations” represented a low point of judicial 
activity not just because of the reduced availability of litigants in the summer and the early months of fall, 
but because the judges themselves were involved in those agricultural activities. Most of the magistrates 
who did not sit in the small commissions that adjudicated current affairs during these months did not stay 
in Toulouse: a number of them—especially the wealthiest—were “au pays” (in the countryside), where 
they oversaw the intense agricultural activity of the tenants and day-laborers who rented or worked their 
lands.385 
This participation of the conseillers into the traditional approach to yearly cycles shared by the 
majority, is further evidenced by the parlementaire use of religious feasts and celebrations as milestones 
in the judicial calendar. I have already mentioned above how Easter, a movable feast, marked the 
beginning of the spring parlement. Tellingly as well, although the opening of the winter parlement 
occurred at a fixed date, the conseillers never referred to it as “the 12th of November” but always as the 
“day after the Saint-Martin d’hyver.” Originally, all parlementaire activities that occurred on a yearly 
basis were identified with reference to a religious feast on which or close to which they occurred. In the 
fifteenth century for instance, the pronunciation of arrêts généraux took place, as in Paris,386 only four 
times a year, always two days before major religious feasts: Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, and the Nativity 
of the Virgin (September 8). This use of the religious calendar as a stock of temporal markers for judicial 
                                                      
384 “[It is the season of] full employment : townspeople rush to the countryside, leave their jobs, as was common 
practice across Europe” (ibid.). 
385 See p. 115 above. 
386 Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'avènement des rois Valois à la mort d'Henri IV, vol. 1, 291. On 
"prononciation" as a practice, see Chapter 8. 
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events, was yet another sign that the conseillers’ approach to the yearly timescale was similar to that of 
the great majority of people in pre-modern Europe.387 
Thus, the parlementaire approach to and conception of the year as a cycle was fundamentally 
unoriginal, for it shared into a traditional understanding held by the majority, that is, one that was 
modeled after natural cycles and that made use of a liturgical calendar that had long been worked out to 
match the seasonal changes that governed agricultural activity. 
 
Workday 
 
When one looks at the smaller timescales of the week, the workday and the half-day sessions 
however,388 it appears that different and far less traditional approaches to time organized the various 
activities that filled the seasonal sessions of the judicial year. A combination of factors—administrative, 
financial and political—explains that the magistrates increasingly resorted to what I refer to as a “clock-
time approach” to regulate their judicial practices on these smaller timescales.  
To avoid exaggerating this claim however, we should note first that the traditional, nature-
oriented approach to time also shaped, to a certain extent, the organization of judicial practices on these 
smaller timescales. For instance, depending on the seasonal session, the parlementaire workday began 
and ended at different times to accommodate natural changes in daylight times. Although this mobility of 
the working hours constitutes another example of how judicial activities were shaped by temporal 
standards shared within early-modern society at large, parlementaire activity differed in that those times 
were regulated by clocks. Indeed, while the workday of most early-modern subjects was delimited by the 
seasonal changes in actual sunrise and sunset times, in the Parlement this mobility was mediated through 
human measurements of time—that is, through man-made instruments such as calendars and clocks. 
                                                      
387 See Robert Mandrou, Introduction à la France moderne. Essai de psychologie historique, 1500-1640, Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1961, 96-7. 
388 The month, while used to date acts, documents and more generally all the records of the court, was completely 
irrelevant temporal unit in terms of regulation of parlementaire activities and practices. 
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Thus, while the conseillers accommodated natural cycles on a yearly timescale, they did not 
follow these rhythms exactly: as the royal ordonnances reveal, the judicial seasons dictated the use of one 
of three possible workday schedules (winter, spring, vacation), and the man-made clock regulated each 
one of those three schedules. The 1493 Ordonnance sur l’administration de la justice for instance, 
specified that during the winter session, the conseillers and présidents must assemble in their respective 
chambers “to work on the affairs [of the court] (…) before seven o’ clock rang”, and “immediately after 
six” during the spring session (from Easter to late June, early July).389 
Furthermore, the workday was divided into sessions that were also regulated by clocks. A few 
years later, in 1510, the Ordonnance de Lyon sur la réformation de la justice further specified that from 
Quasimodo on (the Sunday after Easter), hearing sessions would begin at seven in the morning and last 
until ten, from eight to eleven during Lent.390 These morning sessions—whether hearing sessions or 
otherwise—were called “matinées” by opposition to the afternoon sessions called “après-dînées.” Despite 
their name, these afternoon sessions did not begin when the conseillers were done lunching but were 
regulated as well by clock-time. The Ordonnance de Lyon added indeed that these afternoon sessions 
would start at three and end at five.391 
It might seem difficult at first to ascertain whether or not those prescriptions were actually 
followed. On the one hand, one finds evidence that the conseillers were indeed at work early, as on that 
morning of April 1638, when the greffier Etienne de Malenfant noted in his Mémoires that “the 
                                                      
389 “enjoignons à nosdits présidens et conseillers que depuis la St-Martin d’hyver jusqu’à Pasques, ils soient entrés 
et assemblés en toutes les chambres de nostredite cour, pour besongner aux affaires d’icelles avant les sept heures 
soient sonnées, et depuis Pasques jusqu’à la fin du parlement, aussitost après six heure du matin, sans en partir 
jusqu’à la levée d’icelle.”Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 
1789, XI, 221. On the division of the year into Winter, Spring and “vacancy” sessions, see below “‘Parlement’ and 
judicial year.” 
390 “… depuis Quasimodo aux jours ordinaires [the days when the court held hearing sessions, that is, on weekdays 
except Wednesdays] que l’audience commence à sept heures du matin, et durera jusques à dix, et en caresme 
commencera à huit et durera jusques à onze…” Ibid., 589. 
391 “… et aux jours qu’on a accoutumé plaider de relevée, commencera à trois heures et durera jusques à cinq…” 
Ibid. 
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deliberation of Messieurs [the conseillers] had been very long, [and then] eight o’ clock rang.”392 In the 
eighteenth century, the conseiller who owned the copy of Malenfant’s Mémoires seemed to be surprised 
by how early his predecessors worked, noting in the margin that “at eight in the morning it was already 
late in the Palais,”393 thereby suggesting that such was no longer the case in the eighteenth century. 
Similarly, Malenfant noted in 1620 that noon was an unusually late time for the court to still be sitting in 
session.394 
On the other hand, the very repetition of these prescriptions suggests that royal concerns about 
punctuality and uninterrupted attendance during the sessions might have had some basis. In 1602, about a 
century after the ordonnances mentioned above, Etienne de Malenfant noted again at the beginning of his 
Mémoires the rule that the magistrates “must come early in the morning and keep working until the court 
gets up, for it happens often that they come too late and leave too early.”395 And indeed, one also finds 
evidence in the court’s records that the conseillers’ assiduity was not beyond questioning. In February 
1627, the conseillers of the Chambre des Enquêtes embroiled in a conflict with those of the Grand 
Chambre,396 took advantage of the fact that the courtroom of their colleagues was still deserted at seven in 
the morning on a Monday to occupy the room and thus prevent their elders’ work in order to force them 
to compromise.397 As this last example suggests and as I will explain in more detail below, the irregularity 
                                                      
392 “… et les opinions de MM. étant longues, et l’heure de huit étant sonnée …” Malenfant, II, 67. 
393 “à huit heures du matin il étoit déjà fort tard au Palais.” Ibid. 
394 “…la Cour mandoit à Carrière, chef de Consistoire, et Durand, avocat, de venir au Palais où elle étoit séante 
bien que l’heure fut fort tarde car il étoit près de midy.” Ibid., I, 207 (November 26, 1620). 
395 “les seigneurs doivent venir bon matin et continue tant que la Cour soit levée et souvent advient que trop tard 
viennent et trop tôt se partent.” Ibid., I, 8. 
396 The Chambre des Enquêtes argued that one of their own, not a conseiller from the Tournelle as the Grand 
Chambre had decided, should “move up” to the Grand Chambre to replace one of its recently deceased conseiller. 
397 “on the said day of Monday, the said President of the Enquêtes (…) assisted of all the conseillers from the 
Enquêtes went as early as seven o’ clock in the morning to the courtroom [of the Grand Chambre] and sat on the 
benches on which they usually sit in general assemblies, having resolved that they would not move from there, thus 
preventing the hearing session [of the Grand chambre], until the said general assembly was granted to them.” 
(“advenu led. Jour de lundy lesd. Sr. Presidens des enquêtes (…) assistés de tous MM. Les conseillers des Enquêtes 
se rendirent dès les sept heures du matin à la salle de l’audience et prirent les sièges qu’ils ont accoutumé de 
prendre aux chambres assemblées, resolus de ne bouger de là et d’empecher la tenue de lad. Audience, jusques à ce 
que lad. assemblée des chambres leur fut accourdée.”) Ibid., 289 (February 20, 1627).  
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of the conseillers’ attendance was not entirely random and often served some personal or collective 
interests. 
If we look further into the organization of the workday and get down to the scale of half-day 
sessions (matinées and après-dinées), it appears that the content of these sessions was regulated by a 
weekly schedule specific to the Parlement and which seemed to follow the religious calendar only in that 
the Sunday was, as for anyone else, a day off. The table below (Table 1) shows that this weekly schedule 
was different for each chamber and adapted to the specificity of its activities. 
We should note first that the use of such a schedule, in which activities changed depending on the 
day of the week and, furthermore, were strictly regulated by clocks (at least in theory) reveals, contrary to 
what I noted about the traditional character of the parlementaire year, a certain originality. The 
conseillers’ approach to these smaller timescale differed profoundly from that of the rest of the 
population, for whom, as Robert Mandrou noted, “precision in the measurement of the time spent on a 
particular job, in the evaluation of the time of the day, [was] not yet a mental requirement or a 
requirement of daily life.”398 For the conseillers however, it was very much a requirement of everyday 
judicial life, and the daily use of clock-time, and even more importantly, the use of clock-time as a basis 
to assess a number of judicial fees and revenues, explains that contrary to Gargantua, the conseillers 
always had to subject themselves to hours.399 
Hours did more than just delimit the parlementaire workday. The ordonnances I mentioned above 
defined the schedule of the conseiller as officier, but outside of this schedule (for instance during the 
blocks of time that I have marked as “instruction” or “sabatines” in the table above), the conseillers were 
free to act as commissaire. The same judicial practice, for instance deliberating, had different implications 
for the conseillers  depending on whether it was undertaken as officier (for instance, deliberating in a 
                                                      
398 “La précision dans l’évaluation du temps passé à un travail, et dans l’évaluation du moment de la journée n’est 
pas encore une exigence de l’esprit et de la vie quotidienne.” Mandrou, Introduction à la France moderne. Essai de 
psychologie historique, 1500-1640, 95-96. 
399 Gargantua declares “I never subject myself to hours: hours are made for men, men are not made for hours.” 
(François Rabelais, Gargantua, Book 1, Ch. 41). 
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conseil session on a Monday morning) or as a commissaire (the very same act of deliberating but in a 
Saturday afternoon “sabatine”). This double nature of parlementaire activities was fundamental, for it 
determined the form of authority the magistrates mobilized (officed-based or commission-based). More 
interestingly for the purpose of this chapter, judicial practices undertaken in the capacity of commissaire 
were not paid on the wages (gages) the conseiller earned as officers, but by fees that were indexed on 
some measurement of the time they spent working as commissaires. 
Thus, it is worth looking into this dual capacity of the conseillers for it related to time in two 
main ways. First, the capacity in which the conseillers acted was in part based on time, for the conseillers 
could not practice as officiers and commissaire at the same time. More interestingly for my purpose, this 
dual capacity transformed the way in which judicial time was money, so to speak, for an increasing 
emphasis on commissarial activities oriented judicial practice toward productivity. 
Before I explore this relationship between time, money and judicial practice however, I want to 
consider more generally how time was embedded in the judicial process and as such, was used as a 
resource (and not just a financial resource) by all the actors involved in that process. 
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Grand Chambre Tournelle
Chambre(s) des 
enquêtes
Deliberation
Hearing Session 
(public)
Deliberation
Hearing Session 
(public)
Deliberation
Hearing Session 
(closed)
Deliberation Deliberation Deliberation
Deliberation
Hearing Session 
(public)
Deliberation
Hearing Session 
(closed)
Sabatines
(Saturday deliberations by commission)
Deliberation
Instruction
Deliberation
Deliberation
Instruction
Deliberation
Deliberation Deliberation Deliberation
Instruction
Assembly of chambers
Instruction Instruction
Instruction
Deliberation
Instruction
Deliberation
Instruction
Deliberation
Instruction
Deliberation
Deliberation
Instruction
Instruction
Hearing Session 
(closed)
Hearing Session 
(closed)
Saturday
Matinées
Après-dinées
Sunday
Thursday
Matinées
Après-dinées
Friday
Matinées
Après-dinées
Après-dinées
Tuesday
Wednesday
Matinées
Après-dinées
Matinées
Après-dinées
Monday
Matinées
Table 1. Weekly schedule of the chambers of the parlement de Toulouse. 
Note that “instruction”—a literal translation from French—designates the work that 
the conseillers did individually and most often outside of the Palais on the cases for 
which they were either enquêteur or rapporteur. Deliberation sessions (conseil) that 
took place on the same half-day as hearing sessions, occurred before those hearings 
(six to seven o’ clock in the morning during the Spring, seven to eight during the 
Winter, three to four in the afternoon).  Hearing sessions in the mornings consisted 
mainly of lawyers’ speeches, open to the public. In the closed hearing sessions of the 
afternoon, only lawyers and procurators were present with the magistrates to settle 
more technical points of procedure. 
 188 
 
On the strategic uses of parlementaire times 
I suggested earlier that the apparent irregularity of the conseillers’ punctuality at the opening of 
daily sessions was not random. A closer look at the two examples mentioned above—one instance of 
parlementaire lateness and one of punctuality—shows that both occurrences were predicated on an 
intended strategic use of time on the part of one group of conseillers in its struggle against another group 
of conseillers. I first look at these “internal uses” of time (that is, strategic uses of time within the context 
of parlementaire internal politics) to suggest that such uses probably shaped as well the magistrates’ 
approach to the temporal dimension of their judicial practices. As we will see, this approach that framed 
time as a strategic resource was not particular to the Parlement, or even to the judicial world, and the 
magistrates’ strategic use of time within the court was certainly informed by a similar use outside the 
court, a practice which the magistrates, as clients, patrons, landlords, tenants, creditors, debtors, etc. 
shared with early-modern European society at large. 
The parlementaire approach to time however, was also informed by strategic uses of time that 
were proper to judicial practices. I demonstrate that these particular judicial uses of time were predicated 
on the fact that time was an integral element of the judicial procedure, that is, of the formal rules that 
regulated judicial practice.  
Internal uses 
We must keep in mind that the ordonnances that sought to regulate the work hours and more 
generally the attendance of the conseillers are normative sources and that their very existence suggests a 
discrepancy between the legislative ideal and the reality that these legal provisions were meant to correct. 
Thanks to previous studies, we do know with some statistical precision that the conseillers’ attendance 
records were far from stellar from the origins of the Parlement de Toulouse and tended to worsen in the 
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early-modern period.400 As André Viala calculated from the court’s records, about two thirds of the 
conseillers on average were present on any given day circa 1475, less than half circa 1500 and that ratio 
fell under one third in the course of the following twenty-five years.401 While these statistics are useful to 
uncover a general trend, and while Viala’s explanation that increases in personnel generally led to 
decreases in attendance seems to hold true, these averages conceal the irregularity of the conseillers’ 
punctuality and attendance on a daily basis and, more importantly, and mask the fact that this irregularity 
was not random. Indeed, when one looks more closely at the circumstances surrounding the two episodes 
I have mentioned above, a pattern emerges. In February 1627, the choice of a Monday was not innocent 
on the part of the conseillers of the Chambre des Enquêtes: their goal was to put pressure on the Grand 
Chambre by preventing it from starting its regular hearing session, thus leaving the litigants waiting at the 
door of the courtroom, to protest the interruption of the normal course of the royal justice that was due to 
them. The fact that Monday was a day of hearing session (“audience”) in the Grand Chambre was 
common knowledge, inside as well as outside the Parlement, but more importantly, the conseillers of the 
Chambre des Enquêtes knew that at seven in the morning, none of the conseillers of the Grand Chambre 
would be yet in Grande Salle d’audience as the ordonnances said they should. Even more significantly, 
the two facts were connected: the conseillers of the Chambres des enquêtes knew that their colleagues 
from the Grand Chambre would be late precisely because Monday was a hearing-session day. 
Conversely, the conseillers were early at work on that morning of April 1638 and still sitting 
“late” on that other morning of November 1620, because they were not holding hearing but deliberative 
sessions in those two instances.  These two assemblies of 1620 and 1638 were well attended, began early 
in one case and ended late in the other, because the matters at stake were of particular interest to the 
conseillers. In 1620, the court was gathering in a general assembly (“assemblée générale des chambres”) 
                                                      
400 The tendency is the same in other parlements, in particular in the parlement de Paris (see Aubert, Histoire du 
Parlement de Paris de l'origine à François Ier 1250-1515,  ; Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'avènement 
des rois Valois à la mort d'Henri IV, ). 
401 On a total of twenty conseillers circa 1475, fourteen were present, on average, on any given day, thirteen out of 
twenty-nine in circa 1500, eleven out of twenty-nine circa 1515, twelve out of forty-one circa 1526 (Viala, Le 
Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 1, 408). 
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to discuss issuing an arrêt to quash the recent election of the capitouls—the local municipal councilors—, 
a move of major political importance for it rested on the claim that the court, as a sovereign body, could 
oversee and override the local privileges that the king in person had granted to the municipality of 
Toulouse. 
In 1638, the episode was of lesser political implications but more interesting for us here, because 
the matter at stake was precisely the modalities of the hearing sessions and the parlementaire debates in 
this instance illuminate some of the ways in which time and judicial practice related to one another. 
Special circumstances had called for this debate: the premier président had left Toulouse on an official 
mission to the king and all the other presidents of the Grand Chambre happened to be absent on that 
morning. While the doyen of the Grand Chambre (its most senior member) had authority, in this absence 
and in his quality of “born president,”402 to preside over all other businesses of the chamber, he could not 
preside over the public hearing sessions of the Grand Chambre. The reason for this was simple enough: 
the doyen was not allowed to wear the red robe that was required to preside over these formal and public 
hearings. This rule was so unquestionably accepted by all, that none of the conseillers of the Grand 
Chambre present on that morning suggested that the doyen M. de Maussac should just either put on a 
presidential red robe or preside over the session in his black conseiller robe. All agreed that a president 
was needed to hold the public hearing session in the Grand Chambre and all agreed that that president 
should be M. de Ciron, president of the Tournelle, the second chamber of the court after the Grand 
Chambre by order of prestige and authority.  The conseillers of the Grand Chambre however, were 
divided on two points that both related, albeit in very different ways, to time and its use in the parlement 
de Toulouse. 
The first of those two uses of time was not, in fact, particular to the parlement de Toulouse or for 
that matter to the judicial world at large. It consisted in a strategic use of delays or immediate summons to 
manifest one’s superiority over an adversary in a power struggle—when one makes an inferior wait on a 
                                                      
402 “… led. Sr. doyen … ayant l’honneur d’être président né en la grand chambre en l’absence des Srs. presidens y 
servant…” Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, II, 66. 
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meeting request or, on the contrary, demands to meet unexpectedly and right away, in both cases for the 
sole purpose of asserting a hierarchical difference that will shape the outcome of the negotiation at hand. 
In this case, the conseillers in the Grand Chambre felt that they had to re-assert their superiority over the 
Tournelle, because the hierarchy between chambers had been troubled by an unusual situation of 
dependence of the Grand Chambre on the Tournelle. From the perspective of the conseillers in the Grand 
Chambre indeed, the normal hierarchy of power was upset not only by the prospect of having a president 
of the Tournelle act as their chief, but also by the fact that they had no choice but to initiate the request, 
and thus invert traditional roles by putting themselves in the lower position of a petitioner. Cornered in 
this uncomfortable position, the conseillers of the Grand Chambre sought to make one point very clear: 
“to let the said M. de Ciron [president of the Tournelle] know that he had no right to come and preside the 
said hearing session until the Grand Chambre had requested him to do so.”403 To get their point across, 
the conseillers of the Grand Chambre agreed that they would send the greffier Malenfant rather than one 
of their own to go make that request. And to make that point even clearer, they sent Malenfant not to ask 
M. de Ciron to come preside over the hearing session, but to let him know that he should be at the 
disposal of the conseillers in the Grand Chambre, and wait for them to be ready to hold that session. 
Once the conseillers of the Grand Chambre were ready to hold the session, they disagreed about whether 
to make M. de Ciron wait any further or, on the contrary, to summon him immediately would better 
manifest the Grand Chambre’s authority over the Tournelle: 
Some were of the opinion that they should not let him know so soon and wait another 
half an hour or fifteen minutes; others thought that they should let him know immediately 
so that M. le président [de Ciron] and MM. of the Tournelle understood that it wasn’t 
their place to deliberate on how the hearing sessions of the Grand Chambre should be 
held.404 
                                                      
403 “… faire savoir aud. Sr. de Ciron qu’il n’avoit point droit de venir presider en lad. audience qu’après y avoir été 
appellé par la Grand Chambre.” Ibid., 67. 
404 “Les uns furent d’avis de ne leur pas faire savoir si tôt cette resolution et d’attendre une demi heure ou un quart 
d’heure ; les autres qu’il y falloit aller presentement à cette fin que M. le president et MM. de la Tournelle seussent 
que ce n’etoit pas à eux de deliberer sur la tenue des audiences de la Grand Chambre.” Ibid., 67 
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As I noted earlier, this use of time as an instrument in power struggles is certainly not particular 
to the Parlement or to the early-modern period. The conseillers were familiar with this strategic use of 
time, both as wielders and “victims” of this weapon, both inside and outside the Parlement. This was 
certainly a common occurrence for the conseillers, not just in the strict context of their professional 
activities, but for instance in the relationships of patronage they were part of as both clients and 
patrons.405 
Time as an element/object of procedure 
 
One should note, however, that this strategic use of time was particularly ingrained, and in a 
specific way, in the judicial world. This specificity is best explained by the fact that judicial approaches to 
time were also informed by strategic uses of time prompted by the rules of judicial practice. In this 
section I show that these particular judicial uses of time were predicated on the fact that time was an 
integral element of the judicial procedure, that is, of the formal rules that regulated judicial practices. As 
we will see, this specifically judicial approach to time is twofold because there are two interrelated 
approaches to the judicial procedure—a normative approach that conceives of the procedure as a set of 
rules and an instrumental approach that conceives these rules as a set of tools to maximize one’s profit. 
From a normative perspective, the judicial procedure is a set of rules designed to regulate a 
process geared toward the resolution of conflicts. Tellingly, the manuals of judicial procedure that record 
and gloss the rules regulating the various operations that make up this process, follow a specific 
chronological order that seeks to normalize rather than reflect the temporal dimension of actual judicial 
proceedings. According to the idealized judicial process described in procedure manuals, a conflict had 
much better chances of being resolved when proper time is given to the various stages of a trial—say, 
gathering evidence, interrogating witnesses, or deliberating—and when these stages are followed in a 
certain order—with the issuing of a sentence occurring at the end rather than the beginning of the process. 
                                                      
405 See Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, . 
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Not surprisingly then, a number of the rules that make up the judicial procedure are time-oriented, for the 
resolution of conflicts, like any other process, is inscribed within a certain timeframe and its success is 
predicated on the proper timing and chaining of each one of its successive operations.  
The judicial process, however, also has a unique temporal dimension, for respecting these time-
oriented rules is not only a way of ensuring that the process reaches its goal—resolving a conflict—but 
also a fundamental way of giving to the final product legal validity. This is true in a very general way, 
whether the judicial process is regulated, as it still is today, by the formal rules enacted in codes of 
procedure or by rituals such as the Carolingian ordeals. Time is thus, so to speak, a doubly critical 
dimension of the judicial process: first because it is a process and as such its success depends on the 
proper timing and sequencing of its various operations, and then because it is judicial and as such the 
validity of its “final product”—say, a sentence—is predicated on the respect of specifically legal time 
requirements. 
For this reason, time is an integral element of the judicial procedure. Indeed, a significant number 
of the formal rules that make up the judicial procedure followed in the Parlement are time-oriented and 
can be broken down into two categories. Rules that belong to the first category were specifically designed 
to make sure that trials moved forward from one stage to the other, and were thus explicitly defined in 
temporal terms. More specifically, this first category encompasses rules that either define the time 
required before a certain legal operation can take place, for instance the ajournement procedure that 
establishes the time—generally fourteen days—after which a summoned litigant is to appear before the 
court, or the minimum and/or maximum time a certain legal operation can last.406 Often, rules in this first 
category were designed to regulate time in order to accommodate practical and contingent requirements. 
For instance, the fourteen days generally granted for an ajournement was designed to both satisfy a 
judicial—almost moral—requirement (to give time to the litigant to prepare for his appearance in court) 
and accommodate the practical constraint of the slowness of early-modern travel (i.e. in this case, the 
                                                      
406 For instance, the delay to appeal a “lower” sentence to the parlement de Toulouse was ten days (Formulaire de la 
chancellerie du roi sous Louis XI ; Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms fr. 5727, fol. 16v.)  
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slow traveling of both the ajournement notification and of the litigant). In fact, the procedure for these 
ajournements could be used as an index of early-modern travel times to Toulouse, for it defined different 
delays based a on space-oriented taxonomy of lower jurisdictions: two weeks for a case from Toulouse 
and closeby regions, three weeks for more distant regions of the ressort, a month for even more remote 
corners of the ressort and for cases from the jurisdiction of the parlement de Bordeaux, and six weeks for 
cases coming from the jurisdictions of the other parlements.407 
The second category comprises rules designed to specifically act on time. This second category 
encompasses rules which, in a general way, sought to either slow down or speed up the overall judicial 
process. For instance, the procedure defined delays to grant a litigant a défaut (a favorable sentence when 
his opponent did not appear in court after three of the ajournements defined above), times given to 
lawyers and procurators to add documents to their clients’ files, it also made time-oriented distinctions 
such as the one between arrêts interlocutoires (judicial decisions that required that a case be further 
processed in one way or another) and arrêts définitifs (that marked the complete end of the processing of 
a case). 
 
Judicial procedure, however, was not a simple set of rules that lawyers and judges only had to 
follow to make sure that conflicts were resolved properly. Moving beyond this normative conception of 
the judicial procedure, lies an instrumental conception in which time is equally if not more important. 
Indeed, because the procedure regulated a process in which all the actors involved—litigants, lawyers, 
procurators, judges, judicial personnel in general—had personal stakes and goals often distinct from a 
pure ideal of conflict resolution, all of them considered the judicial procedure not just as a set of rules, but 
also as a set of tools they could use to solve a particular conflict in a way that served their particular 
interest. In that respect, the temporal dimension of these rules-as-tools was essential, whether one sought 
                                                      
407 In more detail : two weeks for Toulouse, Lauragais, Albigeois, Villelong, Comminges, Foix, Rieux, Rivière 
Verdun, Astarac, and Gaure ; three weeks for Carcassone, Béziers, Pézenas, Montagnac, Gignac, Castres, Albi, 
Terrabasse, one month for Beaucaire, Montpellier, Velais, Gévaudan, Vivarais, Mercoeur and the ressort of the 
parlement de Bordeaux ; six weeks for the ressorts of the parlements de Paris, Rouen, Bourgogne, Provence, 
Dauphiné (Ibid.). 
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to speed up a trial to limit his expenses (litigant), get money quickly (winning litigant, lawyer), prevent 
the opposing party from gathering counter-evidence or on the contrary slow it down to increase his 
chances of winning (litigant, lawyer), to alleviate his doubts (judge), inflate the fees he could charge 
(lawyer, judge), or make the trial drag on in the hope it would die out (litigant). 
It might seem at first that lawyers and litigants had more reasons to try and slow down or speed 
up the judicial process, for their stakes in the resolution of a conflict seem more obvious and direct. And 
indeed, as a number of ordonnances reveal, the slowness of justice was most often blamed by the king on 
lawyers, procurators and their clients who had become experts at manipulating procedural rules to delay 
or even escape unfavorable sentences. But the judges as well took advantage of the temporal aspects of 
these rules to reach comparable effects on the judicial process. The ambivalent ideal of justice I 
mentioned earlier, could prompt the magistrates to use procedure to try and meet the requirements of 
either a summary or a wisely slow justice, depending on circumstances and their own collective or 
individual interests. For instance, a few famous cases demonstrate that the magistrates were willing to use 
procedural tricks to speed up trials, either under popular pressure (Calas affair, 1762) or royal pressure 
(trial of the duke of Montmorency, 1632). 
Over time, lawyers and procurators had become experts at using delays to capitalize, often 
literally, on specific aspects of the judicial procedure. In fact, delaying tactics (“manoeuvres dilatoires”) 
had become an integral part of the procedure for legal practitioners: they expected their opponents to use 
them as much as they expected them to comply with actual requirements of the judicial procedure as 
defined in royal legislation. The adjournments, delays, suspensive appeals, defined in the procedure were 
the main tools used by lawyers and procurators to prolong lawsuits, because it was the surest way to 
multiply and increase the fees paid by both parties, obviously a source of revenue for the practitioner but 
also the most common strategy used to exhaust financially one’s opponents in hope of forcing them to an 
advantageous settlement.   
These practices are one of the main reasons for a slowness of justice often invoked in the 
preamble of the royal ordonnances that sought to reform judicial procedure. In most cases however, these 
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preambles did not point out directly the causes of the slowness of royal justice, but rather stated that a 
reformation was in order to “cut short” (“abréger”) trials. Often, this goal was presented as one of the 
main judicial duties of the king, as in the preamble to the ordonnance of Lyon (1510) that stated that “the 
greatest good and relief we can give to [our] subjects, is to end or at least cut short the trials they have.”408 
Thus, royal attempts to reform justice were often connected to this overall ideal that royal justice had to 
be “good and brief,”409 an ideal most clearly expressed in the preamble to the ordonnance of Orléans 
(1560), which opened “Recognizing that the office of a good king is to have justice dispensed to his 
subjects, promptly and on the spot [where they live].”410 
In a number of ordonnances, however, the preambles commented on—and in a few cases 
attempted to explain—the slowness of royal justice. Those preambles described the litigants’ plights that 
resulted from this slowness and blamed it on the way lawsuits were handled, but did not point fingers to 
lawyers, procurators or judges. It was the case, for instance, in the October 1535 ordonnance for the 
reformation of justice in Provence that lamented “the prolixity of trials that were so very poorly managed 
and handled that justice is immortal in that region, and as a result [the inhabitants of Provence] are 
grieved and plagued by innumerable difficulties, troubles, and expenses that they have to bear because of 
the length of the said trials.”411 In a few cases however, ordonnances pointed out explicitly the cause of 
this slowness and its consequences and lie blame on lawyers and litigants who exploited the procedure. In 
this respect, the ordonnance of Lyon was the clearest: 
                                                      
408 “considerans que le plus grand bien et soulagement que puissions faire à [nos] sujets, c’est de mettre fin ou à 
tout le moins d’abreger les procès qu’ils ont.” Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 
jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, XI, 579 (June 1510). 
409 “(…) We desire with all our heart that our subjects be kept in peace and that good and brief justice be 
administered to them and maintained in our kingdom” (“(...) Nous qui desirons de tout nostre coeur nos sujets 
estre entretenus en paix et que bonne et briève justice leur soit administrée et ait cours en nostre 
royaume...”) Ibid., XI, 220-1(July 1493). 
410 “Reconnoissant que l’office d’un bon roy est de faire rendre à ses sujets prompte justice sur les lieux (…)” ibid., 
XIV, 73 (Janvier 1560). 
411 “la prolixité des procez qui estoient si très mal conduits et démenez, que justice y estoit immortelle, en 
quoy ils estoient molestez et travaillez par innumérables peines et travaux, fraiz et mises qu'ils 
supportoient pour la longueur desdits procez.”Ibid., XII, 424. 
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(…) it is impossible to draft laws, statutes, or ordonnances precise enough to address 
the diversity of the cases that happen every day and to hold in check the subtlety and 
shrewdness of some lawyers and other legal practitioners, and the malice of some of our 
subjects ; parts of our said ordonnances of our said predecessors, because of the diversity 
of the ways in which they have been interpreted, and [as a result,] the pace of our said 
justice has been so troubled and perverted that our poor subjects have been and are  
greatly afflicted and harassed today, and because of this, countless trials, questions and 
disagreements have arisen, which, in the long run, would bring the destruction of our said 
poor subjects.412 
Royal efforts to “cut short” trials through partial reforms of the procedure in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the situation described in the preamble to the famous 
ordonnance of 1667, often referred to as Colbert’s “code of civil procedure,” was resembled, in its 
diagnosis and language, the 1510 ordonnance: 
(…) having recognized that (…) the ordonnances wisely established by the kings our 
predecessors in order to end lawsuits are neglected or diverted [from their original 
purpose] by time and the malice of litigants, that they are applied differently in several of 
our courts, which causes the ruin of families because of the multiplicity of procedures, of 
legal fees and the diversity of judgments issued, and that it is necessary to address this 
situation and make the treatment of lawsuits faster, easier and more certain by doing 
away with a number of useless delays and acts and by establishing a uniform procedure 
in all our courts.413 
Although ordonnances tended to point the finger at litigants and lawyers as the cause of the 
slowness of royal justice, royal judges were not innocent, for their attitudes vis-à-vis this question was 
ambivalent. On the one hand, delaying a trial might mean more fees for them as well. On the other hand, 
shorter trials meant more trials, hence more fees. The ability of a judge to maintain a profitable balance 
                                                      
412 “(...) il est impossible faire loix, statuts ni ordonnances précises, à tous cas qui peuvent chacun jour 
survenir, aussi que par la subtilité et cautelle de plusieurs avocats et autres praticiens, et la malice de 
plusieurs nos sujets ; partie de nosdites ordonnances et de nosdits predecesseurs, par la diversité des 
interpretations trouvées sur icelles, le train de ladite justice a esté tellement troublé et perverti, que de 
present nosdits pauvres sujets on esté et sont grandement molestez et travaillez, et sur ce, sont intervenus 
innumerables procès, questions et differens qui, au long aller, seroient la destruction de nosdits pauvres 
sujets.” Ibid., XI, 579 (June 1510). 
413 “(…) ayant reconnu (…) que les ordonnances sagement établies par les rois nos prédécesseurs pour 
terminer les procès, étoient négligées ou changées par le temps et la malice des plaideurs; que même 
elles étoient observées différemment en plusieurs de nos cours, ce qui causoit la ruine des familles par la 
multiplicité des procédures, les frais des poursuites et la variété des jugemens; et qu'il étoit nécessaire d'y 
pourvoir, et rendre l'expédition des affaires plus prompte, plus facile et plus sûre, par le retranchement 
de plusieurs délais et actes inutiles, et par l'établissement d'un style uniforme dans toutes nos cours et 
sièges.” Ibid., XVIII, 106-107 (April 1667). 
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between the two depended on a number of parameters I will explore in more detail below:414 his chances 
of obtaining as many lawsuits as possible from the premier président of his chamber (and these chances 
often depended more on his connections within the court than on his professional aptitude), the expertise 
needed to get through as many of these lawsuits as possible to multiply the fees, and the different kind of 
talent that was required to produce the amount of work, especially the written work, on which the volume 
of those fees was indexed.  
Time as constraint/resource 
 
It should be clear at this point that time could be both a constraint and a resource for all the 
parties involved in the judicial process. This was in part due to the temporal ambivalence of the ideal of 
justice I presented at the beginning of this chapter. Indeed, judges could either be pressed by time or take 
their time, depending on which side of the twofold ideal of justice they looked at: swift judging met the 
expectations of a summary (and mainly retributive) justice—that is, one that kept itself busy patching the 
social fabric everywhere and every time it was torn by conflict—on the other hand, patient judging met 
the expectations of a wisely slow justice—one that took the time needed to weave and sew the threads of 
an invisible but solid mending work. 
My analysis of the temporal aspects of judicial procedure and their use by actors in the judicial 
process suggested that within the intellectual and ethical framework of the time, a pragmatic approach to 
this double ideal gave a lot of flexibility to play with temporal resources and constraints. First of all, 
because the judicial process was a confrontational process—that is, one in which the actors involved did 
not collaborate towards the same goal, for they sought above all a conflict resolution to their own 
advantage—the temporal constraint on one party was almost always a temporal benefit for the other. If 
only because, as we will see in more detail later on,415 judges often sided with one party for extra-judicial 
                                                      
414 See Chapter 5. 
415 See Chapter 5. 
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reasons, the temporal resources and constraints of one party could also be the temporal resources and 
constraints of his judge. Acknowledging the personal interests of the magistrates and their collusion either 
with litigants, patrons, or political figures also suggests that the temporal expectations that stemmed from 
the ambivalent ideal of justice could be, with a bit of cynicism, turned on their head. Expectations of a 
prompt justice, far from being a disturbing pressure on the judge could be welcomed as a great resource 
when a magistrate had reasons (whether personal, political, or financial) to expedite a case. 
Thus, while there is no doubt that the temporal dimension of the judicial procedure affected 
judicial practices in significant ways, the way in which it affected them as either a constraint or a resource 
depended mostly on contingent factors. 
Judicial time is money 
 
I have already suggested that the personal interests of the magistrates might have shaped their 
perception of how time related to their professional practices. I did so by considering their personal 
interests broadly speaking, but it is worth further exploring how the temporal dimension of the judges’ 
financial interests shaped more specifically their professional practices. By considering how “judicial 
time is money” in this section, I open up a number of important questions that I will address in 
subsequent chapters for they take us beyond the scope of this chapter.416 For now I would like to turn to 
the question of the double administrative nature of the function of conseiller in the Parlement, for it 
informs the ways in which time, money and judicial practice related to one another, and thus falls within 
the scope of this chapter. 
As is well known, conseillers in the parlements were officers (officiers) and the office of 
conseiller in a sovereign court was one of the most prestigious in the royal administration. It is a less 
known fact, however, that the conseillers also conducted part of their judicial activity in the capacity of 
                                                      
416 I will consider later (Chapter 5), the connection between devaluation of wages with the increasing importance of 
épices, and the very significant impact on several judicial practices, such as reporting and sentencing. 
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commissaires. In the following section, I explore some of the basic differences between those two 
different capacities in which the conseillers acted as judges, for they entailed two perceptions of judicial 
time—perceptions rooted in financial questions—that shaped judicial practices in two significantly 
different ways.  
Droit annuel, annual wages: the judicial time of the officer 
Longue durée: the office as patrimoine 
 
The office was conceived by the officer—that is, its owner, or rather as we will see shortly its 
tenant for life (usufruitier)—as an object situated in the longue durée. Indeed, because the office was in 
essence a share of royal authority, it was eternal. While new offices could be created—and the kings 
indeed created many of them, especially at the end of the seventeenth century, when their sale appeared to 
be a quick and easy source of cash for the royal treasury—417 the theory was that they were a 
démembrement of royal authority (much in the same way as a newly created jurisdiction was a 
démembrement of the larger and pre-existing jurisdiction it was created from).418 This longue durée 
dimension was all the more perceivable when the officer inherited or bought an office whose existence 
could be traced several centuries back in time.419 Thus, whether one held a recently created office or one 
that had existed for decades, it was understood that the existence of the office preceded the lifetime of its 
current tenant. And it was understood as well that, on the other end of one’s lifetime, the office would 
                                                      
417 William Doyle, Venality : the sale of offices in eighteenth-century France, Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; 
Oxford University Press, 1996, 26-57. 
418 See above p. 106. 
419 In the parlement de Toulouse, a few offices of conseillers could thus be traced back to the creation of the court 
(1444). In the parlement de Paris, some could be traced back to the thirteenth century. In theory though, and as I 
have just suggested, the Toulousain offices were “dismemberment” of Parisian offices (for the parlement de 
Toulouse was a dismemberment of the parlement de Paris, itself a dismemberment of the conseil du roi, an 
institution that could be traced back in some elementary form to the origins of the monarchy). This theory was 
reinforced in practice by the fact that a number of conseillers in the 1444 parlement de Toulouse had previously 
been conseillers in the parlement de Paris. 
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survive its tenant. This fact was not only well understood, it was at the center of royal officers’ (and 
would-be royal officers’) patrimonial and dynastic strategies. 
The office was not simply a share of royal authority, it was also a capital—both financial and 
symbolic—, and this feature shaped in fundamental ways the officer’s perception of the temporal 
dimension of his office. Because it was a share of royal of authority, the office was a very valuable form 
of social capital: it connected its holder to the figure of the king and thus bestowed on him some of the 
ideological clout attached to the transcendental nature of royal power—its divine origins, its inscription 
within a secular tradition from “time immemorial.”420 More pragmatically, it was also a form of social 
capital because it gave to its holder powers—for instance, the power to arbitrate conflicts—valued and 
feared within the community. From a temporal point of view, the everyday exercise of any of the 
functions attached to the office was thus tantamount to a daily reassertion of this social capital.  
Further, the office was also a financial capital, and as such it shaped even more profoundly the 
officer’s perception of its temporal dimension. As is well-known,421 offices were venal, and the official 
recognition of the venality of offices (1522) and later of their hereditary nature (1604), had a significant 
impact on officers’ perception and management of their offices, with important consequences on their 
professional practices. Buying an office of conseiller in a parlement had always been a considerable 
financial expense, even for the wealthiest families. The social capital I just mentioned—the powers the 
office of conseiller gave to its owner, the social mobility it allowed because it was an ennobling office, 
the careers it opened—, justified this large investment. Until the royal recognition and practice of the sale 
of offices, however, and even more significantly until the officialization of their hereditary nature, the 
purchase of royal offices was not a secure investment. In fact, before the recognition of venality, the 
                                                      
420 See Chapter 1. 
421 On the venality of offices in general, see Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII,  and 
Doyle, Venality : the sale of offices in eighteenth-century France, . 
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office could be lost if it was proved that it had been purchased, and before the recognition of its hereditary 
nature, it could be lost in case of the sudden death of its tenant.422  
Those two changes increased the security of the investment and thus caused a dramatic increase 
in the financial value of offices. This increase of both the security of the investment and of the value of 
the office as capital led to a decrease of the value of the office as a financial investment. This decrease 
was due to a number of factors. There were “mechanical” factors: the wages were not proportional to the 
financial value of the office, and the rare increases of those wages were far too modest (let alone the fact 
that the king paid those annual wages very irregularly) to follow the exponential increase of the value of 
the office. There were political factors, for the royal guarantee of the hereditary nature of the office came 
at a financial cost for the officers with the creation of an annual tax (“droit annuel” also known as 
“paulette”) they had to pay to the king, and which, contrary to the wages attached to the office, was 
indexed on its value (about 4% of the capital spent on the purchase). Finally, there were  economic factors 
specific to the time-period, for the context of rising prices and inflation for most of the seventeenth 
century, made the wages (assessed in money-of-account rather than in actual currency) even more 
insignificant.423  
As a result of this evolution, purchasing an office was still, at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, a very lucrative investment in the long run, because of the explosion of their price, because it 
exempted its owner from paying the main direct tax (“taille”) which also exploded in the following few 
decades, and because of the social capital it brought to its owner. But it was an investment that came at a 
very high cost in the short term for there was no direct financial return unless the office was sold. It meant 
that the purchase of an office entailed not just a one-time expense, but also the cost of maintaining one’s 
                                                      
422 Before the hereditary nature of offices was officially recognized in exchange for the payment of a new tax (droit 
annuel, roughly equivalent to 4% of the value of the office), the so-called “forty days clause” was in effect. 
According to this clause, a sale passed within forty days before the death of the owner would be invalidated (see 
Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 226-32). 
423 This trend started early on : in 1525 the wages of the conseillers in Toulouse represented in relative value only 
half of what they had been in 1444 (Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 
environ, vol. 1, 205). The trend is similar in the parlement de Paris (see Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de 
l'avènement des rois Valois à la mort d'Henri IV, vol. 1, 445). 
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living afterwards, because the direct financial benefit of being an officer was close to null, in particular 
for those who, because they were already noble, were already exempt from paying the taille.  
Épices, tours, question: the judicial time of the commissaire 
 
In other words, from a plain financial point of view, the practice of justice as a royal officer was a 
waste of time that had to be compensated otherwise. A number of extra-judicial compensations—land 
ownership, royal and patron pensions, credit, matrimonial strategies—that were available to the 
magistrates but in most cases those were more readily available to conseillers who were already wealthy. 
Most conseillers, however, had to turn to a number of judicial activities they exerted in their quality of 
commissaires. It seemed like an appealing financial option for two main and complementary reasons. 
First, most commissarial activities were paid in fees that were distinct from the fixed wages that the 
conseillers received as officers. Further, the amount of those fees seemed conveniently expandable, for it 
was assessed collectively by the judges themselves and indexed on some measure of productivity—a 
notion that I will clarify below for it introduced a new perception of the temporal dimension of judicial 
activity, with significant consequences on practices.  
The distinction between the two capacities of officier and commissaire was largely an 
administrative fiction that resulted from the exploitation of a confusion between an older, medieval 
parlementaire practice—that of calling “commissaire” an individual conseiller who was sent on a one-
time, specific task—and the transformation of royal “commissions,” increasingly used by the kings in the 
early-modern period to circumvent traditional administrative networks (most famously the functions of 
the intendants de province were defined and delimited by a royal commission).424 The court defined as a 
“commission” any task or activity that fell outside of the duties of the conseiller as officer, that is, any 
activity that was not encompassed by the original domestic model of the conseiller as member of the 
judicial curia regis in the Middle Ages. Anything beyond the basic duties of the original counselor who 
                                                      
424 See Anette Smedley-Weill, Les intendants de Louis XIV, Paris: Fayard, 1995. 
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originally sat with the king in his council to assist him in his judicial functions—hearing complaints and 
pleas, deliberating, pronouncing sentences—was the object of a particular mission. These extra-judicial 
missions were quite diverse and included diplomatic missions, practical tasks in other areas of the royal 
administration (such as tax assessment), participation in reform projects.425  
The most lucrative and thus the most practiced of these activities was that of reporting 
(“rapporter”), that is, sifting through the documents and evidence of a lawsuit to write down a reasoned 
review of the case and an argued judicial solution to it, which the rapporteur later exposed orally to the 
fellow-members of his chamber. 426 I focus here on those features of the practice of rapporter that help 
explain the genealogy of the fictional distinction between officier and commissaire. From this genealogy I 
proceed to explain how and why the conseillers came to utilize this fiction to secure additional revenues. 
Finally, I evaluate how this administrative innovation affected the conseillers’ perception of the temporal 
dimension of the practice of rapporter and their judicial practices more generally. Indeed, the analysis of 
this “commissarial dimension” of rapporter illustrates most clearly how time and money related to one 
another and with what effects on practice itself. As we will see, there were two main effects: that of 
turning rapporter into a productivity-oriented practice, and, for that reason, that of turning the practice 
into an object of competition within the institution, that is, among the conseillers. 
I focus below on the financial and temporal aspects of reporting,427 two dimensions that evolved 
in relation to one another as the conseillers turned to this particular commissarial activity to make it their 
practice of choice to extract additional revenues from their profession. In search for these revenues that 
could counter-balance the financial cost of being an officer—that is, both the cost of the purchase of the 
                                                      
425 For instance, in the Parlement de Toulouse in the fifteenth century, the président Jean Dauvet was sent by Charles 
VII to the council of Basel as one of deputies, later as commissaires at the Etats of Normandie (1438) and later 
Languedoc (1456), as ambassador to the Duke of Burgundy in 1452. Premier Président Louis de la Vernade was 
sent throughout Languedoc in 1455-56 as a commissaire in charge of reforming the administration of the province 
(Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 1, 123). 
426 I analyze this practice in detail in Chapter 7. 
427 The practice of rapporter was also a defining element of professional identity—as it distinguished judges from 
other legal professionals—and a criterion of judicial expertise—in the sense that a judge’s proficiency as a 
rapporteur was one of the criteria used to evaluate his overall talent and expertise as a judge. These are essential 
aspects of this practice to which I will come back in Chapter 7. 
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office and the cost of maintaining the appearance of a livelihood in tune with the social standing implied 
by the position—the conseillers realized very early on the financial potential of this activity. This 
potential rested in the nature of the fee, the “épices” (literally “spices”) that the conseillers charged the 
litigants (“taxed” them in the language of the time) for their work as rapporteur. First, the épices were 
paid for an activity that could be categorized as a “commission,” then they could be arguably related to a 
practice that drew on a medieval ideology of gift exchange, and finally—and maybe most importantly—
they were assessed arbitrarily by the magistrates themselves. 
It is difficult to date precisely when the practice of reporting was introduced in the Parlement, but 
what is certain is that it was not originally part of the deliberating process either in the royal council or in 
the Parlement that was later detached from it in the 1250s. The introduction of the practice of reporting 
formalized parlementaire deliberation in significant ways that I will analyze later, but what matters here 
is that the practice was both an innovation and a one-time and specific task the court assigned to one of its 
members, and as such, it qualified as a commissarial activity distinct from the basic duties of the 
conseiller-officier. Consequently, it qualified as well to be compensated by some form of payment 
distinct from the officer’s wages and proportional to the task performed. By 1550, this payment took the 
form of a monetary fee, but its name “épices” was a reminder that it was originally a “free” gift in kind 
that litigants offered to their judge in recognition of his services.428 The monetization of the épices is one 
of the factors that explain how reporting became a productivity-oriented judicial practice.  
Another important related factor of this turn to productivity was the possibility, introduced 
together with the use of the written procedure, of quantifying the practice. Indeed, the materialization of 
the lawsuit into a bundle of documents made the labor of the rapporteur readily—if roughly—measurable 
with the naked eye. Not unlike today’s historian who tries to estimate the amount of research work that 
lay ahead by gauging the size of the registers piled on her table, the conseillers in the Parlement evaluated 
the length and difficulty of the preparatory work of a report by sizing up the pile of documents that was 
                                                      
428 See Chapter 5. 
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put on the desk at the beginning of their deliberation. And indeed, the procedure required that the oral 
presentation of the rapporteur to his colleagues began when he “put the trial on the desk” (“mettre le 
procès sur le bureau”), so that the documents were not only available for consultation during the 
deliberation that followed the rapport but also a visible index for the épices that were assessed at the end 
of the deliberation. 
Finally, the conseillers’ need for additional revenues in the wake of the explosion of the price of 
offices, was the sine qua non condition to unlock the full financial potential of the practice of rapporter 
and further its transformation into a productivity-oriented practice. Although the quantification of the 
practice allowed by the use of the written procedure, combined with the monetization of the épices had 
made it possible to transform reporting into a profitable judicial practice, it was not significantly driven 
by productivity concerns until the rising price of offices made it incumbent on the magistrates—especially 
the least well-off—to find new ways of extracting additional revenues from their professional activities. 
In fact, the partial data at our disposal indicates that the amount of épices charged by the parlement de 
Toulouse runs parallel to that of the price of offices.429 
This money/time approach shaped not just the practice of rapporter but more generally all 
commissarial practices.430 It seems that an invisible moral line determined whether a commissarial 
practice could be charged for a fee or not. As we will see with the épices that were charged as a payment 
for the rapport, this was in part justified by the fact that the épices could still be loosely related in the late 
sixteenth century to an older ideology of gift exchange.431 In the face of mounting criticism of the épices 
however, it seems that both the king and the parlementaires realized that the conseillers were 
overstepping the boundaries of this moral economy. A number of solutions were considered to rein in the 
                                                      
429 One should note that this transformation had consequences on internal politics within the corps for time 
constraints limited the supply of lawsuits to report on (See Chapter 5). 
430 It is the case in particular of the practice of inquiring, for it was undertaken for a fee by conseillers who had been 
nominated commissaire enquêteurs for a particular case (See Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration 
royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, vol. 1, 400). 
431 This is also suggested by the fact that, while indexed on the “size” of the trial, the amount of épices also seemed 
to take into account the apparent fortune of the litigants. 
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increase of the épices and although their implementation met some relative success in slowing down the 
increase, these measures did not address its structural causes—the magistrates’ need for cash that resulted 
from the rising price of offices.432 Thus, the capping of épices that took place in the first half of the 
seventeenth century prompted the conseillers to turn to other judicial activities from which they could 
extract additional revenues, that is, they turned to other commissarial activities that fell outside the realm 
of officer activities already covered by the gages. 
The influence of the clock-time approach on those commissarial activities was the strongest on 
new practices, a case best illustrated by the “tour de sabatine.” The sabatines were a particular kind of 
deliberative sessions that took place on Saturday afternoons—hence the name sabatine. These were 
particular deliberative sessions in the sense that although deliberating was undoubtedly an original 
function of the medieval parlementaire in the curia regis—“aide” and “conseil” were the two duties of 
the vassal to his lord—, hence an activity paid for by the gages, the fact that these sessions took place on 
a day when the court was not sitting, qualified this type of deliberation as a commissarial activity that 
could be paid for by a fee. Further, the classification of the sabatine as a commissarial activity was made 
even clearer by other ad hoc institutional markers: the nomination (commission), the lexicon 
(commissaire), the institutional organ (a small group of parlementaires drawn from all chambers). In 
terms of fees and their indexation on productivity, the parlementaire design of this practice pushed a 
notch further the clock-time approach. Indeed, the clock regulated directly and strictly the indexation of 
the fee paid to the conseillers. The calculation of the fee was based on the number of hours the conseillers 
spent deliberating on a Saturday afternoon. Each hour, an huissier of the court would enter the room 
where the conseillers deliberated and would go around holding a container (itself called sabatine) in 
which the commissaires would drop a small piece of paper with their name signed on it.433 At the end of 
the session, the greffier would add the hours and draft an allocation for each conseiller. Thus in the case 
                                                      
432 See p. 237. 
433 Emile Vaisse-Cibiel, "Des gages, épices et sabatines à l'ancien Parlement de Toulouse," Mémoires de l'Académie 
des Sciences Inscriptions et Belles Lettres de Toulouse 4 (1866): 183. 
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of the sabatines, two man-made times combined to shape the practice in significant ways: the 
parlementaire weekly calendar justified that the activity could be categorized as a commissarial activity 
(for the court was not officially sitting on Saturday afternoons) and the clock chiming out the hours 
served to assess the payment for the activity.  
The temporal shaping of the sabatines is also interesting because of its possible influence on 
“regular” deliberation as well. While the practice of deliberating as an officier retained some of the moral 
weight derived from the exercise of a higher and quasi-mystical function—that of judging other men in 
the name of God and the king—one can assume that churning out of sentences for money that happened 
in sabatines sessions, the personal experience of the deliberation as an hourly job, contributed to further 
undermine a transcendental dimension of the practice that was already eroded by the repetitiveness 
inherent with any routinized task. 
This is not to say that a wholesale monetization of all judicial practices conducted in a 
commissarial capacity took place. A moral line was drawn: no épices were to be paid in criminal cases 
(pro deo, “for God,” noted in the margin instead of the amount of the fee), or when litigants were deemed 
too poor (pro bono, “for good,” in the margin), and other activities were not paid at all. This is the case 
for “questioning” (i.e. torture), a practice of interest here, because despite its non-payment, 434 it was 
shaped as well by a clock-time approach. While timing did not serve as a basis to calculate a fee to be 
paid to the magistrate who oversaw the application of judicial torture, time was an important index 
regulating the procedure, especially in the case of the “preparatory question.”435 Indeed, criminal 
procedure was very strict on the fact that torture could only be applied a certain number of times, and only 
                                                      
434 For reasons that also explain the non-payment of épices in criminal cases, moral concerns barred the payment of 
a fee to the judge in the case of judicial torture. I will come back later to this particular point when I analyze épicer 
in detail (Chapter 5). 
435 Question préparatoire, that is, the torture that sought to establish the guilt of the accused, was distinct from the 
“preleminary question”—question préalable—that was applied to the convicted right before the carrying out of a 
capital sentence, in order to elicit a denunciation of his accomplice. See John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of 
Proof : Europe and England in the Ancien Régime, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, 16-7 ; Lisa 
Silverman, Tortured Subjects : Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France: Chicago, 2001, 74-5. Note that 
the preliminary question itself was divided into two stages: “ordinary question” (the “water question” in Toulouse, 
that is, the modern waterboarding) and, a few hours later, “extraordinary question” (the strappado in Toulouse). See 
Dubédat, Histoire du Parlement de Toulouse, 68-9. 
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for a limited duration each time. The goal of those time-based regulations was twofold: to avoid killing or 
severely injuring the accused, and to ensure the validity of the confession extracted (or the validity of the 
denial, when the accused resisted). The first goal is rather straightforward and does not need much 
explanation: while there was definitely a punitive and retributive aspect to the “preliminary question”—
and it suffices here to turn to Foucault’s famous analysis of the torture of Damiens on the day of his 
execution—the “preparatory question” was not linked to a system of sanctions but to a system of proof 
that did not seek to punish and needed to keep the accused in relatively good health in order to extract the 
confession that was needed to establish his guilt.436 Similarly, an accused who lost consciousness in the 
middle of the interrogation could not be said to have, properly-speaking, denied the crime he was 
questioned for. Thus, the timing of the application of pain was meant to protect, not the physical person of 
the accused per se, but the legal validity of the procedure.  
Although in practice the magistrates did not follow all the requirements of the procedure (most 
notably, they rarely refrained from suggestive questioning), they seem to have followed time 
requirements more and more scrupulously. As Lisa Silverman noted in her study of torture in the 
Parlement de Toulouse, while the practice of judicial torture was supported throughout the early-modern 
period by a belief that “the truth was embodied and that pain might free it from its carnal location,”437  
there were some significant changes in the conceptualization and employment of torture itself. The strict 
timing of the application of pain was one of the ways in which the magistrates sought to disambiguate 
torture as an evidentiary procedure to take it further away from the medieval ordeal, in which indications 
of guilt (or innocence) were conflated with the giving of evidence.438  
 
                                                      
436 Lisa Silverman notes that, on a more symbolic level, torture as practiced in the parlement de Toulouse had lost its 
purgatory function by the 1620s (Silverman, Tortured Subjects : Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France, 
71). 
437 Ibid., 83 
438 On the judicial ordeal see Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986 ; Margaret H. Kerr, Richard D. Forsyth, and Michael J. Plyley, "Cold Water and Hot Iron: 
Tiral by Ordeal in England," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 22-4 (1992) ; and Esther Cohen, The Crossroads 
of Justice: Law and Culture in Late Medieval France, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. 
 210 
The clock-time approach to professional activity was not particular to justice—the same can be 
observed for instance in the financial administration, in particular in financial courts, cours des aides, 
chambres des comptes. Nor was it particular to the royal administration more generally: a number of  
métiers, especially newer “arts mécaniques,” featured a similar approach, sometimes guided by 
productivity as was the case with some commissarial practices in the Parlement (rapporter, sabatines 
deliberations).There were, however, some significant bureaucratic, judicial and parlementaire 
idiosyncrasies to the conseillers’ approach. 
Serving the goal of extending the reach and control of the monarchy over its territory and 
subjects, the bureaucratization of royal administrations—be they of “justice, police, [or] finance” to use a 
contemporary expression—created among royal agents a particular, clock-oriented approach to their 
professional activities. One of the main instruments of early-modern bureaucratization behind this 
phenomenon is an ever-expanding use of written documents that created a self-sustaining fantasy of 
administrative perfection that placed royal agents in a double-bind vis-à-vis time. Motivated by temporal 
concerns—how to treat more cases faster in order to further royal control—the use of written documents 
had contrary temporal consequences on royal administration. On the one hand, it did enable royal agents 
to treat more cases faster (especially when the use of printed forms allowed to cut significantly on writing 
time itself), but on the other hand it also created an administrative backlog of a new kind with new 
temporal constraints that could only be addressed with more bureaucratization (i.e. new institutions, more 
royal agents, hence more paper). 
The history of the Parlement as an institution aptly illustrates this phenomenon. Before the 
adoption of the written procedure at some point in the thirteenth century, royal judges could only hear as 
many lawsuits as their time and the time for speaking allowed. There was no judicial backlog then, 
properly speaking, for the litigants who could not be heard were simply turned away, and whether they 
(and their case) would come back later to court to be treated was out of the hands of the magistrates.  This 
was what I would call a “soft backlog,” that is, one that was perceived by judges, legal professional and 
litigants, but that had no visibility for it left no material traces, and was therefore hard to evaluate. The 
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practical solution to this somewhat still intangible problem was the one that had led to the creation of the 
Parlement: when the king-as-judge could not hear all the complaints of his subjects, he demultiplied 
himself and his time by delegating this function to some of his conseillers.439 This solution was good 
enough as long as the royal domain was confined to a rather small territory around the Paris region.  
The development of the appeal procedure—a central piece of the assertion of royal control over a 
domain that expanded dramatically in the thirteenth century—made it imperative to treat this backlog in a 
different manner. Indeed, the success of the appeal procedure as an administrative technology at the 
service of a political agenda of territorial expansion and centralization, depended on the ability of royal 
courts to treat an increasing number of lawsuits coming from ever more remote corners of their 
jurisdiction. The adoption of the written procedure—a new technology developed a few decades earlier 
by the papal administration to address similar concerns—was seen as the most efficient way to solidify in 
practice the capillary but still theoretical reach of royal justice throughout the kingdom. This adoption 
turned the soft backlog of oral procedure into a hard backlog of written procedure.  
One should note as well that the written procedure also contributed to make justice more 
generally a more productivity-oriented activity. Thought of in part as a way to reduce the ever-increasing 
number of oral lawsuits that the Grand Chambre did not have time to hear, the adoption of the written 
procedure to supplement the oral procedure and the creation of the Chambres des Enquêtes to treat the 
written lawsuits, actually had the contrary consequence of increasing the overall caseload of the 
Parlement. Because it was not limited by the time the court could physically spend to hear barristers and 
procurators, because it did not require the time and expense of transporting oneself to the court, and 
because the (relative) geographical progress of literacy made it available to ever more litigants in the 
ressort, the use of the written procedure is at the origin of a dramatic increase of the volume of lawsuits 
the court had to process. In addition, the backlog that resulted from this increase that the court could not 
treat, materialized physically in a mass of documents and papers that could not be turned away like 
                                                      
439 See p. 51. 
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litigants and functioned as a visible and increasingly difficult to manage reminder that royal justice 
operated more and more under time-pressure. 
The two towers of the Palais then, did not just help outsiders locate the Parlement de Toulouse, 
they were also, for those inside, a twin symbol of the changing nature of judicial practice and of its 
relation to space and time. The effects of the once slow bureaucratization of royal justice—a literal 
bureaucratization, that is, a multiplication of bureaux to treat and produce always more paper—
materialized in those two towers: the tour des archives was a visible axis of stone and paper around which 
judicial itineraries and processes had ended up revolving ; every hour the tour de l’horloge reminded all 
that it increasingly regulated these processes and more generally the movements of men and papers to and 
from the tour des archives, in and out the Palais. 
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PART THREE: 
BETWEEN FACTS AND FAITH: PRACTICE, JUSTICE, AND 
TRUTH 
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CHAPTER 5. 
“LA GRANDE EPICERIE JUDICIAIRE”: MONEY, JUDICIAL PRACTICE AND POLITICS 
IN THE PARLEMENT DE TOULOUSE. 
 
I use the phrase “grande épicerie judiciaire” to convey the idea of the wholesale merchandization 
of old regime royal justice (épicerie literally means “grocery store,” but with a pejorative slant), while 
playing on the early-modern judicial meaning of the word épices (literally “spices”), a fee litigants were 
required to pay to their judges before a sentence could come into effect.440 
I am not the first one to attempt a pun on this particular and now mostly forgotten meaning of 
épices: more than three centuries ago, Jean Racine made his audience laugh by playing on this same word 
in a passage of Les plaideurs (1668), his only comedy. At some point in the story, Dandin, an old 
magistrate and the protagonist of Racine’s comedy, has become so consumed by his professional habitus 
that his son had him locked up in his own house under the watch of his manservant Petit-Jean. Dandin, 
however, managed to escape and Petit-Jean retells: 
He [Dandin] kept asking for his spices [épices], 
So, I rushed to fetch the pepper pot from the pantry [offices], 
And in the mean time, he vanished.441 
The rhyme between épices and offices certainly echoed, with a comical twist, an association that 
was immediately clear to Racine’s audience. This audience knew all too well that as surely as the pepper 
pot was to be found in the pantry, épices were inherent with offices. Thus, beyond the crude farce of this 
situation in which an elderly magistrate tricked his servant out of a room so that he could wriggle his way 
                                                      
440 Although they did not elaborate specifically on the phrase, Elie Barnavi and Robert Descimon have mentioned 
“the forbidden fruits of the judicial spice shop” (“fruits défendus de l’épicerie judiciaire” Barnavi and Descimon, La 
Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 novembre 1591), 174) with implications 
similar to my use of the expression. 
441  Il me redemandoit sans cesse ses épices ; 
  Et j’ai tout bonnement couru dans les offices 
  Chercher la boîte au poivre ; et lui, pendant cela, 
 Est disparu. 
Les plaideurs, Act II, Scene 7. 
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out the window in his solemn judicial garb, lies a fairly commonplace critique of a practice—that of 
collecting arbitrary épices from litigants—that had long been considered abusive.  
The loathing of épices and offices that Racine echoed in his comedy is in itself an interesting 
object of historical analysis, for the critique reached unprecedented levels in the second half of the 
sixteenth-century, at a time when the épices themselves remained fairly stable from a statistical point of 
view. In this chapter, I first look at this critique, its origins, and its transformation to try and explain this 
intriguing discrepancy between facts and their perceptions and what it might reveal about contemporary 
representations of justice. I then go beyond this commonplace—and to some extent fantasized—
representation of the épices from outside the courts, to analyze épices from within the courts, that is, as an 
element of everyday judicial practice and revenue. The analysis of épices and more particularly of their 
repartition among the conseillers in the Parlement de Toulouse suggests that this parallel judicial income 
had become a structuring element of internal divisions within the court during that period. My analysis of 
a failed reform of the distribution of épices in the late 1630s in the Parlement de Toulouse illuminates 
how this mundane, day-to-day judicial practice can help us to better understand the transformation of the 
social identity and political role of the parlementaire magistracy between 1550 and 1650.  
 
In order to shed light on those connections, it is first necessary to explain in some detail what 
épices were, how they functioned, and how they ended up playing such an important role in the 
administration of royal justice at the turn of the seventeenth century. In 1550, the point at which I begin 
my analysis, the main characteristics of the practice of “spicing a trial” (“épicer un procès”) were already 
established and would undergo only a few but important changes over the course of the following 
century. The practice took place in a closed-door session of the court called conseil442 during which the 
judges of a chamber443 gathered to make a decision (temporary or final) about a case. Only one of the 
                                                      
442 I do not call this session “in camera” to avoid a possible confusion: only the judges and the chamber clerk 
attended this session, litigants and their lawyers did not. 
443 On the division of the Parlement into chambers, see p. 336 below. 
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judges, previously designated by the first president of his chamber as the rapporteur of the lawsuit, had a 
detailed knowledge of the case and of the documents found in its file. During the conseil session, the 
rapporteur gave to his colleagues a summary of the case in the form of an oral presentation that pointed 
to the specifically legal problems of the lawsuit and afterwards recommended a legal solution in the form 
of a sentence.444  Whether or not the chamber decided to follow the rapporteur’s recommendation, the 
president of the chamber would decide on the épices, that is, the money the litigants would have to pay to 
the judges for their work on the case.445 The litigants then had to pay the épices to the greffier446 before 
the arrêt could come into effect. The greffier would give half of the amount to the rapporteur of the case 
(again, whether or not his colleagues had decided to follow his opinion) and put the other half into the 
“common purse” (bourse commune) of the chamber. Each month, the money found in that common purse 
would be divided equally among the members of the chamber.447 
This is a very rough summary of how the épices functioned around 1550 but one needs to bear in 
mind that these modalities were the result of a century-old transformation. The transformation of the 
practice from the thirteenth century on is important to note for my purpose, because the distant—and 
fantasized—memory of the transformation of épices from a voluntary gift in kind into a mandatory 
monetary fee, informed early-modern litigants and judges’ perception of the épices. 
 
                                                      
444 See Chapter 7 below. 
445 Loyseau, Cinq livres du droit des offices, liv. I, chap. VIII, 96-97  ; Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri 
IV et Louis XIII, 472. 
446 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 194. Things were different in the Parlement de Paris : 
Henri III had managed to impose (with a lit de justice on March 7, 1583) the creation of a collector of épices who 
taxed the money paid by the litigants before putting it in the « common purse » of the various chambers. All the 
parlements in the provinces had successfully refused to create this office, with the notable exception of the bi-
confessional chamber of Castres where the receveur (a “pernicious creation” in the words of La Roche-Flavin) taxed 
5 sous per écu (about 9% of the épices decided by the president). La Roche-Flavin, ibid. 
447 Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, II, 73. 
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Origin and transformation of the épices from 1250 to 1550.448 
 
In the Middle Ages, the meaning of épices was far less precise than the one I have just described. 
It could refer to any remuneration litigants gave their judge for an “extraordinary” judicial act, that is, an 
act that did not occur during a regular hearing. From the very inception of the Parlement de Paris in the 
thirteenth century, those remunerations were gifts in kind given to the judge after he had issued his 
sentence and, in theory, on a voluntary basis. This practice was also common at the time in guilds and 
universities, where gifts of this kind functioned as a substitute for wages. In the case of royal judges 
however, the épices did not compensate an absence of wages, but rather completed or replaced wages that 
the king often failed to pay in full and sometimes failed to pay at all. From the very beginning then, the 
problem of épices was closely linked to the question of judges’ income, and thus, to the ideal of a cost-
free justice.449 
The simple idea behind the épices was that the easiest way to compensate judges for their unpaid 
wages was to allow them to derive a complementary income from the exercise of justice itself. Provisions 
to that effect were made in the 1250s, that is, around the time the Parlement de Paris was established as a 
permanent court, distinct from the royal council.450 From the start, provisions to ensure judges’ income, in 
the form of wages or otherwise, were most of the time backed with prohibitions made to judges to receive 
                                                      
448 The ancient origin of épices is often mentioned by contemporary authors (La Roche-Flavin, Loyseau, later 
Boucher-d’Argis for his article in the Encyclopédie). Those early-modern references to ancient examples are mostly 
valuable for what they reveal about how contemporaries attempted to justify épices, that is, by pointing out 
illustrious precedents (both in Athens and in Rome). 
449 While complaints about the cost of education were commonplace (on the part of students as well as parents, see 
Charles H. Haskins, The Rise of Universities, Ithaca: Great Seal Books, 1957, 76-9), there was no widely shared 
sense that education should be free. 
450 In an ordonnance of december 1254, Louis IX, decided that litigants would have to consign, at the beginning of a 
lawsuit, a tenth of the value of the object disputed in front of the court. The amount consigned would serve first to 
pay for the judicial expenses of the winner of the case and the remainder would go to the judges (Recueil général 
des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, I, 272). Félix Aubert, noted that this 
measure was inspired by a prescription of Diocletian (Aubert, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'origine à 
François Ier 1250-1515, I, 94). 
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gifts,451 thus suggesting that judicial wages paid by the king,452 were conceived as a way of preventing the 
use of gifts. As the medieval transformation of épices reveals, wages and gifts were indeed like 
communicating vessels and the development of the practice of collecting épices, its systematization 
indeed, was to a large extent a quasi-mechanical effect of the king’s inability to regularly pay judges their 
wages, let alone to increase these wages to keep up with rising prices. 
In 1550 the view that the existence and rise of épices were a symptom of the king’s failure to 
provide his subjects with justice for free thus appealed to a three-century old tradition. With each renewal 
of the prohibition, sometimes accompanied by insufficient increases of wages, the king himself seemed to 
acknowledge this failure. This is the first aspect of the transformation of épices: always presented as a 
lesser but necessary evil that was temporarily tolerated in anticipation of better times, the épices were 
actually turned into an integral and official part of the judicial procedure, because of a lack of financial 
means (sometimes of political will) to insure the payment of judges’ wages. Even the 1673 édit which, 
centuries later, was to definitively ratify the official recognition of the épices and fix their regulation until 
the French Revolution abolished them,453 used this rhetoric in the most explicit way in its preamble: 
although justice must be rendered for free, the custom of past centuries has introduced some 
remuneration for the judges beyond the wages we have granted to them, and we intend to take 
charge of that additional remuneration ourselves in the future, when the state of our affairs will 
allow us to do so, and in the meantime we have decided to act to moderate it. [my emphasis]454 
                                                      
451 The same ordonnance of 1254 for instance, sought to prevent the giving of gifts in a variety of forms: one article 
forbid not only judges, but also their wives and children to receive any sort of gift, except for food or drinks for a 
value not exceeding 10 s. per week, another article sought to prevent an indirect form of gift by putting limits on the 
money judges could borrow from litigants (no more than 20 l., the interest being limited by the fact that the loan had 
to be paid back within two months). Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la 
révolution de 1789, I, 267-8. 
452 Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'origine à François Ier 1250-1515, I, 94-9. 
453 With the exception of the episode of the Maupeou reform (1771-1774), which briefly abolished, among other 
things, the venality of offices and the épices. This episode should be given more attention, since the reform 
generated some discussion of the épices, which, Viala argued, shaped historians’ later approach to the question.  
454 “La justice devant être rendue gratuitement, l’usage des siècles précédents a néanmoins introduit en faveur des 
juges quelque rétribution au-delà des gages que nous leur avons accordés, dont nous avons intention de nous 
charger à l’avenir, lorsque l’état de nos affaires le permettra ; cependant nous avons résolu d’y pourvoir par un 
tempérament convenable.” Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 
1789, XIX, 86-7. 
 219 
The first characteristic of the transformation of épices of interest to us then is their 
systematization, a transformation from voluntary gift into mandatory judicial fee, which, although plainly 
accepted by 1550, had fallen short of extinguishing the old ideal of a cost-free justice, which the opening 
of the 1673 édit did not fail to mention. 
The second main aspect of the transformation of épices was their monetization. The 
transformation from a gift in kind (most often but not always spices)455 into an amount of money occurred 
around the year 1400456 and had important consequences. First, it made épices easier to track and manage 
thanks to the accounting techniques that were developing at the time, thus facilitating their 
systematization. Secondly, monetization entailed a devaluation of épices on a symbolic level. The épices 
in kind, whether spices, exotic or dry fruits, candies, marmalade, or even meat or cheese, were types of 
food that carried a high symbolic capital in a world where plain bread dominated the diet of most.457 
Currency too, was scarce for most people, but it was an item increasingly invested with negative social 
value in the fifteenth century, and thus the monetization of épices probably affected the perception of the 
fee. In some way, one could say that the monetization of the épices, in addition to a systematization that 
transformed them into an arbitrary tax, offered a fertile ground for the development among litigants of the 
idea—and stigmatization—of a merchandization of royal justice. This older idea would find a particular 
                                                      
455 Most of the time, gifts took the form of rare food, often spices in the modern sense (pepper, cinnamon, cloves), 
but also marmalade, candies of various sorts (in particular sugared almonds), exotic fruits. When local communities 
could not find these, they could offer local gastronomical specialties (including wine from Bas-Languedoc and 
cheese from Auvergne and Quercy). Other local products, such as gloves (Millau and Espalion) or knives could be 
offered as well. Candles, an essential but expensive commodity, could be given too. Is some cases, especially when 
gifts were given by a local community to a visiting judge, they could be of more common nature (rabbits, partridges, 
oats for the horses), but still attempted to manifest the acknowledgment of higher social status of the receiver. See 
Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, 159-61 ; Vaisse-Cibiel, "Des 
gages, épices et sabatines à l'ancien Parlement de Toulouse," 178 ; Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle, ed. François 
Bluche, Paris: Fayard, 1990, 632. 
456 Viala questioned that original date but acknowledged that by 1470 the great majority of épices were paid for with 
cash in the Parlement de Toulouse. Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 
environ, 163. 
457Steven L. Kaplan, The bakers of Paris and the bread question, 1700-1775, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1996, 1-3. 
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resonance in the second half of the sixteenth century, when the sons of merchants who had made their 
fortune in the first half of the century entered the elite of royal magistracy.458 
One last important change occurred before 1550. When the épices became a mandatory judicial 
fee, the setting of their price shifted from the litigants to their judges. Of course, a tacit grid of prices of 
the épices had always constrained the supposedly “voluntary” gifts of litigants,459 but the transfer of their 
assessment to the judges had significant consequences for the future. Maybe even more significant was 
the transfer of this assessment from the conseiller in charge of the case to the president of his chamber. 
While this change is difficult to date with precision,460 there is no doubt that it was completed by 1550. At 
that point, the estimation of épices had become a powerful instrument of internal control and of pressure 
on the conseillers of a chamber at the hands of their presidents, which, as we will see, would become 
critical in shaping court politics in the later period, especially in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
As Racine’s reference to pepper—an épice—indicates, the memory of those changes shaped the 
perception of the épices on both sides and played an important role in the changes that were to occur 
between 1550 and 1650. While this period of further transformation of the épices must be divided into 
two distinct periods (corresponding roughly to the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the 
seventeenth century) the cause of both phases of the transformation was the same: the introduction of the 
venality of offices, a change of major consequences for both the royal administration and French society 
as a whole.  
Épices and Venality 
 
                                                      
458 See p. 228 below. 
459 Litigants infered the expected value or the proper kind of gift to offer to a magistrate from a series of variables: 
the litigant’s own fortune, the experience and ranking of the judge, the level of the court in the institutional 
hierarchy, the value of the object disputed, and, maybe most importantly, the value of the gift their opposing party 
was likely to make on the basis of the same information. 
460 It is likely that the first ordonnance mentioning this point (1491) simply validated an older practice, progressively 
established from within the courts. 
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The venality or sale of royal offices was introduced as a new means to overcome the chronic lack 
of financial resources I mentioned above. The king’s need for increased resources was not primarily 
dictated by the problem of the payment of the wages of his agents (although this argument could be used 
on occasion as a rhetorical ploy to justify new taxes) but was dictated by the exponential increase of 
military expenditure.461  
Venality, by officially turning dignité and autorité into commodities, had very important social 
and political consequences,462 but I should focus here on its financial aspects and in particular on its 
consequences on the practice of collecting épices from litigants. The new system indeed could only have 
obvious consequences for the épices: not only were they seen as before as a necessary complement to 
wages that remained too low, but in addition as the easiest way to pay oneself back for the money spent 
on an office. While most historians considered that there was a direct link between venality and the rise of 
épices,463 André Viala, who came the closest to providing a systematic study of the épices in a sovereign 
court,464 argued that the sharp increase he observed in the global value of épices collected in the 
Parlement de Toulouse between 1460 and 1525 preceded, and thus was disconnected from, the 
introduction of the venality of offices. Viala concluded that “the development [of épices] was a 
consequence much more of the venality of the magistrates and of their desire to get richer, than of the 
venality of offices or any other institution.”465 A century later, and in another instance of a contemporary 
wordplay on the double meaning of épices, La Roche-Flavin gives some credit to Viala’s view: 
                                                      
461 This increase was a result of the coming of a new kind of war, involving an unprecedented number of troops, 
most of which were now constituted by a professional and permanent army, using new costly techniques, and, 
beginning with the Italian campaigns of the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century, fought on unusually distant 
battlefields. These new wars, quickly and repeatedly depleted the royal treasury, despite the contribution of taxes 
(tailles, aides, etc.) that had finally been made permanent as recently as around the end of the Hundred Year war. 
462 I reviewed some of those consequences in Chapters 2 and 4. 
463 For instance Adhémar Esmein, Cours élémentaire du droit français à l’usage des étudiants de première année, 
Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1925, 400 ; Emile Chénon, Histoire générale du droit français public et privé des 
origines à 1815, 2 vols., Paris: Sirey, 1926, 574 ; Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 75 ; 
Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle, 632.  
464 Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, I, 211-4. 
465 Ibid., I, 215. 
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(…) in France most of the judges in the lower courts, and some in the higher ones, are 
infected by this disease, which seems to be akin to dropsy but is somehow its very contrary. 
Indeed, a thirst of spices burn them from the inside, and these spices delight them so much that 
the more they get some, the more they are parched and cannot get enough; thus they burn in their 
soul and conscience [“en leur âme et conscience”] and do not care about their duty, their oath, or 
even about justice, as long as their insatiable appetites are spiced up [“espicés”].466 
 Thus, the lure of profit is certainly an element that should be taken into account when 
considering the rise of the global amount of épices collected by the court, especially during the period 
Viala observed when the relative value of wages was not yet as low as it would become later. I think, 
however, that Viala’s analysis is flawed at several points. To begin with, Viala’s chronology is 
questionable because he dates the introduction of the venality of offices after its official acknowledgment 
in royal legislation, that is, from the year 1521-2, when Francis I first forbid the survivance, that is, the 
bequest (most often to a son or a close parent) of offices467 and then, after having “recovered” his 
property,468 started selling them openly.469 In fact, the king had been selling offices for a good while at 
that point. Roland Mousnier, in his still authoritative study of the venality of offices, surmised that French 
kings might have sold public charges as early as the fourteenth century.470 Without going that far back in 
time, the repeated prohibitions of the sales of offices in the second half of the fifteenth century seem to 
offer strong evidence that the practice was already in place and that the king had not given up yet on 
trying to cover it up.471 
                                                      
466 "(…) la plus part des juges inferieurs de France, et aucuns des superieurs sont infectés deste maladie qui semble 
tenir de l’hydropisie, et toutesfois luy est contraire. Car ils bruslent d’une soif d’espices, qui les eschauffent 
tellement que d’autant plus qu’ils en prennent, ils sont davantage alterez, et ne s’en peuvent aucunement ressasier, 
dont ils bruslent en leurs ames et consciences, ne se soucians de leur devoir et serment, ny de la justice mesme, 
pouveu que leurs insatiables appetits soient espicés." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 193. 
467 Edit portant revocation des survivances des offices, July 8, 1521 (Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, 
depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, XII, 189-90). 
468 Offices were considered a part of the royal domain. It is certainly no coincidence that the official introduction of 
the venality of offices corresponds to a period of sale of portion of the domain (in theory inalienable). See the stream 
of ordonnances regulating the sale of the royal domain in these years (ibid., XII, 194, 96, 97). 
469 Déclaration portant institution de vingt nouveaux offices de conseillers au parlement de Paris, January 31, 1522 
(ibid., XII, 196) and, on the same year, creation of the “parties casuelles.” 
470 Mousnier even identified forms of what might be called a “proto-venality” as far back as the twelth century 
(Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 15-7). 
471 Ibid., 23. 
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More importantly, one can find evidence of an already clear sense of the existence of a link 
between épices and the sale of offices before the end of the fifteenth century. The General Estates 
convened by Charles VIII in Tours in 1484, complained to the king, first about the venality of offices: 
(…) offices are often given to people without expertise who have bought and still try today to 
buy these offices. And it happened often times that when an office became available, the letter of 
nomination was sent to go-betweens with a blank space left for them to write down the name of 
the highest bidder, regardless of his qualification.472 
Shortly after, the deputies made the connection with épices clear, voicing the complaint that 
“because several have been put in charge at great cost and expense, since they have bought their office, 
and because they are willing to reward themselves [soy récompenser, literally “to make it up for their 
expense”], they have demanded too great and excessive épices.”473 Only a few years after he had sold his 
office of conseiller in the Parlement de Bordeaux (1570), Michel de Montaigne denounced both venality 
and épices in close proximity when he rhetorically asked in his Essays, “[w]hat is more uncouth than a 
nation where, by legal custom, the office of judge is openly venal and where verdicts are simply bought 
for cash? Where, quite legally, justice is denied to those who cannot pay for it (…)?”474 Half a century 
later, La Roche-Flavin, moving from the level of anecdotal abuses to that of a more general and analytical 
assessment of the problem of épices, mentioned the same link more explicitly and connected it to the 
question of stagnating wages and rising prices.475 
Thus, by 1550, épices and venality of offices were strongly connected in the minds of both judges 
and litigants. For judges, the épices appeared as the most convenient resource to turn to in order to 
compensate for the money they had spent to buy their office. For the litigants, épices and venality were 
linked as two important loci of a larger critique of the judicial system. This connection is at the core of the 
transformation of the épices in the course of the following century. The two phases of that 
                                                      
472 Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, XI, 53. 
473 “Et pour ce que plusieurs y ont esté préposez à grands frais et despens, pour avoir acheté leurs offices, et eulx 
cuidans soy récompenser, ont exigé grandes espices et trop excessives.” Ibid., XI, 55. 
474 Michel de Montaigne, Essays, trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin Press, 1991, 132-3. The original reads  
"qu’est-il plus farouche que de voir une nation où par légitime coutume la charge de juge se vende et les jugements 
soient payés à purs deniers comptants et où légitimement la justice soit refusée à qui n’a de quoi payer.”  
475 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 194. 
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transformation—roughly 1550 to 1600 and 1600 to 1650—correspond to two different situations, 
articulated around the 1595-1605 decade that proved critical because of two major events: the end of the 
religious wars and the introduction of the droit annuel (1604), an annual tax office-holders had to pay in 
exchange for the guarantee that their office would be automatically transmitted to an heir of their choice 
(most often a son or a nephew). 
 
1550-1600: épices, venality, morality. 
 
It would certainly be an exaggeration to talk about a “public debate about épices” in the second 
half of the sixteenth century. First, because the use of the notion of “public debate” is problematic for this 
era, but also because specific criticism of the épices did not leave any trace in the documentation beyond 
the complaints of the successive General Estates, which, after they had been voiced in an original manner 
for the first time in 1484, could well have simply become stereotyped repetitions of the same grievance.476 
The question of épices during the 1550-1600 period should be approached in the light of a larger ongoing 
discussion about the morality of judges, and beyond, about the ideal of justice.  
The statistical study of the registers of the Parlement de Toulouse shows that the global amount of 
épices collected by the judges during the period stagnated or maybe even decreased.477 The disconnect 
between this stagnation and the rise of accusations of corruption against the magistrates is a cue that the 
study of the transformation of épices at the time should be thought of as part of a broader approach to 
changing perceptions of royal officials in general and of royal judges in particular. Accusations against 
royal judges became more frequent and more intense between 1550 and 1600. Some went as far as 
                                                      
476 Mousnier noted that the 1484 complaints were “astonishingly similar to those voiced in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.” (Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 26). 
477 The total amount of épices collected in the Parlement de Toulouse in 1555 was of approximately 7,750 écus. In 
1578, it was a little over 8,000 and about 7,600 in 1589. 
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depicting magistrates as thieves, as on this broadsheet, which Pierre de l’Estoile saw on the walls of Paris 
in 1576: 
Thieves in rhythm (sic), like Bretons and Gascons ; 
Thieves by reason, like millers; 
Thieves with neither rhythm nor reason, like Présidents, Conseillers, lawyers, procurators and all 
that kind of vermin.478 
As this broadsheet suggests, those extreme formulations pointed fingers at the Parlement 
specifically (“présidents, conseillers”)479 but also targeted royal justice more generally (“all that kind of 
vermin”).480 As Elie Barnavi and Robert Descimon pointed out, “the objective basis of those insulting 
diatribes must be sought in the high cost of justice,”481 and I would add that, in the case of the conseillers, 
it should be sought more specifically in the visible face of this cost and the very real price that had to be 
paid on a daily basis, that is, in the épices.482  
In order to understand the terms and implications of the ongoing critique of royal justice and the 
role épices might have played in it, this discussion must be put back into the context of specific economic, 
social and ideological changes at the time. First of all, a few features of the social and economic context 
of the time can help explain the phenomenon of a perceived, and in fact very literal, “merchandization of 
justice.” This perception was shaped by the cumulated effect of two different economic phases of the 
sixteenth century that were particularly pronounced in the Toulouse region. First, a period of economic 
growth had especially benefited a few merchant families in Toulouse with the development of the pastel 
                                                      
478 "Larron en rithme (sic), comme Breton, Gascon; 
Larron par raison, comme un Musnier; 
Larron sans rithme ni raison, comme Presidens, Conseillers, Advocas, Procureurs, et toute telle autre vermine." 
Quoted in Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président 
Brisson (15 novembre 1591), 132. 
479 In the judicial administration, the titles of “président” and “conseiller” were only in use in the parlements.  
480 Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 novembre 
1591), 129-77. 
481 Ibid., 132. 
482 The reference to épices is explicit in some of the most famous and scandalous cases of corruption of the time, for 
instance the “Poille affair” (1582) and the “Lebreton affair” (1586). Ibid., 166-8 ; 70 
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trade483 that generated its highest profits in the years 1505 to 1530.484 This phenomenon is relevant here in 
two respects. First because all the great names of the Toulouse pastel trade—ironically some of them had 
also practiced the épicerie trade—485 used their newly acquired fortune to enter the Parlement between 
1540 and 1560. The same men indeed—Bernuy, Assézat, Lancefoc, Boisson—who had already been 
sagacious enough to invest their capital into the “blue gold” trade in the first half of the century, were 
well-inspired again when they later reinjected most of their profits into different kinds of investments. 
They bought seigneuries and castles around Toulouse, they bought other hôtels in Toulouse, most 
importantly they bought royal offices486 for their sons and constituted comfortable dowries for their 
daughters in order to marry them into the milieu of royal officers. Thus, even after their sons had entered 
the court, these families further associated with the royal magistrates by way of intermarriage.487 
As Robert Schneider noted however, “the two elite milieus remained somewhat separate,”488 not 
only in their actual dealings with one another but maybe also, and more importantly here, in the mind of 
the people of Toulouse who could have easily maintained the distinction between merchant and 
                                                      
483 Pastel, woad in English, is a tinctorial plant that grew in the Toulouse region (particularly in the Lauragais) and 
that was the only source for blue dye in Europe until indigo coming from India and China became widely available 
at the end of the sixteenth century. Changes in tastes and styles in the sixteenth century created a great demand for 
pastel on which a few Toulousains merchants, borrowing business techniques from Spain, built considerable 
fortunes in the first half of the century. 
484 Gilles Caster, Le Commerce du pastel et de l'épicerie à Toulouse de 1450 environ à 1561, Toulouse: E. Privat, 
1962, 381. 
485 Although I have not found any explicit mention of this irony it is unlikely that it would have been lost on 
contemporaries who could see the father selling one kind of épices and the son receiving another kind. 
486 Barnavi and Descimon noted that “the office seemed like an interesting investment, which, in addition to fiscal 
and honorary privileges, yielded more than land (between 5 and 3.33% for the ground rent [rente foncière]) and 
moveable rent [rente constituée] (8.33%). Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : 
l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 novembre 1591), 164. 
487 Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et l'administration royale laïque, 1420-1525 environ, I, 235-40 ; Robert A. 
Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse, 1463-1789. From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City, Ithaca ; London: 
Cornell University Press, 1989, 54 ; Wolff, Histoire de Toulouse, 244. The most famous case here is that of the 
alliance between the Bernuy and Dufaur families, arguably the two most prominent families in Toulouse, 
respectively in the pastel trade and in the Parlement. 
488 Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse, 1463-1789. From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City, 54. 
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parlementaire families. The rise of these men had been so swift489 and was still so recent in the second 
half of the century that the solemn judicial robes they had just put on would have failed to hide their 
origins, social as well as geographical.490 These men’s fathers had been too prominent as businessmen in 
the recent history of the city for their quasi-simultaneous entrance in the sovereign court in the 1540s and 
1550s to go unnoticed. This particular exposure made it very difficult to try and maintain the appearance 
of a smooth and discreet assimilation of those prominent newcomers into the court. The visibility of this 
social change within the judicial milieu generated resentment towards the magistracy from two bordering 
social fronts: that of the high bourgeoisie and of the old nobility. 
Indeed, the venality of the prestigious—and ennobling—office of conseiller had turned the 
parlements into one of the most visible contact points between the bourgeoisie and the nobility. This 
contact, however, only involved a minority of both worlds and those who were excluded from the 
process, that is the majority, resented it. Most in the old nobility had failed to associate themselves with 
those who, at the top of the royal administration, were beginning to form a nobility of a new kind, not yet 
called “robe nobility,” and were highly critical and anxious about the ongoing remapping of the 
geography of honor, dignity and merit that resulted in large part from the generalization of the venality of 
offices. The decline, not yet the collapse, of the old feudal system of distribution of honors, functions and 
dignity, certainly encouraged them to subscribe to and promote the idea of a corruption of the new 
system. The belief in this corruption, although candid among gentilhommes, was also a powerful tool to 
question the “merit” of those who had managed to evict the old nobility from positions of power in the 
proximity of the king. 
                                                      
489 The most famous case here is that of Jean de Bernuy whose rise and fortune received international attention when 
Francis I paid him a personal visit in his Toulouse hôtel in 1533 as a mark of gratitude. Bernuy indeed, had used his 
personal fortune to stand surety for the colossal ransom paid to release Francis I from his captivity in Madrid (1526). 
490 It is worth noting that these were all “foreigner” families. Literally for the Bernuy and Boisson who had recently 
come from Burgos in Spain (Jean de Bernuy was “naturalized” in 1501). Others came from regions of the “deep 
South” generally looked down on as backwards by the urban people of Toulouse: Basque country for the Cheverry, 
Rouergue for the Assézat. 
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As for the bourgeoisie, its resentment focused on the successful rise of what was to remain a 
minority among them. Their resentment resulted from the frustration and belittlement felt at the tendency 
of the few newly promoted to immediately mark their difference from their recently estranged original 
stock. First, resentment could find its cause in the fact that, early in the second half of the sixteenth 
century, the doors to social mobility started to close in front of the majority of the bourgeoisie. To them, 
but also to the rest of the population, the success of those who had attempted, just in time, the social leap 
into the sovereign court, appeared to be all the more unashamed when Toulouse started suffering, as the 
rest of the region and most of the kingdom, from a degradation of economic conditions. The “crash of the 
pastel trade” in 1561,491 that was further aggravated by the turn to indigo as the main source of blue dye 
in the following decades, put an abrupt end to a particular type of social rise that had been—and was to 
remain—an exceptional trait of the first half of the century. This “crash” did not simply put a stop to the 
rise of merchants, but also brought the local economic development to a general halt, even a recession,492 
thus taking down with it the many people who, already at a lower socio-economic level, lived directly or 
indirectly from the pastel trade.493 In a crude but very real sense then, those who had managed to pass 
from trade to magistracy could be seen as rats who had jumped ship just in the nick of time. In a more 
general way, the degradation of economic conditions and the consequent increase in poverty accentuated 
an always latent perception that Nicole Castan described for a later period as the “firm belief, particularly 
among the poorest, that justice was confiscated and turned into an instrument of domination by the 
wealthy and powerful.”494 
                                                      
491 It was indeed in many respects a financial crash in the modern sense of the term, since it resulted from the 
combination of rash speculations on the part of pastel traders in Toulouse, serious financial difficulties on the 
Anvers market where most of the capital of the trade was located, and a turn to new, remote and cheaper sites of 
production in Asia. Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse, 1463-1789. From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City, 
24. 
492 Ibid., 34. 
493 The trade of pastel employed numerous workers, some of them, such as essayeurs, peseurs, or emballeurs, 
practiced entirely new professions, thus completely dependent on pastel. 
494 Nicole Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc à l'époque des lumières, Paris: Flammarion, 1980, 54-5. 
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All in all then, the idea of a “merchandization of justice,” with its stream of accusations of 
corruption, could be appealing to the major part of society—it even seems to everyone but the magistrates 
themselves—who could feel they had been excluded from reaping the benefits of the economic growth of 
the first part of the century. Understandably, the resentment focused on those who had managed, or so it 
seemed, to secure the greatest part of the benefits, those merchant families who had risen in a mere half a 
century from the market stall to the highest court benches. 
To be sure, the majority of the conseillers in the Parlement did not come from those families, but 
the astonishing rise to power of a few newcomers certainly did focus popular attention. Their entrance in 
the court could not go unnoticed and raised questions about the connection between the world of business 
and that of justice. In that respect, one could say that resentment or jealousy alone could not have shaped 
those questions: they were informed as well by larger and more theoretical concerns and interrogations 
about justice and magistracy. The penetration of merchant families in the parlementaire milieu had been 
significant enough for those concerns and questions to be voiced within the court itself. For instance, 
while the Parlement had no apparent problem accepting in its ranks second generation members of 
merchant families who had been educated from their youngest age with the ambition of securing a 
position in the royal administration, La Roche-Flavin recounts how the court made difficulties to accept a 
man who had been himself a businessman before buying an office of conseiller. In the end, the court 
confirmed his nomination, considering that 
he was from an honorable family, well learned, had received a literary education in the colleges, 
before he tried the trading profession to see if it would be more advantageous and pleasant to him 
[and that] his experience having demonstrated to the contrary, he had left the trade a long time 
ago and went back to studying, obtained his degrees, and gave public lectures at the University.495 
The objections raised in the court however are worth mentioning here as they convey some of the 
negative stereotypes about trade. According to La Roche-Flavin, some conseillers had objected to his 
nomination because  
                                                      
495 “il estoit de bonne maison, bien instruict, et eslevé aux lettres ès Colleges, avant qu’il tentast si la profession de 
la merchandise luy seroit plus commode et aggreable, que l’experience luy ayant faict recognoistre le contraire, il 
l’auroit quittée puis longues années, et se seroit remis à l’estude, et passé ses degrez, et leur publiquement en 
l’Université.” La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 347. 
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[he] had often delivered merchandise to their houses when he was an apprentice (…) and there 
was no doubt that the Law [that is Roman Law] calls merchants “Viles negotiatores” and closes 
the doors of public offices and dignities to them (…) and Aristotle [wrote that] the goal of 
merchants is not public benefit, but to make money, either in a good or a bad way, whatever the 
price, which is confirmed by the fact that the richest among them always commands the most 
respect.496 
To be sure, one should be wary to take those views at face value, as an accurate and 
unproblematic representation of parlementaire money ethics. What is revealing here is that these 
objections are not conceived simply in terms of “dérogeance” (the loss of one’s nobility for practicing 
lowly activities such as trade) but in terms of “public benefit” or common interest. These objections—as 
well as the reasons for finally accepting the nomination—reflected a parlementaire concern for the 
interpenetration between the world of trade and that of justice, a concern underlain by older stereotyped 
views of the ideal magistrate, which La Roche-Flavin merely echoed a few decades later. These views 
were part of a portrait of the “perfect judge” composed and promoted in great part from within royal 
courts, in particular the sovereign courts, to address the unprecedented accusations of corruption and 
venality that targeted the magistrates in the second half of the sixteenth century.  
Before I turn to contemporary representations of the “perfect judge” and the place that could be 
left to the questionable practice of épices within that portrait, it should be noted that accusations of 
corruption were not shaped solely by a changing social and economic context but also by the particular 
intellectual and ideological climate of the religious conflicts in the second half of the sixteenth century. I 
do not mean to suggest here that accusations or physical attacks on magistrates were religiously motivated 
but rather that eschatological concerns, heightened at the time by the religious conflicts,497 might have 
indirectly reshaped ethical discussions, including considerations on the necessity and urgency of a 
moralization of royal justice. This idea would hold particularly true for the last decade of the conflicts, 
                                                      
496 “le pourveu leur avoir souvent apporté de la merchandise en leur maison en qualité d’apprentif, ou facteur et 
estant certain que la Loy appellee les marchands “viles negotiatores" leur fermant l’entrée et la porte à tous offices 
publiques et dignités (…) Et Aristote [écrit que] le but d’un marchand n’est de server ny profiter au public, ains de 
gaigner, bien ou mal et à quel prix que ce soit, tesmoings qu’entre eux le plus riche est le plus estimé.” Ibid. 
497 Denis Richet is the main proponent of the idea that “eschatological anguish” was a feature of the time, at the core 
of the religious conflicts. See Denis Richet, Les guerriers de Dieu, Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1990. 
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dominated by the challenge the Catholic League presented to the monarchy.498 While the popular appeal 
of the League can also be explained to a large extent by social change within the urban settings—
exemplified in Toulouse by the penetration of pastel merchant families into the Parlement—we cannot 
dismiss the religious dimension of the League’s critique of the degeneration of the judiciary, manifest in 
the repertoire—lexical and ideological—used in sermons and pamphlets to denounce the corruption of 
judges.499 But the accusations voiced by the League’s preachers and propagandists, although framed in 
mystical terms and subservient to a general call for redemptive regeneration, merely recycled previous 
accusations. In other words, the role of the League in that respect could have been limited to giving new 
clout and a particular religious expression to the same accusations, which, although targeting individual 
judges, always took aim at the magistracy as a whole. 
The first part of the parlementaire answer to those accusations consisted in insisting on the 
isolated and highly individualized character of notorious cases of actual corruption. Most importantly, the 
second related step of the courts’ defense strategy was to push forward an ideal of the “perfect christian 
magistrate.” This ideal was the conseillers’ general answer to accusations that targeted not individuals but 
the parlements as a whole. Elie Barnavi and Robert Descimon demonstrated how the rising noblesse de 
robe mobilized the medieval rhetoric of exempla in order to compose the portrait of this professional 
ideal-type that filled the magistracy’s social need to “restore  the imaginary legitimacy of its 
domination.”500 Edifying eulogies, tombs, biographies of virtuous conseillers or présidents, all of them 
composed or sponsored by their surviving colleagues, were as many instantiations of that ideal-type, 
                                                      
498 One could say that, in a sense, the League turned against the parlements one of their own rhetorical and political 
weapons: the conseillers and presidents, in order to try and occupy the void left by the absence of regular 
representative institutions in the kingdom had presented themselves as the sole link between king and subjects 
within an organic representation of society, and this myth, turned on its head by the League, was now firing back at 
them. Following through with the logic of this representation indeed, the parlementaires had exposed themselves to 
becoming surrogate targets in the stead of a distant king: corruption could be seen as spreading like gangrene from 
one part of the body to another, and corruption in the sovereign courts in particular (the courts closest to the king) 
could be perceived as a symptom of the corruption of the head of the monarchy. 
499 Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 novembre 
1591), 173. 
500 Ibid., 171. 
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circulated as widely as possible in order to differentiate the parlementaires from both the bourgeoisie and 
the lower, non-ennobling magistracy.501 This distinction was not simply promoted through the circulation 
of idealized example of virtuous forbearers, but also enacted through a number of new exclusive social 
practices: “moral isolation, cultural rupture, a unique way of life, everything combined to distinguish 
robins from the common people of the bourgeoisie.”502 In the case of Toulouse, the substantial entry of 
both magistrates of the Parlement and members of the older sword nobility into the local confréries de 
pénitents in the 1590s constitutes a perfect albeit complex example of practices which, outside of the 
court, aimed at redefining the parlementaire ethos as visible sign of social distinction.503 
How could this ideal of the perfect magistrate work in practice in the court? How in particular 
could this ideal-type accommodate venality and épices? According to Barnavi and Descimon, the point of 
this portrait was precisely to focus on the restoration of an older ideal of innocence and dignity of justice 
in order to elude the problem of venality as the cause of a new type of corruption.504 Even better: “the 
moralization that judges pretended to impose on themselves was part of a general process, of which 
venality was the linchpin.”505 Venality was indeed at the very center of this process of redefinition of the 
social identity of the royal officer because it had undergone an important transformation in the preceding 
decades as a result of both changing economic conditions and increasing social stigmatization of the 
magistracy. From an instrument of upward social mobility it changed into an instrument of exclusion 
from a group that was more and more thought of as a new social entity, in transit between bourgeoisie and 
nobility. An ordonnance of 1560 still distinguished officiers de justice from gentilshommes but likened 
the two social statuses precisely in their relation to trade: commerce was prohibited to both of them under 
                                                      
501 Ibid. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Pierre Gérard, "La confrérie des Pénitents Bleus," L'Auta 467 (1981): 130-3 ; Paul Exupère Ousset, La confrérie 
des Pénitents Bleus de Toulouse, Toulouse: Impr. Saint-Cyprien, 1927 ; J. Adher, "Les confréries de Pénitents de 
Toulouse avant 1789," Bulletin de la Société Géographique de Toulouse 16 (1897): 422-39. 
504 Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence : l'assassinat du président Brisson (15 novembre 
1591), 171. 
505 Ibid., 172. 
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the penalty of losing respectively one’s office or one’s nobility. Two decades later, the relation of the 
magistracy to trade and money was still a concern and was the main basis for resisting the ongoing 
process of fusion with the old sword nobility. It is worth quoting at some length Montaigne’s sarcasms on 
that matter: 
this trade [justice] is held in such high esteem that there is formed a fourth estate in the 
commonwealth, the Church, the Nobility and the People (…)  [T]his fourth estate, having charge 
of the laws and sovereign authority over lives and chattels, should be quite distinct from the 
nobility, with the result that there are two sets of laws, the law of honour and the law of justice 
which are strongly opposed in many matters (the first condemns an unavenged accusation of 
lying: the other condemns the revenge; a gentleman who puts up with an insult is, by the laws of 
arms, stripped of his rank and nobility: one who avenges it incurs capital punishment; if he goes 
to law to redress an offence against his honour, he is dishonoured; if he acts independently he is 
chastised and punished by the Law ; (…) [T]hese two estates, so different from each other, both 
derive from a single Head, yet one is responsible for peace, the other for war; the first acquires 
profit, the second, honour; the first learning, the second, virtue; the first, words, the second 
fortitude; the first the long gown, the second the short?506 
It is no coincidence that this passage immediately follows Montaigne’s diatribe against venality 
and épices. These were arguably, two of the main remaining obstacles on the magistracy’s way to full 
nobility.  
Venality and épices could both be conceived as testimonies of the magistracy’s original link to 
the world of merchants, bourgeois par excellence. Since the organization of the judicial system and the 
financial needs of the king made it impossible to abolish the two practices, both were in need of clear 
signs of a moralization lest they became indelible stains of roture on the purple robes of the magistrates. 
This moralization took the form of selective amendments to the internal regulations already in 
place in the court. Although no coherent program of systematic reform of the épices is to be found at the 
                                                      
506 Montaigne, Essays, 132-3 (Book I, Chapter 23). The French reads: “aye cette marchandise [i.e. la justice] si 
grand credit, qu'il se face en une police un quatriesme estat, de gens maniants les procés, pour le joindre aux trois 
anciens, de l'Eglise, de la Noblesse et du Peuple; lequel estat, ayant la charge des loix et souveraine authorité des 
biens et des vies, face un corps à part de celuy de la noblesse: d'où il avienne qu'il y ayt doubles loix, celles de 
l'honneur, et celles de la justice, en plusieurs choses fort contraires (aussi rigoureusement condamnent celles-là un 
démanti souffert, comme celles icy un démanti revanché); par le devoir des armes, celuy-là soit degradé d'honneur 
et de noblesse qui souffre un'injure, et, par le devoir civil, celuy qui s'en venge, encoure une peine capitale (qui 
s'adresse aux loix, pour avoir raison d'une offence faite à son honneur, il se deshonnore; et qui ne s'y adresse, il en 
est puny et chastié par les loix); et, de ces deux pieces si diverses se raportant toutesfois à un seul chef, ceux-là 
ayent la paix, ceux-cy la guerre en charge; ceux-là ayent le gaing, ceux-cy l'honneur; ceux-là le sçavoir, ceux-cy la 
vertu; ceux-là la parole, ceux-cy l'action; ceux-là la justice, ceux-cy la vaillance; ceux-là la raison, ceux-cy la force; 
ceux-là la robbe longue, ceux-cy la courte en partage?” 
 234 
time, a series of isolated amendments points to a general tendency, which, originating from the ranks of 
the conseiller themselves, aimed at controlling and limiting the abuses that were the most damaging to the 
court’s public image. Mercuriales and arrêts adopted by the Parlement de Toulouse during the period 
effected a few changes in that direction, by enforcing a number of prohibition, forbidding for instance 
direct payment of the épices to the rapporteur and transferring it instead to the greffier.507 In the same 
vein, an arrêt of 1570 forbid the conseillers to put litigants under arrest in order to force them to pay the 
épices of their trial.508 A decade later, confiscation of the litigants’ property was also forbidden,509 and the 
amount of épices that could be demanded for a temporary judgment (“arrêt interlocutoire”) was limited. 
While no direct link can be firmly established between these new regulations and actual practice, 
the study of the court’s records shows that, contrary to what accusations of corruption would lead to 
think, both the global amount of épices collected by the court, and the average amount per trial increased 
but followed closely the rise of prices during the period: from about 12 l. in 1555 to almost 14.5 l. in 
1576, this average seems to even decrease slightly below 14 l. in 1589.  
If new internal regulations were more or less respected then, the problem for the magistrates was 
to reconcile two potentially contradictory aspects of their new ethos: the promotion of the disinterested 
character of their work, which put serious limits on the income that could be derived from épices, and the 
necessity to maintain the outwards signs of  a higher standard of living intended to manifest both the 
magistrates’ belonging to the nobility and their authority as officers of the king, who held a share of 
sovereign justice in their hands. In the 1590s, some magistrates seem to have had some real trouble 
making those two ends meet, literally, and the only viable solution to help them conform to both 
necessities imposed by the new ethos was to try, again, to increase their officer wages rather than their 
commissaire fees. In his lettres patentes of the 22nd of January 1589, Henri III increased the wages of the 
presidents and conseillers of the Parlement de Toulouse, justifying the raise not simply with vague 
                                                      
507 Mercuriale of 1586, see Vaisse-Cibiel, "Des gages, épices et sabatines à l'ancien Parlement de Toulouse," 186 
and La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 194. 
508 Arrêt of October 21, 1570. Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 195. 
509 Arrêt of February 4, 1580. Ibid. 
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generalities about the magistrates’ poverty, but pointing out specific cases of parlementaire destitution, 
noting that 
there have been the recent cases of four conseillers of this [court], men of honor and of great 
legal knowledge and erudition, who were so poor when they died that, although some of them had 
children, no heir could be found to accept their succession because of their extreme poverty, and 
these men were Me Martin Gilbert, Pierre Maynier, François de La Garde and Jean des Portes, 
who had served in their office honorably and for a long time, and the same could happen to many 
of those currently in the court if God called them back today.510 
Of course, these allegations should be considered with great caution, as they were in some respect 
signs of the king’s participation in the composition of the portrait of the “perfect Christian magistrate”: 
qualified, virtuous, disinterested. There are two reasons, however, not to dismiss those individual cases as 
the mere exempla of a purely rhetorical construction. The first reason is that the image of the poverty of 
magistrates, real or not, was not an entirely positive one, for the financial destitution of the conseillers 
undermined their prestige and authority, hence that of the king they represented. The second reason is 
that, without ruling out the rhetorical function of those examples, there seems to have been some reality to 
this poverty, although it is very difficult to measure. To be sure, this was a relative poverty when 
compared to the rest of the population, that is, if we are to take into account some of the financial 
advantages (tax exemptions, greater ease to find credit) even the poorest of conseillers enjoyed. But it was 
poverty nonetheless when considered (as the magistrates and most people seem to have done) in relation 
to the expenses the conseillers had to undertake in order to maintain the standards of living that matched 
the dignité of their office. Thus, the conseillers who had left Rouen to follow Henri IV in 1593 
complained to the king that their wages were “(…) so low that they [were] not enough to pay the rent of 
the houses in which they now live[d] (…).”511 A few years later, the jurist Charles Loyseau would also 
frame the relative weakness of the wages in terms of the living standards the magistrates were expected to 
                                                      
510 "il s’est treuvé despuis peu de temps quatre des conseillers d’icelle personnes d’honneur de grande doctrine et 
erudition estre decedez si pouvres qu’ilz n’ont treuvé aucun heretier quoy que aucuns d’entre eulx eussent enfans 
pour leur extreme pouvreté, savoir Me Martin Gilbert, Pierre Maynier, François de La Garde et Jehan des Portes 
qui toutesfois auroient longuement et fort honorablement servy en leurs charges et en adviendroict autant a ung bon 
nombre de ceulx qui restent aujourd’huy s’il plaisoit a Dieu les appeler" ADHG, 1B 1910, fol. 21v.-22. 
Enregistrement des actes du pouvoir royal, January 22, 1589. 
511 Quoted in Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 455. 
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maintain, noting that “life is now so expensive and the wages of justice officers are so low that they can 
hardly support the magistrates in accordance with their quality.”512 The 1589 lettres patentes mentioned 
above confirm this view and explained that the increase of the wages of the conseillers in the Parlement 
de Toulouse was meant to “give them some honest means to support themselves in accordance with the 
dignity of their offices and to avoid being exposed to the contempt of the common people because of their 
poverty [my emphasis]”.513  
The 1589 increase however, did not have the expected effects, for a few years later the 
magistrates’ wages were situated barely above the average income of the general population: thus Roland 
Mousnier calculated that the during the years 1593-7 the yearly wages of a conseiller in the Parlement de 
Rouen compared to 468 days of work of a journeyman in the building trade. 
 
1600-1650: épices, parlementaire factions, politics. 
 
In his chapter about épices, La Roche-Flavin echoed Loyseau’s remarks with a few additional 
words of explanation: 
now life, clothes, and everything else is so expensive, and the wages are so small that it’s 
impossible [for the magistrates] to live from them according to their quality; and also because the 
price of their offices is now six times what it used to be; and also given the hard work, the 
diligence that is demanded of them in the Palais by the function of their office. And on this point 
my own experience allows me to say that, truly, my wages of eight hundred livres a year have 
never been sufficient to cover a fourth of my very moderate expenses, so much so that one can 
                                                      
512 Loyseau, Cinq livres du droit des offices, liv. I, chap. VIII, 96. 
513 “leur donner quelque moyen honneste pour s’entretenir suyvant la dignité de leurs charges et pour n’estre 
exposez au mespris du peuple a cause de leur pouvreté.” ADHG, 1B 1910, fol. 22.  
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say that sovereign magistracy is an honorable servitude and an honest poverty for those who do 
not have other resources (…).514 
While the idea of “honorable servitude” and that of “honest poverty” certainly reinforced 
important features of the ideal-type of the virtuous magistrate, there had been indeed a degradation of the 
value of the wages in the first decades of the seventeenth century. When La Roche-Flavin published his 
work in 1617, the relative value of the annual wages of a conseiller had decreased, according to 
Mousnier’s count, to the equivalent of 365 days of work of a journeyman in the building trade (down 
from 468 days two decades earlier).515 Thus, at a time when the personal fortune of the conseillers was 
increasingly seen as a fundamental basis for their authority—an element indispensable to the exercise of 
their office and profession—but also as a tangible sign of their assimilation into the old nobility, the 
decrease of the relative value of those wages forced the magistrates to turn to other sources of income that 
would allow them to maintain their social identity, hence their authority. 
In those conditions, it comes as no surprise to see those who, as La Roche-Flavin wrote, “had no 
other resources,”—inherited fortune, land, ecclesiastical bénéfices, rentes—turn to the épices. Thus, the 
old problem of the épices as substitute to wages was reactivated, threatening both the recent internal 
reforms and the model of the perfect magistrate. As La Roche-Flavin’s remark about the price of offices 
suggests, this model itself had created new practical problems for the decades to come when venality 
reached what seemed to be the natural end of its transformation into an instrument of control of social 
mobility: the legalization, in fact the institutionalization, of the heredity of offices. The guarantee of the 
heredity of offices had an immediate consequence: that of a sudden explosion of the price of offices. This 
explosion, combined with the increasing cost of maintaining the appearances of the newly assumed 
parlementaire ethos, put considerable and renewed strain on the question of épices. The question turned 
                                                      
514 “mesmes à present, que la vie, habits, et toutes choses sont si cheres, et les gages si petits, qu’il n’est pas 
possible, [que les juges] s’en puissent entretenir à beaucoup près, selon leur qualité ; et attendu encores 
l’encherissement sextuple de leurs offices, plus que le temps passé ; et eu esgard au labeur, et assiduité, qu’il leur 
faut rendre au Palais à la fonction de leurs charges. Sur quoi l’experience me permet asseurer avec verité, que mes 
gages de huict cens livres par an n’ont esté jamais suffisants, pour faire la quatriesme partie de ma despence fort 
moderée, si qu’on peut dire, que la Magistrature souveraine est une honnorable servitude, et une honneste pauvreté, 
si d’ailleurs on n’a des moyens (…).” La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 194. 
515 Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 455. 
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into a debate, a conflict even, this time confined to the bounds of the court, which could  jeopardize one 
other important aspect of that ethos, that of the representation of the corps as a “hierarchy of equals.” The 
dispute became so serious that it threatened to reveal the fictional nature of this representation of the 
corps to the world outside the walls of the Palais. 
For those reasons, the parlementaire counter-attack to accusations of corruption had led to 
validate the principle of venality and did not put an end to questions about the épices and problems of 
social distinction. Indeed, those questions did not disappear but were brought instead into the court, and 
kept within the walls of the Palais, thus removed from public scrutiny. The detailed study of épices 
during the first decades of the seventeenth century demonstrates the existence of mounting tensions 
within the court over their control and distribution and suggests as well that those tensions revealed and 
reinforced an ever increasing social differentiation, this time not with groups exterior to the court, but 
within the corps itself. 
The statistical analysis of the records of the Parlement de Toulouse516 first demonstrates a 
significant increase of the épices during that period. This observation further suggests that this regular 
increase resulted from both the increase of the épices themselves and the constant decrease of the relative 
value of the wages, slowly eaten away by a rising inflation. In 1555, a lay conseiller517 serving in the 
Grand Chambre earned, in theory, 375 l. in annual wages and about 550 l. in épices. In 1638, the ratio had 
gone up and was now of one to two, with 500 l. in wages and about 1,000 l. in épices. At this date, this 
ratio was comparable in the two Chambres des Enquêtes: a conseiller in these chambers earned 400 l. in 
wages and in average, 900 l. in épices in the first chamber, 800 in the second. The ratio of one to two only 
holds true, however, if we assume that the wages were paid regularly and at their official value, which 
                                                      
516 This study is based on a systematic analysis of the amount of épices noted in the margin of the dictum of arrêts 
kept in the registers of the Parlement. The note also included the name of the rapporteur of the case to whom the 
épices were to be paid. About rapporter as a practice see Chapter 7, about the dictum and the recording of arrêts see 
Chapter 8 below. 
517 Historically, a number of conseillers were also ecclesiastics. The wages of these “conseillers clercs” were lower 
than those of the “conseillers lais” because it was expected that they enjoyed the parallel income of a bénéfice 
ecclésiastique. Although there would always remain a number of ecclesiastics among the members of the court (and 
to begin with, a number of bishop who had a right to membership), offices of conseillers clercs would increasingly 
come to be occupied by lay men. 
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was almost never the case. Indeed, we know that in practice wages were paid irregularly, at best with a 
delay, sometimes not at all, most often after deductions—actually forced and disguised loans— that the 
king withheld to pay for more urgent expenses, in particular during wars, civil or foreign. 518 In 1613, 
Etienne de Malenfant, greffier of the Parlement de Toulouse, noted with precision the wages conseillers 
actually received, and these were far below their official value—that is, the value defined in the royal 
ordonnances fixing the gages. In this relatively quiet year with no military front open inside or outside 
the kingdom, the discrepancy gives an idea of the amounts the king withheld in “normal” conditions.519 
The relative value of the épices was then far greater in that year: an average of 950 l. for a conseiller in 
the Grand Chambre, that is about 4.8 times his wages, 600 l. for in the Première Chambre des Enquêtes, 
that is about 4.5 times the wages, 300 l. in the Seconde Chambre des Enquêtes, about 2.35 the wages. 
Averages, however, are very misleading here, and it is at this point that the detailed statistical 
study of the épices reveals gaps, discrepancies, divides within the court that might be overlooked 
otherwise. Contrary to wages indeed, épices were not equal for all conseillers and those averages mask 
great differences. The conseiller Vedelly, the most active rapporteur in the Grand Chambre in 1613, 
earned about 1,800 l. in épices, or about 9 times the wages that were actually paid to him on that year. A 
“conseiller écoutant” (“listening magistrate”), that is one that had not been rapporteur once during that 
year, only got his share of the “common purse,” about 480 l., that is about 2.5 times his wages. The 
discrepancy is slightly greater in the Première Chambre des Enquêtes where Bachelier, the most active 
rapporteur on that year, received about 1,700 l. in épices while a conseiller écoutant only received 300. 
But differences are significantly less pronounced in the Seconde Chambre des Enquêtes where Bertrand, 
most active rapporteur, received 1,200 l. in épices, while a conseiller écoutant received, as in the 
Première Chambre, 300 l. from the common purse. 
                                                      
518 Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 460, 62. 
519 On that year, conseillers lais in the Grand chambre received 195 livres 1 denier 6 sous, conseillers clercs in the 
same chamber 163 l. 46 d. 3 s. Conseillers in the Enquêtes chamber received about a third less: 133 l. 21 d. 7 s. for a 
conseiller lai, 107 l. 10 d. 7 s. for a conseiller clerc. (Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 199). 
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An even more detailed study of earnings in épices at the individual level yields important results 
that suggest the existence of groups within the court. To summarize, the serial study reveals the existence 
of important differences between the various chambers of the court. The analysis of the registres d’arrêts 
for the month of December 1637 for instance, suggests a relative homogeneity in the Grand Chambre: 
during that month, all the conseillers of that chamber had been rapporteur at least once and although the 
most active rapporteurs earned about 2.7 times more in épices than the least active in the chamber, there 
was a linear progression of income between these two ends. In the Seconde Chambre des Enquêtes on the 
contrary, three groups of conseillers appear clearly. The majority (18 conseillers out of 25) had not been 
rapporteur at all (14 conseillers) or only once (4 conseillers). This group, representing 72% of the 
members of the chamber only received its share of the common purse, that is, about 38% of the total 
amount. An intermediary and smaller group of 3 conseillers (12% of the chamber) had received 15% of 
the épices and the group of most active rapporteurs (4 conseillers, 16% of the chamber) had managed to 
secure 47% of the épices for itself. Thus in that chamber, the average of 56.4 l. of épices per conseiller 
during that month masked differences between a great majority who earned an average of about 29.3 l. 
and a minority who received 167 l. in average.   
The profile of the Première Chambre des Enquêtes was a mix between the two opposite models, 
that of the Grand Chambre and of the Seconde chambre des enquêtes. It resembled the Seconde Chambre 
des Enquêtes in that in the Première Chambre too a number of conseillers had not been rapporteurs at all. 
However, although their share of the épices was small, as in the Seconde Chambre, (18% of the total), 
they did not represent the largest group (36% of the members of the chamber). The Première Chambre 
resembled the Grand Chambre precisely in that there was no clear majority: the group of the most active 
rapporteurs had received most of the épices (67%) but represented 40% of the chamber (10 conseillers 
out of 25) and the “intermediary group” of conseillers who had been rapporteurs a few times represented 
24% of the chamber and had received 15% of the épices. 
These statistics suggest not only the existence of groups, more differentiated as the hierarchy of 
chambers went down, but also that the problem of the épices for the conseillers was not one of raising the 
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amount of money demanded from the litigants520 but to secure as many appointments as rapporteur as 
possible. From that point of view, the different configurations of the different chambers must have 
translated into various attitudes towards the question of épices and their distribution. In the Grand 
Chambre the continuous spread of the share of épices received by each conseiller must have resulted into 
a relative homogeneity of the income that suggests that some sort of consensus about the épices (probably 
that of status quo) must have dominated. In the Première Chambre des Enquêtes, although one can 
identify groups of conseillers that corresponded to different ranges of income in épices, the equality in 
size of the groups could lead to their mutual neutralization: the group of “conseillers écoutants” could 
only oppose the group of active rapporteurs with the support of an “intermediary group” whose 
expectations of a promotion into the group of active rapporteurs prompted them to adopt a wait-and-see 
attitude. The divide in the Seconde Chambre, much more pronounced, created serious tensions between a 
majority left with a small share of the common purse and a minority who confiscated most of the épices. 
Despite the fact that they represented the majority of that chamber, however, those conseillers 
écoutants only had a limited number of options to better their situation. The first one, was to wait for an 
hypothetical promotion to the Première chambre des enquêtes. But because this promotion was based on 
seniority (calculated after the dates of reception in the court), it could mean waiting many years, possibly 
in vain. The second option consisted in securing, one way or another, the favor of the president of the 
chamber, the one in charge of the “distribution” of the lawsuits to conseillers, that is, of the choice of the 
rapporteur for each trial. But this option was heavily dependent on previously established social networks 
and factions, which as we will see, although not completely fixed, were rather rigid and evolved on the 
impulsion not of the small conseiller but of the presidents themselves and even of grandees outside the 
court. The last option then, was to attempt an “institutional coup” by obtaining a reformation, not of the 
mode of distribution of lawsuits to rapporteurs by the presidents (the antiquity of this practice made the 
push for a major revision unlikely to succeed), but of the rules of the distribution of épices through the 
                                                      
520 As matter of fact, the average amount of épices per trial did not change significantly during the period: 4.37 écus 
in 1589, 4.17 in 1612, 5.23 in 1638. 
 242 
common purse, a much more recent hence still flexible institutional innovation. Although the most 
realistic option, this last solution would still be difficult to achieve, however, because of the constraints 
imposed by the court’s internal procedures: in order to reform the “communauté des épices,” a general 
meeting of the court (“assemblée générale des chambres”) had first to be granted. Then the divisions 
between chambers had to be overcome in that assembly in order to constitute a large and united front 
pushing for the reform and supporting it by a vote that would result in a formal decision that would finally 
amend the system in place. 
This was a long stretch, but it was what some conseillers attempted in 1638 in the Parlement de 
Toulouse. While their attempt eventually failed, it produced, fortunately for us, some serious tensions and 
a heated dispute that help us to better understand the divisions suggested by the figures, averages and 
discrepancies of the statistics presented above. The debates not only confirm what the detailed study of 
the épices suggested, but also point to the importance of the financial, but also political and social stakes 
surrounding the question of épices in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
In April 1638, some conseillers in the Tournelle—the criminal section of the Grand Chambre—
required a general assembly of the chambers to try and reform the mode of redistribution of épices. 
Clearly—and as the debates would later confirm—those conseillers were trying to take advantage of the 
temporary absence of the premier président Gaspard de Fieubet, who had been summoned to Paris by the 
king to justify the court’s earlier refusal to register new taxes. Their motivations were rather clear as well: 
the profits of criminal justice were by far inferior to those derived from civil justice and their attempt at 
reforming the communauté quite simply aimed at compensating the loss in épices for the years they had to 
take their turn to “go down” (“descendre”) from the Grand Chambre to the Tournelle. While the 
conseillers in the Tournelle could always count on the support of a majority of conseillers in the two 
chambres des enquêtes (and especially in the second one), they also expected to receive the support of 
those in the Grand Chambre who benefited the less from the system (that is, those who were appointed 
the least often rapporteurs). The hope of those in the Tournelle was that these conseillers in the Grand 
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Chambre would dare, in the absence of their premier président, join their colleagues of the “lower” 
chambers in an attempt to reform the established system. 
But in requesting a general meeting to discuss this particular question, the conseillers of the 
Tournelle had taken the risk of being beaten at their own game: those who benefited even far less than 
them from the system of distribution of the lawsuits—mainly the conseillers écoutants in the Seconde 
Chambre des enquêtes—seized this unexpected opportunity to put forth demands that went far beyond 
what the Tournelle had wished for. The conseiller Ségla, who spoke on behalf of the Tournelle to propose 
the original reform opened Pandora’s box by asking that the share of épices put in the common purse be 
raised from 50 to 75%: the conseiller d’Olivier speaking afterwards on behalf of the Seconde Chambre 
des Enquêtes not only asked that the totality of the épices taxed in each lawsuit be put into the common 
purse, but also that the purse became common to the Parlement as a whole, as opposed to each chamber 
individually.  
This was in fact a revolutionary proposal with potentially far-reaching consequences. To begin 
with, the financial consequences would have been far more considerable in the project of the Seconde 
Chambre des Enquêtes as a simulation of the two proposals suggests.521 By increasing the share of épices 
put in the common purse but maintaining separate purses for each chamber, the project of the Tournelle 
benefited more or less equally all the conseillers écoutants of the court and the most active rapporteurs 
would have borne the cost of this transfer. In this project, the average of épices per conseiller would have 
been left unchanged within each chamber. The proposal of the Seconde Chambre des enquêtes was 
radically different and could have had far more important consequences, not only on the distribution of 
épices but on the workings of politics and factions within the court. Obviously, because it abolished the 
income difference between conseillers rapporteurs and conseillers écoutants, their project entailed a 
significant financial benefit for the conseillers of the chambre des enquêtes,. In effect, this change would 
                                                      
521 See Table 2 and Table 3 below. 
 244 
have also annihilated the power that the présidents wielded over the conseillers of their chamber thanks to 
their monopoly over the distribution of lawsuits. 
Thus, the reform of the communauté des épices proposed by the Seconde Chambre des enquêtes 
would have profoundly affected both the distribution of resources and the balance of power within the 
court, thereby demonstrating the close connection between the two. This attempt, by leaving intact the 
practice of the distribution of lawsuits from the point of view of the procedure but emptying it of its 
substance in terms of internal politics, could seriously affect the functioning of clientele networks in the 
court by challenging the prominence of the Grand Chambre and of the présidents in each chamber. From 
its origins in the middle of the fifteenth century, the distribution could have been conceived of as an 
instrument to ease the transition from an older system, in which magistrates were allowed to receive 
pensions from grandees, to a new one, in which the service of the king became exclusive of all other 
fidelities.522 The new system of distribution had, in effect, put the presidents in charge of rechanneling in 
a new form the money wealthy and powerful individuals were willing to pay to secure a favorable 
outcome for the many trials that both they and their clients had in the sovereign court. Pensions paid to 
conseillers had disappeared, thereby extinguishing in appearance the personal relationships that had 
previously existed between magistrates and grandees, but new forms of patronage had been improvised 
and the magistrates never ceased to be attached to clientele networks. Powerful litigants were no longer 
allowed to grant pensions but they could (and did) seek to reach the ear of the presidents to make sure 
their lawsuits would be appointed to the right conseiller. Therefore, while the presidents were supposed to 
appoint a rapporteur “considering the nature of the lawsuit and the quality of the rapporteur,”523 it is 
clear that in practice they considered first, when applicable, the interest of their own patrons and clients, 
and then the clientele networks to which litigants and conseillers belonged. 
                                                      
522 This tacit role of the distribution is suggested by the fact that it appeared (Ordonnance of Charles VII, on October 
22, 1446 ; Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, IX, 154-5) 
precisely at the time when the law finally strictly forbid conseillers and président to receive pensions from anyone 
else but the king himself.  
523 Ibid., IX, 155. 
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This practice was explicitly denounced in the 1638 debates. M. de Senaux, premier président in 
the Seconde Chambre des enquêtes—the chamber where, the statistics suggested, the greatest inequalities 
were to be found—spoke to the assembly to express his indignation about a proposal, which, as was clear 
to everyone in the court, targeted the présidents and more particularly himself. His strategy was to 
preemptively counter-attack the denunciation of the alleged abuse:524 
M. de Senaus (…) took offence of the opinions he knew had been voiced by those who 
desired this community [of épices], and that this community was sought only to restore liberty in 
the Palais, a liberty that was limited because, or so they said, the presidents gave their favor to 
whoever they pleased when distributing the trials, and because of this did not dare to express 
opinions other than those of the présidents lest they would be mistreated during the distributions, 
and his opinion was that the court should wait [for the return of the premier président].525 
But the assembly kept on going since after a few votes the court was still evenly divided on the 
question of whether or not to reform the communauté. The remarks of M. de Noel, conseiller in the 
première chambre des enquêtes, demonstrated the extent of the differences not only of interest but also of 
opinion between some conseillers and their président, when he pointed out that, contrary to what M. de 
Senaus seemed to imply, there was nothing insulting in the word “liberté”: 
M. de Noel (…) was of the opinion that there was no reason to be so offended by the word 
“liberty” and that this word was not so badly chosen in this instance, but that, on the contrary, if it 
had been said indeed, it would have been well said. His opinion was to proceed [and vote to 
reform the community of épices].526 
There seems to be here, both in this mention of this particular kind of “liberty” and beyond the 
self-serving aspect of the proposal to extend the communauté to the Parlement as a whole, a certain esprit 
                                                      
524 The procedure in these assemblies was that, in theory, each participant was allowed to speak each one in his turn, 
that is, following the order of the hierarchy, from the first president down to the youngest conseiller in the Seconde 
chambre des enquêtes (or of the Chambre des requêtes when it was invited to participate in the assembly). In fact, 
each speaker only had to options: either to support an opinion expressed before him or to propose a new opinion. 
Those at the bottom of the hierarchy saw their opportunities to speak further limited by the fact that the “vote” 
would stop as soon as one opinion would have received the necessary majority. 
525 “M. de Senaus president en la seconde chambre des enquêtes, (…) se formalisa des paroles qu’il savoit avoir été 
dites par ceux qui desiroient lad. communauté, qu’elle n’étoit desirée que pour remettre la liberté dans le Palais, 
laquelle n’y etoit pas entiere, à cause des faveurs que les Sr. presidens fesoient en leurs distributions des procès à 
ceux qu’il leur plaisoit, et que par ce moyen il y en avoit qui n’osoient être d’autre avis que de ceux des Sr. 
presidens de peur d’être maltraités par eux aux distributions, et fut d’avis d’attendre.” Malenfant, Collections et 
remarques du Palais, II, 76 (April 28, 1638). 
526 “M. de Noel (…) fut d’avis qu’il n’y avoit pas tant de raison de se formaliser du mot de liberté, lequel n’étoit pas 
couché si mal en cet endroit que M. le préopinant le trouvoit, ains au contraire que s’il avoit été dit, il avoit été bien 
dit, et fut d’avis de passer outre.” Ibid. 
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de corps that transcended traditional institutional divisions between chambers. It is difficult to evaluate 
how sincere and widespread this conception of the corps was, but it is worth noting that it did not result 
only from the experience of political opposition to the king and his intendants, but also from concerns and 
debates directly related to the exercise of justice. Further, it is also worth noting here that this aspiration to 
a certain unity of the corps emerged precisely at that time and principally among the members of the 
chambres des enquêtes, since some of these men would play an important role a decade later when 
internal dissensions, jealousies and suspicions came to be temporarily overcome at the beginning of the 
Fronde. 
Those divisions followed the lines of client-patron relationships within and outside the court, and 
to a significant extent the uneven distribution of lawsuits followed these same lines as well. There was 
nothing new about this state of affairs in the seventeenth century527 and we can already see the 
distribution operate in such a way at the beginning of the period considered here. In June 1556 for 
instance, Louis de Saint-Gelais first approached Jean de Mansencal, then premier président of the Grand 
Chambre in the Parlement de Toulouse, who, like himself, was a favorite of connétable Anne de 
Montmorency, to make sure that the trial of his kin Jean de Saint-Gelais, bishop of Uzès, would be 
distributed to an understanding rapporteur. He then approached several conseillers who were to sit at the 
hearing of the trial, to make sure the rapporteur would obtain the majority necessary for his 
recommendation to become arrêt. 528 The same type of practice still existed one hundred and fifty years 
later, and was not a prerogative of grandees. The practice had not only survived but had also spread to 
lower levels of society, as the correspondence of the conseiller Tournier in the early eighteenth century 
demonstrates. François Malaubère, the tutor of Tournier’s two sons in Paris, liberally used his reports to 
the conseiller to relay requests for help not only in his own lawsuits in the Parlement de Toulouse but also 
                                                      
527 Sharon Kettering, "Clientage During the French Wars of Religion," Sixteenth Century Journal 20 (1989): 221-39 
and "Patronage and Politics during the Fronde," French Historical Studies 14 (1986): 409-41. 
528 Mark Greengrass, "Functions and Limits of Political Clientelism in France before Cardinal Richelieu," in L’état 
ou le roi: les fondations de la modernité monarchique en France (XIVe-XVIIe siècles), ed. Neithard Bulst, Robert 
Descimon, and Alain Guerreau, Paris: Éditions de la maison des sciences de l’homme, 1996, 69-82. 
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for those of his parents and sometimes even of vague acquaintances. Thus, Malaubère wrote on the 7th of 
March 1701 to the conseiller Tournier: 
(…) I forgot, Monsieur, (…) to commend to you the interests of Madame de Poypetit of 
whom you are the rapporteur in a lawsuit she has against M. Dorlan, her brother in law. It is an 
appeal of some sentence of the sénéchal in Auch, the circumstances of which I do not know. 
What I am asking is that you do me this favor to grant the honor of your protection to this good 
woman and give her all the favors that your ordinary justice will allow, either regarding the 
matter of the trial itself or by speeding up the preparation of the case. M. Fitte procurator of the 
king in our city of St Puy will tell you, if he has not done so already, about this matter. 529 
The passages underlined by the hand of the conseiller Tournier suggest that the magistrate took 
good note of the very unofficial requests of his sons’ tutor. These sons themselves, despite their young 
age (one was eleven and the other thirteen years-old at the time), could serve as intermediaries in this type 
of petitions, as revealed in another letter of Malaubère a few month later, in which he wrote “(..) your 
messieurs [that is, his sons] have been asked a recommendation letter for some M. Balsac who has some 
lawsuit in your Parlement. Thus, don’t be surprised when you receive it.” 530 The first of these two 
examples suggests that, even after a lawsuit had been “distributed,” one still could and should, as 
Madame de Poypetit had done, activate one’s network of relationships to try and obtain the favor of the 
rapporteur that had been appointed to one’s case. Maybe Madame de Poypetit had previously 
maneuvered so that her case would be distributed to Tournier but had failed, maybe she had waited to 
know the name of her rapporteur to figure out who would be the gascon in the court who could help her 
reach the ear of the magistrate. 
In any case, Madame de Poypetit’s approach, the tortuous course of her request which, from 
Saint-Puy to Toulouse, passing through Paris, finally reached a conseiller (and maybe the right one for 
her) illustrates how clientele networks, increasingly complex and widespread throughout society, could be 
                                                      
529 “J’oubliai encore, Monsieur, et c’est une chose que j’oublie il y a deja deux ordinaires, c’est de vous 
recommander les intherets de Madame de Poypetit dont vous etes rapporteur dans une affaire qu’elle a contre M. 
Dorlan son beau frere. C’est un appel de quelque sentence du senechal d’Auch dont je ne sçai point autrement les 
circonstances. Ce qu’il y a c’est que vous me ferés grace d’accorder l’honneur de votre protection à cette bonne 
dame et lui faire tous les plaisirs que votre justice ordinaire permettra soit pour le fonds, soit pour le tems 
necessaire à l’instruction du procès. M. Fitte procureur du roy de notre St Puy vous parlera si deja ne l’a fait de 
cette affaire.” ADHG, 49 J 20, 7 mars 1701. 
530 “(…) On a demandé à vos messieurs une lettre de recommandation pour un certain M. Balsac qui a quelque 
affaire dans votre Parlement. Ainsi ne soiés point surpris quand vous la recevrés.” Ibid., July 23rd, 1701. 
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mobilized through a practice that had become an integral although unofficial part of the procedure. It is 
this system, completely embedded in the functioning of royal justice by the end of the seventeenth 
century, which the debate over épices could have transformed indirectly but significantly by reforming 
the communauté des épices. 
One could say that the existence of groups or factions within the court was indispensable for this 
system to function: divisions, distinctions and differences of interests among conseillers and presidents 
allowed the perpetuation within the corps of rivalries between competing networks outside the court. In 
fact, the distinction between inside and outside of the court might not even be relevant when we consider 
that internal factions were simply the extension into the court of the branches of larger networks. It is not 
surprising that those branches would have thrust into the judicial courts, for after all, the power to affect 
the outcome of trials was one of the most precious social and political capital in Old Regime France. 
 Conseillers in the court were certainly aware that the judicial power vested in their office, the 
share of royal authority and sovereignty that was passed on to them as local embodiments of the king-as-
judge, were also a share of that precious capital. We can speculate that those who pushed for a reform of 
the communauté des épices, were animated, to a certain extent, by their frustration with a system that 
wasted this capital for them, simple conseillers écoutants who sat watching others, the rapporteurs, 
handle the well-paid cases of wealthy patrons. As they probably realized then, their deprivation of 
rapports was the cause of a double loss of capital, both financial and social. 
The system of distribution of lawsuits and of repartition of the épices would not be changed 
however, since the attempted reform failed. Those who opposed it—présidents, active rapporteurs, senior 
conseillers in the Grand Chambre, all those who increasingly formed an aristocracy within the now 
unquestionably noble profession—successfully diverted the debate, as any good jurists would have done, 
on a mere technicality: given that the premier président was unaware of the question at stake when he 
originally granted the general assembly, should the court proceed to debate the question or wait for his 
return from Paris? The content of the opinions expressed in the discussion of this point show that no one 
was fooled by the diversionary move, but opponents to the reform had managed nonetheless to limit the 
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damages by avoiding a full-fledged debate over the question of the distribution of lawsuits and épices. 
The court decided that it was “necessary to wait for another time to discuss this question and to postpone 
the debate to some other day.”531 In other words, supporters of the status-quo had intimated that it was 
urgent to do nothing. 
 
Although the attempted reform had failed and the system in place remained unchanged, it opened 
a window for us, through which we can observe how the century-long transformation of épices had ended 
up affecting the functioning of the court. This transformation had consequences on individuals within the 
court, as it shaped their income, fidelities, perspective of careers, and politics. It had consequences on the 
physiology of the corps of the Parlement, a body in theory united but in practice divided into organs ever 
more differentiated, with an all-powerfull Grand Chambre at its head. 
Finally, it had consequences on judicial practices. Maybe primarily, it affected the practice of the 
rapport, precisely at the time when rapporter was becoming, as a result of a parallel transformation, a 
major factor of professional identity for the judges.532 The transformation of the épices resulted in a 
system in which, from the point of view of the magistrate, the rapport was not primarily, and maybe not 
at all, about litigants and their disputes. To a significant extent, the rapport had become a very valuable 
and sought-for commodity that was conceived of in terms of financial resources, perspectives of career, 
and internal politics. 
In this “spice shop,” the flow of exchange seemed to never abate: there was constant bargaining 
and bickering over a range of such commodities: épices of course, but also rapports, fidelities, offices. 
While it seemed that litigants were ever more numerous and that the universe of endless legal quibbling 
Racine satirized in Les plaideurs could generate in turn endless trials, the court was in fact a world of 
limited resources and competition for those resources among the conseillers certainly shaped their 
conception of their own professional practices.   
                                                      
531 Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, II, 77. 
532 See Chapter 7. 
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Table 2. Simulation of the distribution of épices for December 1637 on the basis of the reform proposed by 
the Tournelle in April 1638. 
 
 
Table 3. Simulation of the distribution of épices for December 1637 on the basis of the reform proposed by 
the Seconde chambre des enquêtes in April 1638 
 
  Epices actually received 
in December 1637 
Reform of the Seconde chambre des 
Enquêtes 
  Amount Difference 
Grand 
Chambre 
Most active rapporteur 202 l. 77 l. -72% 
Conseiller "écoutant" 65 l. 77 l. +18% 
Average per conseiller 130 l. 77 l. -31% 
Tournelle* 
Most active rapporteur   77 l.   
Conseiller "écoutant"   77 l.   
Average per conseiller   77 l.   
1ere chambre 
des Enquêtes 
Most active rapporteur 153 l. 77 l. -50% 
Conseiller "écoutant" 31 l. 77 l. +148% 
Average per conseiller 61 l. 77 l. +26% 
2e chambre des 
Enquêtes 
Most active rapporteur 197 l. 77 l. -61% 
Conseiller "écoutant" 28 l. 77 l. +175% 
Average per conseiller 56 l. 77 l. +37% 
 
*: incomplete data for the Tournelle. 
 
  Epices actually received in 
December 1637 
Reform of the Tournelle 
  Amount Difference 
Grand Chambre 
Most active rapporteur 202 l. 162 l. -20% 
Conseiller "écoutant" 65 l. 94 l. +44% 
Average per conseiller 130 l. 130 l. +0% 
Tournelle* 
Most active rapporteur       
Conseiller "écoutant"       
Average per conseiller       
1ere chambre des 
Enquêtes 
Most active rapporteur 153 l. 108 l. -29% 
Conseiller "écoutant" 31 l. 47 l. +51% 
Average per conseiller 61 l. 61 l. +0% 
2e chambre des 
Enquêtes 
Most active rapporteur 197 l. 125 l. -37% 
Conseiller "écoutant" 28 l. 41 l. +46% 
Average per conseiller 56 l. 56 l. +0% 
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CHAPTER 6. 
SEEKING TRUTH: INTERROGER, QUESTIONNER 
 
At seven in the morning on the 23rd of June 1685, Pierre Sentenac, a twenty-five year-old carder 
from the Vivarais region,533 was ushered in the torture chamber of the Hôtel de Ville of Toulouse. As he 
sat on the “bouton”—a little stool on which the soon-to-be-tortured sat—the arrêt of the Parlement de 
Toulouse that had sentenced him to the “ordinary and extraordinary question” was read to him.534 As the 
arrêt stated, Sentenac and his alleged accomplice Simon-Pierre Vignes would be “questioned” to “learn 
from their mouth the truth” of a poisoning of which both men were suspected. François d’Ambelot, the 
capitoul and head of the municipal criminal court who was about to preside over the torture session, 
added that this sentence obliged Sentenac to “tell the truth candidly” and “reveal the authors and 
accomplices of the crime” to “satisfy his conscience and avoid the torments of the question, which are 
very great.”535 
D’Ambelot’s opening remarks on the arrêt of the Parlement were brief but ominous. They also 
made clear that magistrates explicitly identified judicial torture as a knowledge practice aimed at 
uncovering truth. As this contemporary understanding of torture and of its judicial uses suggests, the 
practice offers a prime site of investigation of the early-modern transformation of judicial conceptions of 
truth.  Because my analysis of judicial torture is guided by this broader interest for the early-modern 
genesis of a judicial epistemology, my approach differs from that of the already numerous studies on this 
topic. Many of those studies are rich and valuable, but because their interests generally lie beyond or 
                                                      
533 The Vivarais region corresponds roughly to today’s département of Ardèche. 
534 ADHG 1B 3767, June 22, 1685. 
535 “Ledit sire d’Ambelot, chef du concistoire lui auroit représenté  que (…) ont esté condemnés par le susd. arrest 
du jour d’hier a estre mis et appliqués a la question ordinaire et extraodinaire pour sçavoir la verité de tous les 
complices desd. empoisonnements, ce quy le doit obliger pour la descharge de sa consience de dire ingenuement la 
veritté, descouvrir les autheurs et complices desd. crimes et par la il satisfaira a sa consiance, et esvitera le 
tourment de la question quy est très grand.” ADHG, 2B 2899, Verbaux de question donnée à Pierre Centenac et à 
Simon Pierre Vignes dit Laroche (June 23, 1685). 
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beside the question of the development of judicial forms of truth, they tend to strip torture from its 
epistemological dimension.  
Working specifically on judicial torture in early-modern Toulouse, Lisa Silverman approached 
this question by focusing on paralegal sources that document contemporary conceptions of pain and its 
meaning.536 Her answer was that the magistrates kept using judicial torture well into the eighteenth 
century because they still held the belief that truth resided in the body and could be extracted from it 
through pain. Silverman’s argument that magistrates kept using torture because it still made cultural sense 
to them serves as a rejoinder to legal historians and their older interpretation of the abolition of judicial 
torture in the eighteenth century. John Langbein, for instance, saw the abolition of torture in the second 
half of the century (1788 for the question préparatoire in France) not as a victory of the Enlightenment 
but as a late legal recognition of the fact that, in practice, the use of judicial torture had long become 
anecdotal.537 Based on a study focused almost exclusively on legislative sources, Langbein’s explanation 
of this transformation in practice was that reforms of the criminal procedure (such as the code criminel of 
1670) had allowed judges to circumvent the law of proof, thereby making judicial torture an obsolete 
truth-seeking practice. Indeed, by instituting disguised capital punishments—such as sentences to the 
galleys—that did not require a full proof (that is, in most cases, a confession), new laws in the second half 
of the seventeenth century had made torture useless.  
My focus on torture as a judicial practice allows me to offer a third view that partakes of these 
two interpretations while questioning them both. Langbein is certainly correct to point out that the 
criminal reforms of the seventeenth century had largely made the law of proof irrelevant and one would 
be hard pressed to offer another explanation of the correlation between the surge in sentences to the 
galleys and the decrease in the use of judicial torture. I do not question this correlation but I further argue 
that the magistrates did not need the reform of 1670 to circumvent the law of proof. Magistrates had used 
sentences to the galley to do so long before the new code criminel, but that they nonetheless kept 
                                                      
536 Silverman, Tortured Subjects : Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France, . 
537 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof : Europe and England in the Ancien Régime, . 
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resorting to torture before and after the reform, because it fulfilled a specific epistemological role. On this 
point, my analysis is sympathetic to Lisa Silverman’s question about the continued use of judicial torture 
after 1670 and her hunch that this declining but surviving use must be explained by the fact that torture 
still made “cultural sense” to the magistrates. My interpretation however, differs from Silverman’s in that 
I argue that judges kept resorting to judicial torture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not 
because they still conceived it as a viable truth-seeking practice but because they had turned it into a 
truth-asserting practice appropriate to deal with specific cases that were statistically very rare when 
compared to the daunting mass of trials that did not resort to this practice.  
 Based on an analysis of the documents of practice rather than paralegal sources concerning pain 
and its meaning, my interpretation does not question that judicial torture was an instrument of state power 
exercised on individuals’ bodies. Judicial torture was a technology of power worked upon the bodies of 
royal subjects, but as my study of the trial that led to the torture of Sentenac and Vignes demonstrates, 
torture was also an instrument of a subtler but equally powerful apparatus. If torture was a crude—albeit 
statistically anecdotic—illustration of royal attempts to monopolize violence, it was also integral to a 
judicial procedure and a system of practices that underlay royal attempts to monopolize truth, both in acts 
and in discourses. 
 
The journey of Sentenac and Vignes to the torture chamber (“salle de la géhenne”) of the Hotel 
de Ville of Toulouse had begun far away from Toulouse and long before that morning of June 1685. It 
had begun more than a year before and some 270 miles away, in the most remote corner of the ressort of 
the parlement de Toulouse, in the town of Baix in Vivarais. On May 15, 1684, Madeleine Dupont, wife of 
the lord of Massillan, captain of the town of Baix, sent an urgent request to the sénéchal of Nîmes, some 
80 miles south. Her husband, her children, her whole household, and herself had been poisoned three 
times between May 8 and May 9, and her husband had died on the following day. The murder of a 
nobleman—moreover an officer in the king’s army—was a serious matter that would have in and of itself 
called for a rapid answer on the part of the sénéchal. The royal judge was further prompted to act swiftly 
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because the assassination of this catholic aristocrat had taken place in a predominantly protestant region at 
a time of increasing hostility and suspicion toward the reformed subjects of the king.538  Thus, upon 
receiving Dupont’s request on May 15, the sénéchal immediately appointed and dispatched a commissaire 
who had already arrived in Baix to begin his investigation on the evening of May 16. The sire de Nouy’s 
investigation would eventually lead to the use of judicial torture on which I focus in this section. 
I use this case as a thread for my analysis of torture as a judicial knowledge practice for several 
reasons. First, this case seems to conform to the legal expectation that the decision to torture be dictated 
by the type of crime investigated: a hidden and premeditated crime that seemed to offer no absolute proof 
against any of the suspects. This case, however, is also particular in that it complicates this simple 
connection between the use of judicial torture and a lack of evidence. Although Sentenac and Vignes 
were the only ones tortured in the course of the trial, they were not the only suspects and they were not 
even the suspects against whom the judges had the strongest “presumptions”—a legal term to which I will 
return below. The Parlement released other suspects—all employees in the Massillan household—
whereas another one, Antoine Chovin, was sentenced to death and executed without being “questioned,” 
despite the fact that the court had no more absolute proof against him than against Sentenac and Vignes. 
Another valuable particularity of this case is its extensive documentation that allows me to re-investigate, 
not the poisoning of the lord of Massillan, but the attitude of Samuel de Fermat, the conseiller whom the 
Parlement de Toulouse had appointed rapporteur of the case.539 In charge of reviewing the trial that had 
been appealed from the court of the sénéchal of Nîmes, Fermat based his recommendation to execute 
Chovin and torture Sentenac and Vignes on a dossier that is still complete in today’s archive.540 Produced 
for the most part during the trial in Nîmes, this 357 folio-long dossier includes the complaints, requests, 
                                                      
538 Janine Garrisson, L'Edit de Nantes et sa Révocation. Histoire d'une intolérance, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985 ; 
Roger Grossi, ed. La Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes dans les Cévennes et le bas-Languedoc (Nîmes: Editions 
Lacour,1986). ; Elisabeth Labrousse, "Une foi, une noi, un roi?" La Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes, Genève and 
Paris: Labor and Fides Payot, 1985. 
539 For a detailed analysis of the rapport and the role of the rapporteur, see Chapter 7. 
540 ADHG, 2B 2899 (sac-à-procès, 1684-1685). 
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autopsy, medical reports, interrogations, sentences of the first instance as well as a detailed record of the 
torture of Sentenac and Vignes during the appeal trial in Toulouse. 
One of the most intriguing documents in this dossier is the “conclusions” of the procureur du roi 
(the public prosecutor) in the court of the sénéchal in Nîmes. One of the duties of this magistrate was to 
review the documents produced in the course of the commissaire’s investigation in Baix to recommend a 
sentence to the sénéchal. This recommendation is particularly precious because, unlike the later rapport 
of Samuel de Fermat to the Parlement de Toulouse, it has left a documentary trace that reveals the details 
of a judicial reasoning behind the decision to torture (or not to torture) suspects.  The procureur’s 
reasoning demonstrates that, as previous studies of judicial torture have suggested, this decision was 
informed by a specific “law of proof” that subjected the use of torture to legal requirements derived from 
Roman law.  The basic requirement of this law of proof was that a criminal conviction could only be 
established on the basis of a confession of the accused or the testimony of two eyewitnesses. These were 
demanding requirements, designed to protect innocents from harsh criminal punishments by eliminating 
as much as possible the arbitrary of the judge from judicial decisions. As John Langbein noted, these very 
constraining standards of proof were effective in most criminal cases for the great majority of crimes were 
committed in anger and in public and thus often led to confessions and/or the testimony of at least two 
eyewitnesses.  541 The most serious and obvious difficulty was raised when judges had to deal with the 
small number of crimes that had been premeditated and committed in secret. Following the Roman 
example, judicial torture was the legal solution adopted to deal with those few criminal cases that were 
deemed especially vicious but which the standards of proof made almost impossible to prove. Thus, when 
a “full proof” (confession or testimony of two eyewitnesses) was lacking, a suspect could be tortured if 
two conditions were fulfilled: that the crime could carry a blood sentence (the death penalty or a 
mutilation) and that at least a “half proof” could be gathered against him or her. This “half proof” could 
be literally half of a “full proof” (i.e. one out of two eyewitnesses) or a collection of indirect evidence that 
                                                      
541 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof : Europe and England in the Ancien Régime, . 
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amounted to “strong presumptions” against the suspect. In theory, this law of proof was rather 
constraining for the judge, who was left some discretion in the evaluation of how strong presumptions 
were and whether they amounted to a “half proof.”  
The recommendation of the procureur in Nîmes largely confirms that magistrates were keenly 
aware of the practical implications of this constraining law of proof and of the connection between its 
requirements and the use of judicial torture. As the procureur pointed out in his conclusions to the 
sénéchal, “it is not easy on the basis of this dossier to discover who the real authors of the crime are, for 
this crime of poisoning is usually committed with much premeditation and its proof is very difficult to 
bring about, for it can only be extracted from clues and presumptions because this crime is made without 
noise and without the help of anyone.”542 The procureur went on to illustrate this general difficulty with 
the specific circumstances of the case under review, framing his conclusions in terms of the presumptions 
that weighed against the suspects. The most elementary presumption was against all the domestics of the 
house, for the lord of Massillan, his wife and their children had been poisoned by three meals that had 
been prepared in their house. This presumption however was merely “a suspicion that obliged the 
commissaire to arrest them all” but that “was not sufficient to bring about the slightest condemnation 
against them.”543 As the procureur noted, this presumption was further weakened by the fact that “all the 
said domestics have been sick from the poison because they ate either the meat or the broth.”544  There 
were “violent presumptions” against one of them however, for Antoine Chovin had made the second and 
third broth in which a doctor had found arsenic. In addition, Chovin’s “answers [to the commissaire’s 
questions] seem[ed] to make him look guilty”:545 he confessed that he got sick only two days after all the 
                                                      
542 “(…) il est mal aizé de developer dans ceste procedure quelz sont les veritable autheurs de ce crime neanmoins 
comme led. empoisonnement se cometoit d’ordinaire avec beaucoup de premeditation la preuve (…) ne se peut tirer 
que par des indices et des presomptions par ce que le crime se faict sans bruict et sans secours d’autruy.” ADHG, 
2B 2899, Document SS (January 25, 1685). 
543 “(…) ce soubson quy a obligé le comissaire a les arrester et les faire respondre n’est pas suffizant pour operer la 
moindre condempnacion contre eux (…)” Ibid. 
544 “(…) d’autant mieux que tous les susd. domestiques ont esté mallades dud. poizon pour avoir mangé de viande 
ou bien du bouillon (…)” Ibid. 
545 “Ses responces mesmes semblent le rendre coulpable (…)” Ibid. 
 257 
others, that he refused to taste the second broth “under the pretext that it was a day of prayers and 
abstinence,”546 and he admitted to taking orvietan—an herb that alleviated the effect of arsenic—while he 
was still in good health, thereby suggesting that he knew that the broth he had made and had to taste on 
Monday morning was poisoned. The procureur’s review of Chovin’s case thus seems to be a perfect 
illustration of the judicial arithmetic that the law of proof required in theory. It clearly shows how 
suspicions and clues were added to form presumptions which were accordingly categorized and labeled 
with a gradation of adjectives: “feeble,” “strong,” “vehement,” “violent.” 
The procureur’s opinion, however, also illustrates how other, less formal considerations and 
more generally the arbitrariness (“arbitraire”) of justice officials informed their decision to torture or not 
to torture a suspect. Typically, those extra-legal elements came into play when added presumptions 
reached the critical threshold at which they could turn into the “half proof” required to sentence a suspect 
to torture. The procureur reminded the judge that the first half of the requirement to torture was already 
fulfilled in this case, for poisoning, “because of its enormity,” was a capital crime and as such justified the 
use of torture. The procureur’s reference to the Digest on this point (“et quia aliter veritas haberi non 
potest nisi per tormenta”)547 reveals that magistrates were not only aware of the Roman origins of this 
criminal epistemology, but also consciously utilized the authoritative weight of this legal monument of 
antiquity to justify torture. As for the second half of the requirement to torture, however—the need for 
presumptions that amounted to “half proof”—, the procureur introduced unexpected considerations. 
Indeed, the procureur undermined the factual content of the incriminating evidence against Chovin by 
situating it on the background of an extenuating psychological portrait of the suspect. This psychological 
sketch was not produced through a specific evaluation conducted by an independent expert—if such an 
expertise had existed then—, but by the magistrate himself, based on the legal instruments of the case. 
Thus, the magistrate used documents that were geared toward the establishment of facts, not an 
                                                      
546 “(…) il ne fit que gouter le bouillon soubz pretetexte que c’estoit un jour de rogations et d’abstinance (…)” Ibid. 
547 Ibid. The actual phrase in the Digest (48.18.9, De quaestionibus) reads “sed si aliter veritas inveniri non possit 
nisi per tormenta, licet habere quaestionem” (“but if the truth cannot be discovered otherwise than by torment, it is 
permissible to use the question”), which suggests that the procureur du roi cited from memory. 
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assessment of psychological portraits. Having detailed how Chovin’s “very answers make him look 
guilty,” the procureur observed, however, that “Chovin speaks with so much naiveté in all his answers 
and expresses such surprise at the unfortunate accident that befell to this whole family, that it is 
impossible that he had any part in this crime.”548 Despite the violent presumptions against Chovin then, 
the procureur concluded that “there was no reason to condemn him to any punishment, not even to the 
question.”549 Thus, the opinion of the procureur was that, in this case, the naivety of the suspect canceled 
the strength of presumptions which, despite having been deemed “violent,” did not amount to a half 
proof. He made this point clear when he concluded that torture could not be imposed because “there must 
be a half proof, which cannot be found in the inquests performed against this suspect.”550 
  The procureur also described the presumptions against Pierre de Sentenac, servant of the Sire de 
Vercloses, as “violent presumptions.” Similarly as well, his analysis of the suspect’s attitude in the course 
of his interrogations served as the litmus test to decide whether or not those “violent presumptions” 
amounted to the half proof necessary to torture him. In the case of Sentenac however, the procureur’s 
interpretation of the form of his answers (as opposed to their content) led him to conclude that the 
presumptions against him amounted to a half proof. The incriminating elements against Sentenac were 
very different from those against Chovin. Jean Aulion, a merchant of Baix had testified that in 1683, 
about a year before the poisoning, as he was traveling back to Baix with Sentenac from the fair in 
Beaucaire, Sentenac had showed him a little package “folded in a roll of paper” and had told him that “if 
he ate what was inside he would soon be dead.”551 Aulion further testified that when he asked him if it 
was arsenic, Sentenac answered that “there existed other things, finer than arsenic.”552 Finally, when 
                                                      
548 “Chovin parle avec tant de naiveté dans toutes ses responces et tesmoigne tant de surprize dans le facheux 
accident ou estoit tombée toute ceste famille qu’il n’est pas possible qu’il aye aucune part aud. crime (…).” Ibid. 
549 Ibid. 
550 “(…) il faut qu’il y aye une demy preuve ce quy ne se trouve pas dans les procedures faictes contre le prevenu.” 
Ibid. 
551 “[Sentenac] sortit de sa poche un paquet plié dans un rouleau de papier et dit a l’accuzé [i.e. Aulion] de deviner 
ce que s’estoit, lequele luy dit qu’il n’en sçavoit rien et pour lors led. valet lui respondit que s’il en mangeoit il 
l’auroit bien tot fait mourir.” Ibid., Document CC (May 30, 1684). 
552 Ibid. 
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Aulion asked Sentenac if he was carrying this poison on behalf of his master, the Sire de Vercloses, 
Sentenac had answered that he was not. This testimony was enough to arrest Sentenac but it was, on its 
own, a very weak presumption: the episode took place a long time before the poisoning, Aulion had 
actually not seen any poison, and Sentenac was nowhere near the house of the sire de Massillan when the 
poisoning was committed. Two other elements, however, made this testimony much more incriminating. 
First of all, while Sentenac was being held prisoner in the castle of La Voulte near Baix, his father came 
to see him. Denied entrance, he asked the gatekeeper Jacques Methon to give a message to his son. 
Methon passed on the message to Sentenac: the sire de Vercloses, his master, had written to the intendant 
of Languedoc to ask for his release and in the meantime he should acknowledge that he had brought a 
package from Beaucaire, but that it only contained tobacco. Finally, Sentenac’s master, the Sire de 
Vercloses, was the one who could have benefited from the crime. Indeed, and as the procureur pointed 
out, if the whole family had died from the poisoning, Vercloses would have inherited all their property for 
he was Madeleine Dupont’s son from a previous marriage. 
Interestingly, however, this last element was technically not a presumption against either 
Sentenac or his master—for this genealogy did not appear anywhere in the legal documents produced 
during the investigation. Even more interestingly, it appears that the procureur felt bound by this 
technicality, for he did not treat the genealogy of Vercloses as a presumption against Sentenac in his 
conclusions. Instead, he strictly circumscribed the factual basis of his legal reasoning to the elements 
contained in the judicial dossier. It is as if this genealogy that made Vercloses sole heir to the family’s 
entire succession was an obvious incriminating fact that had no actual evidentiary force because judicial 
proceedings—that is, the lawyers acting for the litigants—had failed to turn it into a legal statement of 
fact. By the time the procureur mentioned the relation between Vercloses and Dupont in his conclusions, 
he had already argued—based on a psychological reading of Sentenac’s answers—that his interrogations 
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were “a proof that is not strong enough to absolutely prove him guilty of the poisoning, but powerful 
enough to apply him to the question [i.e. have him tortured].”553 
As in the case of Chovin, what seemed to matter most in the procureur’s reasoning was not so 
much the content of the suspect’s answers as the context and modalities of their utterance. Commenting 
on Sentenac’s answer that he had carried a package of tobacco, the procureur wrote that “the way in 
which he remembered it, reveals that he is guilty and that he disguises the truth.”554 In addition, the 
procureur pointed how Sentenac’s answers became convoluted when further asked about this package of 
tobacco. Instead of declaring plainly that the package contained tobacco, Sentenac said that his master 
had told him to put it “in his office, in the bag in which he kept his tobacco.”555 Sentenac added that “he 
believed that it was tobacco because he found a little bit of it in his pocket, but that there could have been 
tobacco at both ends of the package and poison in the middle.”556 In the procureur’s opinion, those 
convoluted answers “reveal[ed] that he ha[d] brought poison from the fair in Beaucaire by order of his 
master.”557 When one goes back to the record of Sentenac’s interrogations, however,—the same record 
the procureur used to draft his conclusions—nowhere did the suspect actually confess to carrying poison 
nor to having received an order to do so from his master. The procureur, however, not only presented this 
as truth, but added to hammer this point that “he confessed it when he realized that he could no longer 
avoid it and that he had believed he could protect himself by saying that it was tobacco as his father had 
suggested while he was in jail.”558 Thus, the procureur had transformed Sentenac’s answers into a 
confession that the suspect never gave.  
                                                      
553 “(…) ceste preuve quy n’est pas assez forte pour le convaincre absolument de cest empoisonnement est assez 
puissante pour le faire appliquer a la question (…)” Ibid., Document SS (January 25, 1685). 
554 “[il] confesse d’avoir porté un paquet de tabac d’une mémoire quy faict connoistre qu’il est coulpable et qu’il 
deguize la verité (…)” Ibid. 
555 Ibid. 
556 “(…) il croit que c’estoit du tabac par ce qu’il s’en respandit un peu dans sa poche mais qu’il y auroit peu avoir 
du tabac aux extremités du paquet et au millieu du poizon.” Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
558 “(…) il ne l’a advoué que lhors qu’il a veu qu’il ne pouvoit l’esviter et qu’il a creu se mettre a couvert en disant 
que c’estoit du tabac comme son pere luy avoict inspiré dans la prison.” Ibid. 
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There is nothing shockingly surprising in this kind of judicial (re)framing, but there is an 
intriguing paradox in the procureur’s review of both Chovin’s and Sentenac’s cases. In both cases indeed, 
the procureur resorted to a legal requirement of the procedure (the requirement to base one’s conclusions 
solely on the documents of the case) to overcome a difficulty raised by another legal requirement of the 
procedure (to follow a strict law of proof that was meant to keep the “intimate conviction”—“conviction 
intime”—of the magistrate in check). John Langbein suggested that the high standards of proof of the 
inquisitorial procedure adopted in the twelfth century to replace the ordeals and judicial duels of the 
accusatorial procedure, were meant to absorb the cultural shock that came with the substitution of men to 
God as judge of human conflicts.559 The requirement of either a confession or two eyewitnesses to 
condemn a criminal to a capital sentence was meant to eliminate the discretion of judges from the 
conviction of criminals and thus deny that magistrates had appropriated the divine power to judge. 
Similarly, but more problematically, the requirement of a half proof to sentence a suspect to torture was 
meant to protect innocents from the arbitrary proclivities of judges. Obviously—and as the differences 
between the review of Chovin’s and Sentenac’s cases highlight—judges’ discretion could creep back in, 
through the gray area offered by the evaluation of what constituted a half proof. 
The study of practice, however, reveals that magistrates seemed to have felt obligated to give a 
legal form and content to their inner and subjective convictions—a point that eludes studies of legal 
theories and normative sources. The procureur in Nîmes did not simply write to the judge that Chovin 
should be spared because he was too simple-minded to be guilty and Sentenac should be tortured because 
he might have transported poison by order of a master who happened to be the sole heir of those 
poisoned. Or rather, the procureur did write this, but framed his reasoning not on the basis of common lay 
knowledge—“Chovin is a simpleton,” “the sire de Vercloses could have inherited the whole thing,”—but 
on the sole legal basis of the documents contained in the judicial dossier. Why did the procureur feel 
compelled to do so when his “conclusions,” a secret and non-binding opinion, did not need to be cloaked 
                                                      
559 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof : Europe and England in the Ancien Régime, . 
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with the appearance of a strict compliance to procedure? I argue that the procureur did not actually 
struggle to “legalize” an inner conviction that he knew to be problematically subjective, but that his inner 
conviction was “legal” all along, for it was matured through the filter of a judicial epistemology acquired 
by practice. 
If we subject the final product of the procureur’s reasoning—his official conclusions to the 
sénéchal—to a reverse-engineering of sorts, we can work our way back to the epistemology that molded 
this formal document. This, in turn, can help us elucidate some of the traits of the epistemology that 
informed torture as a judicial knowledge practice. While legal requirements did shape this epistemology, 
other non-legal standards and ways of knowing came into play. As I suggested above, although the 
procureur based his reasoning on elements strictly drawn from documents that had legal validity in this 
case (i.e., documents that had been added to the dossier), the interpretive method of a rudimentary 
psychological analysis rather than the deductive method advocated by legal treatises informed the logic of 
his conclusions. The goal of those rudimentary psychological portraits is akin to that of judicial torture 
itself: to try and discover truth by supplementing a lack of absolute proof (confession and/or 
eyewitnesses). Those psychological analyses attempted to displace the area of investigation from an inner 
subject—a location where truth resided but eluded the judicial gaze—to the outside of this subject—the 
visible envelope that was immediately accessible and could be read directly for signs of the truth it hid. 
The methodology employed was that of observation: magistrates scrutinized external signs, not for 
themselves, but in order to reveal what lay beneath their surface and would otherwise remain invisible or 
inaudible.  Thus, the content of the suspects’ answers is less relevant than their form: Chovin might be 
saying that he prepared the broth where arsenic was later found, but what mattered most, according to the 
procureur’s reading, was what the statement revealed about a suspect who was so candidly confused that 
he did not seem to realize that he was incriminating himself. Likewise, Sentenac might be saying that he 
transported tobacco from Beaucaire to Baix. What mattered, however, was that his answers appeared to 
vary, an instability that could be interpreted as an outward and uncontrolled manifestation of a guilty 
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conscience. Thus, psychological analyses could serve to either incriminate or clear: it could reveal a crime 
that the suspect either ignored because he was innocent or tried to hide because he was guilty. 
This judicial strategy that consisted in displacing the area of inquiry onto the individual was not 
new at all at the end of the seventeenth century. Resorting to interpretations of rudimentary psychological 
portraits to operate this displacement, however, was an early-modern development. The use of this 
particular interpretive methodology was indeed a substitute to an ethics-based methodology that had 
broken down at the end of the Middle Ages. How can we explain this shift from reputation-based moral 
portraits to observation-based psychological portraits? In her study of eyewitnessing in sixteenth-century 
France, Andrea Frisch proposed that the disintegretation of a medieval communal model explains why the 
ethics-based methodology broke down.560 According to Frisch, as geographical and social mobility 
increased in the fifteenth and sixteenth century and the development of the appeal procedure extended 
royal judges’ control over communities that were always more distant and unknown, local, community-
based, moral assessments appeared more and more to the magistrates as an untrustworthy basis to 
establish truth. This explanatory model probably holds some validity on a general level, but I would argue 
that the breakdown of this medieval complex of moral and communal values affected the knowledge 
practices of the judges in a more indirect way. Rather than a conscious concern over the reliability of the 
ethical assessments of communities that seemed increasingly distant from the judges—both spatially and 
culturally—the cause of the epistemological shift is to be found in the way in which early-modern “limits 
to the social invention of identity”561 affected conceptions of truth, and more particularly judicial 
conceptions of truth. 
                                                      
560 Andrea Frisch, The invention of the eyewitness : witnessing and testimony in early modern France, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004, 82. 
561 Zemon-Davis, ""On the Lame"," 602 ; "Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France," in 
Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas Heller, 
Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. For an analysis congenial to that 
of Zemon-Davis but with a focus on literary manifestation of Renaissance anxiety over shifting social identities see 
Stephen Greenblatt, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, ed. Patricia 
Parker and David Quint, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.  
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This shift may be best understood by a comparison between the 1685 case and an early fifteenth-
century trial, also for poisoning, also judged in appeal by a provincial parlement. The comparison 
between the two cases, very similar despite the two centuries and half that separate them, illuminates both 
the change in the nature of the portrayals of suspects in judicial proceedings—from moral to 
psychological portraits—and the changing judicial uses to which those portraits were put to—from ethical 
to epistemological function. The 1423 case judged in appeal by the Parlement de Poitiers was similar to 
the 1685 case in many respects: the poisoning was performed during a dinner in the house of noble 
victim, consequently servants were suspected, and the motivation behind the assassination seemed to be 
linked to a question of inheritance.562  Similarly as well, there were “strong presumptions” against some 
of the suspects but no eyewitness and no confession. And similarly again, the judges sought to 
supplement this lack of absolute proof by displacing their inquiry onto the persons of the suspects. But the 
1423 conseillers in Poitiers did so in a way that differed significantly from that used by the procureur in 
Nîmes in 1684: instead of scrutinizing the suspect himself for external signs or attitudes that might reveal 
his hidden guilt or innocence, they sought to establish a moral portrait based on the testimonies of worthy 
members of the local community to which the suspect belonged. Thus, fifteenth-century judges already 
invoked something external to the suspect to uncover a truth supposedly hidden within him or her. The 
displacement from this elusive inner subject to a more apprehensible outside, however, was performed in 
a way that differed significantly from that revealed in the conclusions of the procureur in 1684. In 1423, 
the magistrates focused on a different aspect of the suspect’s individuality—on his reputation in a very 
general sense rather than on his particular attitude in the specific case at stake—and maybe more 
importantly, it limited the role of the judges themselves in establishing the portrait of the suspect. 
Indeed, the moral portrayal of the suspect was not established by the magistrates; it was brought 
forth by the lawyers on the basis of testimonies collected within the local community. This moral, 
incriminating portrayal of the suspect only gathered its full judicial weight when presented in a dyptic 
                                                      
562 Guillaume Ratel, ""Que le droit du roi soit gardé." Les plaidoiries des gens du roi aux parlements de Paris et 
Poitiers de 1418 à 1436" (Thèse pour le diplôme d'archiviste paléographe, Ecole nationale des chartes, 2001), II, 13-
44. 
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with the opposite portrayal of the victim. Lawyers on both ends of the lawsuit would adopt this same 
strategy—angelism toward the client, stigmatization of the opponent—for judicial truth appeared to reside 
in the imbalance between the moral capital of the litigants: the wider the reputation gap, the more evident 
the truth of the case. Thus, according to Guillaume Le Tur, counsel for the widower and avocat du roi—
that is, like the 1685 procureur in Nîmes, one of the gens du roi, a representant of the public 
prosecution—Jean Le Chat, the principal suspect in the poisoning, was “tricky and shrewd” (“caut et 
subtil”),563 “shrewd and mischievous,” “blinded by covetousness.”564 In addition to the fact that this 
portrayal appears to be moral rather than psychological, maybe the most interesting difference between 
this assessment and that of Chovin or Sentenac in 1685, was that this representation was not based on the 
magistrate’s interpretation of the suspect’s behavior within the strictly delimited context of the 
proceedings, but appeared to echo a community-based assessment of the general character of the suspect. 
This difference between the 1423 and the 1685 cases is even starker when one considers that 
neither the accusation or the defense in 1423 seemed to be too preoccupied with what would later appear 
as elementary factual elements. The fact that the 1423 victim was pregnant at the time of the poisoning 
was critical to establish the motivation behind the crime—the point of the poisoning was to get rid of a 
potential, soon-to-be-born heir—but neither Le Tur nor his opponent Jouvenel appeared to be overly 
disturbed by the floating chronology of the crime in that respect. Both parties agreed on the basic fact that 
Perrette Audiguelle and her son both died on February 17, 1423 the day she gave birth, but beyond this, it 
is not even possible to learn with certainty from either counsel when the dinner at which Perrette was 
supposedly poisoned occurred, although this point would appear crucial to us to establish the truth of the 
crime. Not only did the two counsels disagree on the dates, but even within their own argumentation, the 
chronology of events was not consistent. Le Tur said that the poisoning “happened in July” and Perrette 
“gave birth in January,” but then surprisingly added that “there are only five months between the two,” 
though he had said previously that “on (…) the day of Lent [February 17 in 1423], [she] gave birth to a 
                                                      
563 AN, X 2a 18, fol. 11v. (November 18, 1423). 
564 “(…) il est subtil et malicieux et par convoitise peut avoir esté aveullé.” Ibid., fol. 13v. (November 22, 1423). 
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child and died.”565 Jouvenel's statement, though different, is no more consistent. According to him “she 
lived about XI months after the said dinner” but, he added in his following sentence, “if the said lady was 
expecting when the said dinner occurred, it was only since about one month before.”566  
This imprecision on both sides cannot be merely the result of a hazy memory of distant events, 
since Le Tur and Jouvenel’s conclusions were pronounced on November 18 and 22, 1423 respectively, 
that is, less than eight months after Perrette’s death.  Tellingly again, common knowledge and public 
fama seem to matter more than what we would consider facts here, for Le Tur in attempting to establish 
that Le Chat knew that Perrette was expecting at the time of the dinner, does not even try to provide a 
coherent chronology in support of the idea that Perrette must have “showed” at the time of the dinner. 
Instead, Le Tur prefered the argument that Le Chat “could not ignore” that “the lady was very big at the 
time of the dinner” because that fact “was of very common knowledge.”567 Moral portraits of the kind 
established in the Parlement de Poitiers in 1423 slowly disappeared from judicial records not because 
their informants—the litigants’ local communities of origin—had become suspicious or at the very least 
untrustworthy to the judges, but because ethics itself was being superseded by knowledge as the 
foundation of the truth-seeking method of the conseillers. In the seventeenth century, the reputation of 
suspects and victims still played an important role in the judicial process, most notably when it came to 
decide on the punishment of the guilty, but its role in establishing truth had become minimal. 
The changing role of the moral assessment of the suspects in the judicial process, the replacement 
of moral portraits by observations of the suspects’ behavior in the course of the proceedings, appears 
maybe most clearly in a 1628 case. While this was not a case of poisoning it does show particularly well 
the slowly dwindling relevance of reputation to judicial truth-seeking practices between the 1423 and the 
1685 cases. On November 13, 1628 a general assembly of the chambers of the Parlement de Toulouse 
                                                      
565 Ibid. 
566 “(…) elle vescu XI mois ou environ depuis le disner dessusd. et n’eust peu porter les poisons si longtemps. Dit 
que, se au temps du disner la dame estoit grosse, se n’estoit que d’un mois ou environ” Ibid., fol. 12v. 
567 “estoit la dame fort grosse au temps du disner et ne le povoient ygnorer Anne et Le Chat car il estoit tout 
notoire” Ibid. 
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(assemblée générale des chambres)568 reviewed the case of the conseiller Guillermin who was accused of 
having forged a number of official documents to have two men released from the conciergerie (the 
prison) of the Palais.569 In this particular case, we have no reason to think that the judges would doubt the 
reliability of a community-based assessment of the moral worthiness of the suspect, for that suspect was 
one of their own—their colleague, brother, nephew, son—and they themselves were the local community 
in charge of providing this assessment. Even in this case, however, the magistrates did not rely on their 
own assessment of the reputation of the suspect to establish his guilt or innocence. This is not to say that 
reputation and moral worthiness had become completely irrelevant to the whole judicial process in the 
early-modern period, for, as this case also illustrates, reputation did matter a great deal in the formulation 
of sentences. Indeed, while Guillermin’s reputation did not help him clear his name from the crime 
investigated, it certainly helped reduce his punishment as the magistrates acknowledged candidly. As 
Malenfant noted, while Guillermin was originally suspended for six months for what the court deemed to 
be a very serious breach,570 just a month later his colleagues reinstated him purely as favor to his parents 
and allies within the court, all “persons loved and respected in the Palais.”571 Thus, reputation did not 
dramatically change in nature between 1423 and 1628: in seventeenth-century Toulouse as in the 
fifteenth-century Poitou countryside, reputation was a social good that could be shared with and 
transferred to parents, allies and clients, a precious good that could still be used to receive special 
                                                      
568 For more details about deliberation in those assemblies, see Chapter 7. 
569 Malenfant, I, fol. 199-204. For more detail about Guillermin’s case and more generally about the attitude of the 
Parlement de Toulouse vis-à-vis the crime of forgery see Guillaume Ratel, "Les conseillers au Parlement de 
Toulouse, juges et coupables de faux," in Juger le faux (Moyen Âge – Temps Modernes), Etudes et rencontres de 
l’Ecole des chartes, Paris: Ecole nationale des chartes, forthcoming. 
570 “[they] deemed it very foolhardy on the part of a conseiller who knows the secrets of the court to try and  
overturn an arrêt (…) with an interlocutory sentence not deliberated in the chamber but ordered of his own 
interested authority” (“l’entreprise fut jugée très hardie qu’un conseiller qui sçait les secrets de la cour veuille 
renverser un arrêt (…) par un appointement de requête non délibéré en chambre, mais commandée d’être appointée 
de son autorité intéressée.”) Ibid. 
571 “[Guillermin] demandoit à la Cour qu’il lui plût de le retablir en sa charge, ce que la Cour fit, non pas en vertu 
de sa requête, mais elle donna cela à ceux à qui led. Sr. de Guillermin attouche de parenté du côté de sa femme, 
petite fille de M. de Rudelle sous doyen de la Cour, de M. de Vedelli conseiller en la cour, personnes aimées et 
estimées dans le Palais ” Ibid., fol. 203. 
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treatment—whether exceptionally lenient or exceptionally harsh depending on the reputation ascribed to 
one’s community of origin. 
The main change since 1423 was that, as far as establishing guilt or innocence was concerned, 
reputation no longer seemed to play the central role it once did. In 1628 indeed, in order to establish the 
guilt or innocence of their colleagues, the conseillers relied instead on the kind of psychological analysis 
used by the procureur in Nîmes. When the conseillers summoned Guillermin to answer their questions, 
their opinion seem to have been mostly shaped by their observation and interpretation of their colleague’s 
behavior and demeanor as he answered. As Malenfant noted indeed, “the Sire de Guillermin said what he 
had previously said in the Grand Chambre, but with so much confusion and with so little self-confidence 
to make the court believe what he wanted it to believe, that the court remained in its opinion and it 
appeared certain that he had [committed the forgery].”572 As in the procureur’s interpretation of Chovin’s 
interrogations in 1685, those peripheral signs of truth and lie (here “confusion,” the lack of “assurance”) 
seemed to matter more than the actual content of the answers (which, in the case of Guillermin, the 
greffier Malenfant did not even bother writing down).   
 
To come back to the case of poisoning in Baix then, it appears that by 1685 the focus of an 
inquiry on an unmediated observation of the suspects—unmediated in the sense that it was performed by 
justice officials alone, exclusively through judicial instruments—had become the norm. More than a 
judicial distrust of a distant community, it translated an epistemological displacement that can be 
illustrated by other cases much closer to the Parlement and even by cases within the Parlement as the 
1628 example of the conseiller Guillermin reveals. I want to focus now on a significant aspect of this 
epistemological displacement: as I suggested before, the shift from reputation-based to behavior-based 
judicial portraits of suspects entailed a transfer of the control over the portrayal from the local community 
to the magistrates. This substitution reflects another important dimension of the epistemological shift: the 
                                                      
572 “[Guillermin] dit ce qu’il avoit dit en la grand chambre, mais avec tant de confusion et avec si peu d’assurance 
pour faire croire à la Cour ce qu’il vouloit qu’elle crût de lui, que la Cour demeura en cette opinion et lui parut 
certainement qu’il avoit fait appointer lad. requête pour eluder l’arrêt de la cour.” Ibid., fol. 202. 
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monopolization of judicial knowledge practices by experts. This particular shift had two main 
foundations: the magistrates’ participation in the rise of expertise as an ideology and their related efforts 
to reframe their own practices as expert practices. Again, the observation of concrete judicial practices 
will serve as our entry into an intellectual change that is otherwise difficult to pinpoint. The 
“expertization” of judicial practices can be observed in the methodology the procureur used to establish 
his quasi-psychological analysis of the suspects. My later analysis of the torture of Sentenac in Toulouse 
will help to further specify this other epistemological transformation. 
One of the intriguing features of the procureur’s portrayal of Chovin and Sentenac was that it was 
composed exclusively of elements drawn from the legal documents of the case. Further, none of those 
legal instruments were designed to help establish such portraits. The interrogations in particular, the main 
source of the procureur’s psychological analysis, were intended to establish a number of facts and 
circumstances. This was achieved through a cross-reading of all the witnesses’ and suspects’ 
interrogations that either confirmed or invalidated those facts and circumstances. The primary goal of 
those documents then, was to allow the magistrates to weave those facts and circumstances together to 
establish a synopsis of the case. This factual synopsis then served as a basis to formulate presumptions 
against possible suspects. The procureur’s conclusions confirm that those documents were used precisely 
to that end: regardless of their identity as either family-members or servants, of their particular role in the 
house, of the answers of other witnesses interrogated before them, of whether they were catholic or 
protestant, all those present in the house of the sire de Massillan at the time of the poisoning were asked 
the exact same sequence of factual questions: Who fell ill? When? Who prepared the food? Who served 
it? Did you have some of it? Did you, yourself, fall ill? Those interrogations fulfilled their primary goal of 
helping the magistrates to establish a synopsis: Durand, the cook, prepared the Sunday dinner, all those 
who ate it, including Durand himself, fell ill. Chovin prepared two broths on Monday, all those who ate 
them fell even more ill. Chovin himself did not eat the broths he had prepared. This synopsis based on the 
cross-reading of the interrogations of distinct witnesses, not on the analysis of how individual suspects 
had answered, led, as the procureur noted, to violent presumptions against Chovin. 
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The procureur, however, did not just cross-read the interrogations of witnesses and suspects to 
establish a factual synopsis. He also proceeded to cross-read the answers within the interrogations of 
those individuals whom the factual synopsis seemed to incriminate. This secondary reading had a 
different object—the suspects instead of the circumstances of the crime—but replicated the main features 
of the fact-driven cross-reading of the whole corpus of interrogations. Indeed, the psychological 
interpretation that motivated this secondary reading of individual interrogations functioned according to 
the same epistemological assumptions and methodologies as the fact-oriented cross-reading of 
interrogations. The central and common epistemological assumption was that coherence was a marker of 
truth and that, conversely, contradictions revealed the untrue. Thus, to the procureur in Nîmes, the 
coherence of Chovin’s answers, despite their self-incriminating content, revealed the simple character of 
an innocent man who spoke the truth. Conversely, the instability of Sentenac’s answers, the blanks that 
they left, were as many cracks on the surface of his persona, cracks that revealed the intricate and truly 
suspect character within. 
This particular approach to truth underlay the fabrication of the psychological portraits of the 
suspects. This fabrication, because it aimed at uncovering the true character of the suspect hence his guilt 
or innocence, was a judicial knowledge practice. It was also a judicial discursive practice in the sense that 
its methodology not only suited the magistrates’ conception of truth but also served to cast the portrayal 
of suspects as an exclusively judicial expert practice. This assertion of expertise was first achieved 
through a strict delimitation of the stock of elements that could be used to portray the suspects: only 
judicial data—that is, data recorded in the legal documents contained in the proceedings of the case—
could serve to draw a suspect’s portrait. For instance, the procureur in Nîmes established Sentenac’s 
duplicitous character solely through an observation of his shifting answers in the course of his 
interrogation in this trial. Of course, it would be naive to think that nothing external to the proceedings 
actually influenced the magistrate’s representation of the suspect. Beyond the particulars of each 
individual case, elements such as social and cultural prejudice were likely to affect’s the magistrate 
representation of a suspect. But regardless of the extent to which non-judicial elements shaped the 
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procureur’s portrayal of the suspects, the larger and more interesting point here from the point of view of 
judicial practice is that that his conclusions strived to—and succeeded— to present the portraits of Chovin 
and Sentenac as composed exclusively from elements drawn from the proceedings.  
By strictly limiting their sources to the legal documents produced in the case, magistrates 
effectively excluded others from participating in or appropriating this knowledge practice. One could say 
that this delimitation of the sources to the documents of the proceedings put a double lock, so to speak on 
the practice. The first “lock” consisted in making sure never to invite non-experts to offer their own 
assessment of the suspects’ character. For instance, while the assessment of the characters of Chovin and 
Sentenac appears to be the foundation of the procureur’s recommended resolution of the case, none of the 
witnesses interrogated in the course of the trial was ever asked explicitly about the character of the 
suspects or even implicitly invited to offer an assessment of their reputation. In addition to making sure 
that they did not open the door to competing assessments of the suspects’ character, the magistrates 
further established their monopoly over the suspects’ portrayal by turning this knowledge practice into an 
expert practice. Put simply, the expertise required to combine elements of judicial data into portraits of 
the suspects was what made this practice an expert practice. In this instance, being an expert meant 
possessing two things that non-experts lacked to engage in or appropriate the practice: physical access to 
the proceedings and intellectual access to its content. This point becomes clear when we try to work our 
way back from the procureur’s conclusions to the documents he used to compose them. It then becomes 
evident that the portraits of suspects he offers could only be achieved thanks to his position of magistrate: 
unlike non-expert contemporaries, the historian today has access to the exact same set of records used by 
the magistrate, and is thus allowed a privileged bird’s eye view of the proceedings. As becomes clear 
when one goes back and forth between the procureur’s conclusions and the corpus of judicial documents 
he reviewed, this bird’s eye view of the proceedings is the sine qua non condition of the judicial portrayal 
of suspects. Both the consistency of Chovin’s answers and the instability of Sentenac’s character can only 
be supported by a cross-reading of an extensive range of documents contained in the sac. Only the 
magistrates—and the historian—enjoyed the complete panoramic view of the case which essentially gave 
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them a monopoly over the construction and deconstruction of judicial portraits. Litigants only had a 
partial view of the case because their knowledge was exclusively confined to the small corner of 
proceedings in which they had been directly and personally involved. Thus, the first privilege of judicial 
expertise was full access to judicial sources which alone allowed one to construct and challenge judicial 
portraits.  
The magistrates’ epistemological monopoly was further asserted thanks to their actual judicial 
expertise. Indeed, having acces to the documents is of no use for one who cannot understand their content. 
Some elements such as the answers of witnesses were fairly straightforward and would have been 
comprehensible to most literate non-experts. As any historian opening his first sac-à-procès could attest, 
however, literacy and paleographic proficiency do not suffice to make sense of most of the proceedings. 
Most of those documents are far from self-evident and a young, recently appointed conseiller—like the 
inexperienced historian—would have found it difficult to unlock those judicial documents. What was 
needed to open those documents—to extract meaningful elements that could serve, for instance, to draw a 
psychological portrait of suspects—was an understanding of procedure. By procedure I do not mean 
simply the judicial procedure that was defined by law, described and commented on in legal treatises, and 
which both the inexperienced conseiller and the historian could learn through reading. I mean, more 
importantly, the practical knowledge which, acquired through experience, enables the reader to separate 
the formulaic from the specific. In that respect, the key feature of the judges’ expertise was—to use a 
phrase popularized by Carlo Ginzburg—their ability to identify the “exceptional normal” in judicial 
proceedings. Day after day, through their repeated encounters with dozens and dozens of trials, the 
magistrates developed a familiarity with the “normal normal” of routinized proceedings. It is this acquired 
sense of the stereotypical that made the exceptional normal stand out.  In the 1685 poisoning case studied 
here, most non-experts in search of the truth would look to the facts that could be established through 
testimonies and medical expertises. A professional magistrate such as the procureur in Nîmes, however, 
saw judicial value not in the factual but in the procedural: variation between the testimonies of the same 
suspect. Such variations were rare—although not exceptional—and to someone who had reviewed many 
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cases and had sentenced in many other, they were cues that marked the sites of proceedings where truth 
could be produced.  
Despite their judicial expertise, however, magistrates sometimes found themselves in situations in 
which judicial truth— not factual truth—could not be produced. In those few cases, the more truth 
seemed to remain hidden, the more judges seemed to be intent on making use of a regulatory expert 
apparatus to organize and frame the knowledge practices they resorted to. This phenomenon is especially 
visible in the practice of judicial torture. The procès verbal of Sentenac’s “questioning” suggests that the 
magistrate who led his torture was more interested in the rules and methodology of the practice than in the 
truth it was supposed to reveal. For the most part, the account of Sentenac’s torture in the archive of the 
Parlement is focused on the recording of procedural steps that both regulated the practice and displayed 
its expert nature. In a way, what seemed to matter most was not the content of Sentenac’s answers—what 
could reveal the truth of the case—but the form of his judge’s questions—what I would call the truth of 
the practice. 
This truth of the practice depended on strictly following steps that were duly noted in the records. 
In this way, judicial torture appears as a practice, which, above all, sought to assert itself as a valid 
knowledge practice. This validation of the practice through its own deployment was achieved thanks to a 
number of strict requirements. The first requirement can be called the judicial quorum of torture. Most 
analyses of interrogations and torture have emphasized the dialogical dimension of those practices by 
focusing on the exchange between two individuals: the judge and the suspect.573 As we will later see, this 
approach allows us to gain insight into the participatory role that the tortured played, paradoxically, in a 
practice that seemed bent on destroying his very subjectivity. By casting torture as a one-on-one exchange 
between tormenter and tormented however, this approach tends to mask the fact that judicial torture 
involved other actors whose presence and participation was an absolute legal requirement. When Pierre 
Sentenac entered the torture chamber on that morning of June 1685, it was a rather crowded room. In 
                                                      
573 This is most famously the case in Carlo Ginzburg’s study of the trial of Menocchio (Carlo Ginzburg, The cheese 
and the worms : the cosmos of a sixteenth-century miller, New York: Penguin Books, 1982). 
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addition to d’Ambelot, the magistrate who would eventually ask him questions, eight other individuals 
were present in the room: five other capitouls (municipal magistrates), their scribe and two assistants 
(“assesseurs”). Although those officials did not play a direct role in the questioning itself, their presence 
was essential to the validity of the interrogation. Those men participated in a triple validation of the 
procedure. The capitouls’ presence ensured the collegiality that was fundamental to judicial decision-
making. 574 The assesseurs’ role—as their title suggests—consisted in being witnesses to the practice. By 
simply being there, uninvolved in the interrogation, they objectified the practice and became, through 
their eyes and ears, living records of the torture session. Like the two eyewitnesses required in order to 
prove a crime, the two assesseurs could provide through their testimony a full proof of the truth of the 
practice they had witnessed. Like the assesseurs, the scribe recorded the interrogation, albeit not with his 
eyes and ears, but with his hands, producing a material rather than a living testimony that fixed the 
interrogation in writing—a material proof that corroborated the assesseurs’ testimony. But the scribe also 
performed what I would call a meta-validation of judicial torture, for the material testimony he produced 
also recorded the validations others provided by their physical presence. In other words, the scribe’s 
written record attested that others could attest to the validity of the practice they had witnessed. Thus, the 
presence of the capitouls and assesseurs was itself validated through its recording in writing by the 
official city scribe. By recording the number of capitouls present, their names, the identity of the 
assesseurs, and thereafter every single action of the interrogation, the scribe validated through writing all 
the validation procedures performed by others in the torture chamber. 
Before more participants entered the room—the executioner and his assistants—and before the 
actual physical torment could start, the first step of the torture session consisted in a repetition of the 
judicial process that had led the judges and the suspect to the torture chamber. As I mentioned above, the 
first thing that happened when Sentenac entered the room was the reading of the arrêt that had sentenced 
him to the “ordinary and extraordinary question.” Instead of proceeding to torture him immediately, 
                                                      
574 See Chapter 7 below. 
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however, the judges first re-validated this decision by re-enacting the judicial journey that had led to the 
judicial deadlock that torture was meant to break. The suspect was first required to swear again a sacred 
oath to tell the truth—either on God or on the gospels depending on whether he was Protestant or 
Catholic—and to state his identity, as if going through the same liminary procedures of validation that 
preceded his previous interrogations. However, not all the questions previously asked were repeated. 
D’Ambelot only reiterated those questions that had prompted the answers that founded the presumptions 
against Sentenac. Then, in the second part of the interrogation, Sentenac was asked questions of an 
entirely new kind. I argue that despite their interrogative form those were not in fact questions but 
articulations of the truth that the judges had reconstituted and that the suspect had denied. The goal of this 
second category of questions was twofold. First, it completed the re-enactment of the judicial dead-end to 
which the absence of confession had led—thereby revalidating the decision to resort to physical torture to 
hopefully evade that dead-end. It also uncovered for the first time and in a particular narrative form, the 
judicial truth of the case. In other words, it provided the suspect with a template for the confession that 
was expected of him and that could put an end to the torture session. The moment when the interrogator 
shifted from presumption-oriented questions to assertion-oriented questions was pivotal: it fused into one 
instant the double dimension of judicial torture as both a truth-seeking and a truth-speaking practice. 
This twofold, preliminary interrogation embedded in the practice of judicial torture closely 
paralleled another particular type of interrogation that immediately preceded the execution of a convict.575 
I argue that the practical similarities between those two types of interrogations reveal a connection 
between the two judicial practices—torturing and executing—under which they were subsumed. The trial 
of Chovin, Sentenac and Vignes provides an ideal documentary basis to further draw this parallel. Indeed, 
contrary to Sentenac and Vignes who were sentenced to torture in appeal, Antoine Chovin was directly 
sentenced to death. Unlike the procureur in Nîmes, Samuel de Fermat—the Toulousain conseiller who 
reviewed the case in appeal—did not see Chovin as an innocent simpleton. Fermat read the procureur’s 
                                                      
575 For more detail about this other judicial practice, see Chapter 8. 
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conclusions but must have been left absolutely unconvinced by the extenuating psychological portrait of 
Chovin that the Nîmois magistrate had drawn. So much so that Fermat advised his colleagues of the 
Chambre Tournelle—on what ground, we will never know since the conseillers’ reports to their chamber 
were not recorded—576 that torture was unnecessary and that Chovin should be sent to the gallows 
directly. This decision went down very quickly: the case was received in Toulouse on the 15th of May 
1685, and on June 7 already, without further interrogation of any of the suspects or production of any new 
document, Fermat reported the case to the Chambre Tournelle, where he and his colleagues sentenced 
Chovin to death by hanging on the place Saint Georges.577 
While it was impossible to appeal, overturn or reform this decision, Chovin was interrogated 
again, twice, on June 8, the day of his execution. Why interrogate Chovin if the procedure against him 
was definitely closed? What could his interrogation add to the case? The judges could hope that, with the 
certainty of his imminent death, Chovin would give up the names of his accomplices if he had any. And 
indeed, this was one of the questions that were asked to him on June 8. But this was only one among 
many other questions and I would argue that it was asked mainly as a matter of form. The judges had in 
fact probably little hope that Chovin would confess the crime or denounce anyone.578 More importantly, 
the judges had no legal use for either a confession or a denunciation. A confession was useless because 
                                                      
576 For more detail about this absence of record and more generally about the rapport, see Chapter 7 below. 
577 ADHG, 1B 3767 (June 8, 1685). 
578 On this point, see the skepticism or outright criticism of torture expressed by a number of conseillers more than a 
century before: Montaigne, Coras. Montaigne famously wrote: “Putting men to the rack is a dangerous invention, 
and seems to be rather a trial of patience than of truth. Both he who has the fortitude to endure it conceals the truth, 
and he who has not: for why should pain sooner make me confess what really is, than force me to say what is not? 
And, on the contrary, if he who is not guilty of that whereof he is accused, has the courage to undergo those 
torments, why should not he who is guilty have the same, so fair a reward as life being in his prospect?” (“C'est une 
dangereuse invention que celle des gehenes, et semble que ce soit plustost un essay de patience que de vérité. Et 
celuy qui les peut souffrir, cache la verité, et celuy qui ne les peut souffrir. Car pourquoy la douleur me fera elle 
plustost confesser ce qui en est, qu'elle ne me forcera de dire ce qui n'est pas? Et, au rebours, si celuy qui n'a pas 
fait ce dequoy on l'accuse, est assez patient pour supporter ces tourments, pourquoy ne le sera celuy qui l'a fait, un 
si beau guerdon que de la vie luy estant proposé?” Montaigne, Essays, II, 5). This skepticism can also be found in 
later times, expressed by less famous conseiller. For instance Guillaume de Ségla, who wrote that the “question is a 
dubious, hazardous, and uncertain thing”(“la question estoit une chose douteuse, hazardeuse, et incertaine” 
Guillaume de Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre Arrias Burdeus 
religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle Violante  de  Bats 
du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  Ségla  sieur de  
Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  Parlement de  Tholose, Paris: Nicolas La Caille, 1613, 24 ).  
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Chovin was no longer a suspect, he was a convict, in fact a dead man already, as the magistrates’ sentence 
of the day before had established. From a legal point of view, a denunciation of Sentenac, Vignes or 
anyone else was of little use at this point in the procedure: whatever Chovin knew or had seen, he was 
only one eyewitness who could thus only provide at best a half-proof against those who remained 
suspects. The judges had already determined that their presumptions against Sentenac and Vignes 
amounted to a half-proof, for this calculation was the basis of their decision to torture the two men. An 
incriminating testimony from Chovin was of little use because it could not be added to this existing half 
proof to make a full one. The obvious paradox here is that this legalistic arithmetic did not seem to apply 
to Chovin himself, for there was not a full proof against him either: he had not confessed to poisoning the 
food and no one had testified to seeing him do so. In fact, not a single person who had been interrogated 
in the course of the inquiry had even suggested that Chovin had poisoned the food. 
I argue that the function of Chovin’s interrogation between his sentencing and his execution was 
precisely to help the judges overcome that difficulty. In that sense, this final interrogation is comparable 
to that of Sentenac and Vignes in the torture chamber before their physical torment began: it primarily 
articulated the truth of the judicial practices—executing, torturing—devised to move the case forward. 
Thus, both types of interrogation sought to validate another judicial practice—torture or execution—
within which they were embedded. In that sense, those knowledge practices were also discursive practices 
of a reflexive kind: the judges used them as statements about their own practices. The interrogation of 
Chovin on the day of his execution was in that respect similar to that of Sentenac and Vignes before their 
torture: first the arrêt that had already sentenced him was read to him as a prelude to an interrogation that 
reenacted his judicial journey up to that fateful point. Again, this interrogation summarized the particular 
points on which the sentence was based. Like Sentenac and Vignes in the torture chamber, Chovin was 
first asked to take a sacred oath to tell the truth and to state his identity. He was then subjected to the same 
kind of twofold interrogation as Sentenac and Vignes. A first series of questions was meant to have 
Chovin repeat those answers—and only those answers—that grounded the judges’ presumptions against 
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him. The second set of questions, even more clearly than in the case of Sentenac and Vignes, was not 
primarily designed to obtain a confession in the nick of time.  
In the secret of the chapel of the Capitoulat where Chovin was interrogated for the first time on 
that day, it did not really matter to his case whether or not he would confess to the poisoning: as far as his 
judges were concerned Chovin was guilty since they had already declared him so in their arrêt. Rather, 
the function of this interrogation was to assert—and no longer to discuss—the judicial narrative of 
Chovin’s guilt. The two parts of the interrogation articulated this definitive narrative. The elements on 
which Chovin agreed and which served as the basis of the presumptions against him composed the first 
half of this narrative. In the second half of the interrogation the judges alone assumed the role of 
narrators. At that point indeed, their questions started to function as assertions despite their interrogative 
form. For instance, Chovin was no longer asked fully interrogative questions as in the first half of the 
interrogation (“at what time did you make the broth? Did you give it to those who were ill? Who were 
those people?”).579 Rather, this second set of questions already held its own answers that Chovin was 
expected to merely confirm or, more realistically, deny. The answers implied by this second series of 
questions were the building blocks of the second half of a narrative that the judges completed on their 
own. The first of those questions, the one that signaled that the interrogation had entered its assertive 
second half, could not be clearer and more upfront: “are you not the one who poisoned the sire de 
Marseillan and the others with those two broths?”580 From that point on, Chovin’s recorded answers were 
limited to a simple “he denied the interrogation” repeated over and over. Thus, Chovin had stopped 
playing an active role in the elaboration of the judicial narrative of a guilt that he kept denying.  
The irrelevance of Chovin’s answers is made clear by the fact that, despite his denying, his 
interrogator kept moving to the next element of his own narrative. While Chovin had just denied 
poisoning anyone, d’Ambelot disregarded the answer and went on to ask “who gave you the poison? did 
you commit the poisoning on your own out of revenge or were you prompted to do it by enemies of the 
                                                      
579 ADHG, 2B 2899, Verbal d’execution a mort d’Antoine Chauvin, cuisinier (June 8, 1685). 
580 Ibid. 
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sire de Marseillan and his family?”581 Chovin denied again, and, again, d’Ambelot kept following his 
script: “What did they promise or give you? What are the names of those people who forced you to 
commit the poisoning?” Chovin denied again but d’Ambelot kept developing what clearly appears as the 
ready-made narrative that chained together a series of questions that were only interrogative in form. 
Indeed, to further explicit who those enemies were and point in the direction of Sentenac and Vignes, 
d’Ambelot asked: “don’t you know who are the servants or other persons, your accomplices, who bought 
and sent you the poison? What are their names and residence?”582 D’Ambelot did not go on to name 
Sentenac and Vignes lest he further crossed the legal requirement that forbad magistrates to ask 
suggestive questions. Clearly, d’Ambelot more than flirted with that line during this second half of the 
interrogation, not so much because he sought to elicit a particular confession that had become legally 
irrelevant but rather in order to make the judicial narrative of Chovin’s guilt—whether Chovin confirmed 
it or not—as clear as possible. To whom then did this narrative need to be made clear? To some extent, it 
needed to be made clear to those whom we can call—to make it short for now—“the public.”583 Indeed, 
the first interrogation of Chovin on the day of his execution took place in private, in the the chapel of the 
Capitoulat, but functioned as an exact rehearsal of the interrogation that would take place in public, on the 
scaffold where he was to be hanged later on that day. I will come back to this second and public iteration 
of Chovin’s questioning when I analyze execution as a judicial practice.584  
For now, I would like to argue that the first iteration of Chovin’s questioning on that day was not 
simply a rehearsal of the judicial narrative that would later function as an explanatory prologue to the 
execution that “the public” was about to witness. More interestingly and in ways that are more difficult to 
grasp, this first utterance of the judicial narrative of Chovin’s guilt was directed at the judges themselves. 
Spoken out loud by the questioning judge, in the secret of a room where only justice officials and agents 
                                                      
581 Ibid. 
582 Ibid. 
583 I will further elucidate this question of intended "audience” and publicity of the practice in Chapter 8. 
584 See Chapter 8 below. 
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were present besides the convict, the narrative of Chovin’s guilt was to a certain extent a self-intended 
demonstration, meant to address and overcome the positivistic anxiety of a disempowered judicial power. 
That this judicial anxiety would surface precisely at moments such as these, when magistrates made a 
show of their power by using physical force to either execute or torture individuals, is not surprising. In 
fact, I would argue that those demonstrations of force were often designed to alleviate or even sublimate 
the judges’ anxiety over the imperfections and weaknesses of their own knowledge practices. The judges’ 
anxiety was caused by a failure of their own epistemology that could remain hidden from those exterior to 
the judicial process but that the magistrates themselves could not ignore. Having gone through the whole 
paraphernalia of knowledge practices available to them, the magistrates had gathered data, analyzed it, 
drawn hypotheses—which they called “presumptions”—, but they had failed to secure any conclusive 
evidence to a truth that remained based on their intuitions and framed by their prejudices. The 
magistrates’ reaction in the face of this failure was to resort to practices such as torture and execution that 
functioned as reassertions of their epistemology. This reassertion was achieved in part through a 
tautological demonstration: the imposition of a sentence in the flesh of convicts (execution) and suspects 
(torture) functioned in a way as a physical sanction of the truth that the magistrates claimed to have 
reached: Chovin was guilty because he was hanged, Sentenac and Vignes were his accomplices because 
they were tortured. 
 
In a subtler way, the reassertion of judicial epistemology was achieved through the modalities of 
the practices—torture and execution—deployed in the immediate aftermath of, and I would argue as a 
reaction to, the failure of other truth-seeking practices. Judicial torture was a practice regulated by strict 
requirements and procedures that were meant to distance the magistrate from the object upon which he 
acted—the body of the tortured—and reduce as much as possible his latitude of action, as if to assert his 
accessory and neutral role in an objective process. 
Paradoxically then, or so it would seem to a modern sensibility, the “physical stage” of a torture 
session was designed to display the features of a model knowledge practice. Although it probably seemed 
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to last for an eternity to the tortured, this stage appears to be relatively brief in the records of the court: on 
the eighty-three folios recording the two torture sessions of Sentenac and Vignes, only eleven folios 
record their actual physical torture. As the records also suggest indirectly however, this brevity of the 
sources does not necessarily reflect the brevity of the actual practice. Indeed, while both Sentenac and 
Vignes were subjected to the “ordinary” and the “extraordinary question,” those two very different kinds 
of physical torture left an equally brief trace in the records. The “ordinary question” applied to male 
suspects in Toulouse consisted in a rather complicated set up that necessitated the participation of four 
men. Two men pulled on ropes which, passed through a pulley attached to the ceiling, were tied around 
the suspect’s wrists, another man turned a wheel to which the suspect’s ankles were tied by another rope, 
and finally, once the suspect was stretched in that way, a fourth man trampled on a metal device that was 
fastened to his shins. The pain was thus incremental, produced by the combination of a slow stretching of 
the body and repeated blows on the suspect’s constricted legs. This description alone seems to suggest 
that with this “ordinary question” applications of pain were rather lengthy, a fact that appears to be 
corroborated by the number of applications the tortured could bear in the course of one session. Both 
Sentenac and Vignes could only stand being subjected twice to this “ordinary question” during their first 
session—I will come back soon to how the judges assessed that this physical limit was reached. 
As numbers suggest, the “extraordinary question” was an entirely different type of torture that 
produced a different kind of pain: Sentenac could withstand seven applications of it, and Vignes eight 
applications before the session had to be brought to an end. Sadly, we know a lot more about this second 
type of torment, because the “water question” used by the parlement de Toulouse as its extraordinary 
form of torture, has been used in a number of modern contexts—Algeria, Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile—in 
an almost identical form, and most recently at Guantanamo Bay and other U.S. detention facilities around 
the globe under the name “waterboarding.”585 These modern uses of the “water question” have produced a 
number of testimonies from both tortured and torturers that are lacking for other kinds of early-modern 
                                                      
585 Other modern uses include that by Japanese troops and the Gestapo during World War II, French troops during 
the Algerian War, U.S. troops in Vietnam, and by the Khmer Rouge against political prisoners in Cambodia. 
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judicial tortures and allow us to better grasp the practice and how it was experienced on both sides. 
Sentenac and Vignes were laid down on a tilted bench, their body stretched, their mouth kept open with 
two sticks, their face covered with a cloth through which water was poured down their throat. Their 
experience of this torture must have been very close to that described by journalist Henri Alleg who was 
tortured in the exact same way by French troops during the Algerian War: 
The rag was soaked rapidly. Water flowed everywhere: in my mouth, in my nose, all over my 
face. But for a while I could still breathe in some small gulps of air. I tried, by contracting my 
throat, to take in as little water as possible and to resist suffocation by keeping air in my lungs for 
as long as I could. But I couldn't hold on for more than a few moments. I had the impression of 
drowning, and a terrible agony, that of death itself, took possession of me. In spite of myself, all 
the muscles of my body struggled uselessly to save me from suffocation. In spite of myself, the 
fingers of both my hands shook uncontrollably. "That's it! He's going to talk", said a voice. 
The water stopped running and they took away the rag. I was able to breathe. In the gloom, I saw 
the lieutenants and the captain, who, with a cigarette between his lips, was hitting my stomach 
with his fist to make me throw up the water I had swallowed.586 
 
This “for a while,” those “few moments,” the detailed description that Alleg gave us, represent 
the tortured’s perception of a time that was in fact probably very short. Commenting on the waterboarding 
of Khalid Sheik Mohammed at Guantanamo Bay, a CIA official interviewed by ABC News reported that 
Mohammed “had won the admiration of his interrogators because it took him two-and-half minutes to 
start confessing—well beyond the average of fourteen seconds observed in others.”587 While other CIA 
interrogators denied that Khalid Sheik Mohammed had lasted that long,588 there seemed to be no question 
about the brevity of the average application of waterboarding, a fact corroborated by another testimony 
about the thirty-five seconds it took before Abu Zubaida—another Guantanamo Bay detainee—“broke 
down.”589 The memorandum written in 2002 by the Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bebee for John 
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Rizzo, then Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, confirms this estimate and 
specified:  
Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow is slightly 
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. (…) During those 20 to 40 
seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches. After this 
period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full 
breaths. (…) The procedure may then be repeated. (…)  it is likely that this procedure would not 
last more than twenty minutes in any one application.590 
A later memorandum further specified the timing of each application and of an overall 
waterboarding session: 
We further understand that in any 24-hour period, interrogators may use no more than two 
“sessions” of the waterboard on a subject—with a “session” defined to mean the time that the 
detainee is strapped to the waterboard—and that no session may last more than two hours. 
Moreover, during any session, the number of individual applications of water lasting 10 seconds 
or longer may not exceed six. The maximum length of any application of water is 40 seconds 
(you have informed us that this maximum has rarely been reached). Finally, the total cumulative 
time of all applications of whatever length in a 24-hour period may not exceed 12 minutes.591 
The seven and eight applications that Sentenac and Vignes, respectively, could withstand seem to 
be in line with those modern observations, and more generally, it seems that the timings and numbers 
given by CIA officials can be applied to the early-modern practice of the “water question” in Toulouse.  
The point to note here is that the recording of the “physical part” of a torture session is always 
brief regardless of the time the application of pain actually took, whether lengthy (ordinary question) or 
shorter (extraordinary question). This brevity of the recording of physical torture is not due to some kind 
of judicial disgust or guilt toward the application of pain. Rather, the brevity of the recording is better—
and more simply—explained by the fact that there was actually very little to record. This in turn, can only 
be explained if we do not focus exclusively on the question of pain but try to remember instead that 
physical torture was an integral part of a larger practice—judicial torture—made up of interconnected 
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stages and practices. As I have already explained above, this larger practice began with a particular kind 
of interrogation that effectively took “questioning” out of the equation of physical torture. I mentioned 
before that this interrogation functioned as a rehearsal, but in fact it did more than give a preview of a 
later verbal exchange. The interrogation pre-empted this verbal exchange that the pain experienced by the 
tortured made virtually impossible, it evacuated most of the verbal from physical torture. The verbal 
“exchange” that took place during the physical torture of the suspect was necessarily minimal because of 
the physical and mental distress of the tortured, and the preceding interrogation was meant to make the 
most out of this minimum. Thanks to that earlier interrogation, the judge did not have to utter many 
elaborate questions during the application of pain: he merely had to refer back to the questions already 
asked before the suspect was tied up. The suspect too could—or so the judge hoped—refer back to this 
earlier stage: the judicial narrative previously unfolded before him despite his denials contained the ready-
made answers that could put an immediate end to his pain. Therefore, the goal of physical torture was not 
so much, as the magistrates put it in their judgments, “to extract the truth from [the suspect’s] mouth” or, 
as some have argued by extension, to extract a truth that judges believed to be hidden in his body.592 
Rather, the goal was to bend the suspect’s body as close as possible to a breaking point at which his 
mouth would accept to repeat a truth that was already out, for it had already been spoken by the judge a 
few minutes earlier. 
This approach reduced physical torture to the bare essentials, so to speak: each application of pain 
was followed by a short question and a short answer, which is probably all that the suspect could take and 
give because of the physical and mental distress caused by pain. For instance, after Vignes underwent the 
first application of the “water question,” d’Ambelot simply “exhorted him to declare whether he was 
guilty of the poisoning and who his accomplices were.” This was a clear reference to, in fact an exact 
repetition of the interrogation that had immediately preceded Vignes’ physical torment. It was an obvious 
invitation to repeat the judicial narrative previously denied in order to avoid a second application of pain. 
                                                      
592 Silverman, Tortured Subjects : Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France, 81. 
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Instead, Vignes answered “no, and that he had said the whole truth, that he had not put the poison in the 
broth and did not know who had done it.” 593 This refusal to adopt the judge’s narrative led to a second 
application of the water question, followed by the exact same question and an even shorter answer: “he 
said he had told the truth.”594 The judge then adapted his short questions to the accumulated exhaustion 
and distress Vignes had already experienced at that point and which, hopefully, would bring him closer to 
providing the answer that was expected of him. D’Ambelot’s reference to the earlier interrogation 
remained short but became even clearer as he “exhorted [Vignes] to tell if it wasn’t true that Sentenac had 
sent the poison.” Vignes’ answer was equally short for he replied that “he only knew it by hearsay and 
that he didn’t suspect anyone.”595 With the fifth application of the water question that followed this 
denial, the limit recommended today by CIA interrogators was reached, but the early-modern judge kept 
going. From that point on however, the application of pain was not any longer followed by pointed 
questions but by the simple exhortations “to tell the truth,” and the sequence was repeated until it was 
recognized that the suspect had been pushed to his physical limit.  
While the decision to put an end to the torture session rested with the judge, the magistrate was 
not the one evaluating the physical state of the suspect. This evaluation was left to the executioner and his 
team—his servant and two guards—who informed the judge that “the water question was complete.”596 
This division of labor allowed the judge to operate within a purely judicial sphere, as removed as possible 
from the body of the suspect and the pain that was applied to it. The physical dimension of torture, its 
application, the scrutinizing of its effects on the body of the suspect, were left to a team of experts who 
specialized in pain. Conversely, those experts of pain were kept within a purely physical sphere, 
disconnected from the judicial aspect of torture, seemingly unconcerned with and unaware of the ins and 
                                                      
593 “descouvert [i.e. from the cloth that had covered his face] et exhorté de declarer s’il n’est coupable dud. 
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595 “descouvert et exorté de dire la verité sy se n’est Centenac quy a baillé led. poison, a dit ne le sçavoir que par 
ouy dire et qu’il ne soubçonne personne.” Ibid. 
596 “ayant apareu lad. question de l’eau estre complaite ainsy que led. executeur et gardes ont dit.” Ibid. 
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outs of the trial, deaf to both the questions asked and the answers provided. In the records of the court, the 
role of those men appears to be limited to applying pain when the judge required it and to repeat the 
process independently from the direction the questioning took and until they recognized that the suspect’s 
body could not withstand any more pain. 
A number of modalities and requirements were specifically designed to enforce this separation 
between experts of pain and experts of truth, thus allowing the torturer and questioner to act separately, as 
if blind to one another’s presence and practices. First, the modalities of the torture session attempted to 
limit as much as possible the amount of time the executioner’s team spent in the room together with 
justice officials. In a clear assertion of their separation from the judicial dimension of the practice, the 
executioner and his team were kept out of the room during the whole interrogation process that preceded 
the physical stage of torture. Their entrance in the room, summoned by the judge, was the sign that this 
previous stage was over and that the re-enactment of the judicial dead-end that justified the use of force 
was complete: “having seen that the said Sentenac persisted in his denial, ordered the executioner and the 
guards to enter.”597 This exclusion from the recounting of the factual elements on which the judicial 
narrative rested, was meant to ensure that the executioner and his men would remain as foreign as 
possible to the cognitive dimension of judicial torture as a practice. Of course, this exclusion was to 
remain fictional to a certain extent, for the questions asked by the judge during the physical torment of the 
suspect—despite their brevity and the ellipses that the preceding interrogation allowed—were bound to 
expose at least some specific elements of the judicial narrative that torture sought to seal. As if to both 
acknowledge and overcome this difficulty, the first thing that was asked of the executioner and his team 
upon their entrance was to swear an oath, “their hand raised to the image of the passion of Christ,” to “do 
their duty and not to reveal the secrets of justice.”598 Thus, the torture team was to act on the body of the 
suspect and remain deaf to anything but the requests of the judge to proceed or stop physical torture.  
                                                      
597 "Et voyant que led. Sentenac percistoit dans sa negative auroit esté commandé a l’executeur et gardes d’entrée 
[sic.]" Ibid. 
598 "après le serement par eux presté la main levée a la passion figurée notre seigneur auroient promis de faire leur 
devoir et ne point reveler les secrets de justice." Ibid. 
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Conversely, the judge limited his involvement in the physical torture of the suspect to his 
communication with the executioner. This communication between judge and executioner was itself 
extremely limited and sought to maintain a strict division of the torture labor between the two men. The 
goal of this division was to help the question/answer/torment cycle move along. Although the judge and 
the executioner worked toward this common goal, their respective contribution to this collaborative 
process was strictly limited to their own sphere of expertise. Thanks to a euphemism (“apply the first two 
buttons of torture”)599 the judge was able to order the executioner to begin the torture without referring to 
the specificity of the physical torment. I argue that this avoidance of specific references to the physical 
modalities of torture was not a reflection of the judge’s moral reluctance to speak of bodily torments. 
Rather, it was a manifestation of an overall attempt to maintain a separation between the cognitive and 
physical dimensions of torture in order to cast the two areas as the separate objects of two distinct fields 
of expertise. As an expert of the production and assessment of bodily pain, the executioner proceeded to 
translate the euphemistic order of the judge into physical acts: he “duly prepared Sentenac, attached him 
and elevated him” and, together with his team, began to apply the ordinary question for the first time.600 
From that point on, verbal communication between the judge and the executioner temporarily disappeared 
from the records. It did so because the verbal exchange between them was in fact suspended as it became 
unnecessary. As the executioner beat the legs of Sentenac while his valet and the guards stretched him, 
the judge could see for himself, hear for himself, that the physical torture he had not named was under 
way and that the time had come to ask his question. When Sentenac denied the guilt that was proposed to 
him in this interrogative form, a simple gesture from the judge—a nod, a movement from the hand (see 
Illustration 23 and Illustration 24)—sufficed to let the executioner know that the question/answer 
sequence was over and to proceed with the next application of pain. 
                                                      
599 "appliquer led. Sentenac aux deux premiers boutons de question" Ibid. The origin and exact meaning of the word 
"button" is uncertain. It is best translated by “application.”  
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Illustration 23: The Question (1531)601 
The judge (sitting at the table next to the scribe) appears to be gesturing to the 
executioner across the room. 
 
                                                      
601 Facsimile of a 1531 engraving in the “Bamberg Penal Code.” (New York Public Library, Mid-Manhattan Picture 
Collection/Punishmnet Torture). 
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Illustration 24: Torturae Gallicae Ordinariae (1541)602 
The judge sits in the back of the room and, as in Illustration 23, 
appears to gesture. This gesture is intended for the executioner in the 
lower right corner, the only person in the room who is looking at the 
judge at that moment.   
 
As I explained above, this cycle was repeated until the suspect had reached his physical limits. 
The judge, however, was not in charge of evaluating the physical state of the suspect, and the way in 
                                                      
602 Jean de Milles de Souvigny, Praxis criminis persequendi, elegantibus aliquot figuris illustrata, Paris: apud A. et 
C. les Angeliers, 1541, 61. 
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which the decision to stop the questioning session was reached is another illustration of the division of the 
torture labor between judge and executioner. During the second application of the ordinary question, 
Sentenac did not utter a single word because—as the judge could surely see for himself—he had fainted. 
In a rare recording of a statement from the judge on the physical state of a suspect, the scribe wrote 
down—note the direct voice—that “he did not answer anything, as it appeared to us [my emphasis] that 
he had fallen into weakness [i.e. fainted].”603 As other scribal slips of this kind in this record indicates, 
this “us” is the judge addressing the scribe, who eventually failed to systematically translate the direct 
voice of the magistrate from the rough notes taken during the torture session into the indirect voice of the 
final judicial record.604 This “we” then is d’Ambelot, and maybe by extension his fellow capitouls present 
in the room. 
Despite the judge(s) realization that Sentenac had lost consciousness, the torture session did not 
end immediately. Instead, in order to remain within their knowledge-oriented field of expertise, they 
declared out loud what everyone present already knew because the cries had stopped and the torture 
chamber was suddenly silent: that the suspect had not answered. This observation, uttered out loud and 
formally intended for the scribe, was not meant for the record only, it was also directed at the executioner 
to let him know that this question/answer sequence was complete. This was the sign that the torture 
session was moving again from an interrogation sequence to a pain sequence, in other words was passed 
from the hands of the judge to the hands of the executioner. Only then did the executioner offer his 
assessment of the physical state of suspect—an assessment that any non-expert could have made—
Sentenac had fainted—and reported to the judge that “the first two buttons of question” had been 
completed. This in turn, sent the torture process back to the judge who made the judicial decision that 
rested with him only: to end the torture session, untie Sentenac, send him back to jail and resume the 
torture on the following Monday (June 25, that is, two days later) at the same hour. 
                                                      
603 "il n’auroit rien respondu, nous ayant apareu qu’il estoit tombé en foiblesse." (Ibid.) 
604 The best illustration of those slips is when the scribe wrote “our scribe,” obviously an exact transcription of the 
judge’s words that should have been altered into an indirect voice in the final record.  
 291 
Thus, the judge and the executioner kept resorting to a regulatory template of judicial torture that 
divided the session into clearly separated sequences of questions and applications of pain. Each type of 
sequence was the exclusive territory of one expert—the judge or the excecutioner—who, alone, was 
allowed to make assessments and decisions—, even when these assessments were plainly obvious and did 
not seem to require any expertise (for instance when Sentenac had fainted and the torture session had to 
end). The most powerful illustration of the absolute respect for this alternation of sequences in the torture 
chamber is found in this quasi-Kafkaesque moment, when next to the body they had just tormented into 
unconsciousness, judge and executioner kept following a regulatory template to assess the self-evident 
fact that the session had ended. 
I argue that this stringent compliance with the rules of judicial torture was aimed at demonstrating 
the objectivity of the practice and that this demonstration was primarily directed at the judges themselves. 
This was a diversion of the original purpose of those rules which, in an earlier time, had been meant 
primarily to ensure that judicial torture functioned as an effective truth-seeking practice.605 I argue that by 
the end of the seventeenth century, while judges had come to doubt the effectiveness of judicial torture as 
a truth-seeking practice, those rules had been maintained because they ideally served the new truth-
asserting purpose of the practice. These rules indeed had the potential to manifest the objectivity of a new 
way of producing truth, not through its extraction from the body of the suspect, but through the 
articulation of an already established narrative of the guilt of the suspect.  
Maybe more fundamentally, what made the rules of judicial torture amenable to this 
epistemological repurposing—from truth-seeking to truth-asserting—was what appeared, on a quasi-
aesthetic level, as the “scientific” quality of the procedure that those rules organized. From this point of 
view, what mattered was the form of the rules of judicial torture, not their purpose. Whether the 
magistrates imagined that the rules of torture were intended to ensure the legal validity of the 
interrogation, extract truth from the body of the suspect, or assert a pre-established judicial narrative, their 
                                                      
605 Claude Gauvard, "De Grace espécial" : crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age, Publications de la 
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high degree of respect for the strict template of judicial torture gave to the practice the features of a 
careful, repeatable procedure. This empiricist cachet was furthered by the strict division of labor between 
experts that those rules produced, and by the exclusively knowledge-oriented work that this division 
entailed for the magistrate. My analysis of the torture of Sentenac and Vignes illuminated this division of 
labor between executioner and interrogator and I have further suggested that the effect of this division 
was the drawing of a clear delimitation between fields of expertise. I would argue here that this effect had 
become the main goal of torture, and explains, at least in part, that torture was maintained as a judicial 
practice after it had become clear to everyone—and primarily to the magistrates—that it was an unreliable 
truth-seeking practice. The judges’ relative lack of interest for the anwers of the tortured can be explained 
by the fact that what was at stake in the torture chamber was not the truth of the case, but the knowledge-
practices of the judges and more generally judicial epistemology. In that sense, judicial torture remained a 
truth-oriented practice for it was a self-directed discursive practice, one could almost say a narcisstic 
judicial practice, that aimed to reassert the ability of judges to discover and state the truth. 
The tortured, who, at first sight, seems to occupy center-stage, was in fact irrelevant. The truth of 
the particular case investigated did not matter much either when considered from the perspective of 
sovereign justice. Cases such as the one analyzed above were problematic, however, because they could 
suggest that, despite the conseillers’ claim about the divine origins of sovereign justice and of their 
judgment,606 truth eluded them. This was a far more serious issue than the guilt or innocence of Sentenac 
and Vignes, for it challenged very directly the absolutist ideology that underlay the theory of sovereign 
justice. Judicial torture addressed this problem for it allowed the magistrates to re-assert their 
epistemology. The strict compliance with a template that made the practice a repeatable procedure, and 
the division of labor that asserted the magistrates’ monopoly over truth-related practices, combined to 
make torture an epistemologically reassuring practice. As a truth-asserting practice judicial torture could 
not fail: in some sense, the tortured was an object, a mere accessory to the deployment of the judges’ 
                                                      
606 See Chapter 2, p. 89. 
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narrative of truth. His answers were irrelevant to the unfolding of that narrative that had been constructed 
in the private study of the judge, on the basis of a solitary review of the proceedings. The judge remained 
in control of this narrative from the beginning to the end of the torture session: what validated this 
narrative in the torture chamber was not the confession of the tortured but compliance with the rules of 
torture, the strict following of the template that the assesseur witnessed and which the scribe seemed to 
record more precisely than the words of the suspect.  
Thus, torture was still used at the end of the seventeenth century because it did make cultural 
sense to the judges as Silverman argued. It did make cultural sense, however, not primarily as a truth-
seeking practice congenial with the magistrates’ culture of pain, as Silverman argued, but as a truth-
producing practice that fit the judges’ evolving professional epistemology. As the study of practice 
reveals, judicial torture related to truth in more than one way. At the end of the seventeenth century, it 
remained in theory and on the surface a truth-seeking practice. Its organization around sequences of 
questions and answers made it seem like a practice geared toward the discovery of truth, a discovery 
founded upon extraction from the suspect. Several elements in the case reviewed here, however, suggest 
that this truth-seeking dimension of the practice was—or had become—secondary at the very least. My 
analysis of the interrogations under torture of Sentenac and Vignes showed indeed that the suspects’ 
answers were secondary, if relevant at all to the progress of the torture session. The answers of the 
tortured did not seem to bear in any way on the course of a questioning that remained focused on 
developing a particular narrative of Sentenac and Vignes’ guilt. 
In that respect, the questioning of Sentenac and Vignes under torture is similar to the 
interrogation which Chovin underwent twice on the day of his execution. This similarity is the first sign 
that all three men were in fact treated as convicts at the moment of an interrogation that functioned as a 
truth-articulating rather than a truth-seeking practice. This is the key to understanding why Chovin was 
sentenced to death and Sentenac and Vignes were tortured despite the fact that there was no fundamental 
difference—from a strictly legal point of view—in the “amount of proof” gathered against them. Sentenac 
and Vignes were not tortured because the conseiller Fermat was less sure of their guilt than that of Chovin 
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and needed to further seek the truth. Chovin was executed and Sentenac and Vignes were tortured 
because in accordance with the judicial narrative exposed during their interrogations, they had assumed 
different roles in the crime.  The respective interrogations of the three men functioned as three different 
vantage points on the same judicial narrative: Chovin was guiltier because he had committed the crime by 
pouring the poison in the broth, Sentenac and Vignes were accessories to the crime because they had 
provided the poison but had not committed the crime with their own hands.  The decision to torture 
Sentenac and Vignes is best explained if we consider that their physical torment was not meant to help the 
judge find truth but because judicial torture fulfilled other important functions. 
One of those functions was undoubtedly punitive: judicial torture allowed the judges to carry out 
a corporal punishment that matched the suspect’s criminal responsibility according to a truth which was 
already reached albeit not fully supported from a legal point of view. The 1685 case reviewed above 
illustrates plainly that the conseillers did not actually seem to need a disguised death sentence to condemn 
suspects to capital punishment when they did not have a full proof: Chovin, like many others before and 
after him, was hanged without a confession nor even one eyewitness. We will never know for sure why 
the Parlement’s attitude toward Chovin was so radically different from that of the procureur in Nîmes 
who had recommended a complete acquittal. Maybe the conseillers had a contrary interpretation of 
Chovin’s self-incriminating answers, maybe they were not even convinced of his guilt but pronounced a 
death sentence because he had become an obvious and convenient scapegoat as the proceedings started to 
suggest that a client of the intendant of Languedoc—the sire de Vercloses—might be the prime suspect 
behind the crime. More interestingly and despite this difference between their respective conclusions, the 
procureur in Nîmes and the conseillers in Toulouse shared in a similar attitude toward the law of proof.  
In both cases, the magistrates had either bent or ignored the law of proof to reach their conclusions. The 
procureur had used his psychological portrait of Chovin to circumvent the requirement that he be tortured 
; the conseillers, possibly thanks to their status of supreme judges whose sentences could not be reviewed 
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and did not even need to be motivated,607 went further and simply disregarded the law of proof which, in 
the absence of a full proof, should have barred a death sentence. 
We can assume then that if the conseillers wanted to execute Sentenac and Vignes, they could 
have just sentenced them to death like they had done for Chovin. They did not, and I have suggested 
above that they decided not to, not because they had doubts about the two men’s guilt, but because what 
they understood to be the role of those two suspects in the crime did not to deserve death. Why sentence 
them to judicial torture and not to the galleys then? My analysis of their torture as a judicial practice—that 
is, as one link in a longer chain of a judicial proceeding—suggested that one aspect of the answer to that 
question is that while the judges used torture as a form of punishment they did not consider it an exact 
equivalent to a sentence to the galleys. 
 
The analysis I have just offered corroborates John Langbein’s view that a long time before 
judicial torture was abolished in France (1788), royal magistrates had already ceased to think of it as an 
effective truth-seeking practice.608 My analysis, however, is also sympathetic to Lisa Silverman’s 
challenge to Langbein’s argument: while the new code criminel of 1670 made the old law of proof 
irrelevant, magistrates kept resorting to torture and they did so because it made cultural sense to them. My 
disagreement with Silverman’s argument is about how judicial torture still made cultural sense to royal 
magistrates after, and possibly before the 1670 reform. In fact, this is where my analysis of torture as a 
practice leads me to disagree with a view that both Silverman and Langbein share: that judicial torture 
was and remained primarily a truth-seeking practice. Langbein thinks as I do that magistrates started 
doubting the effectiveness of judicial torture early on—I would argue maybe as early as the second half of 
the sixteenth-century. Silverman does not depart from this view of judicial torture as a truth-seeking 
practice, for she argues that magistrates kept using torture even after new laws allowed them to 
circumvent the old law of proof because they still believed that inflicting pain was an efficient way of 
                                                      
607 See Chapter 8. 
608 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof : Europe and England in the Ancien Régime, . 
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extracting a truth that resided in the body of the suspect. On the basis of the analysis I have offered above, 
I think that Silverman is mistaken on this point: the magistrates who tortured Sentenac and Vignes in 
1685 did not seem to believe that they would extract truth from the two men’s body, they did not even 
seem to think that their answers were relevant, for they had already decided what the truth of the case 
was. The magistrates however, did resort to judicial torture because, as Silverman posited, it made 
cultural sense to them, and as Silverman posited as well, it made sense to them because judicial torture 
retained an epistemological dimension. But to the 1685 magistrates, the function of judicial torture was 
not to help discover truth, but to help assert a truth that had already been discovered and to stabilize a 
judicial epistemology that had been shaken by its failure to produce absolute evidence of the truth it put 
forth.  
In other words, the physical torture of the suspect was a statement about the objectivity of judicial 
practice. This assertion of judicial objectivity occurred precisely at a moment when it had been 
jeopardized by a tension between the judges’ conviction and the failure of their knowledge practices to 
secure positive evidence of the validity of that conviction. In that sense, judicial torture was a routinized 
practice that was not principally aimed at the extraction of truth from the body of the suspect but at the 
demonstration of the objectivity of judicial epistemology. This demonstration was the judges’ practical 
attempt to sublimate the imperfection of their own knowledge practices in the face of a truth that they 
failed to grasp positively.  
Thus, I argue that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries judicial torture was still used to deal 
with rare criminal cases in which truth appeared to be elusive, but that a shift in the judicial conception of 
truth led to changes in the purpose of the practice and to the decline of its use. As judges no longer felt 
bound by the requirement of the law of proof that a full proof was needed to condemn suspects in capital 
cases (a change in attitude that the 1670 code criminel simply ratified), obtaining a confession became a 
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secondary goal of judicial torture. The already very low rate of confessions in the mid-sixteenth century609 
suggests that this shift occurred early: those numbers indicate that either obtaining confessions had 
already become a secondary goal of judicial torture or that it remained its main goal but that the judges 
were highly ineffective in reaching that goal. The latter case seems unlikely: in the face of extremely low 
confession rates that they could not ignore, it is difficult to imagine that the magistrates would keep 
sentencing suspects to torture simply motivated by the naive hope that they might be lucky for once and 
secure one of those rare confessions. It seems more likely that the magistrates knew that judicial torture 
was an ineffective truth-seeking practice but kept resorting to it because it fulfilled other purposes in a 
small number of criminal cases. I have argued that there were at least two connected purposes: to assert 
the judicial narrative of a guilt that could not be proven and to carry out a corporal punishment that was 
proportional to that guilt. The judges’ first goal was to overcome a moment of epistemological instability 
provoked by their failure to secure positive evidence of guilt. In that sense, torture was a judicial practice 
that allowed the judges to redeem the failures of judicial practices deployed earlier in the case. Torture 
could help perform this epistemological redemption because its specific modalities gave to the judges a 
legal framework to validate a judicial truth which facts had pointed to but refused to prove. 
                                                      
609 Alfred Soman argued that between 1565 and 1640 the confession rate under torture in the Parlement de Paris was 
inferior to 1% (Alfred Soman, "The Parlement of Paris and the Great Witch Hunt (1565-1640)," The Sixteenth 
Century Journal 9-2 (1978): 41).  
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CHAPTER 7. 
ARTICULATING TRUTH: RAPPORTER, DÉLIBÉRER  
 
Conseillers in the Parlement reached and formed their judicial sentences through the articulation 
of two interdependent practices: that of reporting (rapporter) and that of deliberating (délibérer). Those 
two practices were strictly interdependent because they were always performed in tandem. The rapport of 
a conseiller always led to a deliberation, and, conversely, conseillers never made a decision without a 
preceding rapport that served as the beginning point of their deliberation. As we will see below, 
parlementaire deliberation was a particular judicial practice designed to create—one could even say 
force—the unanimity of the judges on one specific judicial truth, supported by one specific judicial 
narrative, exclusive of all other alternative narratives. Rapporter was inseparable from délibérer, because 
the rapport provided the court with a foundational judicial narrative from which the selective process of 
deliberation started, leading to the singling out of an exclusive judicial truth.  
 
Le métier de rapporteur 
 
This initial judicial narrative, the rapport, was produced by the conseiller who had been 
appointed rapporteur of the lawsuit on which the court deliberated.610 The importance of the rapport was 
such that the central government considered the conseillers’ ability to report an essential yardstick to 
evaluate their overall professional capacity as judges. Beyond the idealized figure of the perfect 
magistrate often conveyed and developed in normative sources—and particularly in the preambles of the 
grandes ordonnances for the reformation of justice—the king and his council considered from a much 
more pragmatic perspective that the good judge was first and foremost a bon rapporteur. This view is 
aptly illustrated by a series of reports that intendants wrote in 1663-1664 to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, then 
                                                      
610 About this appointment, called "distribution," see Chapter 5. 
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principal member of the Conseil royal des finances. In 1663, Colbert required all intendants in the 
provinces to secretly inquire about all the magistrates (presidents, conseillers, gens du roi) of the “cours 
supérieures” (that is, Parlements, Chambres des comptes, Cour des aides, Cour des monnaies) and report 
back to him. While Colbert’s questionnaire is now lost, the reports have been preserved and edited611 and 
the intendants’ answers allow us to infer the kind of information the minister was eager to obtain. While 
Colbert and the king were—not surprisingly—interested in assessing the political loyalty of the 
magistrates,612 they were also genuinely concerned with the ability of the magistrates to properly 
administer justice. In their answers to Colbert, the intendants used two main criteria to assess the judges’ 
professional aptitudes. The first criterion relied on the admittedly vague concept of “métier” that we can 
loosely translate by “experience in the trade [of justice].” In the case of the Parlement de Toulouse, 
Claude Bazin de Bezons, the intendant for the province of Languedoc at the time, wrote for instance that 
the president Caulet “understand the trade” (“entend le métier”), the president Puget “doesn’t understand 
it very well” (“ne l’entend pas des mieux”) because “he entered it late [in life]” (“il [y] est venu tard”), the 
conseiller de Puymisson “is not meticulous in the trade” (“[n’est] pas appliqué à son métier”), on a 
somewhat different note the conseiller Cambolas, although “well-read in the [legal] doctrine” (“de grande 
doctrine”), “is not, however, the most skillful in the trade” (“n’est pas pourtant des plus habiles dans le 
métier”), as opposed to the conseiller Frezal “skilled in the trade” (“habile dans son mestier”). This hint 
that legal erudition was not necessarily synonymous to judicial aptitude is interesting,613 but the notion of 
métier, which could encompass the whole range of parlementaire judicial practices, is admittedly too 
                                                      
611 Georges-Bernard Depping, Les Parlements à l’avènement de Louis XIV, 4 vols., vol. 2, Correspondance 
administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1850-1855, 111-7. 
612 These questions asked by Colbert can be broken down into two broad categories that reflect the central 
government’s two main concerns with the court. The first category of questions that we can deduce from the 
answers provided by the intendants highlight the political concerns of the central government for they mainly sought 
to establish the kind of leverage the king could exert on the magistrates: were they devoted to the service of the 
king? What clientèle network did they belong to? Who had influence on them? What was the basis and level of their 
fortune?  One can only guess that these questions were all meant to identify the magistrates who were most likely to 
be pressured, one way or another, to muster a group of supporters in case the courts decided to oppose the king’s 
decisions and policies. This first category of questions is obviously subservient to the central government’s concern 
with the sovereign courts’ potential to political obstruction, a concern that would lead eventually to the reformation, 
in effect the cancellation, of the droit de remontrance (1673). 
613 It confirms the insider view of La Roche-Flavin on this particular question. See Chapter 2. 
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vague on its own to be helpful to us here. Tellingly, however, the intendants brought up only one judicial 
practice encompassed by this notion of métier, that of rapporter. We cannot know for sure whether 
Colbert had specifically asked the intendants to report specifically about this practice, but at the very least 
we can be certain that rapporter was the only judicial practice the intendants deemed worthy of attention. 
Intendant de Bezons’ occasional elaborations on his basic assessment of conseillers as bon or mauvais 
rapporteurs are more particularly interesting to us here. While de Bezons wrote, for instance, that the 
conseiller Lestang “reports badly” (“rapporte mal”), he added, in the case of the conseiller Viguerie that 
“he knows the law but is confused” (“[il] sçait le droit, mais [est] confus”). Likewise, the mathematician 
Pierre de Fermat, who was then conseiller in the Grand Chambre in Toulouse and whose intellectual 
aptitude cannot be called into question, was indeed “very erudite” (“a beaucoup d’érudition”) but “[was] 
not a very good rapporteur and [was] confused” (“n’est pas trop bon rapporteur et est confus”). 
What did rapporter consist in? Why would it require more clarity than erudition? And why did it 
seem to be such a key practice in the eyes of the central government? Rapporter was a two –stage 
process, divided between the preparation and the presentation of the rapport. The longer, preparatory 
stage took place in the private study of the rapporteur, where the conseiller would review the documents 
contained in the sacs that had been entrusted to him by the greffier.614 This review had several goals, set 
by the requirements of the presentation the rapporteur would have to make to his chamber in the Palais. 
While this presentation was oral, it necessitated the drafting of three documents that constituted the basis 
of the conseiller’s rapport: a summary of the case known as the “extract” (“extrait,” also called “bref”), a 
reasoned analysis of the legal points around which the case revolved, and a draft of the sentence that the 
rapporteur would personally recommend on the basis of that analysis. The legal issues the rapporteur 
researched and formulated in his analysis, as well as the legal decision he proposed to the court to resolve 
the case under review constituted his rapport. Thus, the role of the rapporteur was a pivotal one in the 
overall judging process: as the magistrate with the most detailed knowledge of the case and of the 
                                                      
614 About the sacs see Chapter 3, p. 160 above. 
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documents produced upstream of the proceedings, the reporting judge mediated between the case and the 
court, he personally selected the facts of the case that he deemed worthy of judicial attention, and 
translated them into legal statements that served as the basis for his recommendation of a specific 
sentence to his colleagues.  
Thus, rapporter was a key judicial practice because it operated at the junction between inquiring 
and decision-making. It was a key practice from the point of view of the procedure for no sentence could 
be reached and issued without it. It was also a key practice in relation to judicial epistemology for it 
operated at the intersection between the truth-seeking and the truth-speaking practices of the conseillers. 
Despite this key role from both a procedural and epistemological point of view, however, the practice of 
rapporter has received very little scholarly attention thus far. This lack of attention can be explained first 
by the fact that no rapport has survived in the archives and that the practice is barely visible in the other 
official documents left to us.  The main reason for this absence in the courts’ records is also very simple: 
rapports never made it to the archive because they were not official documents: they remained the private 
property of the conseillers who drafted them. This almost complete invisibility of the rapport reveals 
something about the nature of the practice: rapporter was purportedly excluded from the records of the 
court. This intended erasure was not meant to keep rapporter hidden from outsiders to the court. In fact, 
the only reference to the practice systematically found in the documents of the court—the recording of the 
épices in the margin of the registers of arrêts—indicates that litigants were fully aware—and often 
painfully aware since they had to pay those épices—that a conseiller had been appointed rapporteur of 
their lawsuits and played a key role in the resolution of the case. As I mentioned before, litigants were so 
keenly aware of the existence of the rapporteur and of the importance of his role that they did not hesitate 
to mobilize their clientele networks to lobby the judges (and more particularly the presidents who 
oversaw the distribution of the cases) so that a favorable conseiller would be appointed to their case.615  
                                                      
615 See Chapter 5, p. 247 above. 
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If rapporter was a well-known practice within and outside the court, why then was it virtually 
invisible in the documents of the court? I would suggest for now—and will further argue later—that 
rapporter was erased from official documents because the authority of the particular kind of truth it 
helped articulate, the revealed truth of the arrêt, was dependent on a masking, almost a denial, of the 
truth-seeking practices (what we can call doubting procedures) on which it was based.616 Although this 
absence in the documents prevents us from studying directly rapporter as a practice, it does reveal 
important features of the practice: its individual, quasi-private character and its problematic relationship 
to the particular truth-speaking practices of the Parlement. 
In addition, a number of other sources, produced outside the court, allow us to go beyond those 
preliminary observations and further analyze the practice. First of all, as in the case of distribuer and 
épicer, a number of royal laws that sought to regulate or reform rapporter, allow us to describe the 
practice in simple terms. Again as well, Bernard de La Roche-Flavin’s Treize livres is a very valuable 
complement to this description of the practice drawn from édits and ordonnances. This normative 
representation of rapporter can be further completed thanks to dictionaries, glossaries, and répertoires 
that shed light on the modalities of rapporter and its conception as an important element of the judges’ 
professional identity. Finally, two documents authored by conseillers in the Parlement de Toulouse, Jean 
de Coras’s Arrêt mémorable (1562) and Guillaume de Ségla’s Histoire tragique (1613),617 open two 
unique and complementary windows on a number of otherwise invisible judicial practices, including and 
especially that of reporting. Those two texts, exposing two different criminal trials, serve as my basis to 
both further specify the modalities of rapporter as a practice and demonstrate how it worked as a pivot 
between the truth-seeking and the truth-speaking practices of the conseillers. 
                                                      
616 See “Délibérer” below in this chapter. 
617 Coras, Arrest memorable du Parlement de Tholose contenant une histoire d'un supposé mary, advenüe de nostre 
temps: enrichie de cent et onze belles annotations. Par M. Jean de Coras, Conseiller en la Cour, & rapporteur du 
procès. Prononcé ès arrests généraux, le XII septembre 1560 ; Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour de 
parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre Arrias Burdeus religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller au  
Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle Violante  de  Bats du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une Annotations  
sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  Ségla  sieur de  Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  Parlement de  Tholose. 
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Ordonnance, édits, and mercuriales that sought to regulate or reform rapporter do not give us a 
complete picture of the practice and its modalities. They do give us, however, some valuable information 
on those aspects of the practice that were of concern to the central government. A number of royal laws 
from the mid-fifteenth century on allow us to further specify what the intendants meant in 1663-4 when 
they described a conseiller as bon or mauvais rapporteur. Royal attempts to regulate rapporter reflected 
two main concerns: the first one was relative to the material aspect of the production of the rapport and 
the second one was relative to the quality of its presentation to the chamber. Concerns over the material 
production of the rapport focused on two points: the requirement that the rapporteur personally produce 
his report and the transformation of the litigants’ “productions” (the documents they included in their sac) 
into legal statement of facts at the hand of the rapporteur. The requirement that the rapporteur was to 
personally draft his report was repeated over and over from the mid-fifteenth century to the famous 
ordonnance known as “Colbert’s Code of Civil Procedure” (1667), that remained in effect without any 
major change, at least on this point, until the Revolution. Articles concerning this question always 
emphasized the requirement that the rapporteur write his “extract” (extrait, also called brevet), that is the 
summary of the proceedings contained in the sac, “with his own hand.”618 The courts themselves 
repeatedly issued mercuriales to assert this requirement that the rapporteurs “summarize (“brevetter”) 
with their own hand.”619 To ensure that this requirement would be met, the Parlement de Toulouse 
instituted new rules, using the leverage of the épices to force the rapporteurs to comply: the presidents 
would not award the épices “without seeing the brevet.” As the mercuriale made clear, the brevet had to 
be written in the rapporteur’s own hand and dispensations would only be granted if this hand could not 
physically hold the pen because of the conseiller’s “great age or indisposition.”620 The repetition of the 
royal concern on this point reflected what must have had become a very common abuse among 
                                                      
618 This requirement is repeated in most ordonnances regulating the procedure of the Parilement, from Charles VII 
(1446, art. 13) to Louis XII (1507, art. 53), François Ier (1535, Chap. 1, art. 44) and Henri III (1586). 
619 1582 mercuriale in the parlement de Toulouse, quoted in La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 
571. 
620 Ibid. 
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conseillers who increasingly used their personal clerks to draft documents that they alone, because they 
personally held a share of royal sovereignty, were supposed to draft. 
While the king could have frowned upon this symbolic usurpation of sovereign authority, the 
royal concern was mostly pragmatic. It was not a concern over secrecy, for the king knew very well that 
rapporter had to be a collective practice that the conseillers could not perform without the help of clerical 
auxiliaries to manage and navigate the mass of paperwork included in the sack. Therefore, it was accepted 
as a necessary evil that the “secrets of the court” had to be shared with a number of individuals who, 
although associated with members of the court, where not part of the corps. In fact, the requirement that 
the rapporteurs wrote their brevet in their own hand sought to prevent those auxiliaries from becoming 
the only ones with a detailed knowledge of the case the conseillers had to treat. Thus, the requirement was 
meant to limit the use of otherwise necessary research-assistants, to make sure that the rapporteur had a 
first-hand knowledge of the proceedings on which his presentation to the court was supposed to be based. 
This first-hand knowledge of the litigants’ “productions” was absolutely necessary because the rapport 
and its recommended sentence—that is, the foundation of the court’s deliberation and decision—had to be 
based on the legal points made by the litigants themselves. 
This concern was also reflected in repeated royal regulations not just on the authorship of the 
brevet but also of its content. The brevet was a legal summary of the case, that is, according to the 
ordonnance of 1446, a digest that eliminated “the substance of the acts and documents” and only retained 
“in suitable words and terms the clauses and points of the acts that can serve the decision and judgment of 
the trials.”621 As opposed to the rapport itself, the brevet was not to be interpretive in any way but on the 
contrary should allow each one of the rapporteur’s colleagues to “draw the substance, understanding and 
consequence that he will see fit, without being tied by that of the rapporteur.”622 In addition to this form 
of objectivity, royal regulations concerning the content of the brevet promoted the twin ideals of accuracy 
                                                      
621 Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, IX, 149-65 (Charles 
VII, 1446, art. 126). 
622 Ibid. 
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and exhaustiveness. According to the ideal defined by the ordonnances, the brevet was to be so accurate 
that it could be used as a substitute for the original documents in case the sacs were lost.623 The courts 
accepted this substitution because the brevet had to summarize all the documents and only the documents 
contained in the sac. 
Several regulations had been devised to try and make sure that all the documents were included in 
the brevet. One of the requirements of rapporter was that, on the day of his report, the rapporteur would 
bring back the sacs containing the original proceedings and put them on the desk (“mettre sur le bureau”) 
around which his colleagues sat. Thus, at any moment during the following deliberation each and any one 
of them could check any of the documents mentioned by the rapporteur. To ensure that the rapporteur 
had considered all the documents, two conseillers would, before the rapporteur’s presentation, read aloud 
the inventaires which, drafted by the litigants’ lawyers, plainly listed all the documents they had included 
in their productions.624 Thus, the brevet could be matched to those inventaires but also, if need be, to any 
of the documents the rapporteur would refer to and that the same two conseillers in charge of the 
inventaires could read on request during the deliberation.625 These regulations and procedures were 
obviously meant to prevent any omission on the part of the rapporteur, but the ideals of accuracy and 
exhaustiveness also demanded that the rapporteur did not add anything to what was contained in the sacs. 
Indeed, the judges were forbidden to “propose any fact, whether extolling or castigating either parties or 
the matter judged, nor any additional facts, other than those proposed by the parties in their 
proceedings.”626 Thus, the brevet was a specific type of summary, one that reduced the documents 
                                                      
623 “Quand les procès sont perdus, on adjouste autant de foy aux brevets escrits de la main des Rapporteurs, comme 
aux pieces” (ibid.) 
624 “Ordonnons qu’en jugant les procès, en chacune des chambres, et en la tournelle criminelle, les inventaires des 
parties soient veus et leus tout au long afin que rien ne soit omis qui face à la decision du procès qu’on jugera.” 
(ibid., art. 13).  
625 “Ordonnons que les inventaires des parties ester feuement et entierement leus apr autre que le Rapporteur ; 
auquel deux de nos Conseilliers assisteront, pour faire lecture des pieces et productions, et icelles verifier avec 
l’extraict.” (ibid., art. 126). 
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reviewed to the “facts” they contained, and those “facts” were to constitute the sole basis of the rapport, 
hence of the deliberation of the conseillers.  
The word “fact,” however, is very misleading in this instance, for it suggests to the modern reader 
that parlementaire judicial epistemology was, or pretended to be, akin to a scientific epistemology 
because it operated on an exclusively “factual” basis. Before the middle of the eighteenth century, 
however, the word “fait”, had a specific and now lost meaning that indicated that the deliberative 
practices of the conseillers, far from being exclusively fact-based, were primarily argumentative.  The 
“facts” that the rapporteur had to summarize in his brevet, are what modern French legal language calls 
“means” (moyens). Both the terms “facts” and “means” are best translated as “grounds” or “legal 
arguments,” that is, legal points that the litigants or their lawyers made intentionally and explicitly to 
prove their cause—or what by metonymy was called “their fact” (leur fait). In the same way the 
rapporteur in the Parlement was forbidden to “propose facts” not contained in the proceedings, the 
rapporteur in today’s Conseil d’Etat is not allowed to “raise means” (“soulever des moyens”) that lawyers 
had not included in their dossiers. 627  
This normative delimitation of the field of action of rapporter and délibérer illuminates two 
aspects of judicial epistemology as it was idealized in royal legislation at the end of the medieval period: 
royal judges’ knowledge practices were to be subservient to lay standards of conflict resolution and their 
function was to discriminate between opinions, not to deduce truth from an objective assessment of facts 
(this time in the modern sense of the word). The interdiction made to a rapporteur in today’s Conseil 
d’Etat to reason on “legal grounds” not previously “raised” by lawyers is justified by the requirement that 
judges operate within the rules and spirit of the adversarial system (“le contradictoire”). Despite 
fundamental changes in the French legal system since the fifteenth century, the guiding principle of this 
                                                                                                                                                                              
626 “Deffendons à tous les Presidens & Conseilliers de nos Cours, qu’en jugeant aucun procès ils ne dient, ny 
proposent aucuns faicts, soit à loüange ou vitupere des parties, ou de l’une d’icelles, ou de la matiere qu’on traicte ; 
ny autres faicts, que les faicts proposés par les parties au procès (…)” Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, IX, 248 (Charles VII, 1453, art. 115). 
627 Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d'Etat, 35-6, n. 28. 
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adversarial system was already at the core of Old Regime law and procedure. The adversary system not 
only guided the interactions of lawyers (regulating the ways in which they responded to one another),628 it 
also justified—as in today’s Conseil d’Etat—the confinement of the judges’ knowledge practices to a 
limited field of action. As the 1453 ordonnance explained in clear and simple terms indeed, the 
conseillers were not allowed to deliberate on “facts” ignored (intentionally or not) by the litigants because 
“the parties know or should know better than the judges the facts that they have to propose.”629 In other 
words, if a litigant—or more likely his lawyer—had forgotten to propose a “fact” that could serve his 
client’s cause—for instance a legal irregularity in his opponent’s brief—the rapporteur and his colleagues 
were not at liberty to consider that “fact” to help him win his case. The interdiction made to the 
conseillers to identify their own “facts” in a trial meant that, despite the increased control and autonomy 
over the proceedings that the inquisitorial procedure gave them, they were still expected to act as arbiters 
between the parties, not as investigators in search of objective truth. 
The other significant dimension of royal regulation on this point is that those “faits,” as I have 
suggested above, were expressions of subjective opinions rather than representations of objective facts. 
Contemporary definitions of the word “fait” and of the increasingly preferred term “moyen,”630 as well as 
their older, non-judicial lexicographic origin shed light on the argumentative nature of this object on 
which the conseillers were supposed to exert their knowledge practices. In the medieval lexicon, faits 
were not any kind of opinions, they were the openly subjective and purposefully argumentative opinions 
found in an adversarial situation. In  his Dictionnaire de l’Ancienne Langue Française,631 Frédéric 
Godefroy translated the medieval word “fait” by the modern word “parti” used in expressions such as 
                                                      
628 See Chapter 3, p. 163 above. 
629 “car les parties sçavent ou doivent mieux sçavoir les faicts qu’ils ont à proposer que les juges” (Recueil général 
des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, IX, 248). 
630 The term “moyen” has definitely replaced “fait” by the end of the eighteenth century. The legal meaning of the 
term does not appear in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française until its 4th edition (1762). Even at a later date, 
one of the main legal dictionaries of the time, Guyot’s Répertoire (Joseph-Nicolas Guyot, Répertoire universel et 
raisonné de jurisprudence civile, criminelle, canonique et béneficiale, Paris: Visse, 1784-5), did not list “moyen” but 
retained “fait” in its entries. 
631 Frédéric Godefroy, Dictionaire de l'ancienne langue française et de tous ses dialèctes du IXe au XVe siècle, Paris: 
F. Vieweg libraire-editeur, 1881-1902. 
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“hésiter entre deux partis” (“to hesitate between two options”) or “prendre parti pour quelqu’un” (“to 
take somebody’s side”). Further underlining that the term designated opinions rather than facts, Godefroy 
noted as well that in the Middle Ages “fait” was synonymous with “faith” and “belief.”632 It is from this 
original and general sense that a particular judicial meaning started to develop and was established well 
enough by the mid-fifteenth century to appear in an ordonnance. Around the same time, the word 
“moyen” had started to be used concurrently with this same meaning of a legal argument formulated in 
support of a specific judicial claim.633 As the modern meaning of “fait” as objective fact increasingly 
imposed itself in the general language in the course of the next three centuries—no doubt as a result of the 
development of natural philosophy—the word “moyen” was used ever more frequently in the legal 
context, most likely to work around the contradiction between the old judicial meaning of “fait” as 
opinion and the more recent and more widely used meaning of “fait” as fact. This increasing preference 
for the word “moyen,” combined with the persistence of its original meaning in today’s legal language, 
indicates that throughout the early-modern period and up to the present the idea subsisted that sovereign 
judges—that is, magistrates in a court of final appeal, Parlement then, Conseil d’Etat today—are expected 
to report and deliberate on the compared legal merits of litigants’ arguments, not on the objective merit of 
their claims.  
Those royal regulations concerning the brevet meant that, in practice, an important preliminary 
phase preceded the presentation of the rapport. This phase was crucial for rapporter and délibérer, for it 
established the parameters and limitations of the two practices, both in terms of their function and their 
object. To summarize in epistemological terms, royal regulations on the brevet indicated that the 
knowledge practices of the conseillers were originally understood as serving a comparative rather than 
deductive methodology and as processing objects that were argumentative rather than factual in nature. 
                                                      
632 The example given by Godefroy is drawn from Jean Froissart’s fourteenth century Chronicle: “The duke could 
well add faith, fact and belief to it” (“Le duc y pooit bien adjouster foy, faict et creance”).  
633 See note 630 above. 
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Royal regulations concerning the rapport itself corroborate this royal—and again normative— 
representation of the goal and object of the conseillers’ knowledge practices. An article of an ordonnance 
of 1507, repeated in article 46 of the first chapter of the ordonnance of Villers-Cotterêts, recommended 
that “rapporteurs be keen to see, touch and open the points and difficulties of their trials, without omitting 
anything, without superfluity or repetition.”634 Maybe more valuable for our purpose than brief definitions 
of the ideal rapport, are the underlying royal criticisms of the bad rapport. A number of other royal laws 
indeed pointed out what appeared to be, in practice, the most common faults of a mediocre rapport. Those 
specific critiques allow us to infer what intendant de Bezons’ meant when he denounced conseillers as 
“mauvais rapporteur.” As Bezons himself suggested here and there in his inquiry, the bad rapporteur was 
above all a “confused” rapporteur. Royal laws that sought to curb faults commonly found in the rapports 
allow us first to further specify what the intendant meant by this term “confused” and then to infer a 
contrario, what was the ideal of clarity that made the “bon rapporteur.” Royal legislation suggests that 
the revealing trait of a confused rapport was its excessive length, a length that could be due to one or 
more of three possible faults. Article 42 of a 1535 ordonnance described quite clearly those three main 
faults that could lengthen—hence in the legislator’s mind obfuscate—the rapport: “invoking faits or 
things not invoked and contained in the proceedings,” “repeating often things (…) already said,” and “the 
excessive use of irrelevant and superfluous language.”635  
The royal regulations surrounding the brevet I have just mentioned were clearly meant to curb the 
first fault. The two other faults, however, point out that a good brevet did not necessarily entail a good 
rapport and that rapporter necessitated more than the ability to identify and summarize legal points. 
While we can call the repetitiveness and superfluity denounced by the ordonnance stylistic faults, they 
                                                      
634 "Voulons que nos conseilliers rapporteurs soient bien curieux de voir, toucher et ouvrir les points et difficultés de 
leurs procès, sans rien obmettre et sans superfluité ou redite." Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis 
l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, XI, 480 (1507, art. 55). The exact same point is repeated about three decades 
later in the ordonnance of Villers-Cotterêts (ibid., XII, 434 ; 1535, chap. 1, art. 46). 
635 "conseillers qui (…) réiterassent souvent les choses ja auparavant dites par eux" ; "(…) allegassent faicts, ou 
choses non alleguées et contenues au procès" ; "usassent de trop grand superfluité de langage impertinant."(ibid., 
XII, 433). 
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were criticized for reasons that had to do with more than aesthetics. From a very pragmatic point of view, 
both repetitions and digressions led to a lengthening of the judicial process that royal legislation often 
stigmatized to justify regulations. Royal regulations on the rapport too were justified by the ideal of a 
brief justice for they explained that repetitions and digressions were to be avoided because they “delayed 
and prevented the expedition of matters.”636 The two faults were condemned not just in the name of the 
ideal of a justice delivered without delay,637 but more fundamentally because brevity was perceived as 
quasi synonymous with clarity.  
In book IX of his Treize Livres, La Roche-Flavin made this connection between brevity and 
clarity explicit. La Roche-Flavin intimated that a good rapport is “a well done narration,” and he further 
explained that “a narration is well done when it is laconic” and that terseness consisted in “omitting 
nothing from what need to be said and saying nothing of what can be omitted.”638 To demonstrate how 
this general view held true in the specific case of the rapport, La Roche-Flavin resorted to an illustration 
by the negative, describing how “rapporteurs who acted almost completely to the contrary” failed in their 
task. As in the case of the ordonnances, the use of the bad rapporteur as a counter-example to be avoided 
allow us to further specify what intendant de Bezons meant by “confused.” In addition, because La 
Roche-Flavin was more specific in his critique than the ordonnances, his critique of the mauvais 
rapporteur can help us understand not just why terseness was seen as a quality of the good rapport in a 
general sense but more specifically what were the things that “need[ed] to be said” and those that “can be 
omitted.”  
The rapporteurs who lack terseness, “say a lot, but say nothing,” they “mix the useless and the 
useful,” and the resulting confusion is condemnable because it is contagious, for it spreads to the 
audience. As La Roche-Flavin puts it, those rapporteurs “burden themselves so much that (…) the minds 
                                                      
636 "donnent retardation et empeschement a l’expedition des matieres" Ibid. 
637 About that ideal of a prompt justice, see Chapter 4. 
638 "On appelle une narration bien faicte, quand elle est laconique, quae non pauca, sed quae paucis multa dicat, qui 
n’obmette rien de ce qui se doit dire, et ne dise rien de ce qui se peut obmettre." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, 574. 
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of the other judges are kept in suspense and obfuscated.”639 But what was “the useless” and what was “the 
useful” that the terse rapporteur knew how to discriminate and keep apart? La Roche-Flavin clarified this 
point in another passage in which he explained that the conseillers “while reporting, must not mix the fait 
and the law, but should content themselves with going in depth into the legal disputes that are relevant to 
their opinion.”640 Thus, the terseness advocated by La Roche-Flavin entailed abilities and operations 
specific to the rapport: the aptitude to select, within the exhaustive list of faits drafted in the brevet, only 
those faits that revolved around legal points that justified the sentence recommended by the rapporteur. In 
addition, the ability to limit the discussion to the legal points invoked by those faits and not of the faits 
themselves, was deemed critical. In this respect, legal knowledge could be of great help, for it was 
necessary to “go in depth into the legal disputes” as La Roche-Flavin put it, but “great doctrine” could 
also be a hindrance if it distracted the rapporteur into an erudite discussion of legal points that did not 
underlay the opinion—that is, the sentence—that they would propose in the end.  
As in the case of the ideal brevet, the ideal rapport ought to focus on faits only. Unlike the brevet, 
however, the rapport needed not be an exhaustive list of those faits. In fact, one of the main qualities of 
the good rapporteur was his ability to focus only on those faits that were relevant to the legal crux of the 
case. This selectivity alone was not enough, for the rapporteur also had to demonstrate to his colleague 
why and how the faits he chose to include in his rapport were relevant to the case and most importantly to 
its resolution. The qualities that were thought most necessary for this demonstration were clarity and 
brevity.  
 
The importance of clarity was noted explicitly in contemporary definitions of the rapport and the 
rapporteur. Jaucourt, in his definition of the rapport for the Encyclopédie insisted and elaborated on the 
importance of clarity for the good rapport, noting that “this kind of discourse (…) consists in speaking 
                                                      
639 “Aucuns rapporteurs font Presque tout le contraire, ils dissent beaucoup et si ne dissent rien, ils s’embarassent 
tellement et meslent l’inutile parmy l’utile, que l’estprit des autres juges en demeure suspend et offusqué.” ibid. 
640 "Et ne doivent en rapportant mesler le faict avec le droit, ains reserver a approfonder les disputes du droit, si 
elles y escheoient à leur opinion." Ibid. 
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clearly, with precision and elegance.”641 Clarity was needed, Jaucourt added, because “the methodical 
distribution of the matter [that the rapporteur] seeks to treat, and the way in which he orders the facts and 
evidence, must display such a clarity that all [judges] can understand the affair reported to them without 
difficulty and without effort.”642 Jaucourt’s definition is of interest to us not only because it confirms the 
idea, suggested a century earlier in the reports the intendants wrote to Colbert, that clarity was an 
essential quality of the good rapporteur, but also because it points out that this quality was an important 
element of distinction for the magistrates in the judicial milieu and that the practice of rapporter 
constituted a prominent feature of professional identity for the conseillers. In his definition of the 
rapporteur indeed, Jaucourt added that “the function of the rapporteur demands that he order proofs, 
present the proceedings with clarity, summarize with precision, motivate his recommendation ; anything 
beyond that would smack of affectation, of a desire to shine, of levity, of haste, of vain glory”643 and that 
“the oral presentation […] must be distinct, quiet, without agitation.”644 Lawyers and their speeches—
widely criticized for their confusion, abusive prolixity and lack of substance—are the target here, as 
Jaucourt confirms explicitly noting that “the rapporteur does not speak like a barrister, but like a judge: in 
this quality, he holds something of the law, which, quiet and calm only demonstrate rules and duties, and 
since he is himself expected to be free from passions, he is not allowed to think of exciting those of 
others.”645  
 
                                                      
641 “ce genre de discours, (…) consiste à parler avec clarté, avec précision, et avec elegance.” 
642 “il faut que la distribution méthodique de la matiere [que le rapporteur] entreprend de traiter, et l'ordre qu'il 
mettra dans les faits et dans les preuves, y répandent une si grande netteté, que tous puissent sans peine et sans 
effort, entendre l'affaire qu'on leur rapporte. » 
643 “l'office d'un rapporteur exige qu'il mette de l'ordre dans les preuves, de la clarté dans les informations, de la 
précision dans la récapitulation, et des motifs dans son avis; tout le reste auroit un air d'affectation, d'envie de 
briller, de légereté, d’inattention, de précipitation, ou de vaine gloire" Entry "rapport" in Encyclopédie ou 
Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des méties, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond D'Alembert, Paris: 
Chez Birasson, David, Le Breton, Durand, 1751-1772. 
644 “la maniere de prononcer, […] doit être distincte, tranquille et sans agitation.” (ibid.) 
645 “[l]e rapporteur ne parle pas comme avocat, mais comme juge: en cette qualité, il tient quelque chose de la loi, 
qui tranquille et paisible se contente de démontrer la regle et le devoir; et comme il lui est commandé d'être lui-
même sans passions, il ne lui est pas permis non plus de songer à exciter celles des autres.” (ibid.) 
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Jean de Coras’s Arrêt mémorable and Guillaume de Ségla’s Histoire tragique, can function as 
correctives to those late, normative representations of the practice of rapporter. Those two texts open two 
different windows on rapporter as it was practiced, its modalities, its goals and its results. Before I 
highlight the complementarity of those two texts, I should insist on one important similarity that makes 
them so valuable within the context of this analysis: both authors were conseillers in the Parlement de 
Toulouse and both of them had been rapporteur of the case they decided to publicize. In the more famous 
of those two texts, Jean de Coras presents the case of the faux Martin Guerre, Arnaud du Tilh, which he 
had reported to the Chambre Tournelle of the Parlement de Toulouse in 1560. This case, already famous 
throughout the early-modern period thanks in great part to Coras’s text,646 has received renewed attention 
with the 1982 release of a movie and the publication on the following year of Natalie Davis’s The Return 
of Martin Guerre, a provocative book which in turn generated significant scholarly attention for this 
affaire.647 What made this case seem “prodigious” to Coras was not only the talents of con-man Arnaud 
du Tilh, but also the providential return of Martin Guerre, the man he had impersonated for several years, 
that uncovered the truth of a case that had hitherto eluded him and the other conseillers of the Tournelle 
to whom he reported.  
Guillaume de Ségla’s Histoire tragique was certainly less of a publishing success in its own time 
and has received considerably less scholarly attention than Coras’s Arrêt mémorable since then.648 The 
case did nonetheless attract a fair amount of popular attention in Toulouse and its region at the time, for it 
                                                      
646 Coras’ book alone was edited six times in as many decades (1561, 1565, 1572, 1579, 1596, and 1618). In 
addition to the play, two novels, and operetta that it inspired in France, Coras’ text also served as a basis for 
published accounts in Italy (1591), the Netherlands (1594), and England (1763) (see Zemon-Davis, ""On the 
Lame"," 572). 
647 The Return of Martin Guerre, . 
648 The Mercure François published a first and short narrative of this affair in 1611 that preceded Ségla’s work. His 
book was not re-edited and the story was not retold in print again until 1687, when Germain de La Faille mentioned 
it in his Annales de la Ville de Toulouse (Germain de La Faille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse depuis la reunion de 
[la] Comte de Toulouse a la Couronne : avec un abrege de l'ancienne histoire de cette ville et un recueil de divers 
titres et actes pour servir de preuves ou d'eclaircissement a ces Annales, Toulouse: chez G.L. Colomiez, 1687) and 
again 1771 when Barnabé de Rosoy included it in his own Annales de la Ville de Toulouse (Barnabé Farmian de 
Rosoy, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, Paris: chez la veuve Duchesne, 1771-4). Both those later accounts are 
clearly inspired from Ségla’s work. See Jacques Poumarède, "De l'Arrêt mémorable de Coras (1561) à l'Histoire 
tragique (1613) de Ségla. L'invention de la chronique criminelle," Annales du Midi 120-264 (2008): 506. 
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too had the elements of a good sensational story: sex scandal, conspiracy, murder, flight. The trial for the 
murder of a barrister, Pierre Romain, assassinated on July 8, 1608, led to the execution of his widow 
Violante de Batz du Château, a young and attractive woman from Portugal, and of four of her lovers, who 
had conspired to eliminate the cumbersome husband who kept his wife in Gimont,649 away from Toulouse 
where they all lived.650 The identity of the four lovers involved in this scandalous conspiracy certainly 
explains the notoriety of the case as it unfolded at the time: Pierre Gairaud, a sixty-six year old conseiller 
in the court of the sénéchal of Toulouse, Pierre Arrias Burdeus, an Augustinian friar and docteur régent at 
the faculty of theology of Toulouse, his student Antoine Candolas, and François Esbaldit, leaseholder 
(fermier) of one of the greffes at the sénéchal’s court.651 
Despite the sensational appeal of a case that might well compare to that of the Martin Guerre 
affair, the publishing goals of the conseiller Ségla were different from those of Jean de Coras. While both 
men used their unique vantage point as rapporteur of the case and based their account on the same type of 
documents they had access to in that position (the legal proceedings they had reviewed to prepare their 
rapport), their different objectives led to different choices in the composition of their respective work. As 
a result, although rapporter is key to the composition of both works, the practice is refracted in two 
distinct and complementary lights. Jean de Coras’s explicit goal was to offer the case of Arnaud du Thil 
as a moralizing and didactic example to a wide audience. Coras wanted to urge his contemporaries to 
guard themselves against the “faux-semblant” that Arnaud du Thil embodied and Natalie Zemon-Davis 
described as a new source of anxiety in what many contemporaries perceived as the fast-changing world 
of the second half of the sixteenth-century. 652 
                                                      
649 Gimont is located about thirty miles West of Toulouse. 
650 Poumarède, "De l'Arrêt mémorable de Coras (1561) à l'Histoire tragique (1613) de Ségla. L'invention de la 
chronique criminelle,"  . 
651 Ibid. 
652 The preface to the second edition (1572) states that Coras’s offers to the reader “a singular example of the just 
revenge of God against villains who, ultimately, do no go unpunished for their treachery and misdeeds.” Davis’ 
view (Zemon-Davis, ""On the Lame"," 601-3) is sympathetic to a point to Stephen Greenblatt’s argument about the 
significance of external attributes, social roles, and contractual places in determining identity in the sixteenth century 
(Greenblatt, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," 210-24). 
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To that end, Coras used his position as rapporteur to draw elements from the proceedings and use 
them as the building blocks of a narrative that uncovered Arnaud du Thil’s methods, stigmatized his 
duplicity, and pointed out the weakness of those who had fallen for his lies. Likewise, the text of the arrêt 
inserted in Coras’s work, together with his commentary on the sentence, functioned as a warning to 
would-be Arnaud du Thil—forgers, impersonators, charlatans and con-men of all kinds—and to their 
potential victims. Guillaume de Ségla invoked similar goals for his publication that he presented in his 
dedication to premier président de Verdun as “a great lesson for people of all sorts and qualities.”653 It 
seems, however, when one reads Ségla’s text that the lesson was not a warning against treachery for 
everyone, but rather a warning to judges against their certainties. Unlike Jean de Coras with the Martin 
Guerre affair, what seems to have most impressed the rapporteur Ségla, what appeared “prodigious” to 
him, was not the case itself, but the way in which that case was suddenly reversed when it was about to be 
closed. Thus, Ségla seemed primarily concerned with the role and responsibilities of the judges, and in 
particular his own, as a rapporteur. Although Ségla used his position of rapporteur to inform a publicized 
stigmatization of the condemned, he also uncovered a number of elements of the judicial process to 
justify his actions to the wider public as well as to himself. Indeed, Ségla’s text is far from a self-serving 
account of how the sagacious rapporteur confounded the guilty. On the contrary, Ségla candidly 
acknowledged that at several critical turns in this trial he stood on the wrong side of judgment, so to 
speak.654 In fact, based on the difficulties Ségla encountered in this affair, his mention in the dedication of 
the book that “[he] was so tired and worn-out by the work [he] had done on this case that [he] sought to 
                                                      
653 “Voicy une belle leçon pout toute sorte et qualité de personnes, la lecture de laquelle seroit non moins agreeable 
qu’utile.” Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre Arrias Burdeus 
religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle Violante  de  Bats 
du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  Ségla  sieur de  
Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  Parlement de  Tholose, ii. 
654 When the court gathered to deliberate on the case of Burdeus, Ségla had some doubts about his guilt and wanted 
to proceed further, but the contrary opinion to execute Burdeus won the majority of the votes (for more detail about 
this voting process, see “Délibérer” below). Burdeus’s spontaneous confession later on revealed that Ségla’s doubt 
while tenable from a legal point of view, could have led to clear a criminal. Later on, when François Gairaud 
resisted torture, Ségla took it as a confirmation of his initial view that Gairaud was guilty of “malversation” with 
Violante (i.e. having sexual relations with her) but innocent of her husband’s murder. Unexpectedly, however, 
Gairaud confessed to his involvement in the crime. 
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avoid remembering or talking about it” might have been more than rhetorical.655 To be sure, Ségla was 
not, in this trial, the only conseiller who supported opinions later proven to be mistaken, but as the 
rapporteur of the case, Ségla had been the one who proposed those opinions, based on a more intimate 
knowledge of the case than the other judges in the chamber. Ségla was interested not just in the case then, 
but also in the difficulties the court, and particularly himself, encountered. Furthermore, Ségla was 
interested not simply in the difficulties of this specific case but more generally in the questions it raised 
about the judicial practices of the magistrates and their ability to uncover truth. 
Guillaume de Ségla was a seasoned conseiller, who had sat and reported on many trials over the 
years and this was certainly not the first time he found himself on the losing, and as it turned out wrong 
side of deliberation in a capital case. Thus, while it would be exaggerated to ascribe a cathartic function to 
the Histoire Tragique, I think that the work did seek to address the conseiller’s concern over judicial 
practice triggered by his personal involvement, doubts and failures in the case. From a legal standpoint, 
the doubts that grounded Ségla’s differing opinions remained perfectly tenable, thus raising 
epistemological questions about judicial practice with implications for the capacity of judges to uncover 
truth. Because of this different concern, Ségla’s narrative was the “tragic story” of both the litigants and 
the judges, when Coras’s text was a “tragic-comedy”656 whose protagonists were primarily du Thil and 
his victims. Where Coras was mainly astonished by the duplicity and extraordinary talent of Arnaud du 
Thil, Ségla marveled at the uncertainties of the judicial process. Thus, in Ségla’s text, rapporter is one of 
                                                      
655 “j’estois tellement lassé et recreu du travail que j’avois prins en cest affaire, que j’en fuyois la mémoire et le 
discours” Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre Arrias Burdeus 
religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle Violante  de  Bats 
du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  Ségla  sieur de  
Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  Parlement de  Tholose, ii v. 
656 This is a contemporary phrase, used in the printer’s preface to the 1572 edition : “un cas autant estrange et 
memorable qu’il en advent jamais, contenant Presque une tragicomedie, car la protease, ou entrée d’icelle, est fort 
joyeuse, plaisante et recréative, contenant les ruezes, finesses et tromperie d’un faux et supposé mary. L’épitase, ou 
entresuitte incertaine et doubteuse pour les debats et differents survenuz pendant le proces. La catastrophe et issue 
de la moralité triste, piteuse et misérable pour le regard de l’hypocrisie et simulation descouverte, ensemble de la 
punition exemplaire qui s’en est ensuyvie.” (Jean de Coras, Arrest memorable du Parlement de Tholose contenant 
une Historie prodigieuse d'un supposé mary, advenüe de nostre temps, enrichie de cent et onze belles et doctes 
annotations, Paris: Gallior du Pré, 1572, Advertissement de l'imprimeur aux lecteurs). 
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the practices that helps uncover the reprehensible actions of the accused but also an object of analysis 
within a larger reflection on the truth-seeking practices of the judges. 
In other words, Coras’ and Ségla’s texts are complementary for our analysis of rapporter.  
Coras’s Arrêt mémorable gets us close to the product of the practice, for his text—like his rapport to his 
colleagues—sought to ascertain du Thil’s guilt and justify a matching sentence. The text of Ségla’s 
rapport is far less visible in his Histoire tragique, but because of his different agenda, it opens a unique 
window on the practice itself and its modalities. 
In addition to offering us a unique view into the workings of rapporter, Ségla’s text also gives us 
a dual perspective on the practice because the twists and turns of this particular trial led him to assume 
two different judicial positions in the case, both of them related to the practice. Indeed, Guillaume de 
Ségla was not originally the rapporteur of the affair and was only appointed to this position after Jean de 
Mansencal, the initial rapporteur, was removed from the case. As Ségla explains, the change was decided 
by the court when the interrogation of one of the witnesses revealed that Bertrand Mealhe—Mansencal’s 
clerk—was present at the murder scene.657 This unexpected and very unusual replacement of an acting 
rapporteur confirms that rapporter was officially an individualized practice, and necessarily a 
collaborative practice. On the one hand, Mansencal’s removal was akin to a récusation (the formal 
exclusion of a judge from the deliberation because of his personal connection to the matter at stake), thus 
confirming the personal nature of rapporter I have already observed. On the other hand, however, a 
possible reason for the substitution in this specific case reminds us that rapporter was also a collaborative 
practice, performed with the assistance of unofficial auxiliaries—such as the clerk Bertrand Mealhe. 
While it is conceivable that the court removed Mansencal for fear that he might be challenged later on not 
as rapporteur but as judge because of his personal connection to a potential suspect,658 I would argue that 
                                                      
657 Poumarède, "De l'Arrêt mémorable de Coras (1561) à l'Histoire tragique (1613) de Ségla. L'invention de la 
chronique criminelle," 521. 
658 This is the explanation offered by Jacques Poumarède in his analysis of Ségla’s text (ibid.). 
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he was removed primarily because of the court’s concern over the fact that Mealhe, as his clerk, had 
access to the proceedings that he helped review in preparation of the rapport.659  
Ségla was chosen as the new rapporteur almost certainly because he was, after Mansencal, the 
conseiller who was most familiar with the case. Before the substitution indeed, Ségla had assumed two 
roles which, as his text suggests, were possibly connected to one another and certainly related to the 
practice of rapporter. Those two roles, that of assesseur (assistant) and that of contretenant (“responder”) 
to the rapporteur, shed light on an essential trait of rapporter, for they confirm that, in practice, rapporter 
was organized by an adversary principle akin to the one that regulated the interaction of lawyers in civil 
procedure.660 We know virtually nothing of the role of assesseur beside what Ségla’s text suggests. It is 
likely, however, that the assesseur, while less directly involved in the proceedings than the rapporteur, 
had a much better knowledge of the case than the other judges of the chamber who discovered the 
proceedings when the report was presented to them. We know from Ségla’s text that, as an assesseur, he 
was present when Mansencal conducted interrogations in preparation of his rapport and he attended the 
torture of Burdeus ordered by the court following Mansencal’s report. On those two occasions, Ségla 
observed carefully, as his text reflects, but did not intervene or act in any way. Although his role was thus 
limited to a passive act of presence during proceedings that the rapporteur Mansencal led, Ségla certainly 
was, as his assesseur, the second best informed conseiller in the chamber when the deliberation began. 
This position explains that, on that day, the assesseur often (and possibly systematically) became 
contretenant to the rapporteur.  During the deliberation that sentenced Burdeus to death—that is, while 
Mansencal was still rapporteur of the case—Ségla acted as contretenant (or “compartiteur”) to the 
                                                      
659 Indeed, while the court removed Mansencal as a rapporteur, it did not exclude him altogether from the 
proceedings as it would have done if it was mainly concerned over a possible récusation. On the contrary, the court 
kept Mansencal close to the case, for he simply switched roles with his assesseur Ségla: the président de Verdun 
“ordered [Ségla] to take the trial and do the report concerning the other defendants” but also ordered that “[Ségla] 
would continue with [Mansencal] the additional interrogations, accaramens, and other preparatory proceedings 
[instructives] left to do” (Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre 
Arrias Burdeus religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle 
Violante  de  Bats du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  
Ségla  sieur de  Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  Parlement de  Tholose, 33, ibid.). 
660 See “Délibérer” below. 
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rapporteur. The role of contretenant (a position better known than that of assesseur for it appears 
sporadically in the records of the court) consisted in offering a rejoinder to the rapport presented to the 
chamber.   
Délibérer 
 
Once the rapporteur finished his oral presentation the deliberation began. As I show in this 
section, the particular mode of deliberation used in the Parlement was a decision-making process that did 
not seek to establish a middle ground between a diversity of opinions but attempted, through a particular 
voting system, to single out one opinion and force unanimity around it. The practice of deliberating on 
lawsuits, however, like that of rapporter, has left very little trace in the records of the Parlement. In the 
great majority of cases indeed, the registres d’arrêts only recorded the result of deliberations, that is, the 
final decision made by the court. The records do not indicate how individual judges voted, the overall 
number of votes the prevailing opinion received, or even whether this prevailing opinion was that of the 
rapporteur or that of another conseiller. The records only indicated the name of the rapporteur, those of 
the presidents and conseillers present at the deliberation, the épices awarded to the rapporteur,661 and the 
decision itself—without spelling out a motive.  
As in the case of rapporter, however, there are ways to work around the silence of the official 
records of the Parlement de Toulouse. Once again, insiders—Malenfant, La Roche-Flavin, Ségla, and 
Coras—who wrote directly or indirectly about délibérer, give us a number of elements that help 
reconstitute the main traits of this practice. Their testimony is especially valuable when it comes to those 
few cases in which the deliberation failed to give a majority to the opinion of either the rapporteur or of 
his counterpart (another conseiller called contretenant), a situation that the conseillers called “division” 
(“partage”). Indirectly, those cases give us information on the procedure that normally led to the securing 
of a majority. Yet another fruitful way of reconstructing the modalities of délibérer as a judicial practice 
                                                      
661 See Chapter 5. 
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consists in examining parlementaire decision-making in matters that our modern categories would have 
us label as “non-judicial.” Indeed, the procedure followed by the conseillers in all decisional matters662—
most famously in their deliberations on the registration of new royal laws—was virtually identical to their 
mode of deliberation on lawsuits. Thus, the analysis of parlementaire deliberation in “general assemblies 
of the court” (“assemblées générale des chambres”) allows us to further infer the modalities of the 
conseillers’ deliberations on lawsuits in individual chambers (“séances de conseil”), that have left 
virtually no trace in the records of the court.  
Following this reconstitution of the practical modalities of parlementaire deliberation, I reflect, in 
a second part, on the intriguing uniqueness and cohesion of parlementaire deliberation in the face of the 
broad range of decisional matters a French parlement had to deal with. Starting from a sense that the 
consistency of this mode of deliberation reflects an overall parlementaire approach to truth, my analysis 
in that second section seeks to uncover the epistemological underpinnings of this particular practice. This 
reflection will eventually allow me to identify practice—not just this particular practice, but judicial 
practice more generally conceived—as the keystone of a parlementaire judicial ideology, that is, the 
conseillers’ conception of their particular role in the body politic and social justified by their identity as 
sovereign judges. 
 
                                                      
662 The only other decisional mode I have encountered in the Parlement de Toulouse is when the court had to 
nominate candidates for the position of premier président to the king. These nominations were decided by secret 
ballot (“par voie de scrutin”), as on the 16th of October 1631, when the parlement de Toulouse gathered to decide on 
three names to propose to the king to replace premier président Gilles Le Mazuyer who had just died from the 
plague. Chief scribe Etienne de Malenfant described the procedure in detail: “MM. took an oath to proceed to the 
said nomination duly, honestly and in conscience. In order to proceed by ballot each one of them received a piece of 
paper signed by the chief scribe, on which they had to write down in their own hand the names of the three 
[conseillers] that they wanted to choose. Once filled, the said pieces of paper were put in a silver bowl covered with 
a white cloth that had been placed on the desk. MM. de Caumels, conseiller clerc, de Rabaudy, de Josse, and 
d’Auterive were nominated to verify the said papers. This was done in the following way: the said Sr. de Rabaudy 
read the names written on the papers, the said de Josse, d’Auterive and Caumels wrote the names read by the said 
Rabaudy in rows and marked the votes in their favor in this row (…) And thus was decided that MM. the presidents 
de Caminade, de Bertier and M. de Camboulas, president in the Enquêtes, were the three that had received the most 
votes. Once this election was pronounced, the pieces of papers together with the votes written down by the said de 
Josse, d’Auterive and Caumels were burnt by the chief scribe in the presence of all [the conseillers].” Malenfant, 
Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 333-4. 
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Parlementaire deliberation can be described most simply as the collective practice which the 
conseillers used to reach the decisions penned in their arrêts, whether those arrêts intervened in lawsuits 
or otherwise. Despite the great diversity of decisional matters the court had to deal with, the conseillers 
deliberated in only two possible institutional settings. On the one hand, they deliberated in smaller 
groups, mostly on the lawsuits which had been assigned663 to the particular chamber they sat in. On the 
other hand, they deliberated less frequently as a full corps in general assemblies of all the chambers 
(“assemblées générales des chambres”) on all other affairs. Those “other affairs” included the verification 
of royal edicts on which the historiography of the sovereign courts has concentrated,664 but also a great 
diversity of other matters.  First of all, the court could deliberate on any matter that the premier président 
had put on the daily agenda, whether of his own decision or upon request from a member of the court. 
This was the case in particular for any question relating to internal regulations of the court, whether it had 
to do with wages, “épices,”665 transfers of conseillers from one chamber to another (“remuements”), etc. 
Even if we consider deliberations on royal letters only, the court’s deliberations were not limited to royal 
laws (édits and ordonnances) but encompassed all documents written on parchment and that bore the 
royal “great seal.”666 Whether it took place in an individual chamber or in a general assembly, a 
deliberation would necessarily end with the passing of a specific type of ruling that corresponded to the 
object of the deliberation: “arrêts définitifs” to close a lawsuit, “arrêts interlocutoires” to require further 
                                                      
663 This assignment was done at the beginning of each judicial year through a procedure called “distribution.” See 
Chapter 4, Part 1: “Distribuer,” “épicer”: the great judicial spice shop. 
664 See Introduction. 
665 About épices, see Chapter 5 above. 
666 In March 1634, the parlement de Toulouse refused to let the marquis d’Ambres attend its session because this 
prerogative had only been conferred to him with a lettre de cachet from the king. The procurator of the king refused 
to present this letter to the court for verification because, he argued, the Parlement should only consider “open letters 
sealed with the great seal,” that is, the procurator added with a nice formula, “declarations of the will of the king 
made out of parchment and wax.” When the royal will took that material form, the court very rarely refused to 
deliberate on it. This refusal only happened in exceptional circumstances, as in August 1636 when the court refused 
to deliberate on so-called “letters of injunction” [lettres de jussion], which dated May 2, 1636, pre-emptively 
quashed a ruling the court had passed three days later. Thus, when there was no technicality or legal irregularity in 
the text presented to the court, whether it was an edict or a letter of appointment, the conseillers would hold a 
deliberation. (Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, II, 12-7). 
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inquiry, “arrêt d’enregistrement” to register a new royal law, “arrêt de règlement” to clarify the 
functioning of the court, “arrêt de réception” to install a new conseiller, etc. 
If we consider deliberations on lawsuits only, it is difficult to know the exact details of what 
happened between the end of the rapporteur’s presentation—the foundation of the deliberation—and the 
passing of a ruling. In the great majority of cases, the records of the chamber only registered the decision 
adopted, without much additional information. As in the case of the rapport, this silence of the records 
was not intended to keep the existence of the practice a secret. Again, litigants were fully aware of the 
existence of deliberations and, as their attempts to bribe not just their rapporteur but also the other judges 
of the same chamber attest, they also knew very well that it was an electoral process in which each vote 
counted.667 As I noted before, however, the records of the court themselves do not allow us to grasp the 
mechanisms of this voting procedure, for they only registered the names of the conseillers present at the 
deliberation and their decision, masking the details of the deliberative process to insist instead on its final, 
seemingly unanimous result. 
Aller aux opinions 
 
Thanks to other sources, however, we can reconstitute this voting system as follows. In most 
cases, the deliberation would begin immediately after the rapporteur’s presentation.668 The president of 
the chamber would then “go to the opinions” (“aller aux opinions”), that is, he would ask in turn each 
                                                      
667In fact, public knowledge of the practice was so widespread that La Roche-Flavin seemed to have had no qualms 
about devoting one of his thirteen books on the Parlements to the practice. La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, Livre IX: "Des opinions et comme il faut opiner en un Sénat, Conseils, ou deliberations 
publiques" (Of opinions and how one must vote in a Senate, Councils, or public deliberations). The great majority of 
the thirty-six sections of this book however, are devoted to the moral considerations that ought to guide the 
magistrates in their votes (for instance, section 29, “the opinions of judges must be free of vengeance,” or section 33, 
“when voting, one must prefer the public good to private and particular interests”). The few chapters that appear, by 
their title, to deal with the actual voting procedure are in fact very vague. 
668 In complex cases, however, La Roche-Flavin notes that either the conseillers or the rapporteur himself could 
request that the deliberation be delayed to the following day, “so that the judges could think about it and leaf through 
their books to give a more careful and solid opinion [pour opiner plus meurement et solidement] on the following 
day.” Ibid., 562. 
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conseiller sitting669 around the bureau what his “opinion” (“opinion” or “avis”) was. What would follow 
then, at least in theory, was not a discussion of the rapport or more generally of the case, but a series of 
discrete individual interventions from each “opinant”—each judge giving his opinion. Those 
interventions were kept separate from one another because opiner—the practice of expressing one’s 
opinion—could have only one of two possible outcomes: a conseiller could either side with an opinion 
already expressed by another conseiller—including that of the rapporteur—or voice a new opinion, 
seemingly disconnected from the opinions already expressed. In both cases, the interactions between the 
conseillers were minimal. If an opinant had decided to side with an opinion that had been already 
expressed, he would do so without further comment when the president turned to him, simply answering 
“I am of the opinion [avis] of such.” In fact, La Roche-Flavin indicates that the conseillers had developed 
customary practices to further minimize the intervention of an agreeing opinant. If he was of the same 
opinion as the opinant who immediately preceded him, he would just say “idem,” or “and me,” or “same.” 
The conseillers had even developed a custom called “to give one’s opinion with one’s hat” (“opiner du 
bonnet”) that eliminated speaking altogether, especially for the larger deliberations of general assemblies 
of the court: the opinant would just stand up and take off his hat to indicate that he sided with the opinion 
of the opinant that had preceded him.670  
When, on the contrary, a conseiller wanted to disagree with the opinions expressed before him, he 
could not just express this disagreement with a “nay” or even simply criticize the previous opinions: he 
had to offer an entirely new opinion. Offering a new opinion required not only proposing a different 
sentence but also offering a new interpretative reasoning of the legal difficulties of the case in support of 
this new sentence. In other words, an opinant who wanted to disagree had to propose some sort of rapport 
                                                      
669 La Roche-Flavin gives a great deal of importance to the fact that judges had to deliberate and issue sentences 
while sitting and that judicial procedures performed while standing could be declared null (ibid., 563-4). According 
to him, “opiner” while standing was only permissible in situations in which spatial restrictions prevent the judges 
from sitting (for instance in a general assembly of the parlement in the Grand Chambre where “conseillers who are 
at the third and last bench are forced to stand to give their opinion [pour opiner], otherwise the other judges would 
not be able to see them.” (ibid., 564).  
670 Ibid., 552. 
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of his own. An opinion then, was a counter-rapport of sort, for it adopted a form similar to that of the 
rapport, but contradicted the content of the rapport—both in the sentence it proposed and in the legal 
reasoning it followed. The parallel between rapport and opinion is corroborated by their association in 
contemporary sources. As in the case of the rapport, La Roche-Flavin warned against the use of 
eloquence to express one’s opinion,671 and stressed that legal doctrine was of relatively little use and 
could even be detrimental to the opinant.672 As in the case of the rapport, the opinion had to be brief, that 
is, it had “come to the point and touch its goal forthwith”673 and avoid repetitions, superfluity and 
digressions. Those were common faults of both the rapport and the opinion, and the 1446 ordonnance for 
instance noted that the conseillers “in their opinions often repeat things that they or others have said 
before and bring up faits or things not mentioned or contained in the trial[’s documents].”674 This 
observation suggests what a later ordinance confirmed: that, like the rapport, the opinion should be based 
only on “the facts proposed by the litigants.”675 The reading of the rapporteur’s brevet and of the lawyer’s 
inventaires at the beginning of the deliberation then, was not just meant to allow the conseillers to 
evaluate the soundness of the rapport but to give them the elements they needed to construct and 
formulate a differing opinion if they wished to do so. Other regulations show that, like the rapport, 
opinions were intended to solve the legal difficulties of the case by interpreting legal points contained in 
the documents. At the center of the bureau around which the conseillers deliberated were the sacs that 
                                                      
671 He notes that "eloquent conseillers (…) often abuse their subtle mind and their voluble tongue to do wrongs 
under the color of rights and hide their treachery by interweaving things that resemble virtue and public utility” 
(“car abusans de la subtilité de leur esprit et volubilité de leur langues, ils sçavent faire injustice, soubs couleur de 
justice et sçavent cacher leurs tromperies par entrelasseures de choses ressemblantes à vertu et utiles au bien 
public.” Ibid., 560) 
672 La Roche-Flavin observed that “to express one’s opinion well” in a general assembly of the court “require[d] not 
only the Théorique and the art and science of civil and canon law and of the ordinances but also the use, experience, 
knowledge and handling of state and public affairs” (“pour bien opiner en iceux, n’est pas seulement requise la 
Theorique, et l’art et science du droict civil et canon et des ordonnances, mais aussi de l’usage, experience, et de la 
cognoissance et maniement des affaires d’Estat et publiques” ibid., 565) and added that “magistrates must avoid 
scholastic quibbles and subtleties” (“les arguties et subtilitez scholastiques doivent ester esvitées par les magistrats” 
ibid.580) 
673 Ibid., 574. 
674 Ibid., 573. 
675 Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, IX, 247-8 (Charles 
VII, 1453, art. 115). 
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contained those documents and, as the 1446 ordonnance made clear, this central presence did more than 
symbolically represent the judges’ access to the proceedings of the trial, for “upon the presentation of 
opinions, the rapporteur [was] obligated to give whatever pièce [of the proceedings] to the opinants who 
want[ed] to have them.”676 In terms that are clearer than his comments on the rapport, La Roche-Flavin 
explains what the opinants were supposed to do with those documents: they were to leave aside “words” 
and “grammar” to “extract the juice and the marrow of the acts put in front of them.”677 The marrow here 
is the faits of the litigants, the legal grounds of their claims, considered independently from 
circumstances, rhetorical arguments and “scholastic (…) subtleties.” 
Autonomy was another common feature that the rapport and the opinions of the deliberating 
judges shared. Both the rapport and the opinion are in theory self-contained: the rapport does not pre-
empt differing opinions and an opinion does not criticize, at least explicitly, the rapport or other opinions. 
The opinion, like the rapport, proposes a single sentence—not a number of possible sentences—rooted in 
a particular reasoning, itself based on specific legal interpretations, not on the evaluation of the compared 
merits of possible interpretations of the same point. Obviously, a differing opinion was indirectly a 
critique of the rapport and of preceding opinions, but parlementaire practice sought to maintain the 
illusion of the autonomy of those various sentences and of the reasoning on which they were based. This 
apparent autonomy was maintained by preventing opinions from referring to one another and by a mode 
of deliberation that limited interactions between the conseillers. The conseiller who spoke did not ask the 
rapporteur or the preceding opinants to clarify their interpretations, he offered his own differing 
interpretation instead, seemingly oblivious to anything that had been said before or could be said after. 
And when he offered this autonomous opinion, no one—not even the president who had invited him to 
speak—could interrupt him to ask questions or object to his reasoning. Thus, parlementaire deliberation 
began not as a discussion but as a series of discrete monologues.  
                                                      
676 Ibid., IX, 166. 
677 "Aussi les arguties et subtilitez scholastiques doivent estre esvitées par les magistrats, lesquels doivent prendre 
pour leur partage le suc et la moüelle des actes qui sont produits devant eux, et non s’adonner ny atacher par trop 
aux paroles, ny à la grammaire ou grammairiens (…)." Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 580-1. 
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In addition, this peculiar mode of deliberation created what I would call a burden of 
disagreement. The form and requirements I have just detailed, must have deterred conseillers from 
presenting a differing opinion, unless they had a solid legal reasoning and/or a good reason to do so. I will 
later look in more detail at the epistemological underpinnings of this burden of disagreement—as well as 
its political and judicial consequences—but I want to observe already that this burden was not just 
dictated by the rules of opiner but was also dependent on the moment at which one was offered a chance 
to voice his opinion. It certainly became more difficult to offer a differing opinion later in the 
deliberation, that is, after most of the other conseillers had sided with an existing opinion or offered one 
of their own. For this reason, the order in which the conseillers presented their opinions had serious 
consequences on the deliberative process, for it created a hierarchy within the chamber, giving the 
conseillers who spoke first—a greater deliberative margin than those who spoke last. The conseiller who 
received the greatest deliberative margin in the chamber was the rapporteur, since his familiarity with the 
case, its documents and the opportunity to express himself first and at length, put him in the most 
advantageous position. I have already noted that the president of the chamber was the one in charge of the 
distribution of the trials, thus holding this power of making rapporteurs. As we can see now, this power 
was not simply about the distribution of épices but also a decisional power because the rapporteur was at 
an advantage in the deliberative process. The president’s latitude in this matter went further since, in 
addition to choosing the rapporteur at the beginning of the proceedings, he also had control over the 
speaking order of the opinants at the end of the trial. The president of the chamber was the one who “went 
to the opinions” as I noted earlier, and, as La Roche-Flavin observed, when the rapporteur was done 
speaking, “no one dare[d] to give his opinion unless it ha[d] been asked by the one who preside[d].”678 
The president was absolutely free to decide of the order of the opinants, for “the opinions are asked by the 
presidents after [that of] the rapporteur, without regard for age, seniority, or rank, as it pleases the 
                                                      
678 "… en nos parlemens aucun ne s’ingere d’opiner que l’advis ne luy soit demandé par celuy qui preside" (ibid., 
559). 
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president.”679 The only rule the president had to follow was that, as the ordonnance of 1446 stipulated,680 
they themselves could only give their opinion last, lest it influenced the conseillers who would have to 
speak after them.  
My earlier observation about the existence of a burden of disagreement that stemmed from the 
mode of deliberation would suggest that not many opinions would be expressed in the course of a 
deliberation. The official records of the Parlement cannot help us establish an average number of opinions 
per deliberation, for they only registered the sentence on which the judges had agreed in the end. Other 
documents, however, confirm that, in the great majority of cases, the diversity of opinions was minimal 
and that rarely more than two were expressed. An ordonnance from 1510 indicated that, “when judging 
trials, if it happens that there are three opinions, the smallest one [i.e. the one of the three that had been 
endorsed by the smallest number of conseiller] has to join either of the bigger ones.”681 I will come back 
shortly to this process of “reducing the opinions,” as the conseillers called it, and simply note for now 
that, while the Parlement de Paris accepted to register this ordonnance in 1512, it took fifteen years 
before a trial produced a situation in which three opinions remained at the end of a deliberation. Thus, it 
took fifteen years and thousands of trials in front of the Parisian court before the situation presented itself, 
thereby indicating that the great majority of deliberations—in fact almost all of them—produced less than 
three differing opinions.682  
Despite a lack of statistical evidence, I would argue that a great number of cases produced only 
one opinion, that of the rapporteur and that the conseillers approved it unanimously. I would also argue 
                                                      
679 "… aux bureaux ordinaires des chambres, pour le jugement et expedition des procez civils ou criminels, les advis 
sont demandez par les presidens a ceux qui sont les plus près du rapporteur à rang et suitte, sans observer aage, 
ordre, ny rang, comme il plaist au president." (ibid., 556) 
680 Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, IX, 155 (Charles 
VII, 1446, art. 13). 
681 “S’il advient trois opinions en jugement, la moindre devra se réduire à l’une des deux autres.” Ibid., XI, 576 
(Louis XII, 1510, art. 32). This article was repeated later in the ordonnance of Villers-Cotterets (1539). 
682 Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 576-7. La Roche-Flavin does not tell us what the case was about, or in 
what chamber the 1527 deliberation took place but he indicates that eight conseillers had been of one opinion, seven 
of another one, and four of a third one. He added that it was following this particular case that the parlement de Paris 
issued an arrêt on April 21, 1527 to confirm that the 1510 ordonnance would be followed to resolve situations of 
this kind. 
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that this outcome must have occurred in two different types of case. The first type is that of civil lawsuits 
with very low financial and political stakes. When this type of case came up for a deliberation it is 
difficult to see what incentive the conseillers might have had to go through the trouble of developing a 
differing opinion and legal reasoning, and thus, the “burden of disagreement” was at its fullest. A 
personal enmity for the rapporteur or an esprit de contradiction683 could still prompt a conseiller to 
formulate a new opinion, but there were plenty of more lucrative and more significant cases to shine or 
hurt one’s enemies.  
The second type of cases that produced a single opinion—that of criminal trials in which the deed 
seemed particularly abject and the guilt obvious—is better known. The deliberation on the case of Jean 
Lastaing who in 1612 had snatched a consecrated host from the hands of a priest during mass, illustrate 
this second kind of judicial unanimity. Caught six weeks after he bolted out of church in front of a 
flabbergasted congregation, Lastaing explained his deed by the lure of profit, for he had heard in Spain 
that a gambler with a consecrated host in his pocket would always win. While the court agreed that 
Lastaing was a simpleton, the twenty-two conseillers who judged him condemned him unanimously to be 
burned alive on place du salin. The particularly horrendous nature of his crime—the stealing of the body 
of Christ, a crime of “lèse-majesté divine”—is attested by the fact that Lastaing was judged by the joint 
chambers of the Tournelle and Grand Chambre (a procedure reserved for important and notorious 
cases)684 and confirmed by the organization on the Sunday following Lastaing’s execution of a general 
procession in which the whole court participated as a corps and of particular processions in each parish of 
Toulouse to expiate his crime.685 Likewise, once Arnaud du Tilh was unmasked by the providential return 
of Martin Guerre, the conseillers were unanimous in their support of Jean de Coras’s rapport and its 
                                                      
683 La Roche-Flavin notes that a number of conseillers were animated by such a spirit that led them to disagree, by 
character rather than by conviction: “Parce qu’il en y a certains, qui naturellement ont un esprit de contradiction, et 
sunt natura ita pugnaces, ut tantum sententiis aliorum contradicant et qui consilii quamvis egregii, quo non ipsi 
afferent, sunt inimici, et adversus doctos pernitaces.” Ibid., 578. 
684 Ségla’s Histoire Tragique was judged by the same joint chamber. 
685 Malenfant, I, 68-71 (February 11, 1612). 
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proposed sentence. Specific examples of unanimous condemnations in criminal trials could be 
multiplied,686 thereby attesting to the existence and maybe the frequency of this outcome of deliberations. 
Without any statistical confirmation either, it seems likely as well that deliberations that produced 
two opinions were very frequent, and, I would argue, the most frequent outcome in a parlementaire 
deliberation. It seems indeed that situations in which the rapporteur had a contretenant—also called 
sometimes compartiteur—, were the norm and, as we will see later, were considered an ideal deliberative 
outcome. One conseiller then, would propose a sentence and a legal reasoning that differed from that 
offered by the rapporteur. This deliberative configuration was dualistic but did not have to be Manichean: 
the contretenant’s opinion did not have to be strictly opposite to that of the rapporteur, that is, the 
contretenant did not have to side with the litigant that the rapporteur had chosen to condemn, and 
conversely, he did not have to ask for a condemnation where the rapporteur had asked for an acquittal. 
Ségla’s text gives us a practical example of the rules the conseillers followed to decide which one 
of two opinions they would transform into their collective decision. It seems normal to us that the judges 
would follow an electoral procedure to determine which opinion garnered the most votes. As my critical 
analysis of the practice reveals, however, it was a far less obvious choice at the time and the conseillers 
themselves questioned the efficiency of this rudimentary democratic process. This different approach to 
the voting process is also visible in the technical peculiarities of this procedure on which I want to focus 
now. 
The Histoire Tragique can help us to uncover some of those technical details, first because Ségla 
mentions the number of votes each opinion received—which the records of the Parlement never do—, but 
also because this trial led to a number of electoral deadlocks. Each time, Ségla described the procedure 
the conseillers followed to overcome situations in which that majority remained elusive. The first 
deliberation that Ségla mentions, that on the case of Burdeus, clearly shows that parlementaire majority is 
not the simple majority used in today’s jury—whether popular or professional jury. Eleven conseillers, 
                                                      
686 This was notably the case for cases of infanticide, in which the conseillers tended to unanimously confirm up to 
70% of the death sentences that had been appealed to them (Soman, "The Parlement of Paris and the Great Witch 
Hunt (1565-1640)," 36). 
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including the rapporteur, supported a death sentence against Burdeus and ten others, including Ségla 
himself, wanted to subject his supposed accomplices, Candolas and Esbaldit, to torture.  Despite this 
result that gave one more vote to one of the two opinions, Ségla describes this situation by telling us that 
it was a “division” (“partage”), meaning that no opinion had prevailed. The standards to establish a 
majority in a parlementaire deliberation were indeed peculiar and varied depending on the matter at stake. 
An absolute majority (half of the votes plus one) sufficed in a deliberation to register a new law in a 
general assembly, a majority of two thirds was necessary to approve the installation of a new conseiller, a 
two vote difference was required in both civil and criminal trial. In criminal trials that could carry a 
corporal punishment, however, the rule was that there could be no partage: in cases of deadlock—that is, 
if neither opinion had two more votes than the other—the chamber had to adopt the more lenient of the 
two sentences, even if that sentence had received less votes than the harsher one. In the deliberation on 
the case of Burdeus then, the more lenient sentence—that of torture advocated by Ségla—should have 
passed. It did not, for the parlement de Toulouse followed in this situation a unique rule that might 
explain in part this court’s reputation of severity. In Toulouse indeed, the custom was that there could be 
partage in a criminal trial carrying a corporal punishment if the more lenient sentence had received one 
less vote than the harsher one—in other cases, that is equality of votes or one less vote for the harsher 
sentence, the more lenient sentence would pass like in Paris. Before I explain how those partages were 
solved—how they were “reduced” as the conseillers said—another difference between Paris and 
Toulouse should be noted: nine conseillers were to be present “to make an arrêt” in the Parlement de 
Paris, seven in the smaller Parlement de Toulouse. Whenever this quorum was reached and the 
appropriate majority was secured—depending on the matter deliberated on—, the deliberation was over, 
it was stopped—arrêtée—like the trial itself, and the sentence—the arrêt—had to be made.687 
 
                                                      
687 See “Arrêter” in Chapter 8 below. 
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Partage 
 
When the majority was not reached however, as it happened in the deliberation on the case of 
Burdeus, a situation of “partage” was declared. To deal with those situations, the court resorted to a 
specific procedure called “emptying a divide” (“videment de partage”) that consisted in transferring the 
deliberation to another chamber. “Videments de partage” did not leave more traces than regular 
deliberations in the records of the court,688 but because they occurred in contested, sometimes 
confrontational situations between the conseillers, they generated more interest and attracted more 
attention than unproblematic deliberations.  
In the deliberation on the case of Burdeus, many elements made the partage noteworthy: the 
stature of the accused, the application of the uniquely Toulousain rule that led to pronounce partages in 
serious criminal cases of this kind, and—most intriguingly to Ségla as we will later see—the fact that the 
partage was solved by a very close margin in support of a condemnation later confirmed by divine 
providence. As I just mentioned above, the “emptying” (“videment”) of the divide that had occurred in 
the joint chambers of Tournelle and Grand Chambre, meant sending the case to another chamber. The 
choice of this other chamber was not random but obeyed precisely defined institutional rules represented 
below (Figure 1). 
                                                      
688 As in the case of "regular” deliberations, the registers only noted the final decision and the names of the 
conseillers present, without mentioning the situation of partage, thus making it virtually impossible to give a 
statistical representation of their frequency. 
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Figure 1: Transfer of “partages” from chamber to chamber 
 
In this particular trial, since the Grand Chambre had already deliberated jointly with the 
Tournelle, the partage had to be “carried” (“porté”) to the Première Chambre des Enquêtes. To “carry the 
divide” there did not simply mean to transfer the sacs and their documents from one bureau to another. It 
meant, more importantly, that the rapporteur and contretenant from the chamber where the divide 
occurred would bring those sacs—and their opinions—to the new chamber. This was a critical point, 
because it meant that this second deliberation was not a new deliberation on the trial but a deliberation on 
the partage itself. The idea was that all the “opinions” that needed to be formulated in the case had been 
already formulated in the first deliberation, that only two opinions remained, and that the function of the 
“videment de partage” was to decide which one of those two would “make the arrêt.” Another clear sign 
that the object of this second deliberation was the divide and not the trial itself was that only those points 
on which the conseillers had been divided were “carried” to the new chamber. As La Roche-Flavin 
explained, “when a trial consists in several points and incidents and that the difficulty to solve it [“la 
difficulté de le vider”] is only on one or two points and not the other ones, it is divided [“il est parti”] for 
this difficulty and not for the rest (…). And thus, the chamber to which it is transferred will only dispute 
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and examine those points that are divided and not the others.”689 The two conseillers who “carried the 
divide” were the rapporteur and his contretenant. Ségla then, as the contretenant to rapporteur 
Mansencal at this stage in the trial, was a first-hand witness to what happened in the Première Chambre 
des Enquêtes. A number of significant differences between this new deliberation on the divide and the 
earlier deliberation on the case stand out in his account. The videment began with a repetition of what had 
already happened in the chamber of origin: Mansencal presented his rapport and recommended that 
Burdeus be beheaded and Ségla presented his opinion to support his recommendation that Candolas and 
Esbaldit be tortured first. What followed, however, was a different mode of deliberation: like in the earlier 
deliberation, each conseiller of the Première Chambre des Enquêtes was asked to give his opinion, but in 
this situation of partage he could only side with either Mansencal or Ségla and was not allowed to 
propose a new opinion. He was allowed to do something new, however: ask questions to both the 
rapporteur and his contretenant, object to their reasoning, and the rapporteur and contretenant could 
criticize one another directly in their answers. Hence, the resulting deliberation involved a good deal of 
interaction between the conseillers and resembled a discussion much more than the series of monologues 
observed in the original deliberation.  
While more open and more developed, the interactions that took place between the conseillers at 
this stage were not meant to devise a consensual solution that could reconcile the two confronted 
opinions. On the contrary, the goal of the deliberation was still to decide in favor of one of the original 
and unchanged opinions, exclusively of the other. In fact, the rules to count the votes in this situation of 
“videment de partage” reveal that this second deliberation was not a repetition but an extension of the 
first one: the threshold to reach a majority remained the same (an opinion needed two more votes than the 
other to become decision), but the votes of the two deliberations were cumulated.690 According to those 
                                                      
689 "Quand un procès consiste en plusieurs points et incidens, et que la difficulté de le vuider est seulement en un 
point ou deux, et non es autres, il est party pour la dificutlé et non pour le reste dont l’on s’accorde par la pluralité 
des voix. Et par ainsi ne sera en la chambre ou il est remis disputé ny veu autre chose que les points qui sont partis, 
et les autres non." (La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 585). 
690 “on combine les vois d’une chambre à celles de l’autre” says La Roche-Flavin (ibid., 584). 
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rules of cumulation, both Ségla and Mansencal needed one more vote than the other to see their opinion 
adopted.691  Unfortunately, Ségla does not reveal the tally of votes in this second deliberation for he only 
tells us that “following the opinion of the rapporteur, the sentence to death passed on the fifth of February 
1609 and [Burdeus] was executed on that same day.”692 
Whatever the actual vote, it is also certain that if the two opinions had received the same number 
of votes overall or if Ségla’s opinion had still been trailing by one vote after this videment, the partage 
would have been maintained and would have had to be “carried” somewhere else. In this particular case, 
it would have gone to the general assembly of all chambers, where the exact same introductory 
presentations from the rapporteur and the contretenant as in the Première Chambre des Enquêtes would 
have been repeated. All the conseillers from the Grand Chambre, Tournelle and Première Chambre des 
Enquêtes would have voted again, the conseillers of the Second Chambre des Enquêtes who would have 
joined them for this general assembly would have voted as well. In those assemblies, much larger than in 
individual chambers,693 the premier président would write down the votes by drawing short lines or dots 
                                                      
691 While Mansencal had obtained one more vote in the original deliberation, Ségla was still supporting the more 
lenient of the two sentences. The rule in criminal trials was that votes could not be combined in support of the 
harsher sentence, and thus, Mansencal needed two more votes than Ségla in the Première Chambre des Enquêtes. As 
for Ségla, because the combination of votes was allowed in support of the more lenient sentence (ibid.) he only 
needed one more vote than Mansencal. Assuming that there were seven conseillers present for the videment in the 
Première Chambre des Enquêtes (the quorum), four votes to Ségla and three to Mansencal would have meant a total 
of fourteen for each, in which case the lenient sentence would pass. Four votes to Mansencal and three to Ségla 
would have meant that the divide was maintained for Mansencal, as supporter of the harsher sentence, was not 
allowed to combine his one vote advantage from the original deliberation. The only way Mansencal won as he did 
was with a larger margin of two votes in the videment deliberation: five votes for his rapport against two votes for 
Ségla’s opinion. 
692 “suivant l’advis du sieur rapporteur, il passa à le condamner à mort le cinquiesme Fevrier mil six cens neuf, et il 
fut exécuté le mesme jour.” (Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre 
Arrias Burdeus religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle 
Violante  de  Bats du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  
Ségla  sieur de  Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  Parlement de  Tholose, 32). 
693 The deliberation of the joint Tournelle and Grand Chambre that involved twenty-one conseillers in the case of 
Burdeus’s trial was already much larger than in less notorious trials. The quorum of seven conseillers is indicative of 
a number that was frequently not met because of the conseillers’ absenteeism. 
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on a “divide sheet” (“feuille de partage”) to make the final tally easier.694 As in the previous attempt at 
videment, the only two options available were the two opinions from the original divide. In order to 
reduce the likelyhood of another partage, the videment was pronounced if one of the two opinions led the 
other by only one vote.695 If in the end however, the two opinions still garnered an equal number of votes, 
the partage would be sent to the king and his council. Although in such rare occurrences of an unsolved 
partage the trial would leave the court, the two original opinions remained and the king himself could 
only choose one of those two, that is, rule on the divide and not on the case itself. For that purpose the 
sacs containing the proceedings as well as the rapporteur’s and the contretenant’s written opinions and 
the “divide sheet” would be sent to the chancellor but the king himself would rule. An eighteenth century 
case mentioned by Michel Antoine in his study of the royal council illustrates this process well: a divide 
that could not be solved in a general assembly of the parlement de Besançon on December 1, 1762 was 
sent to the king, who ordered in his arrêt of January 28, 1763 that “the scribe [greffier] of his said court of 
Parlement de Besançon would draft, in front of a general assembly of the chambers, an arrêt of the court 
conformed to the opinion [avis] of the sieur Petit-Benoist de Chaffois, compartiteur [i.e. 
contretenant].”696  
Assemblées Générales des Chambres 
 
The rules followed in a general assembly of the chambers to “undivide” (“départir”) a trial that 
came from a particular chamber, were the same as those followed by the general assembly of the 
chambers in any other deliberations. It is worth pausing on those rules and customs of deliberation in 
                                                      
694 "In the general assemblies of chambers, the one who presides marks the diversity of opinions with dots or a line 
on a blank sheet of paper" (“Et aux chambres assemblées, celuy qui preside marquee la diversité des opinions par 
des poicts ou traicts de plume sur une feuille de papier blanche.” La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de 
France, 576). 
695 Ibid., 24. 
696 Michel Antoine, Le conseil du roi sous le règne de Louis XV, Mémoires et documents publiés par la Société de 
l'Ecole des chartes, 19, Genève, (Paris,): Droz, 1970, 285-6. 
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general assemblies, for they constituted the original template after which deliberation in individual 
chambers had been modeled. Indeed, the original Parlement, that of Paris detached from the curia regis in 
the middle of the thirteenth century, was constituted of only one chamber that always deliberated as a 
whole on all “judicial” matters.697 As both the number of conseillers and the caseload grew in the course 
of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, the court was formally divided into chambers. Although this 
transformation certainly related to changing conceptions about law, justice and professionalization, those 
institutional divisions and the specializations they entailed (for instance between civil and criminal) were 
mainly dictated by practical concerns. The goal was to better handle a caseload that had kept increasing as 
a result of the aggrandizement of the kingdom, the advance of royal administration that furthered the 
royal reach in the provinces, and the progress of royal authority that supported the development of 
procedures such as appeal and évocation. Likewise, the procedures adopted in those individual chambers, 
while derived from those followed by the original one-chamber-court, were meant to help keep pace with 
the increasing caseload. Thus, by the sixteenth-century, deliberation in individual chambers was both 
different from and reminiscent of deliberation in general assemblies of the chamber. The deliberative 
mode followed in those general assemblies was itself most likely reminiscent of the modalities in use in 
the original parlement.  
One of the main differences between deliberations in those two institutional settings was that in a 
general assembly a one vote difference—instead of a two-vote difference in a chamber—was enough to 
secure a majority. Thus, it might seem that the general assembly followed a strict model of relative 
majority, thus indicating that deliberations might have been easier to settle in general assemblies. This is 
true of deliberations in which only two opinions were produced, that is, as we have already seen, in the 
great majority of cases. In general assemblies, however, the existence of three or more opinions was a 
common occurrence. In fact, deliberations in general assemblies were limited to only two opinions in 
                                                      
697 As we will later see, the distinction between judicial and extra-judicial was still unclear at the end of the 
seventeenth century. A fortiori, it was even less clear in the thirteenth century. One could actually say that it is not 
that distinction that dictated the detachment of a particular section of the curia regis that became the parlement, but 
that on the contrary, the detachment itself is at the origin of the distinction. 
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cases of partage coming from an individual chamber. In those cases, the one-vote difference helped to 
avoid perpetuating a partage that had already survived deliberations in three different chambers. In most 
other situations, deliberations in general assemblies frequently produced more than two opinions.  
I want to describe now the procedure known as “reducing opinions” used to deal with those 
deliberations in general assemblies in which more than two opinions were expressed. This description 
will serve as my basis for a later demonstration of the ways in which the conseillers’ self-conception as 
members of a sovereign corps shaped their understanding of the nature of judicial truth. Before I explain 
how the diversity of opinions was “reduced” it is necessary to note that this diversity (more than two 
opinions) was an exclusive feature of deliberations in general assemblies. The greater number of opinions 
expressed was not a simple function of the greater attendance in general assemblies.698 The diversity of 
opinions in general assemblies seems to have resulted from a different approach to deliberation in this 
particular institutional context. Even in deliberations on trials with an unusually large attendance—say, in 
the trial reported by Ségla where the conseillers of the joint Tournelle and Grand Chambre totaled twenty-
one rather than the average seven to ten—the conseillers seem to have done their best to limit the number 
of their opinions to two. In general assemblies, on the contrary, the expression of three opinions or more 
seems to have been the rule. “Reducing” those opinions, meant that when more than two opinions had 
been produced in a round of votes, those who had supported the opinion that ended up receiving the least 
votes were forced to endorse one of the opinions that had received more vote. Thus, deliberations in 
general assemblies could be very long depending on the number of opinions expressed in the first round 
of voting, for the number of rounds of votes would equal this initial number of opinions minus one. In an 
assembly that had about seventy voters, would did not vote simultaneously but each one in turn, and who 
could speak—in theory—as long as they wanted when their turn came, those deliberations could be very 
                                                      
698 In the first half of the century a deliberation in a general assembly in the parlement de Toulouse would involve 
about seventy conseillers. This figure is very approximate. It is based solely on my count of votes for the very rare 
instances in which they were recorded. La Roche-Flavin indicates that there were 100 conseillers in Toulouse at his 
time, but this perfect, round number of “senators” is not very accurate. Whatever the exact figure, it is definitely 
much higher than the number of conseillers who, on average, would attend a regular deliberation on a trial in an 
individual chamber.  
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long. Etienne de Malenfant has recorded numerous cases of deliberations in general assemblies that lasted 
for several sessions (sessions of general assemblies of the chambers would typically take place on 
Wednesday mornings and would last for three to five hours). Thus each round of voting would eliminate 
an opinion until only two of them remained. Interestingly, even after one of those two opinions had 
surpassed the other by one vote or more, a last round of voting took place. As in previous rounds, the 
minority opinion would have to side with the only majority opinion left, thereby resulting in a final vote 
that could only be unanimous.   
Délibération and parlementaire politics 
 
This last round of voting was largely symbolic and was the clearest illustration that “reducing 
opinions” was a procedure designed for ideological rather than pragmatic purposes. Indeed, the 
conseillers were most probably aware that there existed other, faster and simpler ways of counting votes 
to determine a majority. “Reducing opinions” produced unanimity, and with each deliberation the 
procedure forced the conseillers to come together and reassert the unity of the corps they composed. 
To some extent, both this unanimity in deliberation and the unity it was supposed to reflect were a 
façade. As the last round of unanimous voting masked the diversity of opinions that had preceded it, the 
idea of the unity of the corps masked profound divisions among members of the court—divisions in 
parlementaire factions, clientele networks, age groups, religious groups, chambers, etc. Those divisions 
certainly emerged in the course of deliberations, both in general assemblies and in individual chambers as 
a few examples I have already mentioned reveal. In the 1638 deliberation on the “community of spices” 
(“communauté des épices”), the divisions were so profound and the polarization so clear-cut that all the 
rules of deliberation I have just mentioned broke down. In fact, it was not just the rules of deliberation 
that could break down in case of serious internal divisions, but the most elementary sense of decorum: in 
the 1627 confrontation between the two Chambres des Enquêtes and the Grand Chambre over the 
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replacement of a recently deceased conseiller,699 the conseillers from the lower chambers not only 
occupied the Grande Salle to prevent their colleagues from holding their deliberation, they also stood on 
the higher benches, and screamed, clapped and laughed so that the deafening noise would render the 
deliberation properly impossible when the Président of the Grand Chambre decided to proceed despite 
their presence.700 In that same session, some of the fundamental principles of the parlementaire corps 
were questioned as well when the conseillers threatened the greffier—a member of the corps under the 
authority of the premier président—if he recorded any of the events unfolding in front him in the Grand 
Chambre.701 This case of a heated deliberation—and many others mentioned by Malenfant—serves as a 
reminder that the modalities of deliberation I have described are theoretical and normative, and project a 
skewed image of délibérer, one that probably reflects idealization more than reality.  
                                                      
699 This is the same conflict I have already mentioned in Chapter 4 (see p. 184, 189 above). 
700 “[conseillers of the Enquêtes] raised their voice so loud, clapping their hand and with extraordinary movements 
of their bodies, leaving their seat to go up onto the higher benches, so much so that those voiced prevented the arrêt 
[that is, the result of the deliberation that had just taken place] from being heard, even though M. de Caminade, 
president had raised his voice has much as he could so that he would be heard. But the cries were so loud and the 
disorder so great that only those who were nearest to him could hear.” (“[messieurs des Enquêtes] ont tellement 
elevé leurs voix avec batemens de mains et des gestes du corps extraordinaires quittant leurs places et montant aux 
hauts sieges que ces voix ont empeché que l’arrêt ne peut être oui, quoique led. Sr. president de Caminade haussat 
sa voix autant qu’il lui étoit possible pour se faire entendre. Mais les huées etoient si fortes et le desordre si grand 
que sa voix ne pouvoit être ouie que de ceux qui étoient plus proches de lui”). Malenfant, Collections et remarques 
du Palais, I, 291 (February 20, 1627). 
701  “M. de Caminade president [of the Grand’ Chambre] ordered the greffier of the court to write down an official 
record of what had happened to show to the king. To which M. Fresals, president [in the Seconde Chambre des 
Enquêtes] replied that he forbid the greffier to write what M. de Caminade president had ordered him, and calling 
him by his name of “Pressac” and not by the rank and honor he holds in the Palais [i.e. “M. le Greffier”] and told 
him that he should think carefuly about what he was doing and that the Chambres des Enquêtes were powerful 
enough to relieve him of his office and replace him with someone else, that what he ordered him was order by two 
thirds of the compagnie [i.e. the court] he was bound to obey and that if he wrote anything he would regret it” (“le 
Sr. president de Caminade a enjoint au greffier de la cour de retenir acte pour être vû par le roi. A quoi a été 
reparti par le Sr. president Fresals qu’il defendoit au greffier d’ecrire ce qui lui etoit commandé par led. Sr. 
president de Caminade, et l’appellant par son nom de Pressac, non par celui du rang qu’il a l’honneur de tenir dans 
le Palais, lui a dit qu’il avisat bien à ce qu’il fesoit et que la cour aux chambres des enquêtes etoit assés puissante 
pour le destituer de sa charge, et en metre un autre à sa place ; que ce qu’il lui commandoit, lui étoit commandé par 
les deux tiers de la compagnie à laquelle il étoit tenu d’obéir, et que s’il lui avenoit de rien ecrire qu’il s’en 
repentiroit”) ibid..This mission of the greffier was deemed so sacred that it was not even clear whether the king 
himself had control over this act of writing, which, in theory, was done in his name. When Louis XV ordered the 
greffier of the Parlement de Paris to turn over the registers of the court to him, he created such an uproar in the 
sovereign court that the confrontation ended with the conseillers going on strike. In a remontrance of Novermber 27, 
1755, the premier president described Louis XV’s demand as “unusual, irregular, dangerous, and contrary to the 
ordonnances” (Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, II, 67). 
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Thus, before I make larger claims about the “meaning” of the standard rules of délibérer as a 
practice, I would like to acknowledge first that there were a number of situations and occurrences that 
demonstrate that the conseillers routinely bent some of the fundamental rules of the practice, and more 
generally some of the epistemological foundations of parlementaire knowledge practices. Etienne de 
Malenfant, always interested in noting the unusual and the unexpected in his Remarques et collections du 
Palais, thus recorded difficult, tense and even frankly hostile deliberations in sufficient numbers to 
suggest that délibérer was not simply a judicial practice but also a parlementaire political practice. 
This political—one is tempted to say factional—dimension of the practice, appears to be in 
conflict with the assertion of a unified and absolute “sovereign truth.”  “Going to the opinions,” while 
designed to establish unanimity in support of a final decision, also revealed divisions among judges that 
were not limited to their differing judicial opinions, but reflected as well institutional and social 
solidarities. In theory, the control over this practice of “going to the opinions,” gave the presidents of 
chamber a great deal of political power. Indeed, the ability to decide the order of consultation of the 
conseillers meant that the presidents could influence the result of deliberations. The power derived from 
this control was so obvious and could be so clearly abused that a number of customary rules—that is, 
rules not defined by royal law but acknowledged and applied in practice by the conseillers—had been 
devised to limit the ways in which the presidents could utilize this prerogative. One of those rules was 
that the magistrate who presided over a deliberation—that is, the premier président in general assemblies, 
the older president of the chamber in regular deliberations—would give his opinion last. This rule was 
specifically designed to prevent one president from influencing the outcome of deliberations. It was not 
meant, however, to limit the use of political power in the deliberative process, but only to prevent the 
monopolization of this power by one faction alone. In fact, other customary rules of deliberation 
demonstrate that the main parlementaire concern was not to prevent factionalism in decision-making but 
to make sure that factions—and as we are going to see, factions of a particular type—could weigh fairly 
on the deliberative process. 
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Rules concerning the order of consultation best reflect those concerns and the political 
mechanisms vested in the deliberative process. Indeed, the theoretical control of the presidents over this 
order was mitigated by the custom that one had to “go to the opinions” down the ladder of parlementaire 
hierarchy. Although the premier président spoke, he would turn first to the second president of the Grand 
Chambre, then the third and so on. He would then turn to the doyen of the conseillers of the Grand 
chambre and then followed the order of decreasing seniority until the most junior member of the Grand 
Chambre gave his opinion. This process was then repeated for the Première Chambre des Enquêtes, then 
the Seconde Chambre des Enquêtes, and finally the Chambre des Requêtes. This order of consultation 
that combined the hierarchy of offices—president superior to conseiller—, the hierarchy of chambers—
from Grand Chambre to Chambre des Requêtes—and seniority—the most junior member of a chamber 
had the least authority, was an exact reflection of parlementaire hierarchy also known as “order of the 
board” (“ordre du tableau”).702 It made the physical operation of “going to the opinions” very easy, for 
this “order of the board” was reflected—and enforced very jealously—by the seating order of the 
presidents and conseiller on the benches of the Grande Salle d’Audience where the general assemblies of 
the court took place. 
Following this order to “go to the opinions” was an absolute rule in general assemblies of the 
chambers. Malenfant never took the pain to record the order of opinions per se, but when he gives an 
indication of it, it always conformed to that order. La Roche-Flavin, confirmed this order while making 
clear what its consequence on the deliberative process was when he indicates that “in the Parlements of 
Paris (…) and Toulouse (…) it is the rule that, after the older and ancient conseillers who sit on the first 
benches have given their opinions, the others who sit on the last benches very rarely give a reasoned 
opinion—and I have often found that it is better when they don’t—but content themselves with choosing 
                                                      
702 The “tableau” was originally a board, later a broad sheet of paper, on which was printed each year the full list of 
présidents and conseillers in the Parlement, arranged by chamber and in chronological order of their date of 
“reception” in the court. 
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one of the opinions of the elders.”703 While this order of seniority might have been applied less strictly on 
a daily basis in the course of the deliberations on trials of individual chambers, it seems to have remained 
the norm in those smaller assemblies as La Roche-Flavin also indicates.704  
This order of consultation from senior to junior functioned as a political mechanism that allowed, 
with each deliberation, the reproduction or renegotiation of the distribution of power in the court. Indeed, 
elder members, because they could intervene early in the deliberation, when the field of opinions was still 
clear, possessed a greater deliberative weight that reflected their position in the parlementaire hierarchy. 
The younger conseillers, especially those in the lower Chambres des Enquêtes, frequently found 
themselves in the delicate position of having to choose between respectfully supporting the opinion of one 
of the elders or articulating a disagreement that had to be supported by a reasoning exposed to the 
scrutiny—and possibly the mockery—of more experienced conseillers. Thus, all conseillers were equal in 
that they all shared the fundamental parlementaire right of having “deliberative voice,” but the practical 
value of this prerogative varied depending mostly on their seniority, for the very simple reason that junior 
members were far less likely than their elders to fully express an original opinion.  
This unequal repartition of deliberative power was not only a reflection of a linear parlementaire 
hierarchy—from premier président to the most junior conseiller in the Chambre des Requêtes—, it also 
allowed for the manifestation and testing the strength of factions within this institutional hierarchy. 
Structurally, those factions reproduced within themselves the parlementaire hierarchy: led by a président 
of the Grand Chambre, they extended their branches throughout all chambers of the court and their 
hierarchy would be virtually identical to that of the institution. Those factions are precisely of the kind I 
have mentioned in Chapter 5, and it is very clear that the fidelities that were cemented and motivated by 
the search for favors, money, promotions, matrimonial alliances were echoed in the deliberations of the 
                                                      
703 552: “aux Parlements de Paris (…) et de Tholose (…) s’observe qu’apres que les vieux et anciens conseillers 
assis aux premiers bancs ont opiné, les autres, qui sont aux derniers bancs, ne raisonnent leurs opinions que fort 
peu souvent et ay veu souvent trouver mauvais qu’ils le fissent, ains se contentent de choisir quelqu’une des 
opinions des anciens." (La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 552). 
704 Ibid., 554. 
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court. It appears for instance that siding with the opinion of those who belonged to the faction of a 
president of a chamber was seen as a means to secure a favorable distribution of trials, hence of épices. 
For instance, intendant de Bezons noted in his report to Colbert that conseiller Olivier, who belonged to 
the faction of premier président de Fieubet, “love[d] the sac,”705 that is, was avid for trials to report. The 
connection between the lure of profit and belonging to a parlementaire faction was even clearer in the 
case of conseiller Aymable-Castellan who, intendant de Bezons noted, “[was] of the friends of the 
premier président because of the sac.”706 Among other things, being “of the friends of the premier 
président,” entailed expressing that “friendship”—that is, a form of fidelity—in parlementaire 
deliberations, through the support of the faction’s opinion.  
The very procedure of “going to the opinions” was particularly helpful in that respect for it 
allowed the conseillers to align their opinion with that of their faction leaders. In the case of the faction of 
premier président de Fieubet, while the parlementaire custom obliged him to express his opinion last, the 
most prominent figures within his network of allies would speak early on. Among those were conseiller 
de Papus, doyen of the court, that is, the first to give his opinion after the presidents, and conseiller de 
Frézal, who was two ranks below Papus in the “order of the board,” hence in the order of opinions. Of 
those two, intendant de Bezons noted that they were not just “of the friends of the premier président” but 
that the premier président “ha[d] power over [them]” (“a pouvoir sur lui”). Leading figures such as Papus 
and Frézal who were close enough to the premier president to know what the opinion of the faction 
should be, indicated to others in the faction the way to follow. Indeed, those leading figures themselves 
exerted their influence on others, for instance conseiller Chastanet about whom de Bezons noted that “the 
sieur de Frézal is very much of his friends and has power over him.”707 And as de Bezons noted as well, 
                                                      
705 Depping, Les Parlements à l’avènement de Louis XIV, II, 112. 
706 Ibid. 
707 "le sieur de Frézal est fort de ses amys et a pouvoir sur lui." (ibid., II, 111). 
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to “have power over” another conseiller meant to have their vote, as in the case of conseiller Lenoir who 
“[was] always of the opinon of the sieur de Frézal.”708  
It is clear then that in a number of cases, one’s support for a particular opinion could be a pure 
and simple expression of his belonging to a particular patronage network. On occasion, however, the 
deliberative process allowed and even encouraged challenges to the traditional parlementaire alignment 
along patronage lines. The very tense 1638 debate on the “community of spices” I have already 
mentioned,709 is a perfect example of this rare type of deliberation in which solidarities of other kinds 
could supersede the fidelities traditionally organized by the search for profit, services, favors and honors. 
In the case of that particular deliberation and as I have already argued, the deterioration of the socio-
economic conditions of the conseillers at the bottom of the parlementaire hierarchy, led them to align 
their opinions along the horizontal lines of a sort of class solidarity rather than the vertical lines of 
fidelities that linked them back to the presidents of the Grand Chambre.710 In this particular case, one 
could not only say that deliberation was used to challenge the traditional structures of parlementaire 
factions but that the strain which those structures had put on the conseillers’ resources in the specific 
socio-economic conditions of the time had led those who felt wronged to use deliberation as a bargaining 
tool.  
The overall point is that the practice of deliberation and the norms and customs that regulated it to 
turn it into a “unanimizing” process, was also a powerful tool for the expression, cementing and reshaping 
of divisions within the court. Should we conclude, however, that the deliberative process was primarily 
shaped by the conseiller’s fidelities—social, professional, religious, or otherwise—? First of all, it should 
be noted that some of the alignments I have just mentioned happened in particular circumstances that 
should caution against generalization. As I have already noted, the alignment along “class” lines within 
                                                      
708 “est toujours de l’avis du sieur de Frézal” (ibid., II, 112). 
709 See Chapter 5. 
710 Due in great part to the explosion of the price of offices in the first decades of the seventeenth century, the 
increase of the proportional value of épices in the revenues of the least wealthy parlementaire created a resentment 
and even an open hostility vis-à-vis the présidents who had control over the distribution of this increasingly scarce 
resource. 
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the parlementaire hierarchy, happened in a very particular historical context at the end of the three to four 
decade-long readjustement of parlementaire sociology and practices that had resulted from the 
officialization of the venality of offices. Horizontal alignments of opinions of this kind became less 
frequent after 1640 and extremely rare after the parlementaire Fronde at the turn of the 1650s—another 
particular moment that could be perceived, retrospectively, as an illustration of the dangerous influence of 
the factionalism of younger conseillers. Likewise, alignment along religious lines was much more 
common in periods of acute crises: in the 1560s and 1570s the fault line between Catholicism and 
Calvinism could also divide opinions, and to a lesser degree because the polarization was neither as 
marked or as tense, the individual affinities with the Jesuits or the Jansenists could shape deliberations as 
well. In addition, the religious opinions of the conseillers could on the contrary be a factor of unity and 
even unanimity when a deliberation triggered parlementaire Gallicanism. 
Further, the impact of pre-existing parlementaire divisions on deliberations should not be 
exaggerated, because the existence of networks, groups and factions did not extinguish individual agency. 
Looking again at intendant de Bezons’ report to Colbert, it appears that for each example of slavish 
fidelity to a patron within the court one can find an example of independent conseiller. Not surprisingly, 
those independent individuals were, from the perspective of the intendant and the central government, 
potentially dangerous and accordingly, de Bezons often labeled them as “frondeur.”711 Tellingly, 
however, this negative label was often associated with personal traits and qualities that one might look for 
in a judge. Thus conseiller Delon, deserved his label of “frondeur” not just for his independent spirit but 
because he had been actually involved in the Fronde “and had even been exiled” for it. His independence, 
although perceived negatively by the intendant, stemmed from a number of qualities, for, as de Bezons 
also noted, Delon was “very knowledgeable, [had] fortitude, determination and integrity.” As a result—
and this was the point that probably worried intendant de Bezons the most—Delon “[didn’t] let himself 
                                                      
711 Overall, intendant de Bezons’ report seem to suggest that the central government was more at ease with 
conseillers whose slavish servility to their faction or network made them predictable. The intendant—and one would 
assume, Colbert, the royal council and the king—seemed to be far more suspicious of those conseillers whose 
attitude—support or opposition—appeared to be an unknown variable.   
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be governed,” a characteristic which in deliberative terms translated by the fact that he “[was] peculiar in 
his opinions.”712 Likewise, conseiller Boisset, whom Bezons also labeled a “frondeur,” “[had] wits, 
integrity and capacity” and—this trait might have made him look even more dangerous—“spoke well.”713 
Conseiller Masnau further illustrated the association, in intendant de Bezons’ report, between 
independence and those qualities, for he too was described as someone who “[was] believed not to let 
himself be governed” and was “a man of capacity, integrity and determination.”714 
Thus, while groups and networks of conseillers could provide a general framework for the 
outcome of deliberations, differences between conseillers at the individual level—differences of 
character, talent, ambition—allowed for a degree of flexibility in the ways in which opinions aligned with 
one another. This flexibility was greater in deliberations on trials than in general assemblies of chambers 
in which a number of matters debated—acceptance of new conseillers, matters of local politics, 
registration of royal laws, reform of parlementaire discipline—tended to mobilize parlementaire fidelities 
more readily than discussions over the claims of litigants. This is not to say that patronage and fidelities 
had no bearing on the judgment of trials but that in this different deliberative context they influenced the 
opinions of the conseillers in different and more limited ways. The already mentioned example of 
Madame de Poypetit who from her relatively forsaken St. Puy managed to mobilize her Gascon 
connections to reach her rapporteur Tournier in Toulouse,715 illuminates the way in which litigants from 
regions far from the regional centers of patronage could use local acquaintances and solidarities to 
construct ad hoc chains of relations to reach conseillers at the very top of the provincial elite of 
Languedoc. Those attempts were so common that, instead of trying to prevent them by keeping the names 
of rapporteurs secret—a medieval parlementaire rule that had proved impossible to enforce—, the 
                                                      
712 "Delon, homme très sçavant, a du cœur, de la fermeté et intégrité, et ne se laisse gouverner ; mais singulier dans 
ses advis, et a esté frondeur, et mesme a esté exilé." (Depping, Les Parlements à l’avènement de Louis XIV, vol. 2, 
112). 
713 "Boisset, a de l’esprit, de l’intégrité et capacité, parle assez bien, mais frondeur" (ibid.). 
714 "Masenau, homme de capacité, d’intégrité et ferme, et que l’on croit ne se laisser guères gouverner." (ibid.) 
715 See Chapter 5. 
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parlement changed its rules and made those names officially public, so that litigants could recuse a 
rapporteur that was too obviously connected to their opposing party.  
The pertinent distinction seems to be not between deliberations in general assemblies and those in 
individual chambers, but between matters that interested patrons of conseillers and matters that interested 
more or less distant clients of the conseillers, or litigants that had no connections at all. Patrons of the 
conseillers—other conseillers and presidents in the court, prominent members of the provincial 
aristocracy, ministers, princes—could have an interest in deliberations in general assemblies—for 
instance the prince de Condé when the court debated the way in which he should be honored upon his 
visit to the Palais—716 but also in deliberations on their own trials and that of their “creatures.” This 
pressure of patronage “from the top” had a lot more potential to inflect the outcome of deliberations than 
requests “from below” that came from clients, sometimes very indirect and hitherto unknown clients such 
as Madame de Poypetit, an acquaintance of an employee of a conseiller. Serving as a broker for Madame 
de Poypetit, François Malaubert, the tutor of conseiller Tournier’s children, was asking his employer to 
favor her or, at least, speed up the proceedings. 717 
There is no reason to believe that, in the context of the private, often casual and at times familiar 
correspondence between the two men, Malaubert would ask for less than what he expected. His request 
reflects the relatively limited impact of this type of clientelism “from below” on the deliberative process. 
Tournier could prioritize his rapport of this case over others so that Madame de Poypetit would not have 
to endure the cost of additional procedures. He could also favor her “regarding the matter of the trial” but 
there is reason to doubt that his support would have extended, as Malaubert put it, beyond what “ordinary 
justice [would] allow.” The two men must have shared a common understanding of what this phrase 
meant. What was that understanding or to put the question in a more direct way, what did ordinary justice 
in fact allow? The theory and practice of justice I have presented give us some elements of answer. In 
theory, “ordinary justice” as it was regulated by royal laws, did not even allow the request of Madame 
                                                      
716 See Chapter 3, p. 145. 
717 See Chapter 5, p. 246. 
 348 
Poypetit. In practice, “ordinary justice,” that is literally day-to-day justice, was limited by the modalities 
of rapporter and délibérer I have described above. The brevet Tournier would have to present to his 
colleagues had to match the faits contained in the documents exposed on the bureau. Tournier’s 
recommended sentence had to be supported by the faits Madame de Poypetit had proposed in those 
documents. Those faits had to be strong enough to either prevent another conseiller from offering a 
differing opinion or to resist the “counter-rapport” of a possible contretenant. If Madame de Poypetit’s 
case was not very strong, Tournier could always hope to mobilize the friendly, possibly interested support 
of fellow conseillers in his chamber. But was Tournier’s favoring of Madame de Poypetit’s claims worth 
the legal work and the political investment? What if Madame de Poypetit’s brother-in-law—her opponent 
in the trial—had reached out to another conseiller in the chamber who was ready to scrutinize and 
mobilize in his favor as well?  
Those questions and the uncertainties they raised, suggest that rapporter and delibérer were 
practical solutions devised for a two-tiered judicial system, adapted to the two-tiered society it served. 
Litigants who had the financial, social or political capital to raise the stakes of their trials, made it 
worth—and often quasi-mandatory—for the conseillers to engage in a deliberative process influenced and 
sometimes governed by partisan alignments. The same deliberative framework however, could also be 
used to adjudicate the trials of those litigants whose claims, means, and influence were too insignificant to 
spring parlementaire factions into action. 
Délibération and parlementaire justice 
 
To illuminate the ideological and epistemological underpinnings of parlementaire deliberation in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, my analysis now focuses on two connected aspects of the 
practice: its genealogy and its core principles. The genealogy of parlementaire deliberation—that is, the 
retracing of its slow transformation from an advising practice in the thirteenth century into a polyvalent 
decision-making practice—is essential to understand the core principles of the early-modern practice. 
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Those principles—autonomy of the proposed resolutions, secrecy of the deliberation, and unanimity of 
the decision—were practical reflections of the conseillers’ conception of judicial truth and of their own 
role in bringing about this truth. 
The origins of the early-modern deliberation I have described predate the creation of the 
Parlement and explain important aspects of the practice. Deliberations in general assemblies of the court 
resemble most closely what parlementaire deliberation had been originally, that is in the thirteenth 
century, at a time when the court had not been divided into chambers yet. The conseillers of the original 
Parlement, a court which was neither very large nor very busy yet, most likely deliberated in the same 
way they had previously used in the curia regis. This point is important because it suggests that 
parlementaire deliberation—a decision-making practice—was originally an advising practice. The title of 
conseiller was a reminder of this original function of the Parlement: to advise the king on the resolution of 
his subjects’ conflicts. The practice of “going to the opinions” in a general assembly of the court was a 
remnant of this original function in a number of ways. The plurality of opinions that emerged from this 
practice—a plurality encouraged both by the modalities of the practice itself and by the existence of 
factions of conseillers within the court—is consistent with the advising function of the judicial section of 
the curia regis. As the king did in the medieval curia and as he still did in the early-modern royal council, 
the premier président sitting on a chair reminiscent of the royal throne would ask the opinions of whoever 
he saw fit—generally beginning with the oldest, most experienced and most trusted advisors. Those 
opinions, or avis—a term derived from the same etymological root as the English word “advice”—, were 
originally and simply put, advices from counselors to decision-maker. Listening to advice (“prendre 
conseil”) was a requirement of medieval government—gouvernement par conseil—and a plurality and 
diversity of advices was necessary to meet this requirement. The transfer of judicial decision-making 
from the king to the parlement through the theory of representation I have already described,718 entailed 
changes in the practice of deliberation. Indeed, now acting in the absence of the king, the conseillers 
                                                      
718 See Chapters 1 and 2. 
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retained their original function and duty—to propose resolutions to the conflicts of the royal subjects—
but had to devise practical ways of replacing the absent king to decide which opinion to choose in the 
diversity produced. The practice of “reducing the opinions”—the solution devised to achieve this 
substitution—was, as I noted above, neither the most obvious nor the most practical way of achieving 
collective decision-making. It was adopted nonetheless because it satisfied the conseillers’ self-
conception of the corps they formed and their undertstanding of the implications of the theory of 
representation for their decision-making. 
The conception of the court as a part of the body of the king and as a body of its own, created 
specific requirements for parlementaire decision-making. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, parlementaire 
theory conceived of the court as the soul—that is the organ of deliberation—of the body politic, a soul 
that deliberated for the salvation of the whole body. This very abstract conception of parlementaire 
deliberation had practical consequences on actual deliberations. It created a number of deliberative 
requirements that the modalities I have described above sought to satisfy. One of the main characteristics 
of the soul as it was conceived at the time, was its indivisible nature. The unicity of the Parlement as soul 
of the prince, created the requirement of the unicity of its decisions. The Parlement, however, was a corps 
of its own, composed of multiple members, and this fact imposed on the conseillers to find practical 
solutions to create a unicity of decision out of a diversity of opinions produced by this plurality of 
members. In practical terms, it meant that the conseillers had to adapt the advice-oriented deliberative 
practice of the curia regis to produce decisions that were at once unanimous and autonomous. 
The practice of “going to the opinions” preserved the autonomy—or self-sufficiency—of the 
distinct opinions the counselors of the curia regis offered to the king. The practice was congruent with the 
notion of unicity of the corps: the time-consuming procedure that consisted in asking the conseillers one 
by one to express their opinions served to ensure that each decision was made by the whole corps. This 
corps was not conceived as an aggregate of indistinct elements, that is, a more or less shapeless body such 
as a corps de ville that could reach decisions with a show of hands. Rather, the parlementaire corps was 
conceived as the complete collection of the distinct individuals who composed it, it only had existence 
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and authority through the complete recomposition of the royal power that was dispersed among its 
members. “Going to the opinions” was a way of achieving this complete recomposition in practice, for the 
procedure demanded that each single member voice his opinion, that is, manifest the share of royal 
authority he held by virtue of his office. As we saw, even when the conseillers expressed their opinion 
without a voice, they did not resort to a simultaneous and anonymizing show of hands but took of their 
hat in turn, one by one, and down to the last one of them.  
Thus, “going to the opinions” achieved no small feat: it preserved the ideal of plurality of 
opinions inherited from the curia regis origins of the court, and it maintained the ideal of unicity that was 
the by-product of this theory of representation that justified the transfer of judicial authority from king to 
conseillers. In other words, the procedure addressed a number of issues, both theoretical and practical, 
raised by the double nature of the court—part of the body of the king and body of its own—and by its 
transformation from an advisory into a decision-making organ. In addressing those questions, however, 
the procedure also created new issues. The first one was situated at a theoretical level: in order to be fully 
maintained, the ideal of unicity demanded that the plurality of opinions be reduced to one. The second 
issue was more practical and stemmed from the institutional evolution of the court: how could the unicity 
of the corps and of its decision be preserved when the court started to split into chambers that sat and 
deliberated independently from one another? 
The practice of “reducing opinions” I have described above addressed the first issue. Like the 
practice of “going to the opinions” this procedure brought together the ideal of plurality of opinions and 
that of unicity of the corps. The practice did accommodate the plurality of opinions thanks to the system 
of multiple rounds of voting that would focus each time on the minority opinion. No matter how few 
conseillers—it could be just one—had supported the opinion that received the least votes, it focused the 
attention of the whole corps at the end of the round. At the same time that this procedure allowed the 
corps to acknowledge its smallest fraction, however, it also forced this minority back into unicity by 
demanding that it joined one of the larger fractions of the corps that had emerged from the deliberation.  
The way in which “reducing the opinions” forced members of the corps back into a complete unicity is 
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most visible in the last and mostly symbolic round of votes, when all the conseillers without exception 
were asked to join the majority opinion in the final show of unanimity that closed the deliberation. 
Thus, “going to the opinions” and “reducing the opinions” were the two stages of a deliberative 
practice that achieved a swinging movement from unicity, to desagregation and back to unicity. When the 
president went to the opinions, the unified whole that had listened to the rapport a minute before, 
instantly split into two or more fractions. Although this decomposition of the parlementaire corps 
satisfied the ideal of multiplicity of opinions inherited from the advisory function of the proto-parlement 
that was the curia regis, it could only be temporary because it jeopardized the unicity that founded the 
authority of the court. “Reducing the opinions,” as a procedure that necessarily ended the deliberation in 
unanimity, forced the conseillers back into recomposing the wholeness of the corps that was absolutely 
necessary to restore the authority without which the decision produced by the deliberation had no 
authority. In other words, the tandem practice of going to and reducing the opinions achieved a movement 
of decomposition/recomposition of the corps that reflected the paradoxical nature of parlementaire 
decision-making: in order to produce an authoritative decision the court had to suspend—briefly and 
behind closed doors—its own authority. 
Cast on this theoretical background, délibérer seems like a dramatic practice that jeopardized the 
very foundation of the court’s authority. In practice, however, it was a mundane and routine process, 
repeated matter-of-factly with each one of the dozens deliberations the court held every day. This process 
of desagregation and recomposition of the parlementaire corps was further dedramatized by the fact that 
the court had been formally split into chambers since at least the fourteenth century. This more permanent 
kind of challenge to the unicity of the court raised questions about the authority behind the court’s 
decisions. If the court only had authority as a whole, how could a fraction of it—a chamber—claim the 
sovereign authority necessary to back an arrêt? This issue applied, in fact, to the court as a whole: how 
could a fraction of the body of the king—the Parlement—claim to hold the sovereign authority of the 
whole—the king—? The theory of representation that justified the peculiar transfer of royal authority 
from king to court was replicated to justify that a chamber could hold the authority of the court it 
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composed. This cascading representation of royal authority justified the idea that sovereign authority 
could be transferred from king to parlement and from parlement to chambers without being denatured or 
diminished. This abstract multilayering of a specific theory and transfer of royal power was clearly 
illustrated in practice by the procedure used to solve partages that I have described above.  
This way of voting did not simply eliminate the minority opinions, it erased them completely, at 
least symbolically, by forcing the conseillers who had supported them to rally the majority opinion. All of 
this took place behind closed doors, and the imposed silence on the content of the deliberation as well as 
the fact the scribe did not write down a transcript of the deliberation were conceived as means to erase the 
existence of differing opinions. The denial of these differences prefigured the result of the deliberation, 
the arrêt, in which the court, or rather the king as we will see shortly, spoke with one voice, and which, 
because it was not motivated, reinforced this idea that the judgment found its force not in a particular 
legal reasoning but in the unity of the sovereign court that had issued it and framed it as the sole possible 
reasoning. 
Délibération was not a dialog that sought to synthesize the diversity of opinions expressed by the 
conseillers, it consisted in a series of monologues, independent from one another, each presenting a 
different opinion on the same matter. Furthermore, instead of attempting to achieve a synthesis of these 
opinions, the goal of the deliberation was to create unanimity around one opinion that seemed the best. 
The only difference between a deliberation on a trial and one on a royal law was that, in the context of a 
trial, only two opinions were expressed: that of the reporting judge and that of his designated “rejoining 
judge,” thus seemingly following the same “contradictory principle” that regulated the exchanges 
between the opposing lawyers in the course of the trial. The main consequence of the adoption of this 
principle to regulate as well the deliberation was that the opinions of the two opposing judges could only 
be based on the legal points made by the lawyers.  
The guiding principle of the deliberation then was not to find a middle way between these two 
possible decisions but to go along with one of them, to unanimously accept its specific logic, thereby 
rejecting any other logic. All parlementaire deliberations followed this principle that led to the 
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establishment of an absolute and exclusive truth. Indeed, even when there were more than two opinions 
expressed, as was the case with most deliberations in general sessions of the court, the procedure adopted 
always had as its goal to reduce a diversity of independent opinions to just one. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
ASSERTING TRUTH: ARRÊTER, PRONONCER, EXÉCUTER 
 
Arrêt is the particular name and form given to the sentences of sovereign courts. Arrêter as 
practice, however, is not best translated by “sentencing.” As we have just seen, most of the “sentencing,” 
in the general sense of reaching a formal judicial decision, was accomplished through the practices of 
rapporter and délibérer. Thus, what I call arrêter was a practice that consisted in giving a final, written, 
official, and public form to a sentence that had already been established by means of other practices. This 
act of material production and formation of the arrêt was critical, however, for it fully participated in the 
specifically sovereign nature of parlementaire justice. Arrêter was the first of three practices that aimed to 
assert the judicial truth that we have already seen being searched and produced in the preceding two 
chapters. Those three interconnected practices—arrêter, prononcer, exécuter—correspond to the three 
stages of this assertion of judicial truth: materialization, publication, reification.  
Materializing Truth: “Arrêter” 
 
Arrêter was both a routine and an exceptional parlementaire writing practice. As the tens of 
thousands of arrêts that line up kilometers of shelves in today’s archives attest, arrêter was a routinized 
writing practice of day-to-day sovereign justice. It was also a unique writing practice, however, because, 
unlike the great majority of parlementaire documents, arrêts were not supposed to be written by judicial 
auxiliaries—scribes, lawyers, notaries—but by the conseillers themselves. More precisely, and as 
requirements in royal ordonnances had made clear early on in the Middle Ages,719 the rapporteur of a 
case was also in charge of writing the arrêt that concluded that case.  
                                                      
719 For instance, a 1344 ordonnance of Philippes VI stipulates : “The arrêts must be written in the hand of the 
rapporteur, who must then give them to his president for him to sign” (“Les arrests doivent ester escrits de la main 
du rapporteur, lequel les doit apporter au premier president pour les signer”La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, 524). 
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We have already encountered similar regulations concerning the rapport and saw that the 
requirement that the rapporteur write the rapport himself was meant to avoid disclosure of the “the 
secrets of the court.”720 Unlike the rapport, however, the arrêt was a document that was meant to become 
public, thus, the requirement that it be written by the rapporteur must have been guided by different 
concerns. One explicit concern in the ordonnances that regulated the drafting of the arrêt was to prevent 
any change to the terms of the sentence that had been defined during the deliberation. As we will soon 
see, the court had more efficient procedures at its disposal to make sure that the final arrêt matched the 
decision reached during the deliberation session. The main concern behind the requirement that the 
rapporteur write the arrêt in his own hand had to do with the source and nature of the power that gave the 
written sentence its authority. Because the authority of the arrêt was fully contained in its written form, it 
was indispensable that it be written and signed by men who “represented” the king, in the precise 
meaning of “representation” I have already explained.721 The arrêt-as-decision established by a 
deliberation in a conseil session, had no authority until it was transcribed in a specific form and became 
an arrêt-as-document, validated by a number of procedures conducted by those royal officers—the 
conseillers—who had received a share of sovereignty from the king. Furthermore, a written arrêt had full 
legal force and took effect as soon as it was signed by the rapporteur and president, its “pronunciation” 
did not technically validate it or add anything to it.722 
Thus, the arrêt-as-document was in and of itself a materialization of sovereignty, the expression 
of a sovereign will made of parchment and wax, as a procureur général once put it à propos lettres 
patentes.723 For this reason, the process of production of this document—the practices by which 
parchment, ink, and wax were infused with sovereignty—were critical. Behind this process we find once 
more the replication of the theory of representation into a multilayered structure of transfer of power from 
                                                      
720 See p. 304 above. 
721 See p. 66-71 above. 
722 About the “pronunciation” of arrêts, see below p. 367-380. 
723 See n. 666 above. 
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king to conseiller.724 The regulations of the drafting of arrêts show that the theory of representation of the 
king by his agents, despite its abstract nature, revolved on a simple bodily imagery that was to be 
understood in a quasi-literal way. Indeed, the normative conception of the arrêt mobilized straightforward 
bodily analogies: the hand of the conseiller—a hand that “represented” the hand of the king—produced 
the material arrêt, in which the mouth of the king was made to speak. Those two body parts, and the 
actions they were respectively associated with, correspond to the two main and interconnected dimensions 
of arrêter I examine below: arrêter as a manufacturing practice, that is, as an act of material production, 
and arrêter as discursive practice, that is, as an utterance. 
Arrêter was a manufacturing practice in the sense that producing a material arrêt meant, literally, 
to make it with one’s hands. I must explain a few terms before I can describe this process of material 
production. Contemporaries indeed, used different words to designate the arrêt at different stages of its 
production and we need to add our own terms to further clarify this process of production. Two types of 
draft corresponded to the first two stages of this process. We have already encountered the document that 
I will simply call here “the first draft.” This draft was the document that the rapporteur prepared in 
advance of his presentation of the case to his colleagues in a conseil session.725 When the chamber 
decided to side with the rapporteur at the end of their deliberation, the rapporteur could use this first 
draft as the basis for the second draft. When the conseillers decided to side with the contretenant,726 or if 
they required important changes to the rapporteur’s proposed resolution, the rapporteur had to start his 
second draft more or less from scratch. 
This second draft of the arrêt was thus based on the chamber’s decision and the rapporteur was, 
again, in charge of drafting it, regardless of whether or not his colleagues had decided to side with his 
opinion or that of his contretenant. The rapporteur had—in theory—six days to produce this second draft, 
and when the new draft was ready, the rapporteur presented it to his chamber once more. This time, 
                                                      
724 See Chapter 7, p. 352 above. 
725 See p. 298-319 above. 
726 See p. 329-335 above. 
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however, the conseillers reviewed it together, debating its formulation rather than the particulars of the 
case and of its resolution—since at that point, the case was closed and it was now purely a matter of 
giving a proper form to a decision that was already final. 
Once that process was completed, the rapporteur would write a third and final draft called dictum 
(or “dicton,” or “diction”). The rapporteur then presented this final copy to the president of the chamber, 
who would ask the greffier to write in the margin the amount of épices awarded to the rapporteur. 727 
Then, both the rapporteur and the president put their signature at the bottom of the dictum. The greffier 
kept the signed dictum and eventually bound it together with all the other dictums of the day. Those 
smaller, daily fascicles were in turn bound together to form the large registers of arrêts preserved in the 
archives to this day.  
Thus, the registers we see in the archives today are, properly speaking, registers of dictums, not 
registers of arrêts. What the litigants and everyone else at the time called “arrêt” was the copy, also 
called “extract” (“extrait”), of the original dictum which could be obtained from the greffier for a fee. 
This final version that could circulate outside of the court—although not in printed form until the 
eighteenth century—728 was identical to the dictum, except for a few parts that the greffier omitted: the 
marginal notes regarding the épices and the introductory paragraph that recorded the date of the 
deliberation, the chamber in which it was held, and the names of the conseillers who attended it. 
The rapporteur was thus in charge of both the composition and the material production of the 
arrêt at all the critical stages of this process. The choice of producing the arrêt manually (rather than in 
print) was due only in part to the technological constraints of a pre-mass-printing world. Even when 
printed forms and documents started to be used on a daily basis in the Parlement de Toulouse at some 
point in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the requirement that rapporteurs handwrite the arrêts 
remained. Given how short and stereotypical the great majority of arrêts were, the court could have 
                                                      
727 See p. 301 above. 
728 Pascal Bastien, "Les arrêts criminels et leurs enjeux sur l'opinion publique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle," Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 53 (2006): 34-57. 
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certainly turned them into printed forms, leaving blanks to fill in by hand the few specifics typical of 
those sentences: names of the litigants, royal court the case was appealed from, important dates of the 
procedure, party condemned, penalties and punishments imposed. Even after printed forms had made 
their appearance in daily parlementaire uses, the conseillers kept drafting their entire arrêts by hand, until 
the court disappeared at the beginning of the Revolution.  
The preservation of this original requirement when the most formulaic parts of the arrêt—that is, 
most of the arrêt—could easily have been printed, suggests the peculiar nature of this type of sovereign 
sentences. The arrêt derived its authority from its material form, this material form was determined by a 
particular mode of production, and this mode of production was closely tied to the identity of the 
producer, who, in theory, must be conseiller. In fact, even before printing became a realistic alternative to 
handwriting arrêts, there was something unusual about the requirement that the conseillers wrote the 
arrêts in their own hand, for the greffier produced the great majority of parlementaire acts. 
Like the conseillers, the greffier was a royal office-holder. Like them, he held a share of 
sovereign power by virtue of his office, and he used this peculiar power for the specific purpose of 
manufacturing a myriad of official acts that carried significant legal and symbolic force—for instance the 
décrets de prise de corps, that gave the power to arrest, seize and imprison anyone, even a peer such as 
the Duke of Montmorency in 1632. Furthermore, the greffier was without a doubt a member of the 
parlementaire corps—as his inclusion in the group formed by the conseillers during public procession 
attested— and the oath he took each year, like the conseillers, “not to reveal the secrets of the court,”729 
points to the fact that he was privy to all those secrets for he was the memory of the court and his 
presence was thus indispensable at all times, even during the most sensitive sessions of the court.730 In 
addition and from a more practical perspective, unlike the conseillers, the greffier was a professional 
writer of official documents: his calligraphic proficiency and efficiency put him at an advantage to meet 
                                                      
729 Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 9. 
730 Even the gens du roi, that is the magistrates who represented the interests of the king in the court, could not claim 
such privileges: their walking after the conseillers in the public processions and their exclusion from conseil 
sessions manifested clearly that, contrary to the greffier, they were not part of the parlementaire corps. 
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the quality standards of the arrêt set by royal laws.731 Thus, the greffier should have appeared to be, in all 
respects, the ideal manufacturer of arrêts. As matter of fact, if we look at royal jurisdictions below the 
Parlement—sièges royaux, bailliages, sénéchaussées, présidiaux—or any non-royal jurisdiction—
seigneurial or ecclesiastical jurisdictions—732court scribes, not judges, were always in charge of drafting 
sentences.  
Royal laws concerning the Parlements, however, were very clear: they repeated consistently the 
original requirement that the rapporteurs write the arrêts “in their own hand,” and explicitly banned the 
greffiers from doing so. The ordonnance of Lyon (1510) and that for the reform of the administration of 
justice in Provence (1535) pointed out that a number of conseillers “ha[d] [the arrêt] made by the 
greffier,”733 and presented the renewal of the requirement that rapporteurs write the arrêts in their own 
hand as a way to prevent this abuse. Other elements in royal legislation further confirm that what mattered 
most was that the manufacturer of the arrêt be a conseiller, not just a member of the corps, even if that 
member specialized in the writing of official documents. Indeed, while the greffier, as well as the 
conseillers’ clerks were strictly banned from drafting the arrêt, the ordonnances were more flexible when 
it came to what conseiller should write the arrêt. If, ideally, the drafter should be the rapporteur of the 
case for which the arrêt was produced, it seemed acceptable that another conseiller wrote the arrêt. As 
the Ordonnance de Lyon stated (and as the Ordonnance sur l’administration de la justice en Provence 
repeated verbatim), the rapporteurs had to have their arrêt “written in their own hand or in that of one of 
their colleagues [“compagnons”].”734 The ordonnance specified that this “compagnon” was to be 
                                                      
731 About those standards, see below. 
732 See for instance  articles 68 and 101 of the Ordonnance de Blois (1498) that made it clear that greffiers wrote 
sentences in bailliages and sénéchaussées (Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la 
révolution de 1789, XI, 353). 
733 Ordonnance de Lyon, art. 28 (ibid., XI, 590) ; Ordonnance sur l’administration de la justice en Provence, art. 76 
(ibid., XII, 441). 
734 Ibid. 
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preferably “of the [same] chamber”735 but the article did not go any further and did not even require that 
that other conseiller had been present during the rapport or the deliberation on the case. 
Thus, it was crucial that the person who held the pen be a conseiller in the Parlement, and I argue 
that this absolute requirement was dictated, to some extent, by the perception that sovereign power almost 
materialized in the arrêt as physical object. Indeed, the “dictum” handwritten by a conseiller (rapporteur 
or “compagnon” of his chamber) and signed by the rapporteur and président, contained and carried the 
full legal force of the court’s decision. The particular resolution adopted at the end of the deliberation had 
no legal force whatsoever until it materialized as an arrêt-as-document. La Roche-Flavin made this point 
clear when he wrote that “the arrêts cannot be pronounced [“prononcés,” that is publicized]736 or 
expedited [“expédiés,” that is carried out]737 event though they have been decided [“arrêtés”].”738  
Thus, it is the writing down of the arrêt that formally gave the decision its force, and the choice 
of a conseiller rather than the greffier to carry out this writing highlights important aspects of the nature 
of both the arrêt and of the office of conseiller in a sovereign court. The key difference between greffier 
and conseillers on this point was that the greffier wrote for the king while the conseillers wrote instead of 
the king, that is—to draw again on the theory of representation of the king—739 literally in the stead of the 
king. In other words, the greffier was amanuensis of the king, he was like a secrétaire de la main, his 
hand was a substitute, a hand without volition, that could only write under the dictation of the king, via 
the conseillers. The conseillers as for them, did not simply act as the hand of the king, they represented 
his whole spiritual body, they were—collectively—a representation of his soul.740 
In fact, if we further explore bodily analogies in relation to the production of the arrêt-as-
document, it appears that the greffier was excluded from this process because the manufacturing of the 
                                                      
735 Ibid. 
736 See my analysis of “prononcer,” p. 367-380 below. 
737 See my analysis of “exécuter” p. 380-401 below. 
738 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 120. 
739 See p. 66-71. 
740 See Chapter 1, p. 80. 
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arrêt necessitated not only a representation of the king’s hand, but also and more importantly a 
representation of the king’s mouth.  Justifying why the conseillers in the présidiaux—the royal 
jurisdiction immediately below the Parlements—could not call their sentences “arrêts,” Bernard de La 
Roche-Flavin explained that only the Conseil du roi and the Parlements were allowed to call their 
sentences arrêts because “the king spoke in [them].”741 According to La Roche-Flavin, this was not 
primarily because those sentences could not be appealed, but because of the quality of the officers who 
issued them. As he put it, “when Henri II created the présidial jurisdiction,742 he called its officers 
conseillers with the added quality of “présidiaux magistrates,” to mark their difference with those in the 
parlements, the conseil privé and the grand conseil, to whom the quality [of conseillers] belong, 
exclusively of all other justice officers.”743 If we follow this logic then, we can say that the nature of 
judicial sentences depended primarily not on the jurisdiction that issued them but on the quality of the 
officers who produced them. The arrêt was a sovereign utterance because it was produced by true 
conseillers, that is, by men who represented the king directly by virtue of their office, and whose voice 
and words were deemed to be those of the king himself. This point is illustrated very clearly by the fact 
that in the presence of the king the representation lost its purpose and the conseillers lost their voice. 
Indeed, when the king came to a Parlement in person to hold a lit de justice,744 the court lost its 
deliberative voice (“voix délibérative”), and the conseillers literally lost their voice during the 
deliberation: when the chancellor—instead of the premier président—“passed in front of [them] to ask 
                                                      
741 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 80. 
742 Présidiaux were a new royal jurisdiction created in 1552 and inserted in the judicial hierarchy between the 
bailliages/sénéchaussées and the parlements. 
743 "(…) le Roy Henry 2 en erigeant la jurisdiction presidialle, attiltré les officiers, ses Conseilliers, avec la qualité 
jointe de Magistrats Presidiaus, pour faire la difference des Conseilliers aux Parlements, privé et grand Conseil, 
ausquels vrayement ladite qualité apartient privativement à tous autres officiers de la justice."La Roche-Flavin, 
Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 80. 
744 Brown, The Lit de justice : semantics, ceremonial, and the Parlement of Paris, 1300-1600,  ; Hanley, Le lit de 
justice des rois de France. L'idéologie constitutionnelle dans la légende, le rituel et le discours,  ; Holt, "The King in 
Parlement: The Problem of the Lit de Justice in Sixteenth-Century France,"  . 
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their opinion, [they] only nodded, without opening their mouth.”745 Most simply put then, “sovereign 
courts make the king speak in their arrêts,” and those arrêts are “as if uttered by the mouth of the king 
himself.”746 
But what was, in practice, the actual process by which sovereignty was made to flow from the 
hand of the conseiller into the arrêt-as-document? Despite lofty theories of representation justifying the 
requirement that the conseillers write the arrêts in their own hand, the magistrates seemed to have looked 
down on this activity, maybe because they considered it a menial task, and most probably because it was a 
time-consuming practice that could be made much more profitable by cutting some corners. Because of 
this reluctance, royal laws made sure once again that a conseiller did not just “made” (“faire”) the arrêt—
a term that could be interpreted as a simple work of composition that would result in a template or script 
that someone else could execute in writing—but were always careful to add “and write in their own 
hands” (“faire et écrire de leurs mains”).747 To do so, a conseiller was given six days “after the 
conclusion of the trial,”748 that is, after the deliberation on the case had ended with a unanimous vote. We 
can safely assume that conseillers did not particularly enjoy this task, for they often took longer, 
sometimes much longer, than those expected six days to draft their arrêt. The fact that this requirement 
found in royal law was explicitly repeated in the oath the magistrates took each year—while it could have 
been considered as encompassed by their promise “to respect the ordonnances”—suggests that much. The 
institution of financial penalties for those conseillers who took too long to write their arrêts indicates 
even more clearly that for all the grand theory of sovereignty that underlie the arrêt and its making, the 
conseillers did not consider this part of their duties as the most ennobling or stimulating. Thus, on the 
model of “what had become the custom in [the Parlement of] Paris,” the Ordonnance de Lyon (1510) 
                                                      
745 Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, vol. 1, XXXVIII. On the practice of "aller aux opinions," 
see p. 322-327 above. 
746 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 824. 
747 Ordonnance de Lyon, art. 28 (Isambert XI, 590) ; Ordonnance sur l’administration de la justice en Provence, art. 
76 (Isambert XII, 441). 
748 Ibid. 
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extended to all sovereign courts the rule that for each day late past the six days the conseillers had to write 
their arrêt, they would forfeit their wage. 
The lack of parlementaire enthusiasm for this writing practice is also illustrated by the 
requirement that the conseillers draft the arrêts in their homes. The reason behind this requirement was 
yet another illustration of the conseillers’ balking at the handwriting of arrêts: it was meant to prevent 
rapporteurs from starting to draft the arrêt on the bureau of the chamber, right after it had been 
concluded in deliberation. Indeed, the requirement that the conseillers draft the arrêts “in their house, 
after lunch or at night” 749 was meant to maintain a strict division between the time magistrates worked as 
officers in the chamber and the time they worked as commissaires on a particular mission.750 For their 
financial benefit and to avoid spending their time at home writing arrêt, the conseillers tended to confuse 
those two types of time and activity. The king could not condone this confusion, not because it 
undermined some fundamental administrative law, but because it disrupted the judgment of trials and cost 
him—and litigants—a significant amount of money. Indeed, when a rapporteur started to draft his arrêt 
on the bureau immediately after the deliberation had ended, not only was he no longer available to “help 
judge other [trials],” but he was still being paid his regular wages as an officer for the time he spent sitting 
in a conseil session while drafting his arrêt. The issue here was that the drafting of arrêts was deemed a 
commissarial activity, that is, a one-time and individualized service, performed to deal with a specific 
task. As such, the drafting of arrêts was to be compensated by a one-time, individualized fee, the 
épices,751 that was distinct and by nature different from the wages. It seemed morally questionable—at 
least, this was how the requirement to draft arrêts at home framed it—and it was undoubtedly costly to let 
the conseillers be paid twice because of this abusive confusion. This type of moral/financial concern was 
another royal motivation behind the interdiction made to the greffiers to draft the original arrêt. Indeed, 
when a conseiller had “[the arrêt] made by the greffier, he use[d] this pretext to take higher wages” while 
                                                      
749 Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 11 (1602). 
750 On this distinction between officier and commissaire see p. 203-205 above. 
751 See Chapter 5. 
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the rapporteur “still demanded to be paid the whole épices,”752 that is, including a fee for the drafting of 
the arrêt. 
The conseillers also balked at a writing process that they perceived as painstaking not because of 
the physical act of writing—although this might have contributed to the conseillers’ reluctance—but 
because of the tediousness of the review process they had to go through to finalize their dictum. I will first 
describe this collective review in some detail and then speculate on the practical reasons that justified this 
rebarbative process. The requirement that the rapporteur produced the second draft of the arrêt within six 
days after the deliberation and that this work took place at his home rather than in the Palais, gives us 
some information about this initial and solitary stage of the process. In fact, despite another requirement 
that the rapporteur wrote this second draft in his own hand—and to some extent, because of this 
requirement—we have reason to think that the rapporteur often delegated at least part of this process to a 
personal clerk. In that case, it is possible that an intermediary draft written by this clerk served as the 
basis for the second draft, which the rapporteur eventually presented to the court. We know nothing about 
those intermediary drafts beyond the fact that they did exist, since they were explicitly targeted by the 
provisions that reiterated the requirement that conseillers wrote those drafts in their own hand. Whatever 
the case may be, the six days requirement was meant to strike a balance between the time actually needed 
to produce this second draft and an effort to avoid delaying too much the issuing of the arrêt after the case 
had been concluded.  
Six days might have been a bit short for longer arrêts, especially for those few conseillers who 
had several arrêts to draft at the same time because they were appointed rapporteur for most of the cases 
received by their chamber (although it should be noted that, thanks to the extra income they received in 
épices, and despite the interdiction I mentioned above, they were also the most likely to pay clerks to do 
this work for them). For most arrêts, however, six days seems like plenty of time. Rapporteurs were 
given this much time, first to make sure that they would be less tempted to do this drafting during their 
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time in the Palais.753 The six days deadline was also meant to give the rapporteurs the time needed for 
what was a meticulous drafting process. Indeed, the purpose of this second draft was to be dissected 
almost word for word by the whole chamber during a session that can be best described as a “writing 
workshop.” The expression “atelier d’écriture” is also the one Bruno Latour uses to describe a very 
similar—possibly identical—process in the Conseil d’Etat today.754  As in the Conseil d’Etat today, the 
rapporteur in the Parlement would read the draft of his arrêt, sentence by sentence, to the whole chamber. 
The conseillers collectively approved each phrase, one by one, and would stop the reading each time they 
thought a change, no matter how minute, was needed. The change would then be discussed immediately 
and until the conseillers agreed on a new term or approved the rapporteur’s original choice. If they 
decided of a change, the rapporteur was required to write it down immediately, on his own draft. As the 
oath the conseillers swore every year stipulated: “they [read] their arrêts to have them corrected on the 
spot, and whenever they are told a correction, they [make] it, write it down, and read it again.”755 As I 
noted above, it was only after this review process was completed that the rapporteur had the basis to 
write the final version of the dictum. 
Overall, this process of maturation of the arrêt was rather long and painstaking, and, it seems to 
me, there was more to the requirements that regulated this process than a concern for the symbols of 
sovereignty and how it flowed from the king to the arrêt via the hand of a conseiller. The efforts, 
meticulousness, and control that went into the wording of the document reveal more prosaic concerns 
about the nature and practical functions of the arrêt itself. The main concern was that the arrêt and each 
one of its words should be absolutely clear and unambiguous. This goal of absolute clarity was very 
difficult to reach because the conseillers were forbidden to lay out the motives of their arrêts, and they 
were not allowed either to publish majority or dissenting opinions that could have made explicit the 
                                                      
753 On this point, the ordonnances targeted precisely the practice of drafting one’s arrêts “sur le bureau,” that is, 
instead of paying attention to another conseiller’s rapport during a deliberation session.  
754 Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d'Etat, 69-79. 
755 “Item, qu'ils lisent leur arrêt pour corriger en séant, et que tantôt que on leur dira la correction ils la fassent et 
ecripvent et relisent.” Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, fol. 11. 
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details of the arrêt. In fact, as I have showed above, the deliberation process itself was designed to 
eliminate, at least symbolically, all dissenting opinions. 
In those conditions, the operative part (“dispositif”) of the arrêt had to be limpid. It is this same 
concern for clarity that had led to the requirement formulated in the famous edict of Villers-Cotterêts 
(1539) that arrêts, and more generally public acts, be written in French rather than Latin.756 This point is 
interesting in the case of provincial Parlements, because in most regions, French was not—and would not 
be for several centuries—the dominant language. It certainly was not in the jurisdiction of the Parlement 
de Toulouse, where the great majority of the population spoke some form of Occitan (Languedocien, 
Gascon, Limousin, Auvergnat, or Provençal). This suggests that the goal of the edict, and likewise the 
goal of the regulations of the production of arrêts, was not clarity strictly speaking. It did not really matter 
whether every single word of a sentence of the Parlement de Toulouse was limpid to the Occitan-speaking 
litigants of the ressort, but it was important that the philological arguments among specialists (lawyers 
and jurists) that Latin terms often provoked did not open up the arrêt to interpretation. Indeed, I will 
argue in more detail below when I analyze the “prononciation” of the arrêt that the goal of this 
requirement of absolute clarity was to leave no room for interpretation among experts, not to make the 
text limpid to a lay readership.757 
As soon as the president had affixed his signature to the dictum, the terms of the arrêt were in full 
legal force. This was not, however, the endpoint for either the arrêt-as-document or the arrêt-as-decision. 
The arrêt still had to be publicized, that is, the litigants had to be notified of its completion and of its 
substance, a process that was accomplished through the “prononciation” of the arrêt. Maybe more 
                                                      
756 “And because [doubts] have often been raised about the meaning of Latin words in those arrêts, we want that 
from now on all the arrêts, as well as all the other legal documents produced by our sovereign courts and other 
subaltern and inferior courts, whether record, inquest, contracts, commissions, sentences, testaments and whatever 
other legal or judicial document, be pronounced, registered and delivered to the litigants in the French mother 
tongue and not otherwise” (“Et pour ce que telles choses sont souvent advenues sur l’intelligence des mots latins 
contenus esdits arrests, nous voulons d’oresnavant que tous arrests, ensemble toutes autres procédures soient de 
nos cours souveraine et autres subalternes et inférieures, soient de registres, enquestes, contrats, commissions, 
sentences, testaments, et autres quelconques actes et exploicts de justice, ou qui en dépendent, soient prononcés, 
enregistrés et délivrés aux parties en langage maternel françois et non autrement.”) Recueil général des anciennes 
lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, XII, 622. 
757 See p. 367-380 below. 
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importantly, the arrêt-as-decision—that is, the operative part of the arrêt-as-document—had to be carried 
out, it needed “execution,” a term that applied not just to capital and corporal punishments but to the 
whole range of parlementaire sentences, civil and criminal alike.  
 
Publicizing judicial truth: “Prononcer” 
 
“Prononciation” and “prononcer,” the official terms used by contemporaries to name the practice 
by which arrêts were publicized, are misleading words. Indeed, for the great majority of arrêts, the 
publicization of the sentence did not entail a public reading. The term “prononcer” was a remnant of an 
earlier, medieval time when the caseload of the court was so modest that there was enough time to read 
aloud the text of all the arrêts. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a public reading of the arrêt 
still happened in two particular—and statistically rare—types of cases: when the premier président read 
“arrêts généraux” in the Grande Salle and when the greffier of the court read the arrêt at the public 
executions of criminal sentences that carried a corporal punishment.  
Those two particular types of cases are interesting in their own right but they also shed some 
valuable light on the prononciation of the vast majority of arrêts that were issued in civil cases and 
“lower” criminal cases. From a strictly procedural point of view, the prononciations of civil and criminal 
arrêts were identical. In both cases, arrêts were “pronounced in writing,” that is, copied by a registreur—
the greffier—in the official records of the Parlement. At this point, the arrêt—which, as I noted above, 
already had full legal force since the the president and rapporteur had signed the dictum—758 became 
“public,” in the sense that it became accessible for the the first time to individuals who did not belong to 
the sovereign corps. Contrary to what “prononcer” seems to imply in modern French, however, this 
publicization was not oral, but consisted in the deployment of routine archival and documentary practices. 
In that respect, this type of prononciation prefigured what is called today the “reading” (“lecture”) of the 
                                                      
758 See p. 355 above. 
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arrêts issued by the Conseil d’Etat, which, as Bruno Latour noted, consists in pinning a printed copy of 
the sentence on a wall of the Palais Royal.759  
The description of those routine archival and documentary practices helps understand this type of 
intentionally limited publicization. In fact, the publicization of sentences was so limited that the 
Parlement had no official process to notify litigants that an arrêt had put an end to their lawsuit.760 
Instead, the lawyers and procurators of the litigants, who were in the Palais every day, were the ones who 
notified their clients that an arrêt had been issued. A few days after a case had been “put on the bureau,” 
lawyers simply visited the office of the greffier from time to time to inquire whether the court had issued 
a dictum for their clients and whether it had been copied in the registers yet. The prononciation could then 
happen, and in practice, it consisted in requesting that the greffier write down—for a fee—a copy of this 
dictum. In theory at least, the prononciation could always be oral: the litigants could go in person to the 
greffier’s office and request that the arrêt be read to them. In such cases, the rule was that the greffier 
would read from, but not show, the register of dictum. The greffier was forbidden to show the register 
because the arrêt he read aloud had to correspond to what a written copy would have looked like, that is, 
omitting some of the information contained in the dictum.  
In most cases, however, litigants demanded a copy of the arrêt. The greffier then delivered what I 
would call a “prononciation in writing.” When La Roche-Flavin mentioned prononcer—and he did so 
very rarely—it was to insist on its written dimension, by opposition to the public reading of arrêts in the 
Grand Chambre. In fact, to mark the difference between those two situations, La Roche-Flavin did not use 
the term “prononciation” for the writing practice, but used the phrase “filing at the greffe” 
(“enregistrement au greffe”) instead. This filing was definitely a routine and mundane bureaucratic 
practice that did not involved any ritualized display of symbols of sovereignty. Obtaining a certified copy 
                                                      
759 Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d'Etat, 30. 
760 The lack of official notification opened the door to all sorts of abuses, including cases in which a litigant who 
learned first that he had lost a lawsuit could try to settle before the opposing party became aware that the Parlement 
had ruled in their favor. See Guillaume Ratel, "Le parlement de Toulouse saisi par le faux (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)," in 
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of the judgment was precisely the kind of chore for which litigants paid procurators and lawyers, and in 
most cases, those legal practitioners were the ones interacting with the greffier—or even more likely a 
greffier assistant—to make this “prononciation” happen. Thus, the involvement of the litigants in the 
prononciation was limited to paying their procurator or the fee that the greffier charged to produce a copy 
of the dictum.    
Prononciation was a publicization in the most restrictive sense possible. Indeed, while the 
prononciation did mark the release of the arrêt to individuals outside the court, in the great majority of 
cases this release was limited to the sole litigants. Thus, in most cases, “the public” at large was only 
represented metonymically by the litigants. In fact, one could say that even the criminal arrêts that were 
read at public executions, had already been “pronounced” in this same way when the greffier wrote down 
the copy of the dictum that he, himself, would later read in public. In that sense, those criminal arrêts 
were already “pronounced” by the time they were read on the scaffold and—as we will see shortly and in 
more detail—this public reading of the arrêt is to be understood as part of the execution process, not of 
the prononciation.761 
For this reason, the only prononciation which, strictly speaking, occurred orally and publicly, was 
that of arrêts de règlement, and of arrêts généraux. Although those arrêts were, relatively speaking, very 
rare762—especially in the case of the arrêts généraux, a subtype of arrêts de règlements—, the study of 
their prononciation is of great interest here. First, the analysis helps specify the nature of this very 
particular type of arrêt that required a public and solemn manifestation of parlementaire sovereignty. 
More importantly for my purpose, the analysis of those literal but unusual prononciations suggests why, a 
contrario, the great majority of arrêts did not require and even thwarted such grandiose mobilizations of 
sovereignty. 
                                                      
761 See my analysis of “exécuter” below, p. 380-401. 
762 I do not know of a statistical study of those arrêts généraux and I did not attempt one myself, but my sense is that 
a court such as the Parlement de Toulouse did not issue more than a couple each month, at best, for the period I have 
studied. Whatever the actual number, it is certainly dwarfed by the hundreds of arrêts that the court issued each 
year. 
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In stark contrast to simple arrêts “pronounced in writing,” arrêts de règlements and arrêts 
généraux were literally “prononcés,” that is, read aloud and in public. Like the royal ordinances and 
edicts indeed, arrêts de règlements were read aloud publicly in all the inferior royal courts within the 
jurisdiction of a Parlement. 763 An arrêt général was an arrêt de règlement that the conseillers deemed 
important enough to be read publicly, not simply by royal agents in lower jurisdictions, but at the seat of 
the sovereign court itself, by the premier président. This literal prononciation was staged as part of a 
grand ritual that mobilized the clearest and strongest symbols of parlementaire sovereignty available to 
the conseillers. Indeed, arrêts généraux were read by the premier président, in the Grande Salle, in an 
open-door session that took place immediately after Mass and that all the conseillers attended, dressed in 
their solemn red robes. We have encountered all those elements before: the identity of the reader,764 the 
location,765 the choice of the time after Mass,766 the costume doned,767 the whole repertoire of 
parlementaire references to the sovereignty of the court was mobilized to manifest clearly the importance 
and solemn character of the prononciation of arrêts généraux. 
This mobilization was all the more necessary because nothing in the text of the arrêt général 
itself seemed to bespeak or justify this unique ritual. Indeed, when one reads an arrêt general, nothing 
seems to set it apart from what I would call by opposition the arrêt simple. Arrêts généraux could be civil 
or criminal, they were not issued in response to any particular type of crime or offense, they did not have 
to involve prominent rather than modest subjects of the king, clerics rather than lay people, royal officials 
rather than private individuals. They resulted from the typical rapports and délibérations I have described 
in the previous chapter. In fact, it is precisely the mode of prononciation that, alone, distinguished the 
arrêt général from the other types of arrêt. The choice of this specific mode of prononciation—a solemn 
                                                      
763 Philippe Payen, Les arrêts de règlement du parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle. Dimension et Doctrine, Paris: 
PUF, 1997 ; La physiologie de l'arrêt de règlement du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, Paris: PUF, 1999. 
764 The premier président “head” of the corps parlementaire. 
765 The Grande Salle, favorite stage of parlementaire representations. See above p. 149-155. 
766 A moment that underlined the spiritual and religious dimension of sovereign justice and was, quite possibly as 
well, a reference to the figure of Saint Louis. See above p. 53-54. 
767 The red robes that the conseillers only wore in the presence of God or the king. See above p. 94. 
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reading aloud by the premier président—however, was dictated by the peculiar nature of those arrêts, a 
peculiarity not reflected in the substance of the written arrêt, but which was certainly reflected in practice 
by the procedures and processes that led to the decision to resort to this rare type of prononciation.  
Those arrêts were labeled “general,” by opposition to the vast majority of arrêts that I have 
called “simple,” but that could also be called arrêts particuliers, because they were perceived as 
adjudicating conflicts between “particuliers,” that is, between private individuals. This conception of the 
simple arrêt, to which I will come back later, entailed that the scope of its operative part was seen as 
strictly limited to a particular object disputed between specific litigants. In a number of cases, however, 
the conseillers wanted to mark that the scope of the sentence they issued went beyond the particulars of 
the case at hand. In those few cases, the conseillers wanted to manifest that the resolution contained in 
their arrêt was meant to serve as a template for the resolution of similar cases in the future. Arrêts of this 
kind were called arrêts de règlement, a phrase that can be loosely translated as “regulatory sentences.” 
The institutional processes that led to the making of an arrêt général entailed a twofold 
recognition on the part of the conseillers: first the recognition that a particular arrêt had or ought to have 
a regulatory (réglementaire) dimension, and then the recognition that the legislative scope of this arrêt de 
règlement was significant enough to turn it into an arrêt général. This treading of the legislative area 
explains that the issuing of an arrêt de règlement required a clear activation of parlementaire sovereignty. 
As we have seen before, manifestations and mobilizations of parlementaire sovereignty tended to resort 
to the same instutional procedure: the gathering of the court as a corps. This was the case, for instance, of 
the procedure used to solve the partages that could occur in the course of deliberations.768 And it is 
precisely this procedure of partage that the conseillers utilized in order to gather the corps, which, alone, 
could produce the manifestation of sovereignty necessary to back an arrêt with a general legislative 
scope. 
                                                      
768 See Chapter 7 above, p. 331-335. 
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Indeed, on a number of occasions the conseillers “provoked” partages, that is, intentionally split 
their votes evenly, so that the case would be “divided” (“parti”) and transferred to an assemblée générale 
where the arrêt would be decided by the corps as a whole and thus could qualify as an arrêt général. This 
was the case for instance in a March 1602 trial concerning the exclusion of a mother from the inheritance 
of her child who had died while underage.769 I use this case here to illustrate more generally the processes 
and intents that led the conseillers to decide that their arrêt ought to be général. The rule traditionally 
followed in cases such as this one in which the dead father had explicitly substituted another heir to the 
underage child, was that the mother could not lay any claim to the inheritance of her late husband if the 
child died while underage. Some conseillers felt that they needed to issue an arrêt général—or as they 
called it in that instance, “a notable arrêt’”—because that informal rule that came from a particular 
interpretation of a passage of Justinian’s Institutes on this point (substitutio expressa pupillaris excludit 
matrem), 770 was not unanimously approved and had increasingly come under fire at the turn of the 
seventeenth century. The disagreement between conseillers on this point was reflected in the partage that 
resulted from the original deliberation in the Seconde Chambre des Enquêtes. The conseillers split their 
votes evenly between the rapporteur and his contretenant. The rapporteur M. de Roux wanted to uphold 
the old rule and give the child’s inheritance to the tutor appointed by his dead father (in this case, his 
uncle, brother of the father). The contretenant M. de Vesian advised on the contrary that the whole of the 
inheritance should go to the mother. 
Without entering the details of each legal reasoning, two points mainly interest us here. The first 
one is that Vesian’s challenge to the traditional rule, and the support he received from half of his 
colleagues, were motivated by a sense that the old rule derived from Roman law was out of tune with a 
contemporaneous conception of equity. Indeed, Vesian resorted to a number of legal technicalities to 
argue that the mother should receive the inheritance, but the fundamental reason behind the challenge was 
that “equity seemed to desire that the mother having just lost a child, should not lose everything that 
                                                      
769 Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, fol. 14-16. 
770 Book II, Title XVI, Of Pupillary Substitutions. 
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belonged to him as well, which would just be adding affliction to affliction.”771 The point here is that, 
while the conseillers seemed to be evenly divided on the question of whether or not the old rule needed to 
be done away with, they agreed that this lack of clarity had to be addressed with a decision that would 
resolve future occurences. It is at this point, and precisely for that reason, that we see the conseillers 
intentionally provoke a partage so that the case would “go up” to an assemblée générale des chambres. 
The greffier Malenfant tells us that when the rapporteur and contretenant brought their partage to the 
Première Chambre des Enquêtes, a majority in that new chamber initially seemed to support Vesian’s 
opinion. The conseillers decided, however, that one conseiller in support of Vesian should “reduce his 
opinion to that of the rapporteur so that the deliberation could be sent to the Grand Chambre.”772 This 
was done, Malenfant tells us as well, “expressly so that it would result in a notable arrêt that would serve 
as a law in similar occurences.”773   
Once an arrêt deliberated in a general assembly of chambers was issued, the choice of how it 
would be pronounced indicated whether it would remain a “simple” arrêt, or become an arrêt de 
règlement or an arrêt général. Indeed, not all arrêts decided in a general assembly became arrêts de 
règlements. In fact, most of them remained “simple,” in the sense that they ended up being pronounced in 
the same way as arrêts deliberated in individual chambers. The mode of prononciation was precisely 
what determined the nature of the arrêt and this point was decided during the deliberation on the case 
itself. While the succession case above clearly shows that the conseillers brought a deliberation to the 
general assembly of chambers with the intention of producing an arrêt de règlement, it is unclear at what 
point during that final deliberation this decision was made. It is certain, however, that by the end of the 
debate the decision about the mode of prononciation of the arrêt had been made. This fact suggests that 
this decision was made collectively—and unanimously, given the mode of deliberation I described 
                                                      
771 "(…) fondoit son avis (…) sur l’équité qui sembloit desirer que la mere perdant son fils, ne perdit pas tout ce qui 
lui appartennoit, afin qu’affliction ne fut point mise sur affliction." Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, 
ibid., fol. 15 
772 "un de Messieurs qui se reduisit à l’opinion du rapporteur pour renvoyer le jugement du procès à la grand 
chambre" ibid., fol. 16. 
773 “expressément afin qu’il en fut fait un arrêt notable pour servir de loi à pareille question.” Ibid. 
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earlier—774 rather than by the premier président alone. The decision was not simply about discriminating 
between those arrêts that had or were meant to have a regulatory scope and those that did not—in fact, we 
will later see that this distinction is questionable, for “simple” arrêts had a regulatory dimension of 
another kind—, it was also about deciding whether an arrêt with a regulatory scope should be an arrêt de 
règlement or an arrêt général. Again, it was the mode of prononciation that underlie that distinction: the 
choice of the place, of the reader, of the circumstances of the prononciation was meant to mark the legal 
significance of the regulatory arrêt. Arrêts de règlement were to be read by the lower greffiers in each 
inferior jurisdiction of the ressort, while arrêts généraux were to be read aloud by the premier président, 
in public, in the Grand Salle, in the presence of the whole court.  
Following the deliberation of the arrêt in a general assembly, this prononciation “in red robes” 
(“en robes rouges”) was a second and even stronger manifestation of the sovereign status of the court in 
relation to arrêts généraux. This heavy-handed mobilization of parlementaire sovereignty was achieved 
through a manipulation of symbols that I have already described but that I would like to connect now to 
the specific nature, and in particular the legislative dimension, of the arrêt général. Indeed, the court 
combined those symbols—red robes, Grande Salle, etc.—to indicate that arrêts généraux were arrêts de 
règlement of a special kind, that they required a more solemn publicization because they heralded not just 
a change or clarification of a point of procedure, but also manifested a new sovereign position vis-à-vis 
broader social, political, economic, or religious themes. Typically, the changes in legislation effected by 
arrêts de règlement concerned a precise and in general rather technical point of law or procedure. Arrêts 
de règlements could also be dealing with adjustments in matters of day-to-day policy, for, the Parlement 
de Paris had been issuing rulings concerning fountains, bread, poids et mesures, since the Middle Ages.775 
Those decisions are very interesting because those arrêts, that are among the very few that did not 
intervene in the course of a trial, operated openly and directly  within the legislative domain—arrêts de 
                                                      
774 See "Délibérer" in Chapter 7 above, p. 319-353. 
775 Aubert, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'origine à François Ier 1250-1515, I, 298-310. 
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règlements belonging to that category look in their form and substance more like an ordinance than a 
judicial arrêt.  
The legislative change operated by an arrêt général went beyond the legal field strictly 
conceived: it often reflected a change in perception or approach to the general matter at stake in the trial it 
concluded. For instance, the arrêt général that concluded the 1602 trial over the substitution of a legal 
guardian as heir to the deceased father of a deceased child, did not simply concern the narrow legal point 
of pupillary substitutions. Much more generally, and as was made clear by the contretenant Vesian who 
wanted to “bring down this rule [abattre cette règle] that ‘express pupillary substitution excludes the 
mother,’”776 the issue was one of equity toward widows at risk of losing their assets. Although the 
Parlement de Toulouse upheld the old rule in its arrêt général, it is clear that this particular socio-
economic question—the protection of the assets of widows— was on the mind of the conseillers at the 
time, for, a month later—on April 2, 1602—another arrêt général was issued to deal with another aspect 
of this question. 
This other trial interests us here first, because it involved two generations of women and appears 
to confirm that the conseillers in Toulouse, in the early seventeenth century were specifically interested in 
“legislating” in relation to the socio-economic conditions of widows. In this trial, the question of dowry 
was at the core of a dispute between a mother and her daughter after the death of the husband/father: both 
women sought to have priority securing their respective dowry from the succession of the deceased. The 
mother wanted to reclaim the dowry she had brought to the marriage and the daughter wanted to obtain 
the dowry that would allow her to marry. In a way, both women were hoping to secure a share of the 
succession that would allow them to survive the disintegration of the household on which their livelihood 
had hitherto depended. In his will, the father had set aside an amount of money to constitute his 
daughter’s dowry and the lawsuit reveals that this dowry, once added to the dowry that should be returned 
to the widow, exceeded the value of the succession. The question then was whether or not part of the 
                                                      
776 "(…) alleguoit plusieurs autres raisons pour abattre cette susd. règle que substitutio expressa pupillaris excludit 
matrem (…)" Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, ibid., fol. 15. 
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mother’s dowry—that had been fused into the household’s assets—could be detracted to constitute the 
daughter’s dowry, as it was established in the father’s will. Put in the legal language of the time, the 
debate was about whether or not a dowry (in this instance, that of the widow) could be “obliged,” that is, 
could be allocated to honoring a clause of a contract (in this instance, the will of the husband). Until that 
point in time the rule generally followed by the court was to consider that the contract made by the 
husband should have precedence over the restitution of the integral dowry to the widow.  
Strikingly, the conseillers in the Première Chambre des Enquêtes who received the case, just as in 
the trial a month earlier over the question of pupillary substitution, were evenly split over whether or not 
to follow the recommendation of the rapporteur Rességuier to follow the current rule and take away from 
the mother to give to the daughter. Strikingly too, the conseiller Claret who spoke in favor of not only 
disregarding this rule, but of issuing an arrêt général that would serve as a landmark decision to overturn 
this rule as well, did so in the name of equity—just as Vesian had tried to do a month earlier in the trial 
over the question of pupillary substitution. In this trial, however, those who supported a legislative change 
to better protect the assets of widows in the name of “equity” won their case, for the arrêt général 
“pronounced in red robes” on April 2, 1602 decided that the mother should be given priority and that the 
dowry of the daughter should be constituted with what would be left after the whole of the mother’s 
dowry had been detracted from the succession. As Malenfant indicated, “it seemed more reasonable to the 
court to give preference to the mother over the daughter nixa aequitatis ratione,” that is, literally, 
“supported by the reason of equity.”777  
While the magistrates’ interest for this question of the assets of widows at the turn of the 
seventeenth century is certainly fascinating, 778 my main point is about the conseillers’ decision to issue a 
général arrêt, and what this decision reveals, a contrario, about simple arrêts. Indeed, what is most 
                                                      
777 "(…) il a semblé à la Cour être plus raisonnable que la mere fut preferée à la fille nixa acquitatis ratione." ibid., 
fol. 17. 
778 Further inquiry might suggest, I think, that the conseillers’ interest in the topic was informed, at least in part, by a 
range of personal concerns, concerns for their own wives and daughters, but also—and maybe more importantly—
for their estate and fortune. 
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interesting about those arrêts généraux and their prononciation for my purpose, is precisely the way in 
which they differ from the mass of simple arrêts that did not have such an explicit legislative scope.  
Perhaps the greatest difference between those two types of arrêt, albeit not the most obvious one, 
is that the arrêt général, read aloud in the Grande Salle, was publicized in this particular way because, 
contrary to the simple arrêt, it was meant to be interpreted. What the substance and wording of the arrêt 
“pronounced in red robes” on April 2, 1602 tell us is the particulars (the particulier) of the court’s 
decision, that is in this instance that “the mother obtained her full dowry from the assets of the husband 
and the daughter took from what was left after that to constitute hers.” 779 What the wording of this 
arrêt—that resembles any other simple arrêt of the court—does not tell us, but that Malenfant reveals, is 
that the prononciation in red robes was done “so that one must infer and learn from this arrêt that women 
cannot in any way oblige their dowry [my emphasis].”780 “Women cannot oblige in any way their dowry” 
is the new rule, the new law, the legislative dimension that makes this arrêt general. The “prononciation 
en robes rouges” is the very peculiar judicial practice, a rare mode of publicization, intended to signal 
that, contrary to most arrêts, there was something that could be and even should be inferred from the 
content of this arrêt, and that what was to be inferred was of a general and legal nature: something which, 
as Vesian had hoped in the other trial debated a month earlier, “would serve as a law in similar 
occurrences.”781   
The publicization of this invitation to interpret and to “learn” something from the arrêt, the 
acknowledgment of its broad scope, the revelation of the intent of the court in its decision, made the arrêt 
général not just different from the simple arrêt, it made it its antithesis in some important respects. The 
invitation to interpret was a far cry from the prononciation of the “simple” arrêt, that is, from the limited 
release of a sentence that was designed to offer no discursive asperities, so as to render any interpretation 
                                                      
779 "(…) par arrêt de la Cour, la mere a eu son dot entier sur les biens de son mari, et la fille a pris le reste des 
biens pour le sien (…)" Ibid., fol. 16. 
780 "(…) de sorte qu’il faut inférer de cet arrêt, et apprendre que les femmes ne peuvent en aucune façon obliger 
leur dot  (…)" Ibid., fol. 16-17. 
781 "pour servir de loi à pareille question." Ibid., fol. 15. 
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of its text virtually impossible. Was Arnaud du Thil sentenced to hanging because he had committed a 
“prodigious crime”? Coras the published author says that much, but Coras the rapporteur does not: no 
matter how hard one tries to twist and bend the text of the arrêt he wrote, it does not reveal anything other 
than the particulars of the lawsuit (who sued who and for what) and of the sentence (who is sentenced to 
what).  As we have already seen, a number of judicial practices analyzed earlier—in particular rapporter 
and délibérer—were designed specifically to force unanimity, produce brevity, and erase motives. In light 
of the analysis of arrêts généraux I have just offered, brevity, unanimity and absence of motives can be 
understood as the key features that ensured that a “simple” arrêt would offer as few interpretive handles 
as possible.  
In contrast to the arrêt général, the openness of which was proclaimed out loud and staged 
through a grandiose parlementaire ritual, the closeness and self-contained nature of the “simple” arrêt 
was reinforced through the bureaucratic prononciation—the “prononciation in writing” I have described 
earlier. Contrary to the arrêt général indeed, the simple arrêt strived to be a finished and closed product, 
because its sole scope was to end a specific dispute between specific individuals. It did not cite any 
Roman law, it did not refer to royal ordinances, it mentioned the king only when he was deemed to be a 
victim that must be compensated. Accordingly, the silent prononciation of the simple arrêt through a 
bureaucratic practice—the written “extraction” of the arrêt from the official registers—participated in the 
assertion that the court sought to remain at a distance from those cases.  
Thus, based on an analysis a contrario of the broad and clear publicization of arrêt généraux, I 
argue that the limited form of publicization of the simple arrêt—one that did not seek to advertise the 
arrêt to a larger public—befit what I would call the ideology of the arrêt, that is, the rhetorical 
representation of the simple arrêts’ judicial function that was contained in the act itself, in its substance, 
its form and its intended circulation outside the court. This ideology—to which I will come back in the 
conclusion—can be summarized as follow: arrêts are quasi-private constitutional acts, overseen by a 
sovereign arbiter. In keeping with this ideology of the arrêt, the conseillers kept at a distance from the 
pronunciation of their own sentences. This intentional distanciation is also congruent with a view of the 
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simple arrêt as a “silent arrêt.” In a passage worth quoting in its entirety, La Roche-Flavin uses this exact 
expression, “silent arrêt” (“arrêt muet”) precisely to describe the simple arrêt, by opposition to the 
“speaking arrêt” (“arrêt parlant”) pronounced in the Grand Salle: 
The arrêts given and pronounced at the hearings [i.e. Grande Salle] have much more splendor, 
efficiency, example and benefit for the public than those given over the bureau and registered in 
the greffe only. Because not only the lawyers and procurators but also the litigants attend and hear 
(…) the motives of the said arrêts, to serve has a reference for similar cases, and they register and 
perpetuate them in their memory to that effect, or even repeat and pass them on to their children 
and those to their own children and nephews, so that they can use them when they, or others, need 
them. Instead, the motives of those [arrêts] given over the bureau [i.e. “pronounced” at the 
greffe] are unknown, and only the litigants with an interest in them are notified and then they are 
locked in the greffe, which very few people can access, where they are exposed to dust, mold, 
moth and other threats. The latter can be called silent arrêts, the former speaking arrêt.782 
 Although La Roche-Flavin’s implicit preference for the “speaking arrêt” seems rather clear in 
this passage, it is most likely because of this “splendor” (“éclat”) that the prononciation of those didactic 
arrêt (cf. Malenfant’s note that there was something to “infer and learn” from the arrêt général) entailed. 
Indeed, La Roche-Flavin does not say that, contrary to the arrêt général, the simple arrêt does not have a 
legislative dimension. In fact, another passage of the Treize Livres reveals that La Roche-Flavin’s view 
was that all arrêts had a legislative dimension. 
Arrêts, simple or general, were meant to serve indeed “as laws between litigants.” This 
conception of the sovereign sentence helps us to better understand two elements I have observed that 
began to emerge from my analysis of judicial practices in the previous chapter. The first of those two 
elements is the question of the particular nature of the truth produced by the conseillers, that is, an 
absolute truth that hides the mechanisms and rationale that underlay its production. This specific type of 
                                                      
782 "Les arrests donnez et prononcez en l’audience ont beaucoup plus d’esclat, d’efficace, d’exemple et de profit 
pour le public que ceux qui se donnent au Bureau et s’enregistrent au greffe seulement. Par ce que non seulement 
les advocats et procureurs, mais aussi les parties et tous les assistans entendent la plaidoyerie des advocats, et les 
motifs desdits arrests, pour s’en servir de prejugez aux faicts et cas semblables, et les enregistrent et perpetuent en 
leurs memoires audit effect, voire les redisent et transmettent à leurs enfans, et iceux a leurs enfant et nepveux pour 
s’en aider, quand ils en auront besoing pour eux, ou pour autruy. Là où les motifs des autres donnez sur bureau est 
incognu, et n’y a que les parties plaidantes et interessées, qui en soient adverties et est enfermé dans un greffe, 
auquel fort peu de personnes ont l’entrée, non exempt de la poussiere et de la pourriture, et des teignes et autres 
accidens. Lesquels peuvent estre nommez arrest muets, les autres Arrest parlans." La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des 
Parlemens de France, 824. 
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truth was certainly guided, at least in part, by concerns over how the laying out of motives could 
potentially undermine this absolute truth. This prevention against revealing judicial practices must also be 
thought of, I think, as congenial to a particular conception of justice and its role that the conception of 
arrêts as “laws between litigants” illuminates. I will come back to the question of the political and legal 
dimension of sovereign judicial truth in the general conclusion. 
Before that, and for the rest of this chapter, I want to explore the second and more practical 
element which the idea of arrêts as laws between litigants can help us understand. It is the question of the 
apparent distanciation of the judges from the handling of judicial truth once the président and rapporteur 
had signed the arrêt. The analysis of the silent, bureaucratic mode of “prononciation” of the great 
majority of arrêts suggests that once the arrêt as document was complete, the conseillers’ involvement in 
the future of the sentence became increasingly indirect. I want to suggest here that this lack of 
involvement was intentional and that it did not reflect a lack of interest but a purposeful distanciation 
dictated by the ideology of the arrêt I have identified above.  
 
Enforcing Truth: “Exécuter” 
 
Admittedly, this suggestion appears to be at odds with one of the main contentions of the 
historiography of the last few decades on early-modern executions. Indeed, my view that sovereign judges 
“disengaged” from their own sentences after they were issued seems to clash with the idea that the 
execution of those sentences—at least in capital criminal cases—were designed to summon the 
“unrestrained presence of the sovereign” (“la présence du souverain déchaîné”).783 In this last section, 
however, my analysis of exécuter as a judicial practice shows that those two views are not incompatible. 
In fact, in this section I show how the distanciation of the conseillers from the execution of their own 
sentences might have been a critical condition of the demonstration of absolute violence that was integral 
                                                      
783 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977, 49. 
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to capital punishments. Further, I show that this mechanism did not just apply to the execution of capital 
criminal sentences but more generally to all arrêts issued by the sovereign courts. Finally, I illuminate the 
ways in which this distanciation from the execution of sentences participated in the ideology of the arrêt 
that I have begun to sketch in the two first sections of this chapter. 
When mentioned in relation to early-modern justice, the word “execution” immediately conjures 
up images of capital punishment—hangings, beheadings, condemned being broken on the wheel. Strictly 
speaking, however, capital punishment was only one particular form of judicial execution among others, 
and one that was applied far less frequently than modern stereotypes would lead us to expect. In this last 
section, I approach “exécuter” as a judicial practice from this plainly legal perspective. That is, I consider 
the whole range of judicial practices used by the sovereign court to enforce its own sentences, regardless 
of the nature and importance of those sentences. From this point of view, capital punishments—and more 
generally corporal punishments that were performed in public—are a statistically negligible form of 
judicial execution. Yet, because capital punishment was fraught with highly charged symbolic elements—
honor, publicity, violence, pain, tortuded bodies, death—examining execution generally conceived 
through the prism of capital punishment is of great interest for an analysis that seeks to interrogate the 
underpinnings and implications—epistemological, ideological, political—of this judicial practice. The 
expression of the judicial and political theories that underlay execution was much clearer in the case of 
capital punishment than for the great majority of arrêts that often only required a private transaction, and 
in some cases no action at all—for instance when the case was dismissed at the greffe or dropped because 
it was settled outside the court. Of course, and precisely because of the peculiar nature of capital 
punishment and the highly charged elements it manipulated, capital punishment presents a number of 
characteristics that do not apply to other forms of judicial execution. There were, however, a number of 
elements that capital punishment shared with the whole range of judicial executions but that remained 
much more elusive in the cases that had a less dramatic outcome. Even more clearly than in the case of 
prononciation, the common and general feature is the almost complete lack of direct involvement of the 
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conseillers in the execution of their own sentences, a feature that appears most glaringly in executions of 
death sentences. 
Here, I pay particular attention to two aspects of the performing of capital punishment that 
illuminate the way in which sovereign judges sought to represent themselves and their practices through 
execution. The first aspect is the question of the representation of the judges themselves through their 
physical absence at the scene of the execution. This absence raises a number of intriguing questions: if the 
conseillers were absent, who or what represented sovereign justice at the execution? Did this absence 
seek to convey a particular statement about the goals of sovereign justice and the kind of authority that 
supported it? The second aspect is that of the representation of judicial practice at the execution: how 
were the professional practices of the judges represented on the site and at the moment of the execution? 
Were the truth-seeking practices that had led to the arrêt—that justified the arrêt from the internal point 
of view of judicial practice—revealed, ignored, masked? What became of the arrêt itself at the execution? 
Did it play a particular and/or necessary role? Was it further validated by the enforcing of the sentence it 
contained? 
Before I examine those questions, a couple caveats are in order. The first one has to do with the 
position of my analysis vis-à-vis the rich historiography of capital punishment in pre-modern Europe. In 
the last few decades indeed, capital and corporal punishment, and more particularly the discursive 
dimension of those ritualized judicial acts, have received substantial scholarly attention. While I am 
interested as well in the discursive aspects of capital punishment, my approach is somewhat different 
from other accounts because I focus on representations of objects that have not interested very much 
previous analyses of judicial executions. My own analysis focuses much less on the king and the 
condemned and much more on justice officials and the practice of sovereign justice. This focus does not 
seek to invalidate in any way previous studies of early-modern capital punishment. If anything, my 
approach further highlights the richness of capital punishment as a powerful discursive practice. In 
addition, the analysis of representations of sovereign justice and judicial practice that focus my attention 
here, corroborates some aspects of what has now become the dominant interpretation of early-modern 
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capital punishment as a core feature of the retributive justice inherent with monarchical forms of 
sovereignty.  
The second caveat concerns more generally hermeneutical readings of capital punishment as a 
discursive practice. I myself adopt this approach because it presents great heuristic potential for an 
analysis primarily interested in the epistemological dimension of judicial practice. It does very little, 
however, to address directly the practical aspects of judicial practice, so to speak. From that point of view 
too, capital punishment is a fascinating object of analysis for it raises the question of the enforcement of 
judicial decisions with a particular acuity: how much force is actually required to enforce a sentence? 
What role does judicial practice and its representation play in the minimizing of the actual physical force 
needed to capture bodies, extract and isolate them from the community of subjects, maim them and 
destroy them in the open, in front of that community? With this second caveat, I want to point out that, 
while I do not directly address those questions, they certainly are germane to my own analysis of capital 
punishment.  
Capital punishment is a practice primarily geared toward killing individuals, it aims at their 
physical elimination, an obvious fact that seems to be lost, however, in many accounts that sometimes 
focus more on words, symbols and their supposed meaning, than on the practical reality that discourse 
reflects and affects. What intrigues me here is the way in which the discursive aspects of capital 
punishment are integral to fulfilling the primary, physical function of execution. In other words, my 
analysis ultimately seeks to highlight how discourse creates force, or rather how the manipulation of 
words and symbols can help to minimize the amount of force necessary to achieve actual practical results. 
In other words, I do approach the early-modern scaffold as a stage, but I try to do so without losing sight 
of the fact that the killings that took place on it were primarily a physical operation. 
Probably inspired, like many others, by Michel Foucault’s seminal account of the execution of 
François Damiens that opens Discipline and Punish, John McManners described capital punishment as “a 
real-life theatre production with the gallows as the stage set, and the executioner, the condemned man, the 
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confessor, and the escort as the dramatis personae.”784 The idea that the scaffold is a stage predates post-
modern analyses of capital punishment by a few centuries, for early-modern contemporaries themselves 
were keenly aware of that dimension of judicial execution. Philippe Giroux, a président in the Parlement 
de Dijon who was tried for the murder of his cousin, was said to have confided to a fellow inmate that 
dying in a jailbreak attempt would be “preferable to being executed ‘in a theater.’”785 Thus, we are not 
doing too much violence to historical actors’ own understanding of capital punishment when we approach 
it as a spectacle of sorts.  What the goal of this spectacle might have been, how the performers, the 
condemned, the “audience” might have perceived it, is another matter. It is safe to assume, however, that 
contemporaries shared an understanding that capital punishment involved a number of actors, who had to 
fulfill precise roles in order to dutifully perform this act, that is, to both make it happen and at the same 
time represent it to those in attendance, to the condemned, and to themselves. 
My analysis of this spectacle focuses on the absence of the conseillers, arguably the principal 
actors in the judicial drama that had led to the final act to be performed on the scaffold. The sovereign 
judges who had inquired, interrogated, reported, deliberated, and sentenced, were indeed absent from the 
stage. While it is obvious that this absence was deliberate, it is less readily clear what it sought to achieve 
or manifest. Despite the physical absence of the conseillers, was sovereign justice represented in any way 
on the scaffold? Was the trial, the judicial work that had led to its maturation referred to in any way? Did 
it even seem relevant to the performance of the highly ritualized execution? To answer those questions, 
we need to take a closer look at what happened in the absence of the conseillers, with an eye to how they, 
their practice, and more generally sovereign justice might have been indirectly represented in the 
performance of capital punishment, and with what intended effect. 
The first point of interest is the systematic absence of the conseillers. There was an exception to 
this informal rule in only one specific type of case: the execution of those sentenced for crimes “against 
                                                      
784 John McManners, Death and the Enlightenment. Changing Attitudes to Death in Eighteenth-Century France, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, 387. 
785 Farr, A tale of two murders : passion and power in seventeenth-century France, 108. 
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divine majesty” (“lèse-majesté divine”). Gramond, the main source on Cesare Vanini’s trial and execution 
for blasphemy and atheism (February 19, 1619), was a conseiller in the Parlement de Toulouse at the time 
(he would later become its premier président) and was undoubtedly an eyewitness present at Vanini’s 
atrocious execution.786 Likewise, conseillers could be present at the execution of less high profile cases of 
lèse-majesté divine, such as the execution of the corpses of suicides.787 But only in those cases of 
executions that were deemed to function as reparations of offenses committed against God did the 
conseillers attend. Despite the theory of representation, they did not attend the execution of criminals of 
lèse-majesté humaine, that is, regicides. Conseillers are absent from all accounts of the most two famous 
cases, Ravaillac (1610) and Damiens (1757), and they are nowhere to be found either in the accounts of 
executions of their highest profile case (for instance, du Thil, Gairaud, and Calas in Toulouse). Thus, their 
absence at executions in less sensational cases, such as the execution of Antoine Chovin I now turn to, 
cannot be explained away by the lesser importance of the crime or of the criminal, but is a reflection of a 
general and absolute rule. 
The analysis of the execution of Antoine Chovin, sentenced to death by the Parlement de 
Toulouse for poisoning,788 will help us approach the epistemological underpinnings and discursive 
implications of capital punishment as a form of judicial execution. My account and analysis of this 
execution is based on the minutes (“procès-verbal d’exécution”) written down by the greffier, direct 
eyewitness and, as we will soon see, one of the main actors of the execution that took place on the Place 
Saint Georges, on June 8, 1685. Unlike most accounts used by historians, procès-verbaux d’exécution 
were not meant to become published account of the execution, and maybe more importantly here, their 
                                                      
786 The executioner tore off Vanini’s tongue with pincers before strangling him. According to Gramont, “there never 
was a more terrifying cry, it sounded like the bellowing of an ox being put to death” (“il fallut employer des tenailles 
pour la lui tirer, et quand le fer du bourreau la saisit et la coupa, jamais on entendit un cri plus horrible ; on auroit 
cru entendre le mugissement d’un boeuf qu’on tue.”). Cited in Victor Cousin, "Vanini," Revue des Deux Mondes 4 
(1843): 725 
787Robert A. Schneider, "Rites de mort à Toulouse: les exécutions publiques (1738-1780)," in L'exécution capitale. 
Une mort donnée en spectacle, XVIe-XXe siècle, ed. Régis Bertrand and Anne Carol, Aix-en-Provence: Publications 
de l'Université de Provence, 2003, 134. 
788 I have reviewed this case extensively in Chapter 6. 
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sole function was to record the execution. In that respect, the procès-verbal d’exécution gives us the best 
sense of the practice as seen from a judicial point of view, it allows us to see what exécuter included from 
this point of view, where and when the practice began and ended, what elements seemed relevant for a 
record that was solely meant to be filed in the judicial memory. 
Exécuter began away from the crowd, at a distance from both the time and place of the actual 
execution. For Antoine Chovin, as for most of those sentenced by the Parlement de Toulouse, the 
execution began in his cell where the greffier read the arrêt to him. This first of several readings on that 
day, it was the equivalent in a criminal case of the prononciation that took place at the greffes in the vast 
majority of civil cases.789 In cases of capital sentences, this was the moment when the judgment was 
signified to the condemned, but because of the outcome of those criminal trials, this prononciation was 
stripped of all its bureaucratic aspects. As we will see, at the very instant the death sentence was read to 
Chovin, his status changed and he became already legally dead. Having suddenly lost all his rights, there 
was no point in issuing a written copy of the arrêt to him. The arrêt only had use for those who would 
request its execution, in this case, and because it was his duty, the greffier himself. The sole copy of the 
arrêt that was needed then, did not require the payment of a fee to be issued and was to remain in the 
hands of the greffier from the beginning to the end of the execution.  
The change of status of Chovin from accused to convict that the prononciation operated was 
manifested as well by the transfer of Chovin to the hands of the “executioner of high justice” (“exécuteur 
de la haute justice”) of the city of Toulouse. Indeed, although the greffier—and as we will see shortly 
other justice officials—were to be present during the whole execution, the handing of Chovin to the 
executioner, demonstrated this change of status, which also signified that from this very point on, Chovin 
was literally out of the hands of his judges. This transfer was demonstrated visually by the passing around 
                                                      
789 See p. 369 above. 
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Chovin’s neck of a noose that the executioner would hold on to from that point on and until they reached 
the scaffold.790  
The passing of this noose around Chovin’s neck was just the beginning of the preparation of 
Chovin for his execution. Two main preparations took place before the public part of the execution began: 
a physical preparation of the body of the sentenced—initiated by the passing of the noose around the 
condemned’s neck—and a preparation of the words that framed his execution. Those two preparations 
worked toward the same goal: to isolate Chovin, undermine his character, and pre-emptively destroy any 
alternate narrative he might oppose to the judicial truth, which, uttered via the reading of the arrêt, 
underlay his execution.  
The physical preparation of Chovin consisted in stripping him from any visible sign that could 
still connect him to any part of the community of the living he had just left when the arrêt was read to 
him. In a world where “dress served to express not only the gender, the estate, and the occupation of the 
wearer but also occasioned opportunities for honor and insult,”791 it meant a litteral stripping of Chovin’s 
clothes: Chovin was undressed and then required to wear only a white shirt. This dress was undoubtedly 
part of a ritual of public shaming that began before Chovin reached the scaffold. Indeed, Chovin was not 
brought directly from his cell to place St. Georges, but, as the arrêt stated, he was “put in a tumbrel or 
cart, the noose around his neck, […] taken on the usual tour, by the streets and intersections of the 
city.”792 During this tour, Chovin was exposed to the crowd, wearing around his neck the instrument of 
his upcoming execution. In this early-modern society in which one’s social role and position was 
                                                      
790 The function of this noose was purely symbolic, for it was used regardless of the mode of execution—not just for 
hangings. In cases of hangings such as Chovin’s, this noose was not the one used on the scaffold. The clearest sign 
of the purely symbolic value of this noose is that it was also worn by those who had been sentenced to die not only 
by hanging, or on the wheel or by beheading. See Bastien, L'exécution publique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 121. 
791 Silverman, Tortured Subjects : Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France, 27. On the importance of the 
social function of dress in early-modern France see Norbert Elias, The History of Manners, New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978, 143-52, 60-8; James Richard Farr, Hands of honor : artisans and their world in Dijon, 1550-1650, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, 183, 248-9. 
792 “luy monté sur un tumbereau ou charrette ayant la harde au col luy faira faire le tour acoustumé par les rues et 
carrefours de la presente ville.” ADHG, 1B 3767, June 8, 1685. 
 389 
manifested by dress, the stripping of Chovin’s clothes was a stripping of his identity, a visual 
representation of his being cast out from the community. 
The social meaning of this nakedness, readily understandable to anyone in attendance at the 
execution, was made even clearer on the scaffold by the stark contrast between Chovin and the officials 
who surrounded him. The outfits of the officials present on and around the scaffold indicated clearly who 
they were, in what capacity they were there, and for what purpose. Azémar and Bailo, the two capitouls 
present wore their luxurious ermine-trimmed black and red satin robes, their first assesseur Pradines, who 
was also their greffier, wore the official costume of his municipal office, also in the color of the city. 
Monsieur Morel, vicar general to the archbishop of Toulouse wore his priest robe, and the greffier 
criminel of the Parlement wore his ceremonial scarlet robe. Beyond the splendor of this sartorial display, 
the solemnity of what was about to happen on the scaffold and the strength of the authority mobilized in 
this event, was further underlined, not only by the presence of those local powers but by their coming 
together in a rare show of unanimity. On a day-to-day basis indeed, the capitouls, the archbishop and the 
Parlement were the best jurisdictional enemies. They fought each other over privileges and point 
d’honneur, and only collaborated on very rare occasions such as religious events or royal entrances in the 
city. Tellingly, those were also some of the rare moments when they wore the same ceremonial robes they 
wore at public executions.793 The show of unanimity was even stronger in the case of executions, for the 
officials present did not bicker over their place or role as they often did for other official events, arguing 
over who should march first in processions or who should sit closest to the choir in the St. Etienne 
cathedral. 
Thus, on the scaffold, Chovin would be visually isolated by this sartorial contrast, his plain and 
blank shirt clashing against the lavish display of brightly-colored, elaborate and luxurious robes of the 
officials who surrounded him. This isolation thus functioned as a stigmatization through dress that was 
                                                      
793 The greffiers of the Parlement for instance, only used their scarlet robe for the opening sessions of the court, the 
reading of arrêt généraux, funerals of members of the parlementaire corps, processions for major religious 
celebrations, and the entrance of a prince, king, queen or newly appointed bishop or premier président in the city of 
Toulouse. On a daily basis however, greffiers of the Parlement wore a far less luxurious but more comfortable black 
robe to fulfill their duties at court. 
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clearly meant to undermine the character of Chovin. A similar isolation/stigmatization mechanism 
targeted Chovin’s words. The reading of the arrêt was to Chovin’s words what the robes of the justice 
official were to his white shirt: it dressed Chovin’s words in rags and tore large holes in his narrative. 
This contrast between the polished narrative of judicial truth and the disjointed bits Chovin could utter on 
the scaffold, was prepared carefully prior to the public part of the execution process. This preparation was 
recorded in detail in the procès-verbal and reveals an interrogation process that was almost identical in its 
substance and structure to the “questioning” of a torture session. In fact, because others were later tortured 
in this same trial, we can say that the two interrogations were exactly the same in their substance and 
structure. Like the questioning of Vignes and Sentenac in the torture chamber indeed, Chovin’s 
interrogation moments away from his execution, consisted in spelling out in the form of rhetorical 
questions a logical and well-organized judicial narrative that forced the accused to offer fragmentary 
answers that could not form a coherent narrative.794 Like the later questioning of Vignes and Sentenac, 
Chovin’s interrogation had two radically different stages, separated by a sudden turning point. The first 
part of his interrogation was made up of factual questions on largely consensual points (“Asked his name, 
surname, age, birthplace and whether he has wife and children,” “Asked for how long he has been a 
servant in the house of the late Sieur de Marseillan, and what was his current function there” “Asked 
whether he had prepared the soup..,” etc.),795 but ended abruptly when the questions turned to offering an 
indirect account of the scenario of Chovin’s guilt. After Chovin had answered positively that he had heard 
that the Sieur de Marseillan had been poisoned, a clear change in the nature of the questions opened this 
second stage: “Asked whether he is not the one who poisoned the said sieur de Marseillan and the others 
with the said broths.”796 From that point on, all the questions were of the same nature and, as in the case 
of the questioning in torture sessions, those questions were only interrogative in form. While Chovin 
                                                      
794 See Chapter 6. 
795 “Interrogé de son nom, surnom, age, lieu de naissance, s’il est marié et s’il a des enfans,” “Interrogé combien de 
temps il a resté domestique dans la maison du feu sieur de Marseillan, et a quoy il servoit presentement dans lad. 
maison, ” “Interrogé (…) si se feut luy quy respond quy avoit fait lad. soupe ou sy s’estoit quelque autre” ADHG, 
2B 2899, June 8, 1685. 
796 “Interrogé sy ce n’est luy quy a empoisonné led. sieur de Marseillan et les autres avec lesd. bouillons.” Ibid. 
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“denied the said question,” the capitoul ignored the denial and kept going forward with his account of 
judicial truth, as if Chovin had admitted to the poisoning. Indeed the capitoul went on and asked “who 
had sent him the said poison, whether he decided on his own to commit the said poisoning out of revenge, 
or whether he was prompted or obliged to do so by enemies of the sieur de Massillan and his family, what 
they had promised or given to him, and the name of the said enemies who forced him to commit the said 
poisoning.”797  
As in the later questioning of Vignes and Sentenac, the result was the production of a great 
imbalance between a well articulated truth and fragments of what was made to be perceived as an 
incoherent denial. Unlike Sentenac and Vignes, Chovin was not tortured, for he had already been 
sentenced to death on the sole basis of the documents reviewed by the conseillers who decided not to 
subject him to the “preliminary torture (“question préalable”), but the similarity in the dynamic of this 
“preliminary interrogation,” indicates that this exchange was meant to address similar judicial concerns 
over the production of judicial truth and the possibility of epistemological instability on the scaffold. 
Despite the very similar structure, strategy, and overall concerns between this interrogation and the 
questioning of Vignes and Sentenac in the torture chamber, its immediate goals were different, for the 
judge was acting here within the execution process and he did not use force to try and coerce Chovin to 
adhere to the judicial truth that the conseillers in the Parlement had established. Rather, this interrogation 
functioned as a rehearsal to the same interrogation that was to happen in public on the scaffold later on 
that day. It enabled the small prep team gathered around Chovin in the salle d’audience du consistoire to 
do two things: to reveal to Chovin the narrative that they were going to give him a chance to adhere to in 
his last instants, and to gauge whether Chovin was likely to seize or not this opportunity. Either way, this 
preparation was meant to give an additional discursive edge to justice officials—this is the exact same 
group who would be with Chovin on the scaffold—during the public part of the execution.  
                                                      
797 “Interrogé quy luy avoit baillé led. poison, sy c’est de son mouvement et par vengence qu’il a fait led. 
empoisonnement, s’il a esté sussité ou obligé de ce faire par des ennemis dud. sieur de Marseillan et de sa famille, 
qu’est ce qu’ils luy ont promis ou donné, le nom desd. ennemis quy l’ont obligé a commettre led. empoisonement.” 
Ibid. 
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On the scaffold indeed, the repetition of Chovin’s interrogation took an even more assertive turn: 
the same questions were asked as in the secret of the chapel of the capitoulat but Chovin was not given a 
chance to answer them one by one. Instead, all the questions were asked in one go, without a pause to 
answer, and only in the end was Chovin allowed to address them in a very brief statement: “He answered 
that he had said all he knew and the truth, that he was innocent of the said crime, that he did not know 
who threw the poison in the pot nor the name of any accomplice.”798 Thus, the modalities of this 
particular interrogation forced Chovin’s last utterance into brief and disjointed statements. This lack of 
detail and cohesion was accentuated by the contrast with the judicial narrative that had just been 
articulated, the coherence of which was even clearer than earlier in the privacy of chapel, for this time it 
was not interrupted by Chovin’s denials. Thus, although in the interrogative form, this judicial narrative 
asserted a truth that appeared much more robust and cogent than that offered by the convict. It was more 
detailed, it flowed logically from one “question” to the next, pre-empted the upcoming denial of the 
convict. Of course, this discursive imbalance was made possible by the fact that justice officials 
monopolized words and swords on the place St. Georges. In complete control of this stage, the capitouls, 
their assesseur, their greffier, and the greffier of the Parlement isolated Chovin in a number of ways that 
undermined whatever brief statement he was allowed to make. On the scaffold, Chovin was outnumbered 
by the officials who were involved in one way or another in the public uttering of the judicial narrative of 
his guilt. Indeed, all the local authorities were present: two capitouls, their scribe, their executioner and 
his assistant, two assesseurs represented the municipal power, the scribe of the parlement—the hand of 
the king—represented royal power, the vicar general of the archbishop of Toulouse represented 
ecclesiastical power. What is especially intriguing about this show of unanimity is the way in which the 
Parlement—the corps behind the sentence being executed—was represented.  
The conseillers’ absence at the execution of death sentences they had themselves issued is 
particularly glaring because this type of execution was public and involved a number of other prominent 
                                                      
798 “a respondu qu’il a dit tout ce qu’il sçavoit et la verité, estre innocent dud. crime, ny ne sçait ceux quy jetterent 
dans le pot led. poison, ny le nom d’aucun complices." Ibid. 
 393 
officials. The gruesome capital punishments of early-modern royal justice should not mislead us into an 
anachronistic misrepresentation of the conseillers’ sensitivity and interpreting their absence as a 
manifestation of their revulsion against the barbaric and degrading handling of bodies, blood, and pain. 
Nor should we misinterpret the conseillers’ absence as an illustration of an assumed cultural divide 
between the elite, whose quasi-modern sensitivity would keep away from gruesome executions, and “the 
mob,” who gathered around the scaffold, driven by its morbid, medieval pulsions. A quick glance at the 
men who stood on the scaffold beside the condemned suffices to reject this interpretation. Indeed, the 
representants of other local authorities—the capitouls, the vicar general of the archbishop—who were 
certainly intent on arguing that their nobility and respectability was as good as that of the conseillers, 
apparently did not feel out of place at a public execution. The capitouls and vicar general were important 
figures of social and political power and there is no sign that they attended executions reluctantly or that 
they felt that their social status or moral authority was undermined by their association with pain, cries 
and blood. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary that, in some instances at least, officials and more 
generally members of the social elite wanted to be present at those grisly executions. One can still find 
examples of this in the second half of the eighteenth century, for instance at the execution of Jean Calas 
(March 10, 1762), which capitoul David de Beaudrigue—who had led the inquiry against Calas—insisted 
on attending even though he had not been appointed one of the two capitouls in charge of attending this 
particular execution.799 It was also the case of those grandees who made a point of being present at the 
gut-wrenching execution of Damiens, precisely motivated by their expectation that their presence might 
increase their credit with the king.  
The conseillers of the Parlement however,—that is, the men who could take credit for the 
sentence—were absent.  My earlier analysis of judicial torture has already showed that the judges of the 
Parlement did not seem to harbor—at least not any more than the capitouls or the vicar general—an 
                                                      
799 Voltaire, Original pieces relative to the trial and execution of Mr. John Calas, merchant at Toulouse, who was 
broke on the wheel in that city, pursuant to his Sentence by the Parliament of Languedoc, for the supposed murder 
of his eldest son, to prevent his turning Roman Catholick. With a preface, and remarks on the whole, by M. de 
Voltaire., London: printed for T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, in the Strand, 1762, 90. 
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insurmountable aversion for the application of pain, screams and blood. When a conseiller like Guillaume 
de Ségla was reluctant to resort to judicial torture, it was primarily because of doubts over the reliability 
of the question as a knowledge practice: as Guillaume Ségla put it, “the question is a dubious, hazardous, 
and uncertain thing.”800 My analysis of judicial torture also revealed, however, that the conseillers were 
very careful to leave the handling of bodies and pain outside of their field of expertise. In the torture 
chamber, this delimitation was achieved through a strict separation between the physical practices of the 
executioner and the knowledge practices of the magistrates. As we saw, this division of labor that gave 
complete control over bodies and pain to the executioner was not meant to alleviate the qualms of the 
magistrates, but to fulfill an important rhetorical function: it allowed the judges to assert their absolute 
monopoly over the truth-seeking dimension of torture as a judicial practice.  
Likewise, the conseillers’ absence at the public executions they had ordered should be explained 
by the function this absence fulfilled. As in the case of torture, this function was mainly discursive, and its 
object was judicial practice itself. The conseillers’ absence near the scaffold underlay a representation of 
the sovereign court and of its role in relation to the execution, it was not meant to dissociate the 
parlementaire corps from the capital punishment, but, on the contrary, to clearly assert its relation to it. 
Although the conseillers were absent, the sovereign court was in fact present at the execution, but it was 
represented by only one man who was not a judge—its greffier—and one document—its arrêt. The 
choice of the greffier as the court representative was meaningful. The greffier was a full member of the 
parlementaire corps: he was privy to its secrets, he played a crucial role in its truth-seeking and decision-
making practices. In public sessions, he performed his task of writing down the court’s memory in the 
view of all, a crucial act that guaranteed the validity of the court’s action in the public eye.801 
                                                      
800 " la question estoit une chose douteuse, hazardeuse, et incertaine" Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts de  la  cour 
de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre Arrias Burdeus religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud Conseiller 
au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle Violante  de  Bats du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une 
Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  Ségla  sieur de  Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  
Parlement de  Tholose, 24. 
801 See Chapter 3, p. 153. 
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Three particular features of the office of greffier can help us explain his presence as the lone 
representative of the court at public executions: the fact that he was a member of the parlementaire corps, 
the fact that he was not, however, a magistrate, and the fact that his official capacity within the corps was 
related to recording, not decision-making. His presence is an indication that the conseillers did not seek to 
absolutely dissociate themselves from executions but that they sought to represent their relation to 
executions in a precise way, achieved through the presence of the greffier. Indeed, if the conseillers had 
wanted to dissociate the court more clearly from executions they could have sent either one of the greffier 
assistants or one of the gens du roi in the court. Or they could even have let the greffier of the capitouls in 
the case of Chovin, the greffier criminel of the Châtelet in the case of Damiens, read the arrêt. This was 
in fact what those greffier of lower jurisdictions did with arrêts de règlement issued by the sovereign 
courts.802 We know with certainty that the conseillers were adamant that the greffier assistants could not 
replace the chief greffier at public executions because they were not members of the parlementaire corps. 
In an odd 1626 case in which three young men who, having fled Toulouse, were sentenced in absentia to 
be hanged “in effigy” for having given away in the streets pornographic images disguised as religious 
items,803 the greffier civil Malenfant expressed his reluctance to attend the execution instead of the 
criminal greffier who happened to be indisposed on that day. It seems that Malenfant did not want to be 
associated with the carnavalesque aspects of both the crime—the young men had done their deed 
disguised as ermits on “Fat Tuesday”—and of its execution—for mannequins were to be used in the 
absence of the sentenced. Malenfant suggested that an assistant of the greffier criminel could go, but the 
refusal of the court was very clear and reveals that the presence of the greffier as a member of the corps 
                                                      
802 See p. 370 above. 
803 “Le 24 février 1626 jour de mardy de carême prenant, fut faite une mascarade de trois jeun’hommes habillés en 
ermites qui donnoient par la ville aux dames des cartels imprimés sous le nom d’hermites amoureux, et donnoient de 
plus des chapelets aux uns desquels etoient attachées des médailles d’argent qu’ils avoient fait graver à une 
orphevre contenant des saletés d’un homme et d’une femme neus, comme malversant ensemble par posture 
extraordinaire et gravée sur une de celles de l’Aretin, les sales peintures duquelles taillées en taille douce ils 
donnoient aussi en guise d’images de sainteté.” Malenfant, Collections et remarques du Palais, I, 279. 
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was deemed indispensable to the image of the court that the conseillers wanted to project at the 
executions: 
On this same day April 29, this figurative execution was done with great solemnity, which, in the 
absence of M. le greffier criminel, I attended dressed in my red robe. I had pleaded greatly not to 
go, however, but the court, having heard my objections, ordered that I, not one of assistant-
greffier [secrétaire évangelistes] who usually does so when the greffiers [i.e. both the civil and 
criminal greffiers] who do this execution are absent, because of how important the case was.  This 
great pomp [i.e. the presence of the greffier in his red robe] was needed to show to the people 
how dedicated the Parlement was to repairing the insult that those ermits had done to God and his 
Holy Mother by giving away those abominable gifts on Fat Tuesday.804  
The symbolic of dress is again crucial here. The greffier was the only member of the Parlement, 
who could, like the conseillers, wear the red robe that represented sovereign justice. This robe indicated 
clearly that the greffier, while not a magistrate, was a member of the parlementaire corps. Although the 
procureur général du roi and the two avocats généraux arguably occupied a higher position than the 
greffier both in the judicial hierarchy and the hierarchy of dignities, they were not a viable option to 
represent the court at public executions precisely because, contrary to the greffiers, they were not 
members of the parlementaire corps either.  
There was another reason to choose the greffier over the gens du roi—and for that matter, over 
the conseillers—to represent the court: he was not a magistrate. This point is essential, I think, to 
understand the meaning of the conseillers’ absence: the court was represented at executions by the sole 
member of the corps who was not a conseiller, that is, the only person who was an integral part of the 
sovereign body but was not actively involved in the truth-seeking and decision-making practices of the 
court. Thus, the presence of the greffier asserted that the execution of sentences fell within the realm of 
sovereign justice but outside of the domain of sovereign judges. The specific functions that the greffier 
performed for the rest of the corps, further highlight what his presence next to the scaffold meant to 
                                                      
804 “Ce même jour 29 avril cette execution figurative fut fait avec grande solemnité, à laquelle je me trouvai avec la 
robe rouge en l’absence de M. le greffier criminel. Je fis toutefois grande instance pour ne m’y trouver pas ; mais la 
cour après m’avoir oui en mes remontrances ordonna que cette execution seroit faite par moi non par un secretaire 
evangeliste qui a accoutumé de faire les executions en defaut des greffiers de la cour, attendu l’importance du fait, 
et qu’il falloit que par ce grand eclat le peuple reconnut le devoir auquel le parlement se mettoit pour reparer 
l’injure faite à Dieu et à sa Sainte Mere, par les abominables presens faits par ces hermites le jour du mardy gras.” 
Ibid, 281. 
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express about the conseillers’ relation, not just to capital punishment as a judicial practice, but to 
executions of arrêts more generally. The greffier performed practices related to the memory of the court 
and his presence at the execution signified that the conseillers’ spatial distanciation from the scaffold 
reflected a temporal distanciation from executions. The presence of the greffier indicated that, from the 
point of view of the Parlement, what was to happen on the scaffold already belonged to the realm of 
judicial memory.  
 
From that particular perspective then, if the scaffold was indeed a stage as historians and 
contemporaries seemed to have understood, what was performed on that stage was not the final act of the 
judicial drama, but rather an epilogue to it. From the point of view of the conseillers, the drama was 
already over. It had already taken place, in part on an open stage—the courtroom—, but mostly behind 
the scenes, in greffes and bureaux.805 Thus, if we were to keep the drama analogy at all, one could say 
that, from the point of view of the conseillers, the final act of the trial was the writing down of the arrêt, 
and more precisely the instant when the rapporteur and president affixed their signature to the draft. This 
is not to say that the execution was irrelevant to the judges, but that their absence must be interpreted as 
an assertion of their particular position vis-à-vis executions. This position was determined by their unique 
relationship to the judicial truth that underlie the execution and set the judges apart from those in 
attendance near the scaffold. As I noted before, there was no radical cultural difference between the 
conseillers and their contemporaries that could explain that the judges shun capital execution out of an 
anachronistic disgust for violence. It is not as if, for the conseillers, “punishment had ceased to be a 
spectacle”806 earlier than for everyone else, but rather, punishment had never been a stage at all within the 
perspective of the truth-seeking practices of sovereign judges. Their shuning of executions—as we will 
see shortly, not just of capital executions but of execution in general—was indeed, an assertion regarding 
                                                      
805 See Chapter 3. 
806 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, 9. 
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truth and justice: conseillers did not concern themselves with the enforcement of truth, they concerned 
themselves solely with revealing what truth was. 
Thus, the execution was not and should not be perceived a validation of the truth articulated in the 
arrêt. Judicial truth was already established, and it was unquestionable, the execution could not add to or 
withdraw anything from the conseillers’ sentence. In that respect, the study of failed executions and the 
way in which they were handled in the early-modern period is telling. Neither botched executions—those 
were frequent in cases of executions by beheading—or miraculous survivals—those were rare and only 
occurred in cases of hanging—could change anything to the sentence. The judges never perceived those 
occurrences as a divine contradiction to their judgments, but, in the case of miraculous survivals, as a sign 
that God wanted the justice of men to forgive the guilty in this world.807 In fact, conseillers had no role in 
the aftermath of miraculous survivals, for those rare occurrences never led to a revision of the trial that 
would have then been sent back to the judges, but they could only lead to a royal pardon that still 
maintained the guilt that the court had established: the guilty was forgiven but remained guilty and the 
absolute truth produced by the court remained intact. 
Thus, according to this judicial ideology, once the arrêt was signed, the conseillers had no further 
dealings with the condemned man or woman. In a way then, the conseillers did not need to be at the 
executions, because the subject was already dead to them. In fact, attending the execution could have 
been considered an admission on the part of the conseillers that an execution was needed to validate and 
finalize their work. Tellingly, at the moment when Chovin was executed on that morning of June 8, 1685, 
his judges were not just absent at his execution, they were sitting around the bureau of the Chambre 
Tournelle, deliberating on the trials of others, busy issuing other arrêts that would lead to other 
executions, capital or not. Judicial practice kept running its course, uninterrupted by the executions it 
ordered, Chovin had been dead to his judges since the day before, when they issued their arrêt.  
                                                      
807 Bastien, L'exécution publique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 218-20. 
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The overall judicial statement then was that execution as practice was not just outside of the 
judges’ area of expertise, it was absolutely distinct from it. This view resembles the one that underlies the 
strict separation of truth-related practices and body-related practices in judicial torture. As in the case of 
torture, maintaining a strict separation from executions was a way for the judges to both assert and 
strengthen their monopolistic claims over the production of judicial truth. The conseillers of the 
Parlement de Toulouse demonstrated this separation in a number of ways. The separation was marked 
most clearly by their absence at the execution, and was further accentuated by an increasing physical 
distanciation from the scaffold. Originally, executions had taken place in the Palais, and the first measure 
taken to hide the proximity between the scaffold and the bureau had been to close the gates of the Palais 
when executions took place.808 As I mentioned above, however, the judges never questioned that 
executions were an edifying spectacle for the subjects of the king, thus this solution was seen as 
unsatisfactory. The natural solution to maintaining publicity while displacing executions away from the 
judges was to simply move the scaffold away from the Palais, a move that occurred at the end of the 
seventeenth century.809 This chronology of an increasing distanciation between judges and executions 
runs parallel to that of the assertion of the infallibility of sovereign justice, manifested by the role of the 
king’s pardon.810 Thus, the conseillers of the Parlement seemed to have increasingly distanced themselves 
from both punishment and pardon, and thus were ever more removed from the ritual complicity of the 
crowd Foucault described.811 The theory of representation that placed the conseillers somewhere in 
between the king and his subjects, barred them from attending executions, for those were moments in 
which the sovereign was figurated to his subject solely through the unleashing of massive violence.  
As I have already pointed out, however, capital executions represent a very small fraction of the 
overall number of executions of arrêts, both criminal and civil, issued by the Parlement. The great 
                                                      
808 Schneider, "Rites de mort à Toulouse: les exécutions publiques (1738-1780)," 135. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Bastien, L'exécution publique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 215-25. 
811 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, 58-9. 
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majority of executions—for instance the execution of a civil arrêt concerning the payment of debts—did 
not require the conjuring up of “the unrestrained presence of the sovereign”812 and, in most cases, were 
not witnessed by anyone else beside the litigants. Yet, despite those differences, the analysis of how the 
conseillers related to the execution of their capital sentences has highlighted a distanciation that is less 
visible but equally critical to the execution of all arrêts. Those executions are far less visible because they 
are not documented directly and must have never seemed worthy of recording. The main source for the 
study of those executions then is the text of the arrêt itself. As it turns out, however, the text of the arrêt 
reflected and participated in the assertion of a specific relation of the conseillers to the execution of their 
sentences. Indeed, while the text of the arrêt was always brief, its wording and syntax represented the 
judges in a unique position vis-à-vis the execution of the sentence and, relatedly, situated this execution 
within the judicial realm but on the margins of judicial practice. As we have just observed with the 
execution of capital sentences, the result was the assertion of a distanciation of the judges from the 
execution process.813  
The text of the arrêt, like the staging of capital executions, sought to convey a representation of 
sovereign justice that sidestepped the conseillers and erased their judicial practices. First, a number of 
standardized elements in the text of the arrêt combined to “depersonify” judicial practice, by turning the 
judges into an impersonal and seemingly detached collective. The use of the passive voice in the opening 
of the arrêt, “Vu le procès entre…,” literally “Having seen the trial between…,” but maybe better 
translated by “Given the trial between…,” begins this process of depersonification of the judicial process 
from the outset of the arrêt. This use of the passive voice seeks to suggest that there once was a trial, and 
there is now a sentence, while obfuscating both the practices and the practioners that made that transition 
happen. This absence of verb was a way of masking the range of actions that the conseillers had applied 
to this trial. The trial was simply “given.” At best, it had been “viewed” if we want to adopt a literal 
                                                      
812 Ibid., 49. 
813 In fact, the reflection of this distanciation in the text of the arrêt also played a role in executions of capital 
sentences, for the criminal arrêt that the greffier read out loud at several points between the prison and scaffold was 
identical in its form and structure and used the same formulas and language as any other arrêt. 
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translation of “vu.” It was as if there never was any interaction and exchange leading to the decision: no 
documents written, read, analyzed, copied, sealed, discussed, no sacs moved around from archives, to 
private studies, to bureau, no witnesses nor litigants interrogated, “confronted,” collationés, sometimes 
jailed, sometimes tortured, no fees assessed, paid, distributed. All of those actions which, as I have 
showed, were very necessary for the arrêt to be produced were erased by this simple, barebones opening 
of the judgment. What was left were just the names of the litigants and the mention of a trial that had been 
“viewed,” and the use of the passive voice took care here of sidestepping the question of who might be 
the agent who had “viewed” all of this. Thus “Vu le procès entre…” was the standard opening ellipse of 
the arrêt, it erased the principal actors of the truth-seeking and decision-making processes and it reduced 
the profusion of practices, tools and items produced in this process to the bare minimum: litigants and 
their trial. 
This deletion of practice resulted in an alternative representation of the genesis of the arrêt, one 
that was in keeping with a particular theory of the nature and function of the sovereign sentence. In 
addition to the elliptic opening and its use of the passive voice, other elements in the arrêt further 
promoted the view that the operative part (“dispositif”) of the judgment was a natural counterpart to the 
“procès”—that is, the documentary materialization of a conflict between litigants—on which the 
preamble to the sentence focused exclusively. The lack of transition between those two halves of the 
arrêt—the preamble and the operative part—created an effect of simple juxtaposition, that sought to cast 
the conflict and its resolution as naturally joined by an unproblematic correspondence. 
There was one immediate and practical purpose to this elision of intervening judicial practices: it 
made it much more difficult to interpret arrêts, and was thus a way of preventing contestations and 
additional procedures—requêtes civiles and propositions d’erreurs. This juxtaposition also had a less 
directly practical goal, as it participated in the rhetorical assertion of an unproblematic correspondence 
between the two parts of the arrêt. Royal ordonnances and édits that were also always divided into those 
two parts—the preamble, that described a situation that the law aimed to change or redress, and articles, 
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which constituted the operative part of the law—814 structured with the same intent of erasing mundane 
production practices that could undermine the absolute authority of the product. 
Judicial practice, epistemology, and truth 
 
Thus, this particular practice, arrêter, was designed to give a specific form to its product, the 
arrêt, with goals that were both practical—prevent appeals and contestations—and in keeping with a 
certain theory of sovereign justice. I have made similar observations on other judicial practices I analyzed 
in the course of this study—and more particularly interrogating, reporting, deliberating. In conclusion to 
this third part of my study, I would like to bring those observations together to examine the relationship 
between judicial practices, judicial epistemology, and judicial truth in the Parlement de Toulouse. This 
reflection will serve as the basis for a general conclusion, in which I will revisit the main questions I 
began this study with: questions on the relationship between law and society, the historiography and 
history of early-modern France, and broad methodological issues.  
I noted at the end of my analysis of arrêter, that the very form of the arrêt as document—that is, 
the form of the product that resulted from the practices I have described above—fulfilled a rhetorical 
function, seeking to validate a specific theory of sovereign justice. I would like to expand on this point 
here, and argue that this practice was, on a more general level, in keeping with a specific judicial 
epistemology and a corresponding judicial truth. Indeed, the artificial but apparently neutral juxtaposition 
of the basic facts of the trial in the arrêt—who was opposed to whom, over what type of conflict—and of 
the resolution—who was sentenced to what—was an intentional elision of all the judicial practices that 
sidestepped the epistemic uncertainties and the subjective negotiations I have observed more than once in 
the third part of this research.815 In the case of arrêter, this went beyond the practical, procedural goal of 
                                                      
814 In most cases, nothing was to be found between those two parts, and in the few cases where they existed, 
transitions between the two were very brief and somewhat cryptic formulas: “Which having seen, we have decided 
to…,” or “Thus, for reasons that have prompted us to do so…,” or “Of certain knowledge…” 
815 For instance, and most clearly, in the course of my analysis of "questionner," see p. 296 above. 
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preventing judicial appeals and contestations. It had to do with the nature of the truth the conseillers 
aimed to uncover and the rationale that underlie the methods they deployed to do so.   
Before presenting the main characteristics of the judicial epistemology that emerged from my 
study of practices, we should recognize that, not surprisingly, judges had views of their own on the nature 
of judicial truth, as well as their own understanding of why their practices were appropriate to reveal this 
specific type of truth. In other words, there was a contemporary judicial epistemology that I would like to 
consider first, as it will serve as a fruitful comparative backdrop for the definition I propose. 
While the conseillers obviously did not reflect in modern terms of “epistemology,” some of them 
offered fascinating analogies that I want to approach as refraction of a shared, in-house contemporary 
epistemology. In his Histoire Tragique, Guillaume de Ségla offered a mathematical analogy to explain 
how judges transformed the circucmstances of a crime into a sentence—the unproblematic 
“correspondence” between conflict and resolution that the form of the arrêt projected. Reflecting on what 
should guide judges when deciding on the severity of their sentences, Ségla likened sentencing to a 
geometry of sorts:  “Thus, the punishment for murder, although it must be capital, must be ordained by 
geometrical proportion rather than by arithmetical operation, because, as geometricians measure their 
proportions after the equality or inequality of figures, based on their quality and not quantity as 
arithmeticians do, so the do judges and jurists who must measure the quality of the guilty when assessing 
the punishment.”816 Bernard de La Roche-Flavin described judicial practice generally speaking as “the 
true science of law,”817 and in another passage of his Treize Livres, compared the deliberation practices of 
                                                      
816 “Donc la peine de l’homicide encore qu’elle soit capital doit ester ordonnée par la proportion geometrique et 
non par l’arithmetique, car tout ainsi que les geometres mesurent leurs proportions par l’esgalité ou inesgalité des 
figures sans s’arrester à la quantité comme les arithmeticiens, mais à la qualité, ainsi les jurisconsultes et les juges 
en la distribution des peines doivent considerer la qualité de celuy qui a failly.” Ségla, Histoire  tragique et arrêts 
de  la  cour de parlement de  Tholose contre Pierre Arrias Burdeus religieux Augustin, maistre  François  Gairaud 
Conseiller au  Seneschal  de  Tholose,  damoiselle Violante  de  Bats du  Chasteau  et autres.  Avec  cent  trente  une 
Annotations  sur ce  subjet Par Guillaume  de  Ségla  sieur de  Cairas,  Conseiller du  Roy en  sa  cour de  
Parlement de  Tholose, 267. 
817 La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 579. 
 404 
the magistrate to a distillation process, in which opinions passed through “the still of the court” 
(“l’alambic de la cour”), that slowly reduced them to one.818 
I take those analogies as refractions of a judicial epistemology, not because of their scientific 
flavor—although that is a fascinating dimension that I will come back to shortly—, but because they 
provide short, direct answers to the question I began this study with: what do judges do? Ségla and La 
Roche-Flavin’s respective answers vary, but I want to insist here on what those two analogies have in 
common, and then proceed to question this shared representation of judicial epistemology against the 
definition I can offer on the basis of my own study of the magistrates’ everyday practices. 
Both Ségla and La Roche-Flavin held the view that judging was done by subjecting the stuff of a 
legal case—identity of the litigants, nature of the offense or crime, circumstances, etc.—to the application 
of a “science” that the magistrates possessed exclusively. “Science” is the word that La Roche-Flavin 
actually used, and it should be understood not just in its older and general meaning of knowledge—as, for 
instance, in the phrase “de certaine science” often found in the preamble of royal edicts and ordinances—, 
but in the more specific meaning of a specialized body of knowledge that the term had began to take at 
the time. In Ségla’s view, this was a science of proportions analogous to geometry, and in the case of La 
Roche-Flavin it was analogous to alchemy, to a certain extent another science of proportions.819 What I 
find significant beyond this shared idea that justice was, at its core, the science of adjusting sentences in 
proportion to the circumstances of crimes and offenses, is the fact that, in the epistemology that those 
analogies entail, laws do not appear to play any role as either an instrument or an auxiliary body of 
knowledge of its own. In fact, La Roche-Flavin is very clear about the fact that doctrine—the study of 
legal theories, jurisprudence and legislative texts—is of little use to operate “l’alambic de la cour” (“the 
                                                      
818 Ibid., XIII, 17, 702. 
819 It is important to replace alchemy in a historical context in which it was considered as serious a scientific 
endeavor as geometry. The famous reference here would be that of Isaac Newton, an avid alchemist—and also, as it 
were, a magistrate at the Mint—who went on to formulate the laws of motion and gravitation.  
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still of the court”) and complete the process of distillation that drives his analogy.820 He argues instead 
that judicial practice was “the true science of law,” while the knowledge of legal texts and commentaries 
were accessory to judicial practice.821 Guillaume de Ségla’s analogy adopts a very similar view, for, a few 
pages before making the case that judging was akin to geometry by opposition to “arithmétique,” Ségla 
had suggested that another judicial practice—the evaluation of witnesses and presumptions regulated by 
royal laws—was an algebra of sorts. That evaluation, which I covered in Chapter 6 above, is the closest I 
have come in the course of this research to identifying a practice that consisted in a straightforward 
application of the letter of the law. Even in that case, as I have showed as well, magistrates demonstrated 
varying degrees of flexibility in their adherence to the text of the law.822 The larger point here is that my 
analysis of practices corroborates the hierarchy between law and justice implied by the contemporary 
judicial epistemology reflected in those analogies: as algebra was subservient to geometry, so was the 
“arithmétique” of adding together witnesses and presumptions to the “géométrie” that guided deliberating 
and sentencing. I will return, in the general conclusion, to the broader social and political implications of 
this hierarchy, in which law was subservient to justice.  For now, I will simply note that the contemporary 
judicial epistemology that those analogies reflect shares a number of features with the epistemology I can 
sketch on the basis of my observation and analysis of everyday practices.  
                                                      
820 Interestingly, to make this point he calls on another scientific analogy, borrowed from Galen, comparing judges 
whose sole knowledge of laws and jurisprudence is deemed as useless and in fact dangerous as that of those doctors 
who “because they do not know anatomy, tend to wounds haphazardly and randomly, often mistaking a bone, a 
nerve, or a sinew for another one.” (“certains médecins (…) lesquels sans être verses au fait de l’anatomie, 
pensaient les plaies, plus par rencontres et à l’aventure, pregnant bien souvent un ossement, nerf, ou tendon au leiu 
d’un autre“) La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des Parlemens de France, 307. 
821 “La vraie science du droit.” The full passage reads “The true science of law is to be learned in the Palace [of 
justice], and more particularly at hearings. The science of law, without the experience acquired in the Palace, more 
particularly at hearings, ressembles (…) those who, without having seen what the enemy looks like, have trained for 
imaginary battles. That is where true science is learned, which, as Aristotle puts it, can only be made solid through 
experience.” (“La vraie science du droit s’apprend au Palais, même es audiences. La science du droit, sans 
l’expérience qui s’acquiert au Palais, même ès audiences, ressemblerait (…) à ceux qui sans avoir vu l’ennemi, se 
sont exercités en des combats imaginaires. C’est là où s’apprend la vraie science, laquelle, comme dit Aristote, ne 
se peut rendre solide que par expérience.”) Ibid. 
822 See p. 255-258 on the deployment of a judicial algebra that divided proof, into halves, quarters, that could be 
added and substracted.  
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In order to reflect on those similarities, it is necessary first to acknowledge and problematize the 
fact that, because Ségla and La Roche-Flavin’s analogies were publicized accounts with a didactic 
purpose, produced by members of the court, they also carry an obvious element of ethos, for what judges 
do, how they do it, and with what purpose, had political and social implications for the representation of 
the profession that certainly mattered to the two authors.823 I would like to consider that this idealized role 
of the judge is an integral aspect of the epistemology those analogies convey, and I would argue, based on 
the mutual constitutive relationship between normative ideas and everyday practices I have observed time 
and again in this study, 824 that this portrait shaped the practices I have observed. 
The role of the judge in the analogies proposed by Ségla and La Roche-Flavin—as well as the 
ethos and social and political position it enabled them to claim—is that of an expert whose “science” 
remains inaccessible and relatively mysterious to the non-expert. Possession of this “science” is clearly a 
critical requirement in the process of revelation of the judicial sentence—whether that revelation results 
from a proper adjustment of geometrical or chemical proportions, according to the two analogies. Neither 
analogy, however, says much about concrete processes: what mental operations are involved in the 
geometrical adjustment of proportion? How does the “still of the court” function? What does the 
alchemist add to the components of the trial to trigger the proper reaction? We are not told. Thus, the 
analogies have two, I would argue intentional results: first, they equate justice with a specialized field of 
knowledge, and in doing so they say something about what judges do while eschewing the details of what 
it is that they actually do. Secondly and relatedly, because the analogies do not dwell on actual processes, 
the operators—the judges—appear not as passive, but as agents who play a critical but not fully disclosed 
role in those undefined operations. 
                                                      
823 As I showed in Chapter 1, judicial self-representations—priest of the law or knight of a legal militia in the 
Middle Ages—typically has social and political implications and is always meant to support claims to a particular 
role and position of judges within both the body social and the body politic. 
824 One example would be the way in which the refitting of legal concept “representation” used on a regular basis in 
the adjudication of conflicts related to inheritance was used to shape and justify a theory of the origins of the 
authority of the judges—the theory of representation—which, in turn, justified a number of “sovereign” judicial 
practices—most clearly délibérer and arrêter. But the best illustration of this phenomenon is the way in which 
judicial practice itself became a major component of the portrait of the ideal judge, see p. 96. 
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The self-representation of the judge in those analogies is not fundamentally different from that of 
the medieval portrait of the priest of law or the modern representation of judges as “oracles of the law.”825 
As my study of practices has demonstrated, in particular my analysis of délibérer and arrêter, and as the 
analogy of alchemy and even more so that of geometry seems to allow, this representation of judging as a 
process of revelation through an exclusive type of knowledge—exclusive either by virtue of an expertise 
that can only be acquired by practitioners or the mystical power of priesthood—masks a regulated 
sequence of meticulous, often formal, sometime painstaking knowledge practices, applied to distinct, 
identifiable objects.  
In that sense, I would argue that those analogies accomplish something similar to what the arrêt 
achieved: an intentional obfuscation of judicial practices that seeks to not only validate a specific 
representation of practice, but also to participate in its enactment. As in the arrêt, the elision of a wide 
range of practices, or at the very least their blurring into the complex and somewhat mysterious shape of, 
say, the still of the alchemist, does not make the judges disappear, but it creates the illusion that they 
revealed judicial truth from a simple review of the circumstances of a crime or offense, and this illusion 
participated in the validation, hence authority, of this truth. 
In other words, in both the arrêt and contemporary representations of judicial practice, judges as 
appear as holders of an exclusive, hence somewhat mysterious, knowledge that contemporary ideals of 
justice and magistracy required, rather than as the technicians of justice that the study of practice helped 
identify.The arrêt indeed, far from being either a pure decision descended from some immanent and 
disembodied ideal of sovereign justice or the result of some mysterious process of distillation or the 
outcome of the application of a matrix of proportions—a black box of sorts—was the result of a patient 
construction, achieved through a sequence of specific, identifiable, and often mundane knowledge 
                                                      
825 John Philip Dawson, The oracles of the law, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1968. I would like 
to note as well, that while the content of those self-representations do change over time, there seems to be a constant 
in the method employed to justify those analogies: in the case of “priests of justice,” and as I have showed in 
Chapter 1, medieval jurists based their claim on a number of ideas and passages drawn from Roman law, in the case 
of Ségla, the ideas are drawn from Aristotelian traditions, in the case of La Roche-Flavin, the reference is less 
explicit, but in all cases the methodology is a similar combination of loose analogies and lexical interpretations (e.g.  
jurists were knights because laws were swords, they were priests because laws were “things holy,” etc.). 
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practices. There was indeed nothing mysterious behind the process of reduction, of “distillation” as La 
Roche-Flavin would say: it was the result of the practices of a small committee of men who had 
transformed a great mass of papers, words, movements, questions, answers, and silences, into two 
alternative resolutions, that had been reduced to one thanks to a highly regulated procedure, and then 
turned into a short text penned on small piece of parchment. Thus, justice itself, like the material “arrêt as 
document” without which the “arrêt as decision” did not exist, emerged from a painstaking process of 
repeated drafting and proofreading, finalized by one last material act: the signature of a president.  
 
Yet, for all the practices those analogies obfuscated, this mystification tells us something about 
the nature of judicial truth. That truth and the judicial epistemology that regulated the practices aimed at 
uncovering and asserting it, are not fundamentally different from the judicial truth and epistemology that 
emerge from the study of practices that often occurred behind closed-door—as opposed to representations 
for public consumption in didactic treaties such as Ségla’s or La Roche-Flavin. The account of judicial 
truth I offer below focuses on its relation to objectivity, the formalism of the practices that served it, and 
its unanimous and absolute nature. The goal of this account is twofold: it is meant to function as a 
synthesis of the somewhat scattered observations and conclusions of my study of individual practices, and 
it will serve as my basis to reflect on the existence and nature of a judicial ideology. 
The relationship of judicial truth to objectivity is intriguing and challenging to observe in 
historical context. This is where one should be wary of the misleading “scientific” flavor of the analogies 
mentioned above. First, the notion of scientific objectivity is anachronistic for this time period, but more 
importantly in my view and based on the study of judicial practices, it does not appear that objectivity per 
se was either a critical tool of truth-seeking practices or a value invoked through truth-asserting practices 
to solidify the authority of judicial decisions. 
A fruitful site of investigation of the relevance of objectivity to judicial truth, is the relationship 
of judicial practices to facts. “Between facts and faith” is the subtitle of this research in part because this 
idea tied the different parts of the study together. On a first level, the phrase reflects the conclusions of the 
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first two parts: judicial practice was situated between ideas (Part I) and less fluid material constraints (Part 
II). In Part III, I showed that, on another level, judicial practices operated between “faits” and 
“présomptions.” Both of those contemporary terms had a meaning, precisely in terms of objectivity, that 
differ noticeably from our understanding of those terms today. In fact, as I had observed in my study of 
rapporter above,826 the meaning of those terms was not fix even during the period considered here, for it 
is at the turn of the early-modern period—very roughly—that the transition of those terms toward the 
lexical set of objectivity began. As the general meaning of faits slowly moved from its medieval meaning 
of “belief” or “faith” toward the modern, positivistic meaning of “facts,” its legal meaning of “legal 
argument” (the “moyens” of modern French legal language)827 remained unchanged. In parallel, the 
general meaning of présomption followed a route in the opposing direction, from an original legal 
meaning that indicated a degree of proof corresponding to a specific evidentiary basis (e.g. the 
testimonials of two witnesses) to a more general meaning akin to “conjecture.”  
I view this evolution as a reflection not so much of a radical transformation of the nature of 
judicial truth—from from “faith-based” to “fact-based”—but of an adjustment of the principles that 
governed the adjudication of conflicts in royal courts. Indeed, while judges seem to have relied more 
frequently on ascertaining facts instead of community-based assessments, the fundamental principle of 
adjudication were unchanged, the system was still adversarial and the “faits” invoked by the opposing 
litigants do not appear to be more objective at the end of the period considered here.828 This adjustment 
was in part an adaptation to social and cultural changes, possibly due to a loss of trust in social relations 
                                                      
826 See p. 257-261 above. 
827 See p. 307 above. 
828 See my analysis above of the evolution of the judicial portraits used to charge or exonerate: while there is an 
observable change since the Middle-Ages, from reputation-based portraits to psychological portraits constructed 
from a synthesis of legal testimonials, the method remained interpretive rather than deductive, and the portraits were 
still subjective constructions (see p. 257-264). In one telling example in my study of rapporter, we saw a public 
prosecutor not using facts supporting his case because the litigants had not included them in their faits, that is, they 
had failed to turn them into legal statement of facts (see p. 259 above for an example, in practice, of the reluctance to 
resort to faits the litigants did not invoke). 
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in the face of increased social and spatial mobility,829 and a reflection of relatively modest changes in the 
nature of judicial epistemology to incorporate new and external forms of knowledge—e.g. medical 
reports—in its evidentiary system.  
Again, the extent and implications of those changes should not be exaggerated and while the 
respective meaning of fait and présomption in relation to objectivity evolved during the period, the 
conseillers remained comfortable operating in that in-between. As my study of interroger, questionner, 
and rapporter showed, while the magistrates certainly attempted to ascertain facts, they did not chide 
away from relying on faith—mostly in a non-religious meaning of the term—as well. My argument is that 
they practiced in that in-between area, not because they were forced to rely on faith whenever facts eluded 
them, but because the truth they strove to produce was, ideally, a hybrid of facts and faith. The study of 
questionner is especially telling on this point: while the conseillers appear to be fully aware that judicial 
torture was not a reliable producer of objective facts, and yet they kept resorting to it. My argument is that 
they did so because questionner was, under specific circumstances, an efficient truth-asserting rather than 
truth-seeking practice, for the practice was congenial to a type of truth that needed not to be “objective.”  
Those specific circumstances were not moments or situations of epistemic uncertainties in the sense that 
“objective facts” were elusive, but that the facts of the case resisted the articulation of judicial truth. In 
other words, torture was not applied because or when the conseillers failed to ascertain facts, but when 
judicial truth could not be asserted on the basis of présomptions, in the specific legal meaning of that 
term.  
One intriguing irony here, is that in order to overcome this type of procedural dead-end, the 
conseillers resorted to a practice—questionner—which, because it was formalized in the slightest details 
of its procedures, and because those procedures aimed to maintain a certain distance and a mediated 
relationship between judge and tortured, has the outward appearance of a modern, scientific procedure 
geared toward the discovery of objective facts. Because the practice, as I argue, aimed not at discovering 
                                                      
829 On this question, see view the exchange between Natalie Zemon-Davis and Stephen Greenblatt about the 
significance of external attributes, social roles, and contractual places in determining identity in the sixteenth century 
(Greenblatt, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," 210-24 ; Zemon-Davis ""On the Lame"," 601-3). 
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the truth of the matter but at asserting the truth of a judgment, the distanciation of the judge fulfilled a 
different purpose: it sought to guarantee not that guilt was an objective fact, but that the punishment was 
an objective sentence. 
The study of délibérer, another practice geared toward the establishment of the sentence, has 
showed a similar relationship to objectivity. The procedure to validate the outcome of the deliberation did 
rely on a collaborative, peer-reviewed construction of a solution that would bring together the best 
evidentiary basis for the decision, but it was achieved through a peculiar voting procedure, which driven 
by the same adversarial principle I mentioned above, was designed to rally votes behind one proposed 
sentence, exclusive of all other possible sentences, regardless of the potential merits of the rejected 
alternative solutions. In that sense, the rules of the practice and the formalistic adherence those rules, 
valdidated, as in the case of torture, the practice itself rather than its outcome. As in the case of torture as 
well, this strict adherence to procedures of validation, despite the “scientific” sound of this phrase, did not 
entail that it was governed by objectivity, and, I would argue that, in the case of deliberation, the rules of 
the practice were even designed to leverage a form of subjectivity through the mobilization of 
parlementaire factions behind opposing sentences. 
 
As I mentioned above, questionner did not seem particularly concerned with objective facts, as it 
was geared toward the establishment not of factual truth but of judicial truth. Yet, it entailed very specific, 
highly regulated procedures, with rules that were not simply prescriptive but, as the study of practice has 
showed, strictly adhered to.830 For, as I have argued those practices were deployed in the face of epistemic 
uncertainty, they are fruitful sites for an exploration of the nature of judicial truth. As I have already 
suggested, practices such as torture, sentencing, deliberation, produced tautological demonstrations that 
functioned as blanket refutations of the epistemic uncertainties that triggered them: the imposition of a 
sentence in the flesh of convicts (execution) and suspects (torture) was a visible, manifest sanction of the 
                                                      
830 See p. 292 above. 
 412 
truth that the magistrates claimed to have reached, the guilty was guilty because he was hanged, his 
accomplices were accessory to his crime because they were tortured. This (re)assertion of judicial 
epistemology is most intriguing in the case of deliberation and question préparatoire, which, because 
they were secret—as opposed to executions and question préparatoire performed in public—entail that 
the assertion was to an extent self-directed. The judges’ relative lack of interest for the anwers of the 
tortured when following the script of their interrogation, their refusal to consider elements not included in 
the faits of the litigants when deliberating, seem to confirm that the formalist adherence to the rules of 
those practices participated in the construction of a self-intended narrative.  
Although those narratives were critical to the articulation of judicial truth among the judges, not 
all of them ended up being publicized to assert that truth. The judicial narrative validated by the 
application of the question préparatoire or that on public display throught the multiple readings of the 
arrêt before the execution, appeared to be exclusive, unanimous, and indivisible. The same goal justified 
that other self-intended narratives, those developed in the course of judicial deliberation, remained secret. 
This is where the form of the arrêt comes into play, for the elision of knowledge practices from the text of 
the sentence ensured that the judicial truth articulated in the arrêt—univocal and exclusive—was in 
keeping with a specific theory of justice. Within that theory, the authority of the sentence was derived 
from the “representation” of the roi justicier in the unified corps of the Parlement. Each arrêt recreated 
this authority by denying, through its form, that the unicity of the corps had to be temporarily suspended 
to reveal judicial truth.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Judicial truth was absolute, exclusive, and expressed in a single, unanimous, and authoritative 
voice. This is the most concise definition I can give of judicial truth as it emerged from the study of 
judicial practices in the Parlement de Toulouse between 1550 and 1700.  This study showed that the 
judicial epistemology of the conseillers—that is the set of norms and beliefs that organized and regulated 
their practices, and geared them toward the discovery and assertion of this particular judicial truth—
helped maintain a mutually constitutive relationship between a specific socio-political theory and the 
adjudication of everyday conflicts. In this conclusion, I want to further explore the implications of this 
insight to revisit and address the main questions raised at the beginning of this study: questions about the 
relationship between law and society and questions related to the history and historiography of early-
modern France.  
 
The invocation of E.P. Thompson’s name to begin this conclusion might seem odd, for this is a 
study that focused on a classic institution of power and the practices of what is unquestionably an elite 
group in seventeenth-century Languedoc society. Yet, the key word that explains this nod to Thompson is 
“practice,” a seminal site of investigation for the kind of “history from below” that Thompson advocated. 
The association between lower classes—most famously the English working class—and the study of 
practices was motivated, in part, by an effort to work around the limitations of the classic sources of a 
dominant political history—memoires, narratives, treatises, etc.—that made it challenging to apprehend 
“commoners” on their own terms. More fundamentally however, I think that Thompson’s focus on 
practice had to do with a more general view of the importance of agency and the idea that historical actors 
are defined and best apprehended, both as individuals and members of a group or class, through their 
actions. This tautological and powerful idea inspired a number of studies that have profoundly 
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undermined the Namierist approach to history that had been especially dominant among early-modernists 
on both sides of the Atlantic and of the English Channel.  
My rejection of a history of great men which, as I noted in my introduction, has been particularly 
influential in the historiography of the Parlements, as well as my focus on everyday practices entail a 
sympathy and a double kinship with Thompson’s approach that was not obvious to me at first—and thus 
did not guide the problematization or methodology of this study—but that I would like to acknowledge 
now and use as a starting point for this conclusion.  My focus on practice had goals very different from 
Thompson’s—for instance, I do not think that the conseillers of the Parlement de Toulouse need saving 
from the condescension of posterity—and I would also readily acknowledge that the practices I have 
studied are not marginal in the same sense as those of shoemakers for instance. For those reasons, I 
originally underestimated the connections between my project and Thompson’s approach, and I began 
from a partial view of my object as the under-studied professional practices of an elite group. My study of 
those practices however, did more than fill a blank in the history of an elite group, as I would argue that it 
has yielded three significant and connected insights: the first one with implications for our approach to 
“law and society,” the second one regarding the autonomy of law, and the third one for the historiography 
of the Parlements and beyond the history of early-modern France. 
 
While I would reject the idea that I have offered a “history from the top,” I would like to begin by 
acknowledging and reflecting on the fact that this study did not integrate the broad social perspective that 
my initial adoption of a “law and society” framework seemed to entail. In the introduction, I argued that 
judicial practices operated at one important point of contact between law and society, suggesting that 
judicial practices mediated between law and society, with transformative effects on both. This was, 
admittedly, a simplification meant to help me lay out the stakes of this research and problematize its 
object. At the term of this research I think this idea holds true, but that both terms, law and society, as 
well as the nature of their relationship needed to be qualified for the purpose of this specific research.  
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First, “society” has proved elusive. Although there is clearly a significant social dimension to the 
particular theory of justice that grounded the conseillers’ epistemology, hence their practices, the men and 
women of seventeenth-century Languedoc and their relation to royal justice are difficult to apprehend in 
the documents I have studied. This is due in part to a judicial procedure that has produced a disjointed 
archive that gives a partial of view of the relationship of judges to litigants—for instance, the 
representation of litigants and the relationship of judges to them vary depending on whether they are 
apprehended through the speeches of their lawyers, their interrogation, or their sentencing.831 This 
however, is a “simple” practical challenge that could potentially be solved through patient team research, 
and supplementing court records with a wide range of external sources. A more fundamental issue with 
representations of society as refracted through the records of the Parlement is that it is skewed by a focus 
on conflict. This certainly opens a fascinating window on the attitude of magistrates toward the social 
phenomena and conflicts that emerge from the sources, but this leads to a distorted and reductive 
representation of “society.”832 In part because of a lingering uneasiness with this issue of the partial 
refraction of society in parlementaire sources,, and in part because the sources made it more time-
consuming than anticipated to properly reconstruct and study the practices that remained central to this 
study, I eventually decided to stay away from this type of interpretation. 
The “law” component of “law and society” also needs to be qualified in light of this research. The 
combination of a modern, anachronistic understanding of law and of an exaggerated historiographical 
focus on royal legislative activity and accomplishments, creates an expectation that laws (“les lois”) 
would stand for law (“le droit”) when considering the relationship between “law and society.” It turns out 
that laws have been conspicuously, and at first, surprisingly absent from the documents of practice I 
studied. Indeed, beyond the oath that the conseillers sworn every year to uphold royal laws, the existing 
                                                      
831 See Appendix 2 below for a more detailed account of those archival challenges.  
832 There is definitely value in studies that have used parlementaire and more generally judicial records in that way, 
but I would argue that, for instance, studying “honnêteté” and social relations through those records—including 
sacs-à-procès, see Yves Castan, Honnêteté et relations sociales en Languedoc, 1715-1780, Paris: Plon, 1974—
entails approaching them through episodes of breakdown and infer a normal state of things through the normative 
views of judges and the rhetorical representations of lawyers, which I find problematic.  
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legal corpus—and one needs to include not just royal laws but also customs and jurisprudence in that 
category—never seemed to be the primary guide, if a guide at all, of judicial practices. To break down 
this point into the analytical categories I have used in my study, we could say that laws always seem to be 
tangential to the discovery of judicial truth, to its articulation, and to its assertion. At the stage of 
discovery, a limited set of laws provide a framework to evaluate “faits,” and jurisprudence—that is, in 
most cases, the court’s own sentences—appears to play a greater role than royal legislation, Roman law, 
or customs (in that order) in this evaluation. At the sentencing stage, the use of laws appears to be very 
flexible, a variable but certainly not an absolute principle in the geometry, to use conseiller Ségla’s 
analogy, that helped determine the proportion between sentences and circumstances. At the deliberation 
stage, laws are almost completely absent, unless one wants to count the use of Roman law that seem to 
have informed the conseillers’ reasoning in specific areas such as inheritance, which, interestingly, can be 
construed as a form of social intervention.833 Further, references to laws in the judges’ deliberations are 
often made not to invoke the authority of royal laws in support of a resolution, but to justify a judicial 
decision that could create a jurisprudence superseding royal law.834 Thus, the “law” that emerged from 
this study has not turned out to be an authoritative royal legislation that regulated judicial activity, but on 
the contrary and for the most part a system in which laws are accessory to justice.  
Thus, this research did not—and retrospectively could not—uncover a generalizable theory of 
how law and society related in seventeenth-century Languedoc, but it did identify significant points of 
contact between samples of seventeenth-century Languedoc society and the practical application of a 
particular, contemporary theory of law that posited that justice trumped laws. 
 
                                                      
833 See, for instance, p. 373. 
834 As I will explain in more detail later in this conclusion, the idea that justice trumped law did not mean that judges 
stayed cleared from legislating, but that they conceived of adjudication as a way to regulation. Tellingly, when they 
wanted to regulate by issuing a normative text, they did so via judicial practice, that is, resorting to a form—the 
arrêt—and procedures—partage and deliberation—that were in essence judicial. On this point, see my analysis of 
arrêts de règlement p. 375-379. 
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I take those qualifications of law, society, and of the relationship between the two that this 
research had set out to uncover, not as signs of a methodological failure, but on the contrary as a 
manifestation of a reasonable and ultimately productive reorientation of my approach in the face of 
sources that resisted the original analytical framework—whether because of the partial nature of those 
sources or, more importantly, because the critical assessment of their content did not warrant the approach 
initially adopted. As it turned out, this reorientation has yielded a number of unexpected but fruitful 
insights, with broad implications, I would argue, for the way in which we ought to think about the place 
of law and justice in early-modern French history. The combination of my long-range analysis of a 
parlementaire theory of justice with my study of the details of individual practices has shed a unique light 
on the idea that justice trumped laws I just mentioned, suggesting that it was not circumscribed to the 
realm of selve-serving theories, but was corroborated by the everyday adjudication of conflicts and was 
also at the core of a political agenda, which, I think, we should take seriously, with significant 
implications for the historiography of the parlements, but also for our understanding of the nature of 
political culture in early-modern France.  
The third part of this study focused on judicial practices and concluded with a demonstration that 
the contention that justice trumped laws was not solely rooted in the discourses of the magistrates—for 
example in the form of treatises—835 but also reflected and enacted in their day-to-day professional 
practices—for instance, via the rules of deliberation, similarly applied to the resolution of trials, the 
registration of new laws, or more generally any matter the court debated as a corps. In fact, discourses 
themselves—for instance the analogies between the practice of justice and geometry or alchemy I 
discussed at the end of Part III—readily acknowledged and stressed the central and critical role of a 
practical rather than bookish knowledge, that is, quite literally, a knowledge acquired through the 
experience of practice in the court of law rather than the knowledge of legal texts and commentaries 
acquired in law schools. Authors, including conseillers from the court, did not reject laws as irrelevant but 
                                                      
835 Well-known works of doctrine and political theory, such as those of Loyseau, Pasquier, but also didactic works 
intended for a larger audience, such as Ségla’s Histoire tragique or La Roche-Flavin’s Treize livres. 
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they clearly affirmed that their role was marginal, and auxiliary or even subservient to justice. I do not 
need to come back here on the details of the intellectual genealogy of the parlementaire theory of 
justice,836 but I would like to insist on its political dimension to argue that the corroboration and 
enactement of this idea in everyday judicial practice suggests that we should not dismiss the medieval 
idea that justice is the raison d’être of political power as the stale, self-serving rhetorical tool of a 
conservative elite group of magistrates, but that we ought to consider it as a definining feature of a 
political agenda rooted in a specific judicial ideology—by which I mean how judges formulated their 
imaginary and imagined relation to both their own conditions of existence and that of the litigants.  
Before I get to this political agenda, I want to acknowledge first that, as the mention of ideology 
suggests, there was indeed a self-serving—or at least self-centered—dimension to this political vision, 
and that taking it seriously does not necessarily entail adopting a naïve and angelic view of parlementaire 
theory and actions. In fact, a number of practices I studied in this research demonstrate that the conseillers 
utilized their monopoly over sovereign justice to their own collective and personal advantage on a regular 
basis. Sovereign justice was a critical instrument for their dynastic and career strategies, it was the 
keystone of their social capital and it constituted the core of their political power. Chapter 5 also shed 
light on the fact that this instrumental conception of the exercise of sovereign justice certainly had an 
impact on how the business of justice was conducted on a day-to-day basis in the parlement de Toulouse. 
The analysis of how the conseillers distributed lawsuits among themselves and charged fees for their 
                                                      
836 To summarize the conclusion of the first part of my research on this point, the idea that justice trumps law took 
shape in the Middle Ages, under the influence of royal jurists who reformulated the position and role of the king-as-
judge within an anthropomorphized conception of the body social and, on that basis, revived the legislative power of 
the kings. 
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work,837 largely confirmed that the financial, social, and political ambitions of the magistrates shaped the 
trade of justice, including judicial practices.838  
 
It would be misguided, however, to conclude that the practice of sovereign justice was a purely 
cynical enterprise, solely conditioned by the financial needs and ambitions of the conseillers. This view 
bespeaks a reductionist assimilation of ideology to personal interests, and more significantly for my 
purpose, it is not warranted by the study of judicial practices. While the analysis of distribution and épices 
showed that the financial motivations of the judges certainly had a significant impact on the way in which 
the flow of lawsuits was channeled through the court, the analysis of other judicial practices in the 
following chapters showed that the practice of sovereign justice was also guided by genuine concerns and 
expectations about truth. More specifically, the analysis of the magistrates’ knowledge practices—
especially practices that occurred behind closed doors and were geared toward the discovery, articulation, 
and publicization of judicial truth—demonstrated that the exercise of sovereign justice was also genuine 
concerns about how to establish, and impose judicial truth. Those practices were not just vaguely related 
to an idealized and purely rhetorical theory of justice, but appeared to be very directly organized by 
procedures specifically designed to produce concrete enactements of those theories.839 Because those 
theories of justice were intimately linked to a specific view of the body social and of the body politic, I 
                                                      
837 See Chapter 5 above: “La grande épicerie judiciaire: money, judicial practice and politics in the Parlement de 
Toulouse.” 
838 The century-long transformation of épices I analyzed in Chapter 5, had consequences on individuals within the 
court, as it shaped their income, fidelities, perspective of careers, and politics. It also had consequences on the 
physiology of the corps of the Parlement, a body in theory united but in practice divided into organs ever more 
differentiated, with an all-powerfull Grand Chambre at its head. Finally, it had consequences on judicial practices. 
Maybe primarily, it affected the practice of the rapport, precisely at the time when rapporter was becoming, as a 
result of a parallel transformation, a major factor of professional identity for the judges (see Chapter 7 on that last 
point). 
839 The best example of this is the way in which the theory of representation, a core intellectual foundation of the 
authority of the conseillers, was enacted via the rules of practices such as deliberation that ensured that decisions 
were made as a corps. As I have already suggested in Chapter 2, one of the main characteristics of the 
transformation of the medieval theory of representation into the early-modern period was its adaptation to an 
organicist view of the monarchical regime. As I have showed too in Chapter 2, within this organicist view, the corps 
of the Parlement represented the soul of the king, that is, the instrument of both salvation and deliberation. In 
practice, and as I have already explained as well, the conseillers could not claim to represent the soul of the king 
unless they were gathered as a corps of their own, that is, unless they were like the soul, one and indivisible. 
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argue that everyday judicial practices functioned as concrete illustrations of the existence of an operative 
judicial political agenda, which ought to inflect, I would argue, our understanding of the role and place of 
the courts and of the nature of politics in early-modern France.  
 
My analysis of judicial practices does not profoundly change the main lines of the traditional 
historical narrative of the political history of France for the 1550 to 1700 period considered in this study. 
Overall, my analysis does not undermine the account of an expansive monarchy increasingly asserting its 
hold over the provinces in the course of the seventeenth century, nor does it question the idea that, as a 
consequence, popular participation in traditional political institutions receded sharply during that time 
period. In fact, I would say that my study of practices is certainly compatible with the idea that, to a large 
extent, those changes had to do with rights, liberties, and participation in government. However, because 
my approach is not concerned with the causes of the French Revolution but with questions about the 
relatively successful functioning of monarchical institutions for the period that interests me, the focus on 
practices leads me to suggest a more complicated view of the relation between rights, justice, and politics 
in seventeenth-century France. 
I would like to do so first by providing a fuller, and I think more satisfying account of the 
assertion of an absolutist monarchy in the seventeenth century. This study demonstrated on the basis of an 
empirical study of mundane, routine practices, that absolutism and sovereignty were different in form and 
nature from the notion elaborated by contemporary royal eulogists—from Bodin, to Bossuet, via 
Richelieu and Loyseau—that has driven so much of the older historiography. Those thinkers and policy-
makers had a partial approach to the genealogy of the notions of kingship and sovereignty that grounded 
their advocacy of absolutism. Their defense of absolutism emphasized the legislative, military, and fiscal 
dimensions of royal power at the expense of judicial attributions that had originally constituted the core of 
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the revived notion of kingship from which those regalian powers had been derived.840 To be sure, justice 
remained an important component of contemporary absolutist theories, but the emphasis was clearly on 
notions of appeal and its pyramidal hierarchy that served as a validation of critical concept of justice 
retenue and the royal practices it entailed (for instance the évocation of judicial affairs). 
I am not concerned here with the explanation for this partial construction of absolutist theory and 
the selective genealogy that supported it. I am even less interested in vindicating the court by repudiating 
absolutist theory on the ground that it would have somehow “betrayed” its medieval judicial origins. 
Instead, my interest lies in the way in which the judicial practices I have studied participated—or not—in 
the assertion of absolutism. Arrêter provides an apt illustration of the role everyday practices played in 
the routine concretization of the absolutist theory of power. The process designed to eradicate truth-
seeking practices from the arrêt did not aim solely at upholding a certain theory of judicial truth, it also 
functioned as a reification of this related theory of power. It ensured that the arrêt was a direct, unfiltered 
expression of a pure and absolute will, that is, a will that commands without justification or explanation. 
Within an absolutist ideology, sovereign justice, like royal authority itself, had to appear, even in those 
smaller, day-to-day instantiations of sovereignty that were the arrêts—Parlements produced thousands of 
them throughout the kingdom every month—, not as the result of a logical reasoning or any other sort of 
intellectual construction. 
Thus, the analysis of the day-to-day functioning of a sovereign court, at the intersection of theory 
and practice, suggests the importance of the wide in-between space that separates normative political 
discourses that theorized absolutism and the extremely brutal but relatively rare—especially after the 
1640s and 1650s—episodes of violent repression of resistance to absolutist policies. In my view, the day-
to-day reification of political theory through the mostly bureaucratic adjudication of conflicts that touched 
all levels of society, an adjudication that embeds participation and a somewhat voluntary endorsement 
from all “classes,” is the bedrock of the expansion of royal power in the early-modern period. This view 
                                                      
840 This is particularly clear for authors such as Loyseau, whose legal training meant that they were certainly aware 
of the feudal origins of the concepts they manipulated, but skipped over the medieval theoretical corpus to reach out 
for Roman theories that were much more amenable to their argument. On this point, see p. 31 above. 
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does not entail a romanticized account of a more “gentle” version of absolutist expansion, for royal justice 
did unleash a great deal of violence of its own, but a more complicated one, in which the intimate link 
between the use of authoritarian but mostly normative discourses and the use of physical force—from 
jails, to torture chambers, to scaffolds—can be problematized and observed through the repeated 
occurrences of practice. 
  
Thus, despite the historiographical emphasis on the resistance of the sovereign courts to the 
king—and, leaving aside the eighteenth century, the Fronde and the Jansenist questions constitute two 
significant episodes for the seventeenth century—the study of practices functions not just as a reminder 
but as concrete illustration of the cooperation between the central government and the parlements in 
maintaining and furthering royal authority. Parlements, which in many ways embodied the social order 
the monarchy stood for, were unsurprisingly monarchist in their ideas and their practices. 
This convergence of vision and interest between the monarch and its sovereign courts does not 
entail, however, a shared and monolithical view of monarchical rule, of the respective roles and duties of 
the king and the courts. This is a second area where the analysis of judicial practices complicates the 
traditional narrative of the expansion of absolutism: it shows that the century-long intellectual genealogy 
of the political view of the courts was not confined to a theoretical and rhetorically normative level, but 
was operative throughout this perioed in the everyday practices that regulated the adjudication of conflicts 
of all classes of men and women. 
I would define this alternative monarchical vision as “judicial politics,” and it should be clear at 
this point that my understanding of this phrase is quite different from that Julian Swan proposed.841 His is 
a traditional “high” politics—intrigues, factions, negotiations—that is judicial only in that sense that it is 
practiced by judges through the politicization of judicial matters. Within that understanding, the interest 
for the institutional practices of the sovereign court is very partial and remains focused on the same 
                                                      
841 Swann, Julian. Politics and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754-1774. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
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classical sources—lits de justice and lettres de remontrances—that are viewed as a simple façade for 
traditional games of court politics. The “judicial politics” I suggest we should consider as one of the 
foundations of a parlementaire political vision is an almost exact opposite, as it proposes to take a longer 
and broader view of the court’s actions, one that encourages us to consider the judicial dimension of 
political affairs rather than that politicization of judicial affairs. 
One admittedly ironical illustration of the implications of this view of “judicial politics” is that it 
can be mobilized to re-examine the “constitutional question” that has obsessed much of the historiography 
that has been dismissive of the court’s judicial activities. Such a re-examination does not take at face-
value the parlementaire argument that justice, not legislation, is at the heart of law (“le droit”) but 
acknowledges that this idea had enough relevance to regulate judicial practices and, possibly, resonated 
with a political culture shared beyond the ranks of the conseillers. Once we set aside our post-
Montesquieuan lenses to consider the constitutional question from a perspective in which justice trumps 
laws and privilege is not an exception but a norm, it appears that the actions of the Parlement—well 
before the eighteenth century and outside of the context of resistance to the legislative agenda of the 
crown—had very much to do with a constitution, not the type of constitution dictated by teleogical 
concerns over the debates that preceded the Revolution, but one that makes sense within a political 
imagination in which justice still was indeed the raison d’être of political power. 
This view does not entail adopting parlementaire arguments about their supposed guardianship of 
the fundamental laws of the realm (“lois fondamentales du royaume”) — a largely rhetorical and 
historically inaccurate argument—or the view that, because the conseillers were in charge of the 
“manutention of public order,” as an eighteenth-century president would put it—842 only they had the 
practical experience required to recognize the viability of new laws—one would say their 
constitutionality, if the kingdom of France had had such a written document. Based on evidence found in 
the observation of everyday practice however, I think we can consider seriously the implications of the 
                                                      
842 See n. 199. Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, II, 20 
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conseillers’ view that the routine adjudication of conflicts, not doctrine, was “the true legal science”843 
and that this “science” not only gave them the authority to deliberate on the registration of new laws, but 
imposed on them to do so.  
My argument is that the study of judicial practices suggests the existence of an early-modern 
form of “état de droit,” one in which, as I previously suggested, droit meant justice more than it meant 
laws—a notion that is not readily palatable to a modern mind to begin with, but that is rendered even more 
difficult to apprehend in an Old Regime context in which most individuals had no rights. Yet, I want to 
suggest that in the absence of a constitution that guaranteed individual rights, rights that could serve as a 
basis for their judgment in courts of laws, the sentences of those tribunals—especially final, written 
sentences such as the arrêts—functioned as rights of sorts. In other words, written rights were found post 
facto in the judgment rather than ex ante in a constitution. It is easy, from our distant perspective, to 
denounce the inconsistencies and outright aberrations of this legal regime—this is in essence what authors 
like Voltaire or Beccaria did in the eighteenth century at a time when it was far more challenging to do 
so—but it does not help us much addressing a challenging historical question: how this different type of 
regime, the judicial system it entailed, the judicial practices it set into action, and the judicial truth it 
produced came to be an acceptable or even desirable norms for those who were subjected to it. 
The practices studied in this research are part of the equation: they are sometimes the tools that 
litigants themselves adopted to advance their interests, validating and perpetuating in the process their 
own legal subjugation. In fact, the very procedure used by the courts re-enacted with each lawsuit that the 
litigants themselves triggered the core judicial concept of “à chacun son droit,” this fundamental Old 
Regime principle that judgments are not based on equal individual rights—which did not exist—but on a 
case by case evaluation of respective individual’s rights—whether those are derived from personal status 
(“privilège”) or belonging to a group (“libertés”). Thus, judging could not be about maintaining rights 
inscribed in a constitution—for they did not exist—but about recreating them over and over again on an 
                                                      
843 Treze livres des Parlemens de France, IV, 38, 307. 
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individual basis. Arrêts then, were “monuments” “so important to so many citizens” as the engineer 
François Garipuy, an outsider of the court, put it, because they materialized what I would call private 
constitutional moments, overseen by the courts and guaranteed by the king. 
 
Thus, my study of judicial practices in the Parlement de Toulouse confirmed a twofold issue 
within an older historiography of the courts: first that its teleological obsession with the French 
Revolution entailed a narrow focus on the political crises of the eighteenth century thad led it to miss or 
downplay an important aspects of the sovereign courts’ activity—including its role in advancing 
absolutism via the adjudication of everyday conflicts—and secondly, and more importantly in my view, 
that in doing so, it has adopted a narrow view of politics in general, obfuscating in the process a 
contemporary understanding of justice and the central role it played in the political culture of the 
conseillers. This study does not support the view that those courts were apolitical and thus should be 
rehabilitated because they met our modern expectation of a clear separation between justice and politics—
this would be a historical contresens—but that, quite on the contrary, those courts were highly political 
institutions, precisely because the concept of justice and its implementation in practice were a significant 
dimension of early-modern politics. By restituting this aspect of the courts’ activity through an 
examination of the conseillers’ everyday practices, this research highlighted concretely what I think is a 
major dimension of the outillage mental that shaped the magistrates’ thinking and actions, including their 
attitude vis-à-vis the king and his legislative agenda. 
This is not to say that parlementaire opposition to royal reforms—whether in the seventeenth or 
the eighteenth century—was justified, but that it should be approached as a piece of a coherent rationale 
that underlay a specific political agenda. In turn, the coherence of this agenda certainly does not entail 
that it was desirable or that we, from our distant historical perspective, should subscribe to it. The 
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question of the merits and faults of this parlementaire agenda is—to borrow a phrase from Lucien 
Febvre— “une question mal posée.”844  
                                                      
844 Lucien Febvre, "Une question mal posée: les origines de la réforme française et les causes de la réforme," Revue 
Historique 161 (1929): 1-73. 
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Appendix 1: Royal courts in the ressort of the parlement de Toulouse (1715) 
_______________________________ 
 
v Sénéchaussées (pays/province - date of creation of présidial court, if 
any). 
• Sièges royaux within the sénéchaussée. 
_______________________________ 
 
v Annonay (Vivarais) 
• Boulieu-le-Roi 
 
v Auch (Gascogne - 1639) 
• Arreau 
• Sarrancolin 
• Vignec 
• Gembrie 
• Barran 
• Castelnau-de-Magnoac 
• Monléon 
• Fleurance 
• Saint-Puy 
• Castéra 
• Jegun 
• Mauvezin 
• Vic-Fezensac 
• Lanepax 
• Villecomtal 
• Montréjeau 
 
v Béziers (Languedoc - 1551) 
• Agel 
• Aiguesvives 
• Autignac 
• Autignanet 
• Bassan 
• Boujan 
• Cers 
• Colombiers 
• Corneilhan 
• Cruzy 
• Fraisse 
• Gignac 
• Maraussan 
• Montady 
• Puisserguier 
• Rieussec 
• Sabazan 
• Saint-Nazaire 
• Thézan 
 
v Cahors (Quercy - 1551) 
• Duravel 
• Montcabrier 
 
v Carcassonne (Languedoc - 
1551) 
• Viguerie d’Albi 
• Anglès 
• Le Soulié 
• Lamontélarié 
• Cité de Carcassonne 
• Coursan 
• Cuxac 
• Ouveillan 
• Montoulieu 
• Montréal 
• Narbonne 
• Réalmont 
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v Castelnaudary (Languedoc - 
1551) 
• Avignonet 
• Auterive 
• Cintegabelle 
• Cuq-Toulza 
• Laurac 
• Montgiscard 
• Revel 
 
v Castres (Languedoc) 
• Cadalen 
• Castelviel 
• Curvale 
• Lombers 
• Saint-Juéry 
 
v Figeac (Quercy) 
• Gagnac 
• Lamilières 
 
v Gourdon (Guyenne)  
• Cazals 
• Calès 
• Carlucet 
• Couzou 
• Dégagnac 
• Montfaucon 
• Mont-Sainte-Marie 
• Saint-Romain 
• Soullaguet 
 
v Lauzerte (Guyenne) 
• Moissac 
• Montcup 
• Saint-Daunes 
 
v Lectoure (Gascogne - 1621) 
• Auvillars 
• Bretagne 
• Castelnau 
• Caudecoste 
• Eauze 
• Houga 
• Ladevèze 
• Laplume 
• Lavit de Lomagne 
• Manciet 
• Maubourguet 
• Miradoux 
• Nogaro 
• Saint-Clar 
• Tasque 
 
v Limoux (Languedoc - 1642) 
• Caudiès 
• Fanjeaux 
• Félines 
• Termes 
 
v L’Isle-en-Jourdain (Guyenne) 
 
v Martel (Guyenne) 
• Alix 
• Gagnac 
 
v Montauban (Guyenne - 1630) 
• Beauregard 
• Caussade 
• Caylux 
• Lavaurette 
• Lespare 
• Mirabel 
• Moissac 
• Molières 
• Montalzat 
• Monfermier 
• Promilhanes 
• Saint-Caprais 
• Septfonds 
• Villemade 
 
v Montpellier (Languedoc - 1552) 
• Aigues-mortes 
• Frontignan 
• Lunel 
 
v Nîmes (Languedoc - 1551) 
• Beaucaire 
• Maruejols 
• Mende (bailliage royal) 
• Le Vigan 
• Roquemaure 
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• Saint-Esprit 
• Valleraugue 
• Villeneuve-lès-Avignon 
 
v Pamiers (Pays de Foix - 1646) 
• Aspet 
• Castillon 
• Fronsac 
• Frontignan 
• Mazères 
 
v Le Puy-en-Velay (Velay - 1549) 
• Monfaucon 
 
v Rodez (Rouergue - 1635) 
• Casagnes 
• Laguiole 
• Lavernehe 
• Saint-Geniez 
 
v Tarbes (Bigorre) 
• Bagnères 
• Vic-Bigorre 
• Goudon 
• Rabastens 
 
v Toulouse (Languedoc - 1551) 
• Aurignac 
• Beaumont-de-Lomagne 
• Boulogne 
• Castelsarrasin et Montech 
• Cordes 
• Estampures 
• Frontignan 
• Gaillac 
• Gaillac-Toulza 
• Galan 
• Gimont 
• Grenade 
• Huos 
• L’Isle-d’Albi 
• L’Isle-en-Dodon 
• Lavaur 
• Marciac et Beaumarchés 
• Muret 
• Mas-Grenier 
• Rabastens 
• Rieumes 
• Rieux 
• Samatan 
• Saint-Béat 
• Saint-Gaudens 
• Saint-Lys 
• Sainte-Foy-Peyrolières 
• Saint-Porquier 
• Saint-Sulpice-de-Lézat 
• Saint-Sulpice-de-la-Pointe 
• Simorre, Tournay 
• Trie 
• Valcabrère 
• Valence-d’Albi 
• Verdun 
 
v Uzès (Languedoc) 
 
v Villefranche-de-Rouergue 
(Rouergue - 1552) 
• Albin 
• Auzits et Clausevignes 
• Lavinzelle 
• Mur-de-Barrez et Labastice 
• Millau 
• Najac 
• Maussac 
• Peyrusse 
• Pont-de-Camarès 
• Rieupeyroux 
• Rignac 
• Roqueserière et Montfranc 
• Sauveterre 
• Saint-Affrique 
• Saint-Antonin et Verfeil 
• Saint-Rome 
• Saint-Sernin et Valaguier 
• Silvanès 
• Villeneuve 
 
v Villeneuve-de-Berg (Vivarais) 
• Borne 
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Appendix 2: A note on sources 
 
 
As noted in the introduction, the exceptional archive of the Parlement de Toulouse played a 
critical role in this research. For methodological reasons, however, the preceding chapters do not always 
reflect adequately the wealth of documents that served as a basis for my analyses. One of the drawbacks 
of my effort to synthesize extensive judicial cases is that trials and their particulars end up disappearing in 
an analytical account that seeks to generalize. In this note on sources, I would like to do justice to the 
exceptional primary sources that form the bedrock of this study, and use the opportunity of this 
presentation to explain the approach I adopted to make the most out of this dauting archival mass and the 
incredible wealth of information it contains.  
 
Much of my focus here will be on the sac-à-procès of the Parlement de Toulouse, because they 
form the bulk of the documentary basis for my study of practices, but also because they are a truly unique 
documentary type, with no equivalent in other early-modern archives in France, and possibly beyond. But 
first, I would like to give a more general overview of the other primary sources used for this research, 
which will give a more accurate sense of the range and type of documents used for this research and will 
also help put in perspective the exceptional nature—and potential for research—of the sac-à-procès. 
While this research is based on sources found in various archives,845 the archives of the Parlement 
de Toulouse in the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne constitute the bulk of the primary 
sources for this study. Filed under the Série B, the archives of the court—the second oldest Parlement in 
                                                      
845 See Archival ources listed in the References on p. 450 below. Most of the sources outside of the B series of 
Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne have been used punctually, to complement the systematic study of 
sections of the archive of the court, although a few deserved a special mention here, as I studied them extensively 
and systematically as well: François Garipuy’s Plan général au rez-de-chaussée du palais et prisons du Parlement 
de Toulouse [C 2254], and the manuscript memoirs of the greffier Étienne de Malenfant, Mémoires et collections du 
Palais (1602-1647) [MS 147-149]. 
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the kingdom—occupy an impressive 2,036 linear meters of shelves in the stacks of the Archives 
départementales. As a comparison, this volume far outstrips that of other provincial parlements (975 
linear meters for the Parlement de Bretagne, one of the oldest in the kingdom, 493 meters in Grenoble, 
500 meters in Rouen).846 In fact, in simple terms of volume, the Toulouse archive compares to the archive 
of the Parlement de Paris and the nearly two linear kilometers of the “galerie du Parlement” in the Palais 
de Soubise, one of the focal points of any visit of the Archives nationales de France (Illustration 25 
below). 
 
Illustration 25: Galerie du Parlement at the Archives nationales de France (photo credit LP/Arnaud 
Dumontier) 
 
The volume of the series of the sac-à-procès singlehandedly explains why the archive of the 
Parlement de Toulouse compares to that of a court that operated for an additional two centuries, over a 
territorial jurisdiction twice as big, and probably more populated by an even wider margin. While the 
collection of the Parisian court include about 26,800 items, among which about 11,000 registers of 
                                                      
846 Reydellet Chantal. “Les archives du parlement de Bretagne.”  La Gazette des archives, 158-159 (1992), 203. 
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arrêts,847 the archive of the Parlement de Toulouse include three times as many items in total (87,154) but 
barely more than 15% of the number of registers of arrêts found in Paris (1,898).848 The explanation for 
this discrepancy between the overall volume of archive and the number of registers in the two courts is 
found in the fact that the two linear kilometers of the archive of the Parlement de Toulouse are made up of 
the sacs-à-procès, that made up the quasi-totality of the “87,154 items” included in the index of the Série 
B in the archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne.849 The difference between the archives of the two 
courts is aptly summarized by another picture of stacks, this time from the Archives départementales de la 
Haute-Garonne (Illustration 26). 
 
Illustration 26: Jean Le Pottier, former director of the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne, 
standing in the stacks of sacs-à-procès (photo credit: Dépêche du Midi). 
 
 
                                                      
847 9,811 registers of civil arrêts in the X1A series, 1,399 registers of criminal arrêts in the X2A series (Émile 
Campardon, Répertoire numérique des archives du Parlement de Paris, Paris: Archives nationales de France, 1889. 
848 Geneviève Douillard, Inventaire Série B, Toulouse : Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne, 2000. 
849 Ibid., p. 1. 
 434 
Before I present in more detail this unique sub-series of the archive of the Parlement de Toulouse, 
its potential for research, but also the dauting methodological challenges it presents, I would like to say a 
few words about the other, “classic” parlementaire sources found in Toulouse, which also served as an 
important source for my analysis of judicial practices. While the volume of the sacs-à-procès dwarfs that 
of other documents in the archive of the court, those other documentary types are by no means 
insignificant, neither in terms of volume or of historical value for a study of practice. I have indeed made 
use of a range of documents that are very familiar to historians of the sovereign courts, regardless of the 
parlement and the time period they work on: enregistrement des actes du pouvoir royal (record of royal 
letters—mainly ordinances and edicts sent to the court for registration), civil and criminal audiences 
(record of lawyers’ speeches), and, of course the civil and criminal arrêts that ground a significant part of 
my study of arrêter as a practice and of my reflection on the assertion of judicial truth. A simple look at 
the size of one of those registers of arrêt (see Illustrations 27 and 28 below), combined with the often 
challenging script of some of those documents (see Illustrations 29 and 30 below), readily explains that a 
single researcher can only approach a collection of this type by sample. 
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Illustration 27: Registre d’arrêts d’audience for the 1609-1610 session (AD31 1B 2478) 
When the yearly session of the Parlement ended, the greffier would divide his stack of cahiers 
(ordered chronologically), in as many piles as could be bound and hold together. Typically, these 
registers are always around 500 folios long. Depending on the activity of the court on a particular 
year, these cahiers could end up constituting from one to six registers a year. In this example, all 
the arrêts d’audience for the session from November 1609 to October 1610 fit into one register as 
the greffier noted on the cover: “1609, Novembre Décembre. 1610, dix premiers mois.” There 
were far less arrêts d’audience as there were arrêts of other kinds as it appears from a comparison 
to the various registers: in general one or two months of arrêts (arrêts interlocutoires and arrêts 
définitifs that were not arrêts d’audience) from the Grand Chambre and the Chambres des 
Enquêtes (these were bound together) were enough to make up one register. 
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Illustration 28: Registre d’arrêts of the Grand Chambre and Chambres des Enquêtes for the period Nov.-Dec. 
1585 (AD31 1B 93) 
As this register shows, even during troubled periods when the activity of the court reached a low point (this is the 
period when, following the assassination of the premier président Duranti, many members of the Parlement had to 
leave Toulouse in fear of the threat of the Ligue), two months of arrêts for the Grand Chambre and the Chambres 
des Enquêtes would still make up a rather thick register. 
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Illustration 29: minute d’arrêt d’audience (AD31 1B 2478) 
This is a 1609 arrêt of the Grand Chambre in a case revolving around the appointment of a 
tutor for a minor in an inheritance affair. A draft of the kind seen in Illustration 29 below, was 
eventually written down as a minute. These minutes served as the court records and as the 
model after which parties could request (for a fee) that an expedition of the arrêt be issued to 
them so that they could have the decision of the court executed. The way the greffier bound 
these minutes together let us know how he proceeded to transcribe his drafts. These registers 
are made of a series of cahiers bound together. Each cahier corresponds to one day of hearing 
at the Grand Chambre. Most often the last pages of the cahier are left blank. One can guess 
that the greffier took his pile of drafts (as seen in Illustration 29) for the day, and went on 
copying them in a cahier. One must assume that these cahiers were not bound together in a 
register before the yearly session of the Parlement ended. 
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Illustration 30: Draft of an Arrêt d’audience [front and back] (AD31 1B 2478) 
This draft was found by chance, unbound in a register of arrêts civils for the 
year 1610. One can tell this is a draft because it is heavily abbreviated, words are crossed 
out, and the format (about 3x6 cm), is much smaller than that of the arrêts d’audience it 
was inserted in. This draft gives insight into some of the writing practices of the greffier: 
he worked on his bureau, writing not directly on one of those big registers found today in 
the archive of the Parlement but with a stack of smaller pieces of paper of this kind. The 
back of this draft shows that this paper came from other discarded documents cut into 
pieces (apparently, the document reused in this instance were notes taken from the speech 
of a counsel in front of the Grand Chambre). 
 
Fortunately, those series have been indexed rigorously, which makes the chronological sampling 
a simple matter—as we will see shortly, this was not the case for the sac-à-procès. This type of sampling 
allows for statistical studies, which, albeit time-consuming, are relatively straightforward to conduct. This 
methodological approach to what I would call the “classic” archive of the parlements has been used 
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fruitfully before, both for the medieval and early-modern periods,850 and I have also used those sources in 
this traditional way.851  
On the other hand, the lack of indexes referencing specific trials—e.g. via the name of litigants, 
their lawyers, jurisdictions of first instance, types of crimes and offenses—makes it extremely difficult, 
given the mass of documents, to conduct thematic studies based on those traditional types of sources. The 
methodological challenge raised by the insufficiencies of indexes, compounded by the fact that the 
documents themselves are often cryptic and sometimes silent about the specifics of the legal cases they 
recorded, explains that, despite their best efforts, accomplished historian who know those archives better 
than I do, have stalled in the face of the massive and often complex nature of those collections.852 In many 
cases, when a researcher intends to use the court’s archive to shed light on a particular theme—for 
instance a specific type of crime or offense, or a specific group of litigants—or even to analyze the court’s 
attitude towards those objects, she is presented with a poor alternative. The first option is to persist in a 
systematic reading of the collections that might not prove fruitful and will in any case call into question 
any attempt at generalization from a very narrow sample. The alternative is to supplement the court’s 
archive with external sources of a different nature that will allow the researcher to zero in on her object of 
inquiry, but also undermine the potential to generalize because external sources tend to emphasize the 
                                                      
850 For instance, among many monographies, Claude Gauvard’s “De grace especial” : crime, État et société en 
France à la fin du Moyen Âge (Histoire ancienne et médiévale, 24. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991) for the 
medieval period, and Alfred Soman’s Sorcellerie et justice criminelle : le Parlement de Paris (16e-18e siècles), 
(Aldershot: Variorum, 1992) for the early-modern period.  
851 For instance, the systematic study of 67 registers of arrêts across the period considered in this research served as 
the basis for the point I made in Part II about parlementaire time and the annual judicial cycle (registers of civil 
arrêts for the years 1612-1613, 1637-1638, 1662-1663, 1665-1666, 1687-1688, 1699-1700). The analysis clearly 
showed the stability of a judicial calendar over a century, with the peak of activity occurring in August-September, 
followed by a sudden drop in October, from there a slow, regular increase until the end of the summer. That same 
statistical study also showed a relative stability in the volume of arrêts the court delivered from the 1600s to the 
1680s (between 6,400 and 6,700 folios of arrêts per year), and then a clear drop in the 1690s and early 1700s 
(reaching around 5,400 folios) which corresponded to the begin of the use of printed forms in the court, which 
reflected changes in practice I discussed in Part III of this research. 
852 The example of Robert Mandrou, cited by Alfred Soman, will suffice here: for his thesis Magistrats et sorciers 
en France au XVIIe siècle (1958), Mandrou had originally hoped, as his title implied, to make use of the criminal 
records of he Parlement de Paris for the whole seventeenth century, but after he had managed to fully process only 
sixteen “boxes” of arrêts representing a mere two judicial years, he decided to change his approach and to focus 
instead on those arrêts that ended up being printed, and on collections of handwritten copies that jurists had 
compiled for their personal use.  
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exceptional rather than the routine.853 To some extent, my object of study allowed me to work around this 
challenge, since, as I noted in the introduction, a focus on the “normal normal” of judicial procedure—as 
opposed to Carlo Ginzburg’s “exceptional normal,” meant that the massive character of the archive, the 
repetitiveness of the documents, the stability of their form, including the absence of information in the 
sources about the specifics of the legal cases, became an object of study in its own right rather than a 
methodological obstacle. This is most visible in my study of arrêter as a practice, in which my systematic 
study of the form of the arrêts, blissfuly oblivious to their content, allowed me to demonstrate and 
problematize their intentional elision of specific elements of the judicial practices that preceded and 
grounded the arrêt.   
 
This type of analysis of traditional parlementaire sources served as my basis to offer more 
general arguments on the nature of judicial practices and the broader implications of those arguments. I 
have already offered some thoughts on this point in the conclusion of this study, but I would like to point 
out here that this original approach to “classic” sources would have been impossible without the sacs-à-
procès preserved in the 2B sub-series. While the preservation of this source certainly is exceptional, the 
document itself was anything but rare. As François de Garipuy’s report shows, the sacs-à-procès were 
found everywhere in the physical archive of the court, on racks, on tables, on the floor, they overflowed 
all levels of the tour de l’aigle, outnumbering by far all other types of documents in the archive of the 
court.854 This ubiquity was such that the sac became the metonymical representation of the whole judicial 
archive and, as it were, of procedure itself.855 
I would like first to put the volume of the Toulousain collection in perspective, relative to other 
sovereign courts and relative to other documentary types within the archive of the Parlement de Toulouse. 
                                                      
853 This is very much the kind of reproach that can be addressed to Mandrou’s study mentioned in the previous 
footnote, precisely because of the choice of supplemental primary sources he was forced into. 
854 See Chapter 3, esp. p. 164-165. 
855 For instance in the opening of Racine’s play Les Plaideurs, in a stage direction that features a sac, the accessory 
chosen to make the theme of the play—the protagonist is a judge consumed by his professional habitus—clear: 
“Acte I, Scène I : Petit-Jean, traînant un gros sac de procès.” 
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To extrapolate the overall numbers I mentioned above for Paris and Toulouse, and based on the ratio of 
registers to sacs in Toulouse, if the sacs-à-procès of the Parlement de Paris had been preserved in the 
same proportion as in Toulouse, they would represent an estimated total of 800,000 sacs, for a volume of 
20 linear kilometers, which would be comparable to the (in)famous series of the records of Parisian 
notaries for the whole pre-modern period (minutier central des notaires parisiens) at the Archives 
nationales. Considering that, despite the uniqueness of the 2B sub-series of the Archives départementales 
de la Haute-Garonne, not all the sacs-à-procès were saved from loss and destruction in Toulouse, this 
would be a low estimate for the Parisian court.  The sheer volume and the difficulty of transferring this 
massive collection from the Palais de Justice to the Hôtel de Soubise, would suffice to explain the 
intentional destruction of those sacs in Paris during the Revolution.856 The combination of those logistical 
difficulties, documentary challenges, and negative symbolic value, made it very hard to justify the 
preservation of those sacs. In the provinces, despite a difference of scale and different local political 
climates, the justification for preservation, as well as the challenges it presented, were fairly similar for all 
sovereign courts, including Toulouse’s. In fact, it seems that a certain bureaucratic apathy is the sole 
explanation for the preservation of the sacs-à-procès in Toulouse, as the transfer of the archive from the 
Palais de justice stalled throughout the revolutionary period because of political inaction, with the 
unintended and fortunate side-effect that the collection was preserved. 
To conclude about the size of this collection, it should be noted that, while exceptional in its 
volume, it hardly represents the totality of the sacs-à-procès that were once preserved in the archive of the 
court. For one thing, as I just mentioned, it is worth remembering that, although some losses are likely to 
have occurred during the transfer of the sacs from the Château Narbonnais to the Archives 
départementales de la Haute-Garonne, those modern losses pale in comparison to the pre-Revolutionary 
                                                      
856 Other reasons for this voluntary desctruction include the challenges of understanding or simply reading the 
documents those sacs contained, and the negative symbolic value they carried at the time of this transfer (1790-
1792) because of their connection to a despotic judicial regime. Alfred Soman and Yves-Marie Bercé even noted 
that the sacs-à-procès had been the documentary type of choice to be destroyed in occasional revolutionary auto-da-
fé, as a “symbolic sacrifice” destined to appease public opinion (Yves-Marie Bercé and Afred Soman, “Les archives 
du Parlement dans l’histoire,” Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, 153 (1995), p. 256. 
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losses and accidental destructions that François de Garipuy’s report attest (weather, fire, rat-related).857 In 
addition, those losses and destructions only apply to those sacs that had been preserved in the archive of 
the court in the first place. Indeed, once an arrêt concluded a case, litigants could get their productions 
back from the greffe for an additional fee. Thus, it should be noted that the tens of thousands of sacs-à-
procès and millions of documents they contained that can still be found in the 2B sub-series, were 
preserved in the Parlement’s records in part because the existence of this fee deterred litigants to get their 
“productions” back. We must assume that in a number of cases which is impossible to estimate, litigants 
paid the fee to recover documents that might have cost them or could be re-used in future cases. 
Regardless of losses and destructions, the preservation is exceptional and the collection is 
massive. This unique preservation however, does not mean that the sacs-à-procès are readily available for 
us to use. While the number of 87,154 items in the whole archive of the Parlement de Toulouse 
mentioned at the beginning of the inventaire of the Série B of the Archives départementales de la Haute-
Garonne gives a good sense of the volume of this unique collection—especially compared to the 26,800 
items for the archive of the Parlement de Paris at the Archives nationales (Série X)—the precision of this 
number is misleading because it adds fully indexed subseries—such as that of the Parlement itself (4,570 
items), but also of those for other related jurisdictions—858 to a round number of 80,000 which is a very 
rough estimation of the number of sacs-à-procès. Indeed, estimates of the number of items within the 2B 
sub-series vary widely, from this low estimate of 80,000 to an upper estimate of over 100,000.859 This 
25% variance reflects the second main characteristic of this collection after its volume: its internal chaos. 
The picture above (Illustration 25) reflects both the size of the sub-series and its lack of order: there are 
no call numbers on most of the shelves, even less on the sacs themselves. 
                                                      
857 See p. 165 above. 
858 Chambre de l’Edit de Castres (3B) ; Conseil supérieur de Nîmes (4B) ; Sénéchal de Toulouse et d’Albi (5B) ; 
Sénéchal – Présidial de Toulouse (6B) ; Viguier de Toulouse (7 B) ; Eaux-et-Forêts (8B) ; Cour des monnaies (9B) ; 
Maîtrise des ports (10B) ; Juridiction des gabelles (51B) ; Juridiction criminelle des capitouls de Toulouse (101B) ; 
and a number of other, smaller royal, municipal and seigneurial jurisdictions. 
859 This is the number given by Jean Le Pottier, director of the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne at the 
time of my research. The website of the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne today even mention “more 
than 100,000” (http://archives.haute-garonne.fr/recherche_inventaires/sacs_proces.html). 
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Of the 80,000 to over 100,000 sacs preserved in the stacks of the Archives départementales de la 
Haute-Garonne, only about 12,000—so between 10% and 15% of the total, depending on estimates—
have a call number and can be ordered for consultation today. This is one limitation that is worth 
mentioning, but it should be added that 12,000 still represents a volume that, in and of itself, would make 
an exhaustive and systematic study impossible even for a team of skilled researchers. That is, 
notwithstanding much greater challenges related to indexation, judicial procedure, paleography that I 
would like to present now. 
 
Indeed, the main issue with the index of 2B subseries is not so much that it is partial, but that it 
deals with a chaotic series of documents. The state of chaos that Garipuy described in the court before the 
Revolution, compounded by a transfer to the Archives départementales that not only had to manage a 
completely haphazard organization of the collection in the space of the Palais de justice, but also had to 
grapple with the physical format of the sacs, that made it especially challenging—as compared to, say, the 
bound register of arrêts—to preserve the original arrangement of the sacs on the shelves of the modern 
archive. The result is an almost absolute lack of logical sequence between the sacs found in today’s stack, 
an over-representation of certain decades (1660s and 1680s for the period considered in this study) and of 
criminal cases, at least for those sacs that are currently indexed and can be ordered today.860 There are, in 
extremely rare instances, a hint of an original order, which, in most cases, was already long lost at the end 
of the Old Regime. The sacs found under the call numbers 44 and 44bis (see Illustration 17), that 
belonged to the litigants of both opposing parties in a 1608 trial, provide a rare glimpse of what was the 
original and probably very ephemeral order in the collection, when the two sacs of each trial concluded in 
the same deliberation session, made it back to the greffes. For a brief moment then, the date of the 
                                                      
860 The over-emphasis on criminal cases could either be due to the fact that the archives from the Tournelle remained 
together and somehow ended up constituting the beginning of the subseries on the shelves that archivists began 
indexing, or to the fact that litigants were far less likely to try and recover their productions in criminal cases for a 
variety of reasons (the documents they contained had less value, “criminals” were less likely to afford the fee to get 
the productions back, a number of litigants had been executed, banished, or sent to the galleys). It is, in my opinion, 
a combination of both factors.   
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conclusion of trials provided some sort of organizing principle to small batches of sacs. Until a litigant 
decided to pay the fee to reclaim his productions, thus splitting the original documentary binom, or until 
the greffier or his clerks needed to clear some space in the room, and started moving sacs selected at 
random to other parts of the greffes. 
The result is an almost complete lack of order in which sequences of coherent batches of sacs on 
the shelves—a coherence most often due to the fact that those sacs had been kept together because they 
had gone through the same chamber, at around the same time—are very short. One finds for instance a 
sequence of sacs (2B 1573 to 1599) that are related to criminal cases, mostly from Toulouse, and judged 
in the year 1639, but this batch is interspersed with individual sacs that seem completely disconnected 
chronologically, thematically, and legally (for instance, 2B 1589, for a civil case from 1658 that went 
through the Chambre des requêtes), then it is suddenly stops and a new short sequence begins, skipping a 
number of years (2B 1600 to 1617, that are mostly criminal cases from the Castres and Rodez regions, 
judged in 1642). In addition, the chronological order is not just interrupted by breaks of a few years, as it 
sometimes skip back a few decades and then forward again.    
When I conducted my research in the Archives departementales de la Haute-Garonne—between 
2004 and 2006—the only index at my disposal was a series of index cards that followed the order of the 
call numbers of the 10,000 sacs or so that had received one at the time,861 thus reflecting exactly the 
complete lack of chronological order on the shelves where the sacs were stored.  I will say more shortly 
about the possibilities that are now available to researchers with the release, in March 2017, of an 
electronic and expanded index on the website of the Archives départementales.862 But for now, I want to 
say more about the limitations of the index I used, for it dictated the methodological approach to this 
collection, and thus the selection of sacs that were used for this study. The paper index was the result of a 
relatively recent effort of a team of Masters students at the Université de Toulouse, who had been put to 
                                                      
861 It appears from the new online index that about 2,000 additional sacs have been added to the index since then. 
862 http://archives.haute-garonne.fr/recherche_inventaires/sacs_proces.html. I should also note that it appears that, 
with the introduction of this index, the BSP sub-series has now become a series of its own (with call number 
beginning in 2 B). 
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the task of going through the sacs stored in the stacks of the Archives départementales that had received a 
call number, and to do so systematically. The result was an index of about 10,000 sacs, each entry 
recording the same information: the call number, the jurisdiction of first instance, the beginning and end 
dates of the procedure, the crime or offense, unusual documents included in the sac, the names, 
profession, family relationship of the litigants, and, a brief note describing the case.  
For the most part, this information was reliable because it was mostly drawn from the évangile, 
the small piece of parchment that I have analyzed in my study of rapporter,863 and which, itself, 
functioned as an index of sort for what was to be found in the sac. In addition, certain types of 
information included in the index was less reliable: the recording of unusual documents—what is still 
called in the new online index “pièces particulières”—mostly depended on whether or not the indexer 
had found an inventaire in the sac and recognized something out of the ordinary in the list of 
documents.864 In some exceptional cases, unusual documents could be obvious and just stand out when 
opening the sac, either because of their different format: a lettre de cachet signed in Louis XIII’s hand in 
a 1642 trial for a poison sale (2B 1697), a printed poem in Occitan in a 1702 trial for defamation (2B 
6925), or because they were material objects, such as a leather purse in a theft trial from 1688 (2B 5568), 
or the tip of a sword sheath in a 1683 trial for assault and battery (2B 5676). The brief descriptive notes 
are, overall, inconsistent: in some long sequences of sacs they are inexistent (for instance from 2B 5170 
to 5270), in other batches they are detailed and informative about the trial (for instance 2B 912 to 1092), 
yet in others they are limited to notes about a peculiarity of the trial (for instance 2B 1293 “interrogation 
regarding a theft of pigeons,” or even 2B 1747 “very amusing read”). This inconsistency is mostly due to 
the varying degrees of paleographic proficiency and dedication to the task of the indexers. Unfortunately, 
and more regrettably for my purpose, some of the information contained in the évangile and that would 
                                                      
863 See my analysis of the évangile on p. 162. 
864 On the inventaire, see my detailed analysis on p.164 
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have been most useful for this research was not recorded at all in the index: the name of the rapporteur 
and of his contrenant, as well as the chamber where the trial was judged.865 
The chronological disorder of the 2B sub-series meant going through the whole index 
systematically, excluding sacs outside of the scope of this study—my rough estimate is that about half of 
the sacs are from the 18th century—and creating my own database to reorder sacs chronologically so that 
I could create coherent samples, as I had done wih much greater ease for the arrêts—sampling is ideed 
simpler when documents are not only already ordered chronogically, but bound together in a register. 
This database,866 has now been rendered redundant, if not obsolete, by the online index of sacs-à-procès 
of the Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne. It essentially performed the same functions and 
made it possible to overcome the limitations of the paper index to sample sac-à-procès by cross-
referencing the information recorded on each paper index card.  
This database however—and this would be true of the current online index as well—, only solved 
part of the challenge that the collection of the sacs-à-procès still presents today. The ability to use an 
advanced search function to narrow down the indexed sacs to coherent subsets—for instance, the sacs-à-
procès relative to crime of poisoning between 1680 and 1700 for a specific part of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Parlement de Toulouse—does not solve greater challenges that have to do with the 
nature of the document.  
Thus, I would like to present briefly the sac as documentary type to explain those challenges and 
the method I adopted to work around them. I have already described the sacs as a material unit, the 
function of some critical elements of the physical object—the évangile, the inventaire—that help navigate 
the sac and the documents it contains. What I mentioned above about the “pièces particulières”—the 
unusual documents that are in fact common enough that the indexers felt the need to create a category for 
                                                      
865 About those particular indications on the évangile, see p. 163. 
866 It is a relational database, originally built with Filemaker Pro 11 but converted since then to function with the 
latest version of the software. The relational nature of the database means that it is connected to other tables I 
created in the course of this research: tables recording information about individual magistrates in the court, table 
indexing research topics (e.g. particular crimes). In that sense, this database is more extensive than the online index 
of the Archives départementales, but with a narrower purpose, related to the topic of this research.    
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them—underscores the wealth of information and incredible potential for research in this collection. Here 
I want to insist instead on documentary and procedural aspects that create a number of serious challenges 
for systematic research.  
The first challenge is paleographical, it is due in part to the relative difficulty of reading the script 
depending on the time period considered—1550 to 1700 is a long timespan in paleographical terms, and, 
not surprisingly, the late sixteenth to early seventeenth century, from roughly 1590 to 1630, is noticeably 
more difficult to read than the periods before and after. Regardless of the time period, the script is 
objectively not much harder to read than that of contemporary legal documents, for instance the arrêts, 
with this difference that, in the case of the sacs-à-procès, the difficulty is compounded by conservation 
and procedural elements. In terms of conservation, it is a simple issue of physical state of some of those 
documents, due in great part to the history of the funds I have outlined above and the kind of treatment 
those documents—which, left loose in a bag made of hemp, did not benefit from the protection of a bound 
register—were exposed to, first in the Old Regime greffes that Garipuy described, and then during their 
successive transfers to and within the Archives départementales de la Haute Garonne—which relocated a 
number of times since the Revolution. 
Another factor has to do with procedure, and the fact that, because the great majority of 
productions were drafted in jurisdiction of first instance before they were sent to Toulouse, the documents 
inside the sacs were written by many different hands, some of them in remote corners of the jurisdiction 
of the Parlement de Toulouse where standards of penmanship could be relatively loose, not to mention 
varying levels of literacy and the fascinating but challenging use of local the Occitan language in some of 
the documents.  
All of those difficulties combined together meant that the sheer volume and internal complexities 
of the documents contained in the sacs make the simple reading and putting back together of the crux and 
chronology of one single lawsuit an extremely time-consuming endeavor. The inventaire contained in the 
sacs—and it should be noted here that not all sacs contain an inventaire—can help, to a certain extent, 
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map the documents in the sac,867 but it does not function as a summary or a narrative that can only be 
reconstituted through patient, painstaking reading. 
My method to minimize those difficulties was to create small subsets of sacs to study 
systematically, with a unifying theme—type of offense or crime, combined with a certain time period or a 
certain location—, and then order all the sacs in the subset, proceed to read systematically the documents 
they contained, to finally identify one trial that appeared especially rich in terms of documenting the 
practices I had set out to study (interroger, questionner, rapporter, etc.).  
To use the example mentioned above, and that led me to pick the trial for the poisoning of the sire 
of Marseillan I refered to in my study of interroger, questionner and executer, here is what the subset of 
sacs—crimes of poisoning (actual poisoning, suiciced by poison, sale of poison) between 1680 and 
1700—look like: 
Call number Dates of trial Number of folios 
B2 1697 1684-5 140 
B2 2741 1685 210 
B2 2794 1684-5 87 
B2 2899 1685 362 
B2 5067 1691 165 
B2 5269 1697 47 
B2 5379 1687 47 
B2 5962 1687 117 
B2 7787 1686 89 
 
                                                      
867 See p. 164 above. 
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All in all, 83 sacs, representing thirteen subsets of sacs comparable to the one above have been 
read systematically, and while some of their documents have been used to ground my analysis, they were 
not reconstituted into fully coherent judicial narratives.  For each subset however, one trial was chosen 
and reconstituted through exhaustive reading and research of related documents in other series (e.g. 
arrêts), and those documents relevant to the judicial practices studied above were subjected to the 
systematic close reading that grounded my study or practices. Here is a summary overview of those 
thirteen sacs studied exhaustively: 
Call number Date Location (Département) Type of crime/offense Number of folios 
2B 1182 1666 Auterive (31) Abortion 102 
2B 1300 1666 Barèges (65) Witchcraft 126 
2B 1764 1640 Boulogne-sur-Gesse (31) Sedition 135 
2B 2584 1684-5 St Ambroix (30) Teenage suicide 131 
2B 2736 1685 Ste Colombe (47) Theft 91 
2B 2853 1699 Encausse (31) Uxoricide 177 
2B 2899 1684 Baix (07) Poisoning 362 
2B 5522 1687 Gourdon (46) Theft of sacred items 158 
2B 5676 1683 Albi (81) Blows and wounds 100 
2B 6110 1668 Mondonville (31) Teenage murder 78 
2B 6176 1681 Plégades (81) Infanticide and parricide 94 
2B 6204 1683 Escatalens (82) Murder of a priest 83 
2B 7595 1688 Borne (43) Bestiality 74 
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